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Synopsis
The personal trauma associated with the intense violence that engulfed Indonesia
between October and December 1965 is not enough to explain how an open and
documented history of the killings was silenced for over 33 years. Likewise, the New
Order government's political and military power to suppress competing historical
accounts cannot fully elucidate this enduring silence. History is a story about who
controls the means of historical consciousness as well as the production of narratives.
Therefore, part of the answer of what enabled the forgetting of the Indonesian killings
can be found in an examination of the Suharto regime's propaganda project. This
established communism as a social evil and New Order military authoritarianism as
the antidote. An assessment of this narrative demonstrates how officially generated
anti-communist ideology created silences in the process of historical production, and
how forgetting the violence became a powerful determinant of local historical
consciousness.
Anti-communist ideology emerged very early in the New Order story - in the
days following the attempted coup of 30 September 1965 and was characterised by
three stages. First, the swift destruction of the senior organisational and cadre
structure of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party or PKI), and
the mass killings of Leftists by the Indonesian military in collaboration with a broad
coalition of anti-communist forces. Second, by the use of anti-communism as a point
of ideological linkage between anti-Sukamoist allies; and third, when the New Order
no longer required the support of this coalition, the promulgation of anti-communism
as a weapon of intimidation. This ideological weapon was then directed against most
forms of dissent, especially any suggestion of an alternative to the official history of
1965. This pre-occupation with 'historical correctness' was in fact to characterise
New Order rule right up until the resignation of President Suharto in May 1998 (and
continues to the present day).
However, the explanation for why the killings of 1965 were silenced and
forgotten extends beyond social trauma, propaganda, official ideology, and state
power. In addition to all of these factors, a type of state-sponsored memorymanipulation facilitated the careful commemoration of the 30 September Coup and
the military response that began on 1 October 1965, while silencing most memory of
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the killings that occurred across Indonesian between mid-October and late December
1965. This was partly achieved through the medium of 'memory templates'. These
guides to acceptable remembering filled the historiographical vacuum left by the
almost unthinkable pace of social and political transformation - from Sukamoist
populism to Suharto's military authoritarianism. This occurred over a period of weeks
and months and was associated with a deluge of official information about the
military response to the 30 September Coup, and an almost complete silence
regarding the nature and extent of the killings. The Suharto regime was able to use
this to change the way 1965 could be conceived as 'history' with the official version
of the coup dominating the history of the period. In 1997 this determined that at a
local level particular 'facts' about 30 September could only be negotiated through,
inter alia, the prism of a pro-military historiography.
The success of this project was contingent on the key co-ordinates of New
Order legitimacy, namely that the Indonesian National Army, Tentara Nasional
Indonesia (TNI) had rescued the people from the 'menace' of communism, that
Marxism was an ever-present threat to the stability of the nation and that individual
communists, sympathisers, or in fact anyone who was 'like a communist', were
beyond political, social, moral and especially historical, redemption. This was
synonymous with a historiography that invented new chronologies of the coup and
then sought to impose and celebrate them, while almost all unmediated, or durational
remembering associated with the killings remained suppressed and silenced. Suharto's
role in managing the danger of resurgent communism was a critical factor in this
process.
Official historiography continued to develop with the generation of new myths
that reinforced the official version of what happened in 1965 and why. Historical
templates, which were primarily concerned with the role of Suharto in the story of the
Indonesian Revolution, the 30 September Coup and the restructure of both the
Indonesian economy and political culture, while never systematic or convincing at an
elite level, nevertheless had a profound affect on village communities, where they
created a momentum that lasted beyond the formal end of New Order rule. The wellestablished silence also meant that in 1997 at a local level, the violence of 1965 was
only re-called in elusive terms, as vague and very non-specific. This situation
continued even after Suharto's resignation in May 1998. The memory of the killings
in the immediate post-Suharto period was therefore less influenced by raw military

repression than by the far-reaching and still lasting indoctrination associated with
New Order anti-communist ideology and the conceptual terms of reference dictated
by the New Order's creation of guides to official memory.
The examination of naiTatives from 1997 reveals two conflicting stories. A
story of the coup and a silencing of the killings. Oral history research into the brutality
begins the process of compiling new evidence about the nature of the violence from
the perspective of eyewitnesses located in a particular place - the kampung or 'urban
village' community of 'Kidul', and at a particular time - the final year of New Order
rule. However, just as importantly, an examination of the contrast between different
historiographies reveals disparate modes of memory and remembering. This contrast
explains the social mechanisms of forgetting and the process of power within history
writing itself.
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Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms
ABRI

Angkatan Bersenjata Rupublik Indonesian (Indonesian Armed
Forces)

Aksi Sepihak

Unilateral land redistribution policy of the PKI

ANSOR

Youth Wing of Nahdatul Ulama

ASRI

Akadami Seni Rupublik Indonesia (former Gampingan Campus
of the Indonesian Fine Arts Academy)

BAKIN

Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence
Co-ordinating Body)

BANSER

Paramilitary Wing of Nahdatul Ulama

BERDIKARI

Berdiri di Atas Kaki Sendiri (self sufficiency, literally to stand
on one's own two feet)

BTI

Barisan Tani Indonesian (The Indonesian Farmers'
Association)

Dewan Revolusi

Revolutionary Council set up by the 30 September 1965 coup
plotters as a type of governing body

DIY

Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Special Administrative District
of Yogyakarta)

Dwi Fungsi

The Indonesian Armed Forces' dual social-political role

ET

Tahanan Politik, Tapols (former political prisoners)

Gali

Street hoodlum

G30S/PKI

Gerakan Tigapuluh September/PKI (30 September Movement
[of] the Indonesian Communist Party)

GERWANI

Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women's Movement
aligned to, although not affiliated with, the PKI)

GESTAPU

Gerakan September Tigapuluh (30 September Movement)

GESTOK

Gerakan Satu Oktober (1 October Movement)

GOLKAR

Golongan Karya (Functional Groups of the GOLKAR Party)

Guided Democracy Sukarno administration 1957 to 1966
Halus

Smooth, refined, educated, cultured

HAM

Hak Asasi Manusia (Basic Human Rights)

ISI

Institut Seni Indonesia (Indonesian Art Institute, Yogyakarta,
formerly ASRI)

ITB

Institut Teknologi Bandung (Bandung Institute of Technology)
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Jugun-Janfu

Japanese Army slave-prostitute

Kampung

Urban village community

Kasar

Rough, crude, un-educated, un-cultured

KKN

Kolusi, Korupsi, Nepotisme (collusion, corruption, nepotism)

KOPASSUS

Komando Pasukan Khusus (Indonesian Special Forces,
formerly known as the RPKAD)

KOPKAMTIB

Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban
(Operational Command for the Restoration of Security)

KORAMIL

Komando Rayon Militer (Military Precinct Command)

KORPRI

Korps Karyawan Pegawai Republik Indonesia (Indonesian
Civil Service Corp)

KOSTRAD

Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Army Strategic
Reserve Command)

Krismon

Krisis Moneter (Economic Collapse of 1997-98)

LEKRA

Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat (PKI-affiliated People's Cultural
Institute)

LKN

Lembaga Kebudayaan Nasional (National Cultural Institute)

Ma Lima

Mangan, Minum, Madat, Main, Madon (Javanese for excessive
eating, drinking, drug taking, gambling and womanising)

MAHMILLUB

Mahkamah Militer Luar Biasa (Extraordinary Military Courts)

MMC

Merapi Merbabu Corps (Secret hideout of the Indonesian
Communist Party in the forests of the Merapi National Park)

MPR

Indonesian National Parliament

Monjali

Monumen Yogya Kembali (Return to Yogya Monument)

NASAKOM

Nasionalisme, Agama, Komunisme (Nationalism, Religion,
Communism)

NKK

Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus (Normalisation of Campus
Life Program)

NU

Nahdatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars' Organisation)

OPSUS

Operasi Khusus (Special Operations)

P4

Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila (guidelines
for the implementation and experiences of Pancasila)

PDIP

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia - Perjuangan (Indonesian
Democratic Party of Struggle)

PETA

Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland)

PETRUS

Penembakan Misterius (Mysterious Shootings Affair)
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Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia non-Vaksentral (Left-wing
Teachers' Union)
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Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)

PMP

Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (Pancasila Moral Education)

PNI

Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)

Preman

Organised criminal gang member

PSPB

Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa (the History of the
Peoples' Struggle)

REPELTA

Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun (the New Orders' FiveYear Plan)

RPKAD

Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat (Army
Paracommando Regiment)

SBKA

Serikat Buruh Kereta Api (The Railway Workers' Union)

Serangan 1 Maret

The General Attack of 1 March 1949

SOBSI

Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (Federation of
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Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret (Instruction of 11 March 1966
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Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Army)
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Introduction
My approach to the use of oral history narratives in Yogyakarta was inspired by a
remarkable campaign against violence towards women,^ which was launched at the
Museum Benteng Vredeburg, Yogyakarta, on 1 August 1997. The opening featured an
impressive exhibition of fine art, installation, sculpture, and printmaking, and it was
strengthened by powerful and passionate speeches. One speech, and the way it was
reported in the local press, marked a significant departure from the silences that
typified the treatment of alternative historical discourses under New Order rule (196698). The importance of this speech is that it constitutes a starting point from which to
compare different types of literature associated with forgetting the violent upheaval
that engulfed Indonesia in the months between 1 October and late December 1965,
and a basis from which to explore the reasons behind the silence that characterised
popular memory of the killings. This comparison raises questions about historical
representations of the violence, but it also identifies significant gaps in the literature
of the killings. These gaps will be illuminated in this introduction. In turn a particular
analysis will be introduced that explains certain relationships between memory and
history and between New Older historical production and the generation of historical
silences in the story of 1965.
Returning to the 1 August event, one speech delivered by Nyi Mardiyem, exjugun ianfu (Japanese Army slave-prostitute) explained to the spellbound audience
how, together with other young girls from her village, she was "forcibly recruited into
a life of shame and degradation". Nyi Mardiyem was offered comfort and support by
organisers as she emotionally ended her speech with a prayer to Allah for long life, so
that she could: "bear testimony to the violence and humiliation committed against her

^Kampanye Anti-Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan Indonesia. See Rob Goodfellow, 'A Fresh Wind is
Blowing', Inside Indonesia, no.55, July to September 1998, pp.28-29. The inspiration for my general
line of thinking had a number of sources. In the first instance it arose out of a series of conversadons
with Herbert Feith, at his home in Yogyakarta, between August and October 1997. Later an interest in
invesdgating Indonesia's history of forgetting was reinforced and invigorated by a series of letters and
e-mails to me from Benedict Anderson between January and March 1998.
h am indebted to my fellow research student, friend, and the curator of this exhibition, M. Dwi
Marianto, for his assistance in organising interviews with participants of the exhibition. See M. Dwi
Marianto, Membayangkan Ibu Sendiri dan Perempuan Lain Melalui Karya Seni Rupa, Exhibition
Catalogue, Yogyakarta, 1997.

and tens of thousands of other Indonesian women"."* The circumstances that
surrounded the telling of this story places a broader discussion of the power of
silences in the production of history into the social context of a small Yogyakarta
kampung community during the last two years of the Suharto regime. Nyi Mardiyem
however tells two very different stories. One involves the silencing of oral history
narratives by the manipulation of history for political ends, the other relates to the
complex remembrances of individuals.
Significantly, and surprisingly, the 1 August celebration received wide media
coverage, especially in the Yogyakarta press. This was completely unanticipated by
event organisers. Leading local newspapers and popular magazines voluntarily
carried editorials and advertisements promoting the movement's objective of exposing
the intimidation, discrimination, and abuse of women and children.^ While sensitive
issues such as domestic violence in Indonesia have received attention by some
Western researchers,^ and the local and national press have embraced sensational
cases of sexual abuse,^ the interest of journalists in this instance marked a watershed
in the reporting of both historical and contemporary violence.
The significance of Nyi Mardiyem's case was that it was the first of its kind to
publicly raise what were considered 'unresolved historical problems' - in this case,
the collaboration of the Sukarno wartime government in supplying the Japanese Army

The case for compensation for Indonesian tx-jugun ianfu was ongoing in 1997 with funds allegedly
'tied up' in the private Asian Women's Fund. See 'Ganti Rugi Bagi Jugun ianfu Masih di Jepang',
Bemas, Yogyakarta, 5 August 1997, p.2.
''Courtesy of M. Dwi Marianto, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^A secondary debate arose out of the airing of two locally produced TV talk shows - Buah Bibir and
Potret. This centred on issues of paternalism in Javanese culture. See, 'GKR Hemas: Harga Diri
Terganggu Sebabkan Lelaki Lakukan Kekerasan', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 4 August 1997, p.2 and 'GKR
Hemas Setuju Penayangan Buah Bibir dan Potret', Bernas, 4 August 1997, p.2.
An example of this is Norma Sullivan, Masters and Managers: A Study of Gender Relations in Urban
Java, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1994, pp.96-98.
^According to Dewi Ratnawulan (my collaborator in research whose project specifically relates to how
Indonesian women have negotiated the memory of 1965), both cases were sensationalised by the media
for instant mass consumption. See, 'Kasus Perkosaan Keluarga Acan: Jakarta Menangi', Kompas, 23
July 1995, p.4. Further, although a disparate group of women's rights activists was convened under the
banner of APAK {Aliansi Perempuan Anti-Kekerasan), the debate degenerated into a media circus.
This focused on issues of law and order, and crime and punishment, rather than on the structural issues
of women in society or indeed on other issues associated with violence. According to Dewi Ratnawulan
the one bright spot was the national campaign of public demonstrations on 5 August 1995 called
Dekonstruksi Mythos Malam or 'Deconstruction of the Night Myth'. This sought to bring to the
government's attention that it was not only the streets that were unsafe for women, but their homes and
places of work as well. To follow this particular case, see 'Para Pelaku Masih Diburu', Kompas, 26
July 1995, p.2; Mulyana W. Kusumah, 'Hukuman bagi Pelaku Perkosaan', Kompas, 31 July 1995, p.3;
and 'Derita Keluarga Acan, Tanggung Jawab Siapa', Kompas, 30 July 1995, p.2.

with slave labour, or romushas.^ According to exhibition organiser, Dewi
Ratnawulan, a public and painful discussion of the plight of Qx-jugun ianfu would not
have been possible even two years prior to the exhibition. Ratnawulan in fact
described the possibility of the event being staged at any other time as "unthinkable".^
Significantly, no mention was made of the violence that marked the rise of President
Suharto's regime in any public forum associated with the exhibition, although there
were frequent, but carefully veiled intimations regarding "other unresolved historical
issues".

While these comments appear to reference the violence of 1965, Nyi

Mardiyem conceals, rather than reveals, exact details of the killings. However by
raising the plight of former jugun ianfu, the exhibition also raised the prospect that
there actually were alternative forms of remembering despite the fact that silences
rather than open discourse had dominated the production of history under the New
Order.
For example, in a Kedaulatan Rakyat article of 3 August 1997,^^ exhibition
curator, M. Dwi Marianto (Director of Research and Development at the Indonesian
Art Institute, ISI-Yogyakarta), stated that the primary function of the exhibition was to
"raise public consciousness" and thereby "plant ideas into the feelings, thoughts and
desires of everyone involved".

Considered this way, the exhibition in general, and

the launch in particular, was a great success. This was in no small part due to Nyi
Mardiyem herself, who directly participated in raising public consciousness by her
unmediated testimony of World War Two experiences, elevating the issue from the
abstract to the personal. In telling her story, Nyi Mardiyem elaborated to reporters that
rape was "only one level of violence in [Indonesian] society" and that there were
"other, deeper examples of violence, which had not been exposed".''^ These comments
had an invigorating effect on the Yogyakarta press
Ashadi Siregar, writing for Kedaulatan Ra
Rakyat,^"^ took the opportunity to raise
a number of controversial issues around the story of R.A. Kartini, champion of
^For a first hand discussion see Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution: A Leader of the Indonesian
Revolution Looks Back, Angus and Robinson, Sydney, 1972, pp. 122-24.
^Discussion with Dewi Ratnawulan, Gadjah Mada University, August 1997.
''Ibid.
"'Gambaran Murni Perempuan, Bila Dianggap Ibu', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 3 August 1997, p.2.
'^Ibid., "membenamkan ide ide dalam dataran rasa, cipta dan karsa".
'^Ibid.
^Vshadi Siregar, 'Perjuangan Kartini, Ideology Kekerasan dan Perempuan', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 31
July 1997, pp.8 and 15. See also a book review by UGM student, Gandung Indarto, 'Mengupas
Kesenjangan Social', Bernas, 10 August 1997, p.3, concerning the book by R. Baswir, Agenda
Ekonomi Kerakyatan, Pustaka Pelajar, Yogyakarta, 1997. The staff reporter for Kedaulatan Rakyat also

women's rights in Indonesia.'^ Siregar went on to examine less officially acceptable
stories, such as discrimination and violence in a broader context - from HIV/A.I.D.S
to the lack of workers' rights and conditions under Suharto, from labour market
reform to the "structural problems and interpretation of the State ideology Pancasila,
in the context of late capitalism".'^ The significance of these publicly aired comments
cannot be understated. In fact they were unheard of topics of discussion under New
Order rule.'''
This was a time of sustained intimidation of newspaper journalists in
Yogyakarta (and across Indonesia). In August

1996 a correspondent

from

Yogyakarta's leading local newspaper - Bemas - Faud Muhammad Syafruddin
(called Udin) was slain, allegedly because of his investigative reporting of corruption
by a senior member of the TNI in the Yogyakarta Regency of Bantul.'^ The
intimidation of public figures proposing greater openness of Indonesian political
culture was, significantly, the subject of a dramatic production, Karousel atau Komidi
Putar (A Carousel or a Circular Comedy) staged in the grounds of Vredeburg Fort
museum on the second night of the exhibition by the Sanggar Garasi Group (Garage
Workshop), University of Gadjah Mada. Nyi Mardiyem's evocative comments
inspired Sanggar Garasi to cautiously critique the public negotiation of communal
violence.
took the opportunity to write about other issues such as the social gap {kesenjangan social)
commenting that: "In the 52nd year of Indonesian Independence most women still suffer from a life
long inheritance of poverty, ignorance and inadequate diet, relative to women of affluence", quoted in
'Gambaran Murni Perempuan, Bila Dianggap Ibu', op.cit. (See footnote 11.)
'^Confidential interview with a senior Grameda journalist, Jakarta, August 1996.
'^It is interesting to note that Siregar carefully placed his article towards the back of the paper and then
provided government censors with a rather painless first paragraph. It was well known that New Order
Department of Information censors usually only read the headlines of newspaper articles during the
New Order period. Occasionally they would scan over the first paragraph of leading stories. In this way
highly sensitive issues could be raised, or rather 'buried', in the middle or at the end of the text, thus
escaping the consequences of official scrutiny. 'Socially careless' or controversial headlines usually led
to a brief but succinct telephone call from a senior member of the Department of Information - "Bapak
tidak Senang", or "Father, Sir or Mr (read President Suharto, the Minister for Information or in fact any
member of the ruling clique) is not happy". Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
'^Ashadi Siregar also raised the cause celebre of the murdered factory activist, Marsinah, who,
according to Siregar, was singled out "first because she was a common worker, second because she was
an activist, and third because she was a woman". See Barbara Hatiey, 'Ratna Accused, and Defiant',
Inside Indonesia, no. 55, July to September 1998, p.7.
'^Siregar's story was published in the context of the trial of the man who Udin's family claimed was
framed by local authorities as the killer. At the time the newspaper continued to report that the man had
been made a scapegoat by a powerful figure in order to appease local outrage surrounding the police
handling of the investigation. See 'Death of a Journalist' (extract from an International Report on
Indonesian journalists killed because of their investigative work). Inside Indonesia, no. 52, October to
December 1997, p. 15. For a full account of documents from this case see Y. Argo Twikromo and

Producer Baskoro Budhi Darmawan'^ was obviously being very careful,
however, when he described Karousel atau Komidi Putar in the press as "designed to
resolve", or rather, "open-up unresolved contemporary issues".^'^ The play was a
critique of the genesis and finale of a 'hypothetical' urban street riot. The association
with the 27 July 1996 anti-government riots in Jakarta was unmistakable, as were
echoes of a previous and more brutal historical issue - the killings of 1965-66. In
respect to the latter, the play created a powerful and very public counter narrative that
signaled the possibility that there was a competing version of Suharto's rise to power
and the circumstances that accompanied it.
On the late evening of 30 September 1965, a poorly planned and badly
executed coup d'etat was in progress. It failed within 24 hours. However, by the end
of the following day, or 1 October 1965, the Radio Republik Indonesia, and
Telecommunications Building, in central Jakarta had been easily reoccupied by forces
loyal to the then Major-General Suharto, commander of KOSTRAD, the Strategic
Reserve. The coup was at an end. The Indonesian Armed Forces, Angkatan
Bersenjata Rupublik Indonesian (ABRI) counter coup against the PKI, and ultimately
Sukarno and Sukarnoism, was, however, just beginning.^' This political transition had
far reaching implications.^^ From the political centre in Jakarta, to the smallest village
community - particularly in the Special Administrative District of Yogyakarta,
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta, (DIY) Central and East Java, and the island of Bali the brutality associated with the counter coup ripped apart the fabric of great sections
Lucas S. Ispandriarno, Tragedi Udin: Bingkai Kebusukan Kekuasaan dan Kekerasan, Galaxy Press,
Yogyakarta, 2001.
'^Directed by Ahmad Yudi.
'Sanggar Garasi: Tampilkan Repertoar Carousel', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 1 August 1997, p.l 1.
'The PKI was founded in 1920 in Semarang as successor of the Indisch Social Democratische
Vereeniging (ISDV). The PKI was the first Asian Communist Party and a member of the
COMINTERN. It was banned by the Dutch East Indies government because of its activities during
uprisings in Banten and Western Sumatra in 1927, after which time the PKI went underground. It was
re-established after the Japanese surrender in 1945. Between 1945 and 1948 the PKI took part in the
struggle for National Independence. In 1948 it merged with the Left-wing of the Partai Sosialis
Indonesia (PSI); after supporting the peasant revolt in Madiun in 1948, the government brutally
crushed the PKI revolt and imprisoned the PKI's senior leadership. In 1950 the nationalist, anticolonialist, and anti-Western policy of President Sukarno strengthened the position of the PKI. With
three and a half million members by the mid-1950s, the PKI was the strongest communist Party outside
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.
^^By August 1965 the PKI estimated its strength at 20 million members and affiliates. See the PKI's
newspaper Harian Rakjat, 20 August 1965, quoted in Mortimer, Indonesian Communism Under
Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1974, p.366.
In early September 1965 the PKI maintained that membership consisted of the following: PKI members
three and half million, LEKRA (artists and writers) five million, Pemuda Rakyat (youth) three million,

of Indonesian society. By March 1966 the New Order had not only secured political
power but also fully seized the opportunity, by violent means, to establish its own
very specific interpretation of 'what had happened' and to silence rival or alternative
versions. ^
The far-reaching legacy of these events is illustrated by the following two
examples. On the evening of 11 August 1997, one week after the launch of the antiviolence campaign at Vredeburg Fort, and 32 years after the worst of the violence.
Basis magazine^"^ sponsored a night of poetry reading in honour of Sitor Situmorang,
hosted at one of the Yogyakarta Palace residences of the younger brother of Sultan
Hamengubuwono X, Gusti Joyokusumo. A prominent literary figure during the
Sukarno era (1945-66), Sitor was chairperson of the National Cultural Institute (LKN)
from 1959 to 1965. Both Sitor's chairmanship of LKN, and his literary career, were
abruptly terminated in October 1965 with his arrest by the TNI. A question fielded
through the moderator, B. Rahmanto from Sanata Dharma University, asked why
Sitor had not published anything between Sastra Revolusioner, published in 1965, and
Dinding Waktu, published in 1976.

Any direct mention of the poet's imprisonment

and the violent upheaval following 30 September was avoided by the use of doubleentendre and punning. This embellished Sitor's views about the years after 1965
without requiring him to raise them explicitly. In turn, this had a profound effect on
SOBSI (unions) three and half million, BTI (peasants) three million, GERWANI (women) three
million, and HSI (university graduates) seventy thousand.
Robert Cribb, ed., Ttie Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, Monash
University Centre of Southeast Asian Studies Papers on Southeast Asia, no. 21, Clayton, Victoria,
1990, pp.7-8 and p.l2. To place anxiety over the violent intentions of the state into the context of the
literature, Cribb has listed numbers of people killed during the killings of 1965-66 according to some
39 primary and secondary estimates. While these tables show huge differences in accounting for
numbers slain, by any standard the killings were extensive. For instance, government fact finding
missions, one in late 1965 and the other in 1966, put the figure at 78,000 and 1,000,000 dead
respectively (with the first government fact finding mission having an interest in keeping the figure as
low as possible, and the second, conducted by the Operational Command for the Restoration of
Security, putting forward the highest figure to justify their effectiveness in eliminating communism).
Others, including Ricklefs, estimate around 500,000 dead. See M.C. Ricklefs, A History of Modern
Indonesia Since c.1300. Second Edition, Macmillan Press, London, 1993, p.288. Sulistyo's detailed
table in Palu Arit di Ladang Tebu illustrates some 50 individual sources, all with different estimations
of the numbers slain. See Sulistyo, op.cit., pp.11-15.
^B. Rahmanto, 'Sitor Sang Troubador, Pemandu Acara', Basis Magazine, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
For further biographical details on Sitor Situmorang see A.L. Reber, translators notes, 'Sitor
Situmorang: Poet of Lake Toba', Indonesia, no. 55, October 1993, pp.99-118.
^*As moderator, B. Rahmanto called for questions. The question was actually fielded by me after a long
period of silence from the audience. This elicited the response that I was curious about why Sitor had
an 11-year period of inactivity". The question further asked: "Was this a result of a lack of 'inspiration'
or was he rather resting?" The question was sufficiently oblique as to give Sitor the opportunity to
avoid it if he wished. The reason for the 'inactivity' was that Sitor was first imprisoned by the New

the audience who clearly appreciated the subtlety of his approach, being completely
unaccustomed to discussing the issue of 1965 in a public forum.
Early August 1997 also marked the local publication of the novel Ojo Dumeh
by Agnes Yani Sardjono.

Ojo Dumeh is a Javanese language idiom that means

'when you are rich, when you are famous and powerful, do not forget those who
nurtured or protected you in your hour of greatest need'. Essentially, the work is about
forgetting and remembering. The novel is set in Yogyakarta around 1983-85, when
specially trained ABRI hit-men executed thousands of known criminals, called gali,
and many others, including student activists and former members of the PKI.^^ The
so-called 'Mysterious Shootings Affair' or PETRUS^^ provides the background for
Sardjono's central character, the freelance journalist Samhudi.
Ostensibly, the work is about the rich, dark world of the gali, who controlled
the streets of Yogyakarta and other cities in Java, before their violent extra-judicial
annihilation. The book concerns friendship, trust, betrayal, and most importantly,
on

memory.

Ojo Dumeh is a metaphor for the dangers and uncertainty of remembering.

This is because, as both the novel and the poetry evening illustrate, history is about
winners and silences, and dredging up the past has serious implications for both the
victors and the vanquished.
Ojo Dumeh discusses two themes - un-excavated memories and unresolved
historical issues. Samhudi's novel seeks to address these issues by putting literary
flesh and bones on to characters that otherwise remain anonymous victims of the
mysterious gunmen. It creates a template for other unexposed memory. Nyi
Mardiyem's story, told so powerfully at Vredeburg, transforms the official silence'^'
surrounding jugun ianfu into open historical discourse, and in doing so suggests that
Order after 30 September, and then spent until 1997 as an exile in Europe. Rahmanto looked visibly
nervous but quickly lightened up, obviously grateful for Sitor's tact and candour.
^^Agnes Yani Sardjono, Ojo Dumeh: Kesaksian Kali Winongo, Yayasan Pustaka Nusatama,
Yogyakarta, 1997. While this is certainly not the first treatment of the 'Petrus Affair' in popular
literature, it was, nevertheless, "a significant literary contribution". Interview with B. Rahmanto, Sanata
Dharma University, 19 August 1997. See also the book review of Ojo Dumeh by Gangung Indarto,
'Peringatan Bagi Penguasa', Bernas, 10 August 1997, p.3. See also another review of Ojo Dumeh by G.
Indarto, 'Peringatan Bagi Penguasa', Bernas, 10 August 1997, p.3.
^^The modus operandi involved two men on a motorcycle, the pillion passenger being the gunman.
Summary execution was by a single headshot from a pistol.
^^PETRUS,fi-omPenembakan Misterius, or 'Mysterious Shootings'.
^"^his is represented in the novel by the expression "samhudi bagai makan buah simalakama, ditelan
atau dimuntahkan buah itu?", or "if I do not eat the poison fruit I will die of hunger. If I eat the same
fruit I will die of poisoning".
•'' The Indonesian government's official position was to not aggravate the Japanese who continue to be
Indonesia's largest donor of foreign aid.

the silences that characterise 1965 may also be explored. Sitor Situmorang's
description of the effect of his literary dark period personalises and humanises the
experience of tens of thousands of Indonesian writers, poets and artists who were
imprisoned after September 1965. Each of these examples, like the expression Ojo
Dumeh itself, was a carefully concealed reminder not to forget, directed at a public
that had forgotten how to remember. They were also a model for how Indonesians
might begin to remember in a way not proscribed by official historiography. The
public discourse of remembering associated with the above examples therefore
marked a subtle, but important, change in public consciousness. This suggested that
questions could be asked about how the long silence had come about, and further, if
counter narratives may begin to challenge official history.^^ Significantly, this new
consciousness was conspicuous by what was left unexplained not by what was
publicly stated, recorded and analysed.
In Yogyakarta until this time - with the above exceptions and the exception of
a 1994 interview in the Gadjah Mada University student magazine Balairung, with
Pramoedya Ananta Toer

- the Suharto regime had violently suppressed public

discussion of all non-official explanations for the New Order's political ascendancy.
This included the surveillance and suppression of all dissent thinly disguised as
necessary for 'political stability' and 'national security'. Deviations from the official
story of 'communist treachery' were considered by the regime to be anti-Indonesian,
even anti-God.^"^ This included historical narratives that preceded Suharto's rise to
power. For example, the contribution of the PKI in the Revolutionary struggle against
the Dutch (1945-49), the role of the broad Left in the early 1960s as a force of

^^Interview with conference organisers, Yogyakarta, August 1997. The issue of the sexual abuse of
women in detention by the Indonesian military following the mass arrests of Leftists in late 1965 was at
the time considered completely off limits. This was privately acknowledged by the organisers of the
anti-violence campaign who were aware of the sensitivity of the issue for the military. For this reason
the subtie linking of the behaviour of the Indonesian army with the treatment of Indonesian women by
the Japanese army was considered to be "breathtakingly courageous".
^''See an interview with Pramoedya Ananta Toer, 'Saya Pupuk Bawang di Lekra', Balairung, Edisi
Khusus/TH. VII, Yogyakarta, 1994, pp.119-25. This extraordinary interview is believed to be one of the
first public discussions of the writer's work to be produced in any public forum since the early 1980s
when publications such as Bumi Manusia first appeared and then were banned. The explanation for
why the military overlooked the article and did not suppress it or close down the magazine was that
"they were preoccupied with student riots in Semarang the same week, and simply overlooked it".
Confidential interview with a member of the editorial staff, Balairung, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^''Michael van Langenberg, 'GESTAPU and State Power', The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.47.
Common post-coup slogans included: PKI anti-Tuhan (The PKI is anti-God), Aidit Seten (Aidit The
Secretary General of the PKI is the Devil), GERWANI Jabot, Gantung GERWANI, Ganjang
GERWANI (GERWANI are whores, Hang GERWANI, Crush GERWANI).

modernisation," and an acknowledgment of the pre-1965 electoral popularity of the
PKI amongst the rural and kampung constituents of DIY, Central and East Java.^^
These stories and accounts of the killings per se were replaced by a fabricated
discourse that bundled up the 1965 coup, and the 'social upheaval' that followed, into
one linear, anti-communist propaganda narrative that placed the blame for social and
political upheaval squarely on the victims. Kate McGregor, in her research into
military representations of 1965, suggests:

The purpose of commemoration of 1 October [Hari Kesaktian
Pancasila] is to telescope these memoires into a singular memory of the
transition - that of the violence against the military "heroes".''^

The themes taken up in the ceremony replicate themes of the initial
propaganda surrounding the coup including an emphasis on the coup
attempt as a communist plot; the horror of the deaths of the army
heroes; the religious and moral deviance of the communists; warnings
about the return of communism; and 1 October as the day on which the
Pancasila was resurrected.''^

Paradoxically, the coup and the killings have produced separate and distinctive
historiographies that do not necessarily shed much light on each other except as a
propaganda project of the New Order. As Adrian Vickers states, the New Order
frequently reinforced the 'true' explanation of the events - from the 1992 opening of a
'Museum of Communist Treachery', to the 1995 publication of the official version of
history on the ABRI web site."

Kate McGregor makes this same point by an

examination of the work of New Order historian Nugroho Notosusanto, who more
than any individual was responsible for creating an official historiography of the

^^Ruth McVey, 'Teaching Modernity: The PKI as an Educational Instrument', Indonesia, no. 27, April
1979.
''^Justus M. van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics,
University of British Colombia Press, Vancouver, 1965, Chapter IIL
^'^ Katharine E. McGregor, 'Commemoration of 1 October, "Hari Kesaktian Pancasila": A Post Mortem
Analysis?', Asian Studies Review, vol. 26, no. 1, March 2002, p. 39.
^Ibid., p. 43.
""Adrian Vickers, 'Reopening Old Wounds: Bali and the Indonesian Killings - A Review Article', The
Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 57, no. 3, August 1998, pp.774-85.
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coup."^*^ Notosusanto was the product of a unique mix of military politics that in 1964
culminated in the establishment of the Armed Forces History Centre, initially set up to
counter the historical agenda of the PKI-influenced Leftist National Front, and ensure
that a particularly pro-military history of the 1948 Madiun Revolt was disseminated.
This placed Notosusanto in a unique position of not only drafting the New Order's
official history of 1965, but also consolidating ABRI's historical response to
communism as a whole.'^^
Notable examples of this approach include the four volume Sejarah National
Indonesia (National History of Indonesia), first published in August 1968, with a final
up-dated edition released in 1987, the four volume photo-documentary text 30 Tahun
Indonesian Merdeka (Thirty Years of Indonesia's Independence),

first published in

1975 by the same team of authors, researchers and language consultants,"^^ and
Pemberontakan G30S/PKI dan Penumpasannya (The Revolt of the G30S/PKI and its
Suppression),'^ first published in 1982 and updated with a new title in 1994. The latter
was in fact the last formal attempt by the New Order to explain its version of 1965
against the rising tide of new versions - namely The Thirtieth of September
Movement, The Revolt of the Communist Party of Indonesia: Its Background, Actions
and Destruction.^^ All of these accounts stopped short of a description of the killings.
Nowhere do these volumes elicit comment from eyewitnesses. Rather, the purpose
and intention was to establish and reinforce New Order ideological and
historiographical orthodoxy. This process included the writing of new works and the

'^^Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the 'September 30 Movement' in
Indonesia, Pembimbing Masa, Jakarta, 1968.
'"Kate McGregor, 'A Soldier's Historian: New Order Generals Needed New History Books. Nugroho
Notosusanto Was Their Man', Inside Indonesia, no. 68, October to December 2001, pp.8-9.
''^Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Salah, 30 Tahun Merdeka 1945-1975, 4 vols. Indonesian
government, issued in the name of Sudharmono, Minister, State Secretary, prepared by teams of
authors, researchers and language consultants, Jakarta, 1975.
""^Klaus H. Schreiner, 'Remembering and Forgetting at Lubang Buyaya: The 'Coup' of 1965 in
Contemporary Indonesian Historical Perception and Public Commemoration', unpublished conference
paper presented at Remembering and Forgetting: The Political and Social Aftermath of Intense Conflict
in Eastern Asia arid Northern Europe, the University of Lund, Sweden, 15 to 17 April 1999. Also
Schreiner, 'History in the Showcase. The Representation of National History in Indonesian Museums',
Sri Kuhnt-Saptodewo, Volker Grabowsky and Martin Grossheim eds. Nationalism and Cultural
Revival in Southeast Asia. Perspectives from the Centre and the Region, Wiesbaden, Germany, 1994.
Schreiner comments that the position outiined in Sejarah National was fixed by 1968 with the
publication of what was to become the official 'what happened'. See Notosusanto and Saleh, 'Kegiatan
Ilmiah dan G-30-S', Madjalah Ilmu-Ilmu Sastra Indonesia, no. 4, vol. 1, 1968, pp.1-20.
'^Pemberontakan G30S/PKI dan Penumpasannya, Dinas Sejarah TNI Angkatan Darat, Jakarta, 1982.
'^"''Compiled by an anonymous team of writers, Gerakan 30 September. Pemberontakan Partai Komunis
Indonesia: Latar Belakang, Aksi, dan Penumpasannya, Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, Jakarta
1994.
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modification of practically every official or semi-official government publication,
from primary school texts"^^ to government policy documents."^^
Even the tradition of historical writing established by the 1957 National
History Conference in Yogyakarta (under Nationalist and Socialist terms of reference,
which produced the concept and framework of an Indonesian National History), was
hijacked by Notosusanto and Saleh in Seminar Sejarah Nasional I, 1985, Universitas
Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, with the clear intention of reinforcing anti-communist
ideology."^^ This work closely reflected the fundamentals of New Order power, which
included anti-communism as the most prominent feature of both New Order historical
writing and post-Sukarno national identity.^^ The trends in modem Indonesian
historiography, according to Sartono, had, however, already shifted from a descriptive
narrative of nationalism towards a more analytical 'method', even before the New
Order.^° In the hands of Notosusanto and Saleh, Indonesian history was interpreted
through a new and carefully defined analytical prism - national security from the
threat of resurgent communism. In effect, this new method of selecting 'the historical'
allowed for the interpretation of sources based almost solely on anti-communism. It
was an officially approved simplification of the past, which eliminated complex
alternative narratives associated with the Guided Democracy period (1957-65).^^
According to this framework the boundaries of New Order historiography
were not set by events such as the Declaration of Indonesian Independence (17
August 1945) or the Revolutionary War (1945-49), but were characterised by the
'communist rebellions' of 1927, 1948 and 1965, and a new date that ensured that
these 'treacheries' would never be forgotten - namely Hari Kesaktian Pancasila or
'Sacred Pancasila Day' on 1 October. This commemorated the officially 'thriceproven treachery' of the coup plotters, but also the spiritual birth of Suharto's anticommunist rule. It was the murder of six influential generals (and one junior officer)
on the early morning of 1 October 1965 and not the mass killings of November and

""^Poedhyarto Trisaksono, Sosiodrama Pelengkap PSPB: Untuk Sekolah Dasar, Indonesian Department
of Education, Surakarta, 1985.
^^Anon. Indonesian Government Policy in Dealing With the G-30-S/PKI Detainees, Department of
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 1978.
^^Seminar Sejarah Nasional I, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 1985.
''^Nugroho and Saleh, op.cit.
^ Sartono Kartodirdjo, Indonesian historiography, Kanisius, Yogyakarta, 2001, p.20.
^'Henk Schulte Nordholt, 'A State of Violence', HAS Newsletter Online, issue 23, 2000, p.l.
http://www.iias.nl/iiasn/23/index.html date accessed 10 October 2002.
^^Schreiner, 'Remembering and Forgetting at Lubang Buaya', op.cit., p. 152.
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December that characterised this narrative, a view strengthened by the 1994 state
secretariat publication of a 'White Book' on the 'official' history of the Indonesian
communist movement. The purpose of placing these events into an historical
framework, as State Secretary Moerdiono stated in his preface, was: 'To enforce the
National Assembly Decree of 1966 that banned any manifestation of communist
ideology in Indonesia".^^
Printed propaganda material of this type only reached a very limited audience.
By the 1980s the government remedied this shortcoming by the use of visual media
such as television and film, in particular the documentary drama, Pengkhianatan
G30S/PKI, or 'The Treachery of the 30 September Movement of the PKI'. Through
this medium anti-communist propaganda was widely and effectively disseminated to
down to every rural village in Indonesia. This production drew on the talents of
Indonesia's best-known actors.^"^ Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI became the primary
source of popular knowledge about the official version of the coup, but not the
killings, which, again, were excluded and silenced. The film was aired on the
anniversary of the evening of 30 September every year from 1984 until 1998, and was
compulsory viewing for all Indonesian school children. In fact all students were
required to write a comprehension paper on the film's main themes. The widely
distributed biographies of Suharto, commencing with the post-Sukarno Indonesian
Department of Information's General Suharto Man of Destiny^^ continuing with the
'semi-authorised' but officially sanctioned works of O'G. Roeder, notably The
Smiling General,^^ the ghostwritten Suharto autobiography, Soeharto: Pikiran
Ucapan dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi,

and Anak Desa: Biographi Presiden

CO

Soeharto

were likewise actively promoted as authoritative accounts of 'what

happened' on 30 September and 1 October 1965. The effect was to codify history

^^/Z?/^.,p.l47.
^''Krishna Sen, 'Filming History under the New Order', Histories and Stories: Cinema in New Order
Indonesia, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 1988, p.58. In the film Pengkhianatan G30S Umar
Kayam played the role of Sukarno, while Amoroso Katamsi played Suharto.
^^General Suharto Man of Destiny, Department of Information, Jakarta, 1966. This English language
version of the document was the first post-Sukarno publication of the then thoroughly purged and
reconstituted Indonesian Department of Information.
O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia, Gunung Agung, Jakarta, 1969.
Indonesian edition, O.G. Roeder, Soeharto, Dari Prajurit sampai Presiden, Gunung Agung, Jakarta,
1969.
^^Suharto, (seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan Ramadhan K.H.) Soeharto: Pikiran Ucapan
dan Tindakan Saya: Otobiografi, P.T. Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta, 1989.
^^O.G. Roeder, Anak Desa: Biographi Presiden Soeharto, C.V. Haji Masangung, Jakarta, 1990.
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according to very rigid ideological and political terms of reference. This left little
opportunity for a counter view to emerge.
Angus Mclntyre, in analysing these biographical works, reveals two important
themes, namely the consistency over time of the New Order's propaganda account of
1965, and second, Suharto's personal pre-occupation with a type of biography that
reinforced his claim of humble origins, vis-a-vis Sukarno's more aristocratic (less
popular) lineage.^^ The fact that these biographies spent a great deal of energy
dispelling myths about Suharto's alleged minor royal lineage was a clever two-way
bet that promoted his humble origins but left just enough doubt about the myth of
royal connections to actually give the legend some veracity (with the real veracity of
the Sukarno personality cult consistently neutralising this effort).
A highly visible and extensively published poster image of Suharto during the
1980s depicted the President as a simple rice farmer tilling the soil with a hoe supported by the slogan Suharto: Bapak Pembangunan, or 'Suharto: Father of
Development'. However, this theme was not translated in any way into a history of
the towns and villages of DIY, Central and East Java and Bali in the immediate post
30 September period.^° The Suharto biographies were rather dominated by a 'history
from above' approach that excluded village-based actors. In these works we see the
New Order State invent and package their history as consistent with elite Javanese
social values of centralised authoritarian and hierarchical rule - made effective and
legitimate by the close supervision of the Indonesian Department of Education and
Culture. Historical production was now emanating exclusively from the political
centre, and its character was top down.
The interests of the New Order were concentrated on two projects, namely
eliminating what were perceived by ABRI to be anarchistic popular political
expressions and neutralising completing ideologies, especially communism and
Sukarnoism, and the corollary to this, counter or alternative historiographies of the
coup. For example, the regime was extremely sensitive about any suggestion that a
section of the military under Suharto's direct command either orchestrated, or took
advantage of, a very volatile political situation in the hours and days immediately

Angus Mclntyre, Soeharto's Composure: Considering the Biographical and Autobiographical
Account, Working Paper no. 97, Monash Asia Institute, Melbourne, 1996.
Suharto, Otobiografi, op.cit., p.XII.
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following the coup as a pretext to move against the PKI.

Rather, as Suharto

consistently maintained, he had saved the nation by acting decisively to a direct
physical challenge. The effect, even 30 years later, as Margot Cohen, noted on the 50*
anniversary of the Declaration of Indonesian Independence in 1995, was, "the notion
of the danger of latent communism remained firmly entrenched in the Indonesian
psyche".^^
The launch at this time of a thin publication by a 'benevolent foundation'
chaired by Suharto's daughter, Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, entitled The New Order: A
Total Correction of the Nation's Historical Journey, made sure that this interpretation
was to remain a prominent feature of Indonesian political life and historical
thinking.

However one question is, given the Suharto regime's silencing of the

killings with a coup-centred approach to its own historiography, was there a
difference in the way researchers organised their material? Further, how common are
eyewitness accounts in the literature, and what distinctions are there between the
official propaganda narrative of the coup and the academic historiography associated
with the killings?
A great deal of non-Indonesian historiographical material written between
1965 and 1990 has also been preoccupied with the 30 September Coup, rather than the
killings per se. However where the New Order project silenced most eyewitness
accounts by forms of suppression, foreign scholarship may have silenced a history of
the killings by neglecting them. Interest in the coup inadvertently privileged certain
types of historical material, mainly newspaper journalism, official reports, and
military dispatches, which discriminated against a broader understanding of the
violence, particular at kampung level. This is not to imply either a conscious or
unconscious conspiracy. The fact is that until 1990 the events of 1-5 October and the
massacres were not seen as separate historiographical components of 30 September.
Nevertheless as Cribb states, up until 1990, surprisingly little was actually known
about the massacres at all.^"^
'Greg Poulgrain, 'The Night Indonesia Began to Devour itself. Inside Indonesia, no. 45, December
1995,pp.2-4.
Margot Cohen, 'Indonesia: Total Correction: As Interest in History Grows, Official View is
Asserted', Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 October 1995, p.22. See also Margot Cohen, 'The Past as
Prologue', Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 May 1999, pp.37-40.
^hbid.
Cribb, op.cit., pp. 1-2. The few exceptions can be seen in the extensive bibliography produced by PKI
exile M.R. Siregar in Tragedi Manusia dan Kemanusiaan: Kasus Indonesia Sebuah Holokaus Yang
Diterima Sesudah Perang Dunia Kedua, Progress, The Hague, 1995, in the literature outlined in the
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Foreign historiographical themes broadly corresponded to three periods of
post-1965 Indonesian history. The first exhibits a pre-occupation with the coup itself,
the second a fascinations with elite, mostly military politics and economic policy (and
a lack of interest in compiling and analysing eyewitness accounts of the violence at a
local level). The third period marks a significant departure in historiographical
emphasis with a greater interest in the killings as a focus for historical writing.^"''
These periods can be defined accordingly. The first is the New Order's
'honeymoon period' of 1967-74. This was characterised by the relative freedom of the
liberal anti-communist press. It was a period that saw Suharto ruling as part of a
triumvirate with the socialist Adam Malik and the Yogyakarta hereditary ruler Sultan
Hamengkubuwono IX - reflecting the politically tenuous position of the Suharto
group in the early New Order period.^^ The second interval extends from the Malari
Affair of 1974

to the government's crackdown on student activism culminating in

the 1978 suppression of university students and the military occupation of campuses.
Known as Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, or 'Normalisation of Campus Life
Program' (NKK), this operation continued for a decade until the 1989 Bandung and
Yogyakarta student subversion trials,^^ a decade in which, as Vickers states, "the
totalitarian aspirations of the New Order came to the fore".^^ The depoliticisation of
university campuses coincided with the neutralising of Suharto's potential military
challengers and the tightening of New Order military-bureaucratic structure.
The third interval is the period of slow political and economic decline in which
keterbukaan, 'openness', or the appearance of a softer line on political freedom and
press liberalisation was used unsuccessfully by an increasingly desperate New Order
(under intense international diplomatic pressure) as a rearguard action against
introductory chapter to The Indonesian Killings op.cit., and most recently in the bibliography of
Hermawan Sulistyo's Palu Arit Di Ladang Tebu, op.cit.
*^A recent contribution is an overview essay on the Indonesian massacres by Cribb featuring with three
eyewitness accounts. See Robert Cribb, 'The Indonesian Massacres', in Samuel Totten, ed., Century of
Genocide: Eyewitness Accounts and Critical Views, Garland, New York and London, 1997, pp.236-63.
^^Particularly vis-a-vis Sukamoist elements within the Military itself and the relatively strong postSukarno, pro-democratic movement later, mythologised and then marginalised by the New Order as the
Angkatan 66 or 'Generation of 1966'. Adrian Vickers, 'The New Order: Keeping up Appearances',
Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith eds, Indonesia Today, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,
Singapore, 2001, pp.72-84.
^^From Malapetaka Limabelas Januari or 'Calamity of 15 January' violent street riots in Jakarta in
1974. See David Bourchier, Dynamics of Dissent in Indonesia: Sawito and the Phantom Coup, Cornell
Modern Indonesian Project, Ithaca, New York, 1984, pp. 15-16.
^^Rob Goodfellow, Api Dalam Sekam: The New Order and the Ideology of Anti-Communism, Monash
Working Paper no. 95, Monash University Press, Clayton, Victoria, 1995, pp.29-38.
Ibid.,'p.2.

16

growing dissent from many quarters of Indonesian society - including the urban elite
and sections of ABRI. For the New Order the 1990s was a period of offering the
illusion of democratic concessions while desperately trying to consolidate control. It
was a time of growing dissatisfaction with New Order rule. It was also a period in
which anti-communism was revived and strengthened. This was "not so much a
'liberal' period of deregulation, as a period of unrestrained plundering of the
economy",

culminating in Suharto's resignation at the height of the Asian economic

collapse of May 1998.
To begin the survey of the academic literature across these broad periods, the
first attempt to systematically analyse the coup was published in 1971 as A
Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia^^ but widely
circulated in draft form from as early as 1966. While the authors emphasised the
'preliminary' nature of their observations, the work was nevertheless based on a
meticulous study of newspapers by Anderson, McVey and their research assistant,
Bunnell. Preliminary Analysis is still considered an important work on theories of the
coup. In Preliminary Analysis, however, the killings are relegated to a five-page
section entitled 'Reckoning with the PKI'. The reason for this was that the extent of
the violence was not known in 1965-66 and the focus of the Anderson-McVey work
was on understanding the coup itself, with the authors acknowledging their reliance
on newspaper reports, which, in the most part, underreported the violence.^^
As Anderson outlines in 'Scholarship on Indonesia and Raison D'etat:
Personal Experience',

Preliminary Analysis inspired a number of newspaper and

academic articles that were based heavily on the evidence accumulated by Anderson
and McVey. Preliminary Analysis had two unanticipated outcomes, one immediate
the other long standing. The first was that it provoked a counter position that defended
the Indonesian military outlook vis-a-vis the coup and the defeat of Indonesian
communism, and second, it set in place a foreign research pre-occupation with the
coup itself, which did not require the gathering of eyewitness testimony of the
killings. If testimony was utilised then it usually relied on high-level interview sources

''Ibid.
^'Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in
Indonesia, Modern Indonesian Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1971.
Ibid., p.63.
^^Benedict Anderson, 'Scholarship on Indonesia and Raison D'etat: Personal Experience', Indonesia,
no. 62, October 1996, pp.2-3.
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- such as powerful or influential figures - in order to explain various intrigues
associated with 30 September and 1 October 1965.
For this reason, in the immediate post-coup period, there was a rash of 'black
and white' views of the coup. The initial counter to Preliminary Analysis (or as it is
also known, the Cornell Paper) took the form of books and articles, some produced
prior to the coup, which supported the general viewpoint of anti-communist sections
of the military. For example, Arthur Dommen's 'The Attempted Coup in Indonesia'
in the January-March 1966 issue of The China Quarterly; and John Sutter's 'Two
Faces of Konfrontasi: Crush Malaysia and the Gestapu', in the October 1966 Asian
Survey?^ This was followed in the post-coup period by the pro-military, pro-U.S.
accounts of John Hughes in Indonesian Upheaval (still the official U.S. line on 1965
thirty odd years later as illustrated with the publication of former U.S.-Ambassador
Marshal Green's book, Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation)
The Communist Collapse in Indonesia.

and A.C. Brackman's

Another example of pro-military and anti-

communist sentiment is K.D. Thomas' Political and Economic Instability: GESTAPU
no

and its Aftermath.
Leading up to the second historiographical period, an economic and political
cause and effect approach began to dominate the historical writing of 1965. Prominent
examples are Rex Mortimer's Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's
7Q

Accelerated Modernisation

RO

and Richard Robison's Indonesia: The Rise of Capital.

In contrast to these works, during the 1980s research into the nature and extent of the
killings was thin, and dependent on a few individuals such as Max Lane (during his
tenure as editor of Inside Indonesia), Jacques Leclerc of the Centre d'Etudes et de
Recherches Internationales in Paris^^ and Carmel Budiardjo, editor of Tapol
Magazine, the British quarterly dedicated to Indonesian human rights issues.
''Anderson, 'Scholarship on Indonesia and Raison D'etat: Personal Experience', op.cit., pp.3-4.
^'John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, David McKay, New York, 1967.
Marshal Green, Indonesia: Crisis and Transformation, The Compass Press, New York, 1990.
Arnold C. Brackman, The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, W.W. Norton, New York, 1969.
^^K.D. Thomas, 'Political and Economic Instability: GESTAPU and its Aftermath', T.K. Tan, ed.,
Sukarno's Guided Indonesia, Jacaranda Press, Sydney, 1967, pp. 115-26.
Rex Mortimer, ed.. Showcase State: The Illusion of Indonesia's Accelerated Modernisation, Angus
and Robertson, Sydney, 1973.
^"Richard Robison, Indonesia: The Rise of Capital, Asian Studies Association of Australia, Canberra,
1986.
Of

Personal communication, Jacques Leclerc, September 1991. Leclerc expressed a feeling of great
frustration that at the time other Indonesianists did not share his concern or passion for the history of
the massacres.
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During the 1980s there was an identifiable lack of scholarly interest in how the
killings may contribute to local histories across greater Indonesian society particularly at kampung level. Harold Crouch's The Army and Politics in Indonesia^^
and David Jenkins' Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 197519S3 " are examples of the pre-occupation with high level intrigue that raised the
klHings only as part of a broader discussion of TNI pohtics (although Jenkins' work
does rest heavily on oral evidence, in particular that of senior military figures). Again,
these sources serve to illustrate the development of military ideology, not provide an
explanation for the violent foundations of the New Order or the silencing of this
discourse.
In Crouch's work, for instance, transcripts of the post-coup trials of PKI
leaders and implicated military personnel are extensively quoted in the chapter
entitled 'The Coup Attempt'.^"^ However unmediated oral testimony of non-elite
historical actors is never used as a counter source. Scholarly interest in the killing of
the generals, typified in Ben Anderson's translation of the military autopsy report,
'How Did the Generals Die?'^^ continues this practice (although Anderson's intention
was clearly to expose the falsification of evidence for the purposes of propaganda not
produce a narrative of the killings). Nowhere in these sources is it stated that the
killing had already been substantially silenced as attention shifted to theories of the
coup and an analysis of the power of the military in national politics.
Charles Coppel's account of the anti-Chinese hostility associated with the
immediate post-coup period is, for instance, confined to a two-page narrative that
draws mostly on secondary sources. In Coppel's writing, anti-Chinese violence is
identified by four themes, namely, general anti-communism, demonstrations against
China, the enforcement of local anti-Chinese policy (such as in East Java in early
1967), and what Coppel calls a more 'pure' form of anti-Chinese violence, namely
82

Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London,
1978,pp.l41-43, 146-47, 151-57.
83

David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Militaiy Politics 1975-1983, Cornell Modern
Indonesian Project, Monograph Series, publication no. 64, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1984.
Crouch, op.cit., pp.97-157.
Benedict Anderson, 'How did the Generals Die?' Indonesia, no. 43, April 1987. Anderson's paper is
based on the translated transcripts of the Indonesian army medical corps suppressed autopsy report on
the bodies of the murdered Generals. This report clearly concludes that the Generals were not tortured
but rather killed by shooting. The report suggests that the mutilated appearance of the corpses was the
result of submersion in water and tropical heat rather than the enucleation or emasculation reported in
the only two Army-endorsed newspapers permitted to print the propaganda accounts, namely Angkatan
Bersendjata and Berita Yudha.
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that which arose 'spontaneously' and involved damage to property.^^ There is no use
of oral accounts within the text to illustrate his main point that allegations of a
widespread slaughter of ethnic Chinese following the coup was a myth, characterised
in the most part by the destruction of private property rather than loss of life.^^
Further, Paul Webb's discussion systematically outlines the various historiographies
of the coup but devotes only one short paragraph to the killings, summarised briefly,
directly quoting the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as, "one of the
ghastliest and most concentrated bloodlettings of current times".^^
Outside DIY, Central and East Java, accounts have been even scarcer, with the
exception of Geoffrey Robinson's study of the social structures that contributed to the
violence in Bali.

In this work Robinson compiles non-oral evidence, especially

Dutch

sources

historical

and

contemporary

scholarship

to

attack

cultural

anthropological studies of Balinese society. He does this in order to demonstrate the
importance of state structures and political policies for determining the causes of
political violence. While Robison demonstrates that the 1965 massacres in Bali were
initiated and implemented by local and Javanese-based military authorities, within the
context of national politics,^' he does not address the issue of how the killings were
silenced within Bali, but were rather revealed through myths that suggested the
violence was the result of anti-communists 'running amok'.

An account in the

autobiography of Clifford Geertz also appears to support both the, puputan, or the 'self
sacrificing' and 'self-cleansing nature' of the killings, and the 'kill or be killed' myth
so prominent in the anti-communist propaganda. This very brief explanation leaves
most of the important questions about the nature, extent, and historical silencing of the
killings unanswered. For example in one oral account reproduced in his
autobiography, Geertz suggests in respect to the situation on Java that:

**Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1983,
pp.58-60.
^'^Ibid., p.59.
^^Paul Webb, Palms and the Cross: Socio-Economic Development in Nusa Tenggara, James Cook
University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Townsville, 1986.
^'Geoffrey Robinson, The Dark Side of Paradise: Political Violence in Bali, Cornell University Press,
Ithaca, New York, 1995.
"^Ibid., p.307.
''John Sidel, 'Dark Play: Notes on a Balinese Massacre', Indonesia, no. 63, April 1997, p. 190.
'^Adrian Vickers, 'Cockfights and Anger in Bali: Representation in Action', unpublished paper,
presented at the Bali Studies Conference, Princeton University, 1991. Also see Freek Colombijn,
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The communists all just surrendered, confessed openly to plotting, and
were killed, unresisting, next to open graves which the Muslims had
waiting for them. (The communists had graves ready for the Muslims
too, in case things went their way.)^"^

Cribb points out that the scholarly Left in the early New Order period like-wise
showed little interest in the communal and village-based character of the killings. He
raises the example of Caldwell's Ten Years of Military Terror in Indonesia?^ In
Caldwell's introduction the author sharply criticizes conservative scholars for
neglecting the killings, but then devotes little attention to describing or analysing the
violence,

except, that is, in the context of American foreign policy, especially U.S.

reactions to Sukarno's increasingly anti-Western, and pro-communist Chinese and
Soviet rhetoric.^^ The book rather sets out a number of themes associated with the
economics and politics of the immediate post-coup period, again following the path
set by Mortimer and Robinson, namely the military's emasculation of the political
parties,^ and the Suharto regime's re-integration of Indonesian markets with the
world capitalist system.

There is one chapter in Ten Years of Military Terror in

Indonesia by former political prisoner, Carmel Budiardjo, on repression and political
imprisonment. It describes the plight of former detainees. Again, consistent with a
general pre-occupation with the mechanics of the coup and New Order rule, there is
little detailed discussion about the nature of the killings or 'the great silence' that
followed.^^
Likewise, Southwood and Flanagan's Indonesia: Law Propaganda and
Terror,^'^'^ a sympathetic, even polemic Leftist treatment of the period, also draws on
the pro-U.S. accounts of the massacres, and generates mostly stereotypes of the nature

'Explaining the Violent Solution in Indonesia', The Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. IX, issue 1,
Spring, 2002.
'•^Clifford Geertz, After the Fact: Two Countries, Four Decades, One Anthropologist, Harvard
University Press, London, 1996, pp.7-8.
^''Malcolm Caldwell, ed.. Ten Years of Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman, Nottingham, 1975,
pp.13-17.
' Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.6.
'^Caldwell, op.cit., pp.19-39.
'^^Ibid., pp.59-74.
'^/6W., pp. 177-208.
''/WJ., pp. 102-3.
'°°Julie Southwood and Patrick Flanagan, Indonesia: Law Propaganda and Terror, Zen Press, London,
1983.
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of the violence, including the 'kill or be killed' myth,'°' as well as the archetypal story
of the passive, innocent victim.^°^ (A discussion of the role of myth in the memory of
1965 will feature in the next chapter.) Interestingly, Southwood and Flanagan draw
heavily on pro-U.S. accounts such as Hughes and Brackman, as well as, in contrast,
Tapol Bulletin reports generated well after the coup. In the chapter on New Order
violence the authors present no new material. Nor do they acknowledge what was, at
the time of writing, an already mature historical silence. Where oral accounts are used
they are quoted from the thin historiography of the immediate post-coup period. Like
the works mentioned above, Law Propaganda and Terror uses selected secondary
oral accounts to reinforce what had become a body of evidence mostly gathered from
perpetrators, and untested against contemporary eyewitness accounts of victims. In
fact, beyond contemporary newspaper writing, only a small number of first-hand
accounts appear in the academic literature until The Indonesian Killings published in
1990. These examples then emerge to form a 'type' or typical example that are
referred to whenever the point needed to be made about the nature and extent of the
killings. ^°^
Exceptions are the anonymous work

'Additional Data on Counter-

Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East Java' (originally published in
Tapol Bulletin in 1976)'°"^ and the works published toward the end of the second
historiographical period identified above, namely P. Rochijat's 'Am I PKI or NonPKI?' written in exile and translated by Ben Anderson,'°^ 'I Am a Leaf in a Storm','°^
and the appendix to the 1990 Asia Watch report, 'By the Banks of the Brantas: An
Eyewitness Account of the 1965 Killings'.

These works were not widely circulated

amongst Indonesian scholars until the late-1990s, and were at no time available at
1 OS

kampung level to a mass Indonesian readership.

A further example is the eight-part

memoirs of Ruth Havelaar (aka Jitske Mulder), entitled 'Quarterling: The Story of a
Marriage in the Eighties' published in Inside Indonesia across issues 17-25, from
'°'/fe/rf., p.72.
'°V6/J., p.78.
"Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.3-14.
'"'''Massacres in East Java', Tapol Bulletin, no. 15, April 1976, p.3, reproduced in The Indonesian
Killings, op.cit., pp. 169-76.
'°^P. Rochijat, 'Am I PKI or Non-PKI?', Benedict Anderson trans., Indonesia, no. 41, April 1986.
'°*Marni, [trans.] Anton Lucus, 'I Am a Leaf in a Storm', Indonesia, no. 47, April 1989, pp.49-60.
'°^Appendix A: Excerpt from 'By the Banks of the Brantas: An Eyewitness account of the 1965
Killings', in Injustice, Persecution, Eviction: A Human Rights update on Indonesia and East Timor,
Asian Watch, New York, 1990, pp. 87-90.
Marni, 'I Am a Leaf in a Storm', Inside Indonesia, no. 26, March 1991, pp.30-32.
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1988 to 1990.'°^ These sources illustrate a significant gap in the literature, and are a
point of comparison between oral history fieldwork conducted in 1997 and memories
of the post-coup period produced in the 1980s.
Keith Foulcher, in The Indonesian Killings, draws some of the same
conclusions about the general absence, and potential contribution of oral testimony.
He uses as illustration Satyagraha Hoerip's short stories about witnesses or
participants in the killings published in 1972. These record the horror of the violence,
with perpetrators often pleading for understanding or seeking to expunge their guilt.^^°
Like accounts such as 'Am I PKI or Non-PKI?', these were also published as part of a
work of short stories about the killings.^'' However the most prominent example of
this type of literature is a collection of short stories translated by Harry Aveling,
GESTAPU: Indonesian Short Stories on the Abortive Communist Coup of 30
September 1965.

Aveling's collection represents one of the few examples of

unmediated oral testimony complied prior to 1990. Aveling notes that many of the
stories in his collection were told in the first person. As he comments:

Death is the dominant note: in many places the stories are grim, brutal,
even sadistic. Underneath, however, is a deep humanitarianism. To
read these stories is to understand a little better the agony that was
Indonesia's in 1965."^

Foulcher suggests that such treatments of the killings or their consequences are rare particularly before 1990. Exceptions include two novels, Jentera Lepas, which deals
with the fortunes of a family caught up in the aftermath of 1965 and the other, Arjuna
Mencari Cinta, or 'Arjuna Looks for Love', which covers the period before and after
the coup by tracing the changing lives of a prosperous and respected family whose
patriarch is imprisoned, released, and then abducted never to reappear again.

'°^Ruth Havelaar, (aka Jitske Mulder), 'Quarterling: The Story of a Marriage in the Eighties', Inside
Indonesia, no. 17 to 25, 1988 to 1990.
"°Keith Foulcher, 'Making History: Recent Indonesian Literature and the Events of 1965', The
Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.lOl.
Pamusuk Eneste, ed., Pemberontakan GESTAPU/PKI Dalam Cerpen-cerpen Indonesia, Gramedia,
Jakarta, 1983, pp.55-75.
Harry Aveling, ed., GESTAPU: Indonesian Short Stories on the Abortive Communist Coup of 30
September 1965, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1975.
^^^Ibid., p.viii. See in particular, 'War and Humanity', pp.12-22 and 'Death', pp.23-26.
Foulcher, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p. 103.
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In the 1980s, Foulcher notes that the literature changes from creative narrative
to historical and social observation. Any analysis of the silence remains, however,
absent. One possible reason for this general shift is that the period was characterised
by the release of former Leftist literary figures from prison - including Bum Island and the publication of works by three authors, notably a series of historical novels by
Pramoedya Anata Toer, beginning with Bumi Manusia in 1980, the poetry of H.R.
Bandaharo, Dosa Apa, published in 1979, and the poetry of Putu Oka Sukanta,
lis

including Selat Bali.

These authors were concerned with producing a body of

evidence, in fact initiating documentation of their experiences rather than identifying
and analysing historical silences. As Hill notes these works did not reach a broad
readership.''^ In itself the underground profile of these authors constituted further
117

evidence of the New Order's treatment of non-official literature about the killings.
This includes the autobiographical. Surviving Indonesia's Gulag: A Western Woman
lis

Tells Her Story by Carmel Budiardjo, written in exile.

This work draws heavily on

oral accounts to illustrate particular points, such as the brutality of the Suharto
government's treatment of political detainees. However the author does not
acknowledge or explain the well-established silence of ordinary people at the time of
writing and publication in the late 1990s.
Cribb's The Indonesian Killings marks the emergence of a historiography of
the killings. This work includes essays by Michael van Langenberg on the role of the
killings in the legitimation of Suharto's New Order,"^ Ken Young on the influence of
local and national factors in the violence'^° and Keith Foulcher on representations of
the violence in Indonesian literature.'^' Nevertheless, historiographical problems
persist during this latter period as well. For example there is a difference of opinion
between Cribb and van Langenberg as to the extent and importance of the killings.
"^/^/^.,p.l03.
"^David T. Hill, Who's Left? Indonesian Literature in the Early 1980s, Monash University, Clayton
Victoria, 1985, p.37.
"^See Helen Fein, 'Revolutionary and Anti-Revolutionary Genocides: A Comparison of State Murders
in Democratic Kampuchea, 1975 to 1979, and in Indonesia, 1965 to 1966', Comparative Studies in
Society and History, 1993, pp.796-823.
Carmel Budiardjo, Surviving Indonesia's Gulag: A Western Woman Tells Her Story, Cassell,
London, 1996.
"^Michael van Langenberg, 'GESTAPU and State Power', The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.45-62.
Kenneth R. Young, 'Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965', ibid., pp.63-100.
'^'Keith Foulcher, 'Making History: Recent Indonesian Literature and the Events of 1965', ibid.,
pp. 101-20.
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Cribb appears to play down the importance of the killings in terms of their influence
on Indonesian political or historical consciousness:

In most accounts, the killings burst suddenly upon the scene and then
are over, having arrived and departed with the rapidity and
evanescence of a tropical thunderstorm. Historians of Indonesia seem
to have found it difficult to identify both those aspects of Indonesian
society that might have alerted us to the fact that the killings would
take place and any traces they have left on the present political
order.'2^

On the other hand, van Langenberg makes the very strong point that regime change
from Guided Democracy to New Order had profound and far-reaching implications. A
position that will later be borne out in oral evidence collected over 30 years later.

The Gestapu Affair and its consequences is significant well beyond the
history of modern Indonesia alone. It could be argued that apart from
Indonesia, only in the Soviet Union, China and Spain in this century
has mass violence on a huge scale within the national polity also been
utilised to build a state system vastly more powerful than before; and,
in consequence, so markedly changed the civil society within a
generation.'^^

At the same time, tensions were also emerging in the Indonesian-based
historiography. The first of two examples is Iwan Sudjatmiko's doctoral thesis, The
Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party: A Comparative Analysis of East
Java and Bali.

This is ostensibly a critique of competing explanations for the

violence. However Sudjatmiko's pro-New Order approach describes "a bigger
picture", namely "the destruction of the PKI as a movement in Indonesia's route to
modernity".

The argument is that communism represented an ideological

Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, ibid., pp. 1-2.
van Langenberg, ibid., p.61.
'^''iwan G. Sudjatmiko, 'The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party: A Comparative Analysis
of East Java and Bali', unpublished PhD Thesis, Harvard University, 1992.
^^^Ibid., p.237.
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impediment to the emergence of a modem, globally integrated, capitalist state. Oral
testimony is not employed to uncover the nature of the violence, but, ultimately, to
support the author's argument about the benefits to the Indonesian nation that resulted
from the destmction of communism in Indonesia. The extensive use of a vast array of
secondary sources camouflages Sudjatmiko's primary argument that the Suharto
group's historical representations of this period was precisely to document the TNI's
response to the 30 September Coup, not to explain the slaughter hundreds of
thousands of Leftists, which is, consistent with the New Order's treatment of 1965,
conveniently regarded as a separate issue with a very different historiography.
Sudjatmiko's research is diametrically opposed to that conducted by the
International Institute for Social History. Hersri Setiawan's transcripts (related closely
to Siregar's 1995 work Tragedi Manusia dan Kemanusiaan)

reveal a remarkable

level of detail about the remembrances of Indonesian exiles living abroad after 1965.
Many of the ex-PKI were in fact students at the time of the coup. It was simply unsafe
for them to return. This group's more detailed, academic and articulate responses to
questions about the violence are a reflection of their level of education, their exposure
to academic debate about 1965, and the openness of European society to remember
with impunity.'^^
The objective of the project, 'In Search of Silenced Voices', was to collect
individual life histories by interviewing Indonesian political emigres living in Europe,
the Old Soviet Union, The People's Republic of China and Vietnam.'^^ These
testimonies covered their activities as members of the Indonesian Leftist intelligentsia
before 1965, as well as diaspora experiences after 1965. Personal experiences in three
successive eras of their lives are recorded: in Indonesia before 30 September 1965,
abroad immediately after 1 October 1965, and as emigres in the three decades since.
While interviews contain unique data on the history of the broad Left in Indonesia
before 1965, and provide cmcial information on the Leftist diaspora after 1965, they
do not shed much light on the process of 'forgetting' under New Order mle, although
the killings per se are not the primary focus or intention of the work.
^^%id., p.40.
Siregar, op.cit.
'^^Hersri Setiawan, 'Oral History of the PKI', work in progress, International Institute for Social
History, Amsterdam, 2001. It should be noted that most of these Dutch-based Indonesian nationals
were out of the country at the time of the killings, and therefore did not experience the violence first
hand.
'^^http://www.iisg.nl/asia/silenced.html. site accessed 15 August 2002.
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In contrast to Sudjatmiko, who reinterprets sources according to New Order
philosophical terms of reference, and Setiawan who uncovers and complies oral
sources based on exile experiences, Hermawan Sulistyo's work focuses on
inconsistencies in competing historiographies.

Sulistyo seeks an explanation as to

why a body of historiography that may prove 'what really happened in 1965' never
emerged. According to Sulistyo the inconsistencies in interpretations reveal more
about New Order power than illustrate different interpretations. Sulistyo examines and
contrasts alternative explanations of the coup, namely that Sukarno was fully briefed,
and indeed, encouraged the action by the coup plotters (based on the testimony of
Bambang S. Widjanarko, an adjutant of the President);'^' and that the CIA
encouraged the coup as part of the realpolitik of the Cold War, vis-a-vis the PKI, with
the enduring official position of the TNI that the PKI masterminded the coup through
the communist Biro Khusus or 'Special Bureau'.'^^
While Sulistyo charts the course by which one historiography triumphed over
others, his argument only extends to how alternative histories of the coup, not the
killings, were systematically silenced. Furthermore, Sulistyo does not incorporate
village-based oral testimony into his general approach; rather he relies on
comparisons between existing or newly uncovered documentary sources. Sulistyo
agrees that different streams of historical consciousness exist. He argues a case not
only for 'what happened' and 'why' but how certain sets of facts were used to create
New Order historical orthodoxy. The problem remains that these research parameters
only partly answer questions about what were the key elements behind the process by
which ordinary Indonesians seemingly forgot how to remember 1965. Furthermore,
the absence of oral testimony leaves questions about the nature and extent of the
violence at village level unanswered.
The above examples indicate a serious shortcoming in the literature due to a
pre-occupation with historiographies of the 30 September Coup, the repressive
'^°Sulistyo, op.cit. This includes a change in contemporary journalism as well. See Louise Williams,
'Indonesia: The Secret Slaughter', Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 1999, and Marian Wilkinson,
'Indonesia: Hidden Holocaust', Sydney Morning Herald, 10 July 1999.
' " Anthony C.A. Dake, In the Spirit of the Red Banteng: Indonesian Communists between Moscow and
Peking 1959-1965, Mouton, The Hague, 1973.
'^^When captured and questioned by the armed forces, Syam, an army informant, claimed that he was
an agent of the Biro Khusus and that the PKI had infiltrated the army via its Special Bureau and spread
rumours about the Council of Generals who would take power from Sukarno on Armed Forces Day, 5
October. Based on Syam's account, the army placed the blame on the PKI, claiming that the Special
Bureau was set up by Aidit, the Chief of PKI at the time, and led by Syam. Then, to prevent the army
from taking power, the PKI executed the coup with the help of air force officers and PKI volunteers.
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character of the Suharto regime after 1966, and a lack of interest in oral testimony
associated with the violence. On one level this is an omission. On another level it
indicates that an unequal relationship of power existed in the generation of narratives
and that this allowed a discourse of the coup to occupy prominence at the expense of
explanations of the killings. This problem will be addressed by using a certain kind of
theory and methodology adapted from the work of Michael Foucault.
Foucault's statement in On Power, lays down a challenge, namely: "The
question of who exercises power cannot be resolved unless that other question [of]
how does it happen is resolved at the same time".

The attraction of Foucault's

thinking in addressing the problem of historical silences is that a relationship can be
established between the power to control narrative production and historical
consciousnesses. The power to dictate which narratives enter history and which are
silenced is at the heart of this analysis. This thinking exposes both the subjectivity of
historical production, and the political context in which history is made. However it
does not suggest that history is merely one fiction among many fictions. Rather,
identifiable pattems can be established that demonstrate how silences intermpt the
flow of historical consciousness and illustrate the strategies used to suppress the
emergence of new forms of historical knowledge.
As Michel-Rolph Trouillot adds in Silencing the Past: Power and the
Production of History:

Power does not enter the story once and for all, but at different times
and from different angles. It precedes the narrative proper, contributes
to its creation and to its interpretation. Thus, it remains pertinent even
if we can imagine a totally scientific history, even if we relegate the
historian's preferences and stakes to a separate, post descriptive phase.
In history, power begins at the source.'^"*

The logic of this analysis will be established in chapter one by expanding on the
theory of how narrative silences enter the historical continuum at identifiable

'^''Michael Foucault, On Power, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews and Other Writings,
Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed., Routledge, New York, 1988, p.103.
*Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History, Beacon Press,
Boston, 1995, pp.28-29.
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points.'^^ Theories of historical memory will then be discussed in order to illuminate
the relationship between myth and oral testimony in this process. Distinctions
between chronological and durational memory will be defined and explained in
relation to their role in historical production. This will place oral history research into
a current theoretical framework. Chapter one argues that while history is the product
of particular power relationships, counter narratives are actually inscribed in the
silences. This chapter establishes a theory for understanding historical silences in the
history of 1965.
Chapter two examines the context of power relationships in this story. This is
the method that follows the theory. In this chapter the three stages of New Order anticommunist ideology are explained at length.

New Order anti-communism is shown

to determine that 1965 would be remembered according to New Order terms of
reference from the point of fact creation. In fact anti-communist ideology exerted a
powerful influence in terms of what was considered 'fact' at the time of the killings,
and which could be understood and later remembered, thus setting the pattern for
historical consciousness to follow.
Chapters three and four introduce sets of oral testimonies recorded in the
kampung of Kidul during the years 1993 to 1998. Chapter three, in particular,
examines the field of study and discusses ethical issues raised in conducting research
under politically repressive and socially restrictive circumstances. Chapter four argues
that the observations, assumptions and analysis of kampung life in the community of
Kidul represent certain historiographical processes in post-1965 Indonesia. These
observations allow for an understanding of the way in which the violence of 1965 was
carried out at a local level and then silenced. Chapter four applies the method
established in chapter two to a descriptive analysis of case studies. These studies show
a number of distinctive irregularities. Embedded within these testimonies are found
themes and patterns in the story of the killings that form the basis for future
documentary research. For example, while this study does not substantially examine
oral testimony in the immediate post-Suharto period, this is a logical extension of this
particular study.
Chapter five uses documentary sources from the period of August to late
November 1965 to answer questions about these historical pattems. It makes
^^^Ibid., p.26.
Goodfellow, Api Dalam Sekam, op.cit.
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comparisons between what was recalled in the oral testimonies complied in 1997 with
what was written in two local news magazines published during the period of the
violence. A further comparison is made between the oral and archival sources and the
historiography. The cross-referencing of evidence, and the application of the theory
and method established in previous chapters shows that change in political cultures
between Sukarno and Suharto was well estabhshed within weeks of the counter-coup
of 1 October 1965, and that this influenced the conceptual terms of memory in Kidul
in 1997.
Chapter six presents further evidence for the emergence of historical silences
in the history of 1965. It examines issues related to the building and opening of the
Yogya Kembali Monument in 1982. The Monument formalised beliefs Suharto had
about his legitimate right to mle as the restorer of order and the destroyer of
communism. A comparison of the Monument's official aims and objectives and
newspaper reactions to its constmction and opening in 1980-82, with oral accounts
from the immediate pre- and post-Suharto period, illustrate that the New Order
created identifiable guides to official memory. Combined with anti-communist
ideology, these historiographical templates sustained the longevity of the propaganda
message, the historical silence surrounding 1965, and the Suharto regime itself.
Chapter seven integrates the observations, theory, methodology and analysis in
previous chapters with explanations for the radical, anti-military, anti-capitalist and
anti-New Order material that appeared in the public domain from late 1997 onwards.
The significant feature of this comparison is that these developments only partly
translated into changes in historical consciousness within Kidul - a continued
tendency to recall 1965 in terms of highly mediated memories of the violence
characterised by chronology and myth. This chapter examines possible altemative
approaches to opening up a discourse of the killings, which complement the
production of oral counter narratives. It then compares their growing veracity to the
decline of the influence of the official discourse of 1965 after May 1998.
This thesis exposes the causes of narrative silences from the first day that
Indonesians became aware of the implications of a complete change in political
culture emanating from Jakaita on 1 October 1965, when a radically different
hegemony began to fill the political vacuum created by the annihilation of the PKI.
What occurred in the two critical months following the coup would set the pattern for
the historical silence to follow and be reflected in the oral testimonies complied 32
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years later. This thesis is the history of what happened to popular memory in the first
days and months of President Suharto's effective mle, and how the memory of the
killings remained largely forgotten for three decades.
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Chapter One
Memory and History
This chapter looks at the role of power in the story of history by an examination of the
relationship between different types of memory. It examines the function of oral
testimony in historical writing as both chronological and durational and it explains
why this distinction is important to understanding the memory of 1965.
Chronological testimonies are highly mediated remembrances that tell
historians more about conditions at the time of telling.' They are memories that have
been substantially altered, modified and transformed by contemporary experience. An
example would be the process of re-negotiating the memory of a particular event after
the consequences of that experience had come to life. In the story of 1965 it will be
argued that New Order anti-communist ideology was one of the factors that
determined the way memories of the killings were modified to fit with New Order
contemporary political culture, especially the official assertion that communism was
evil, aberrant and force of great potential social instability.
Durational accounts on the other hand are those memories that are
predominately a form of recall. This occurs when memory is a casting back in time
that resists commentary, rationalisation, and retrospective explanation. An example
would be testimony that describes the violence without reference to political or
ideological influences that, in the story of the New Order, developed over a period of
33 years. As an historical source, durational remembrances have the capacity to
breathe life into incomplete or closed archives by the injection of new information and
fresh perspectives on eyewitness accounts of actual events. Oral testimonies that
demonstrate a distinctly durational flavour can validate, question or cross-reference
other forms of historical dialogue. The difference between chronological and
durational remembering concerns matters of emphasis and context, which, in turn, are
determined by political power and ideology. For this reason both types of oral
testimony have the ability to illuminate the process of historical production, not only
by what is documented, but by what is concealed or withheld.

Lawrence L. Langer, Admitting the Holocaust, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp.13-23.
^Ibid.
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This distinction forms the basis of my analysis of oral testimony. It determines
how I use particular oral sources to demonstrate the causes and characteristics of
'forgetting'. The basis of this approach is that the emphasis placed on different
interpretations says different things about the past. This analysis demonstrates that
both chronological and durational remembrances, and the subtle blend of both within
all narratives, thrive under very different conditions. Chronological remembering for
example will be shown to be evidence of a highly subjective continuum of
reinterpreted experiences. These memories are formed over time. In fact chronology
creates the basic architecture of remembering and then forgetting. As chronological
consciousness moves from one historical space to another it changes the way the past
is remembered.
Myth presents a different type of evidence. One distinction is that myth claims
to be a higher form of tmth or reality. At a 'supernatural' level myth implies a
superior level of insight into the human condition.'^ As Nicholas Berdyaev comments,
"myth is a reality incomparably greater than knowledge".^ According to this thinking
myth is based partly on beliefs and partly on fictions and stories that are not easily
explained by logic or empiricism. However, politically generated myth can be
deconstmcted and analysed. When myth arises from, for example, a propaganda
narrative, it becomes merely an enforced tale - tme or false - within an ideological
frame of reference. An appreciation of the role myth plays in historical writing is
important to later discussions about memory. This is because myth forms one of a
number of complex cohesive elements within the story of 1965 (as it does within all
histories and societies). In the story of the Indonesian killings, myth is actually more
than a belief system or fiction. It is an ideological tool for altering social order. For
this reason myth will now be discussed in detail.

^Ibid., p.22.
"^D. Laurenson and A. Swingewood, The Sociology of Literature, Oxford University Press, London,
1972, p.22.
^See Lawrence Wells, 'The Myth of Myth: A Study of Approaches to Mythology', unpublished BA
hons. thesis. University of WoUongong, WoUongong, 1979, p. 153.
^Ronald J. Grele, 'Movement Without an Aim: Mythological and Theoretical Problems in Oral
History', in Robert Perks and Alistair Thomson, eds. The Oral History Reader, Routledge, London,
1988, p.46.
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At one level myth makes people feel comfortable with their lives lived in the
context of 'a past'. Whether it is 'tme' or not often has little bearing on its success or
otherwise. This marks myth's sharpest distinction with chronological memory.
Chronological memory takes as its starting point an actual event. It then reinterprets
this event in light of social or political change. Myth on the other hand, is defined by
'manageable' versions that do not necessarily have a beginning point in fact. Myth is
sometimes accepted in order to suppress painful or unsafe memories, traumas or
tensions, as people align what is 'remembered' with what is secure, acceptable,
possible and indeed, official.
Maurice Halbwachs, who started the debate about collective memory in the
1930s, suggested that: "human beings can remember their history, but they cannot
freely choose the circumstances and conditions of their memories"^ - a clear reference
to Marx. Or put another way, national mythologies and the opposing memories they
sometimes produce, operate in a distinctly social context. These memories are then
expressed through the narrative tensions they create in historical writing. This contrast
exposes power relations.'° "History satisfies the many needs of posterity. Myth on the
other hand is shaped to the needs of the momenf." The past is always changing. As
19

E.H. Carr noted in 1961, this sense of history as 'movement' is by no means an
exercise in meaningless relativity. It is rather because the narrative strategies of
1o

historical writing are "laid bare" that the present age is the most historically minded
of all ages.''' It is the complex interrelationship between different approaches to types
of historical knowledge - including myth, and the way these sourses are considered
that is important for the development of my analysis. ^ To this end the work of
Foucault provides guidance in explaining the theoretical basis for understanding
^Ibid., in Perks and Thompson, Alistair Thomson, 'Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Theory into
Practice in Australia', p.300.
Klaus H. Schreiner, 'Remembering and Forgetting at 'Lubang Buaya", in Remembering and
Forgetting: The Political and Social Aftermath of Intense Conflict in Eastern Asia and Northern
Europe, conference proceedings. University of Lund Press, Sweden, 1999, p. 140.
'Karl Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumiare of Louis Bonaparte', Robert C. Tucker, ed.. The Marx-Engles
Reader, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1975, p.595.
'°Lucy Taksa, 'The Masked Disease: Oral History, Memory and the Influenza Pandemic 1918-19',
Kate Darian-Smith and Paula Hamilton, eds. Memory and History in Twentieth-Century Australia,
Oxford University Press, Sydney, 1994, p.78.
"Wells, 0)9.c/r., p. 168.
E.H. Carr, What is History?, Penguin, Ringwood, Victoria, 1961, p.l34.
'^Michael Foucault, 'On Power', Lawrence D. Kritzman, ed.. Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Interviews
with other Writers, Routiedge Press, New York, 1983, p. 103.
14,Carr, op.cit., p. 134.
'/feid.,p.lO.
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different types of memory. This lays the foundations for an analysis of the power to
silence history. The case for the use of oral sourses to illuminate these silences will
draw on a number of philosophies and social theories as the various components of
this analysis take shape as it in turn produces a usable method for examining the case
studies presented in chapter four.
For Foucault, the answer is not found in affirming knowledge as an
autonomous realm, separate from the terms of these dichotomies, but by mediating a
passage between them: the context. Where Stmcturalism neutralised precisely those
features of historical writing that illustrated the process of history - such as ideology,
belief and myth - by imprisoning knowledge within rigid theoretical terms of
reference, Post-Stmcturalism freed it. For Stmcturalists, the stress was not on the
story of power within history per se, but on an implicit understanding of deeper levels
of reality buried within society's economic stmctures, "penetrating into some secretly
hidden tmth".'^ History is a process involving societal stmctures, but it is also a story
about the question of who wins the right to establish one particular account as
'historical' to the exclusion of other accounts. History is therefore not exclusively
about stmcture, but about the intersecting narrative processes found within stmcture.
It is about the story of power.
In this story it is the interactions of human beings that are integral to the
context, not the stmcture. For example, in his study of 19th century prisons,
Foucault's aim was not to describe real life, or necessarily document what happened
in prison, but to reveal the history of a program for controlling people within an
enclosed space. The meaning of the program was not exhausted by merely knowing
whether the asylum worked. Rather, in 'Madness and Civilization' Foucault talks
about a network of institutions and practices in which the lunatic was both enmeshed
and defined.'^ For Foucault it was a question of how insanity was conceptualised as
evil, aberrant, and abnormal or illness and, most importantly, the question of who held
the power to determine the institutionalisation of a particular treatment or remedy as
acceptable or normal.
Likewise, in 'The Birth of the Clinic' Foucault distances himself from
contemporary, modem, and epistemological histories in favour of the 'archaeology of

' Milner, op.cit., p.66.
'''Michael Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, vol.1, no.l, Paul Rabinow, ed.. The New York
Press, New York, 1997, p.5.
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the medical gaze'.

He does this in order to show not how different practices

determine the stmcture of knowledge, but how, and by what right, those practices
figure in the story of knowledge's conditions of emergence. It is not enough to
describe institutionalisation without revealing the narrative strategies that determine
the complexion of the historical dialogue between the story, the facts, the context, and
the historians' question.'^
In his work on the French Revolution, Foucault's interest lies in the antitheses
of power stmctures inherent in the notions of sovereignty and surveillance. As
Foucault argues in Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, the techniques
of surveillance, vis-a-vis sovereignty, emerged in the immediate post-Revolutionary
French nation state.

These characteristics are fixed manifestations of contemporary

French state power, still in place and visible today. This illustrates that the issue is not
a matter of different interpretations of facts or societal stmctures, but an inquiry into
the manner in which the question is asked of different types of historical dialogue and
the way in which sources are interpreted or re-interpreted.
Foucault's

surveillance/sovereignty

thesis

corresponds

to

the

power

relationship that exists between duration and chronology. The difference between the
linear 'what happened' and the process-orientated 'what is said to have happened'
approach to history can be found here. Chronology is a product of politics, ideology,
belief, society and culture. Duration is more characteristic of sovereignty - human
psychology, integrity and self It is the analysing of these fields of knowledge, or
changes in the mles by which concepts and theories are formed, that is at the heart of
91

the process that determines which histories are written and which are not.

As

Foucault comments:
Whoever ... wishes to study a problem that has emerged at a given
time must follow other mles: the choice of material as a function of the
givens of a problem; the focus of the analysis on those elements likely
to resolve it; the establishment of relationships that permit a solution.^^
1Q

Francois Delaporte, 'The History of Medicine according to Foucault', Jan Goldstein, ed., Blackwell,
Foucault and the Writing of History, Oxford, 1995, pp. 137-49.
''/W^.,p.l48.
Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The Birth of the Prison, Pantheon, New York, 1997,
pp.220 and 224.
^'Delaporte, op.cit., pp. 142-43.
Foucault, Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, op.cit., p.5.
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Foucault rejects the notion of the abstract subject as an indispensable basis for
understanding socio-political and historical currents, but rather he argues for a
multiplicity of "force-relations of shifting, mobile, open-ended interplays''.^^ As
Foucault writes: "I don't believe that the question of who exercises power can be
resolved unless that other question, how does it happen? is resolved at the same
time".'^'' For this reason:

Power is no longer the external social influence that opposes our
autonomy, but the force that is continuous with concrete human
existence and social life ... Foucault's human beings are active bodies
that exist in the midst of the world, and to be in the world in this way is
to be wholly and inescapably open to influence and transformation by
other forces, "to be totally imprinted by history".^^

An examination of what is enmeshed within the story of history and the more specific
question of who has the say-so to tell their particular story, challenges the preeminence of overly theoretical histories. It raises questions about power and human
agency. It is not simply a matter of impersonal forces influencing actions one way or
another, but of human agency. It is not just a case of the powerful verses the
oppressed, but rather modes of power relationships where tactics and position come
into play within the context. As Foucault writes in The History of Sexuality:

I wanted to undertake a history in which sexuality would not be
conceived as a general type of behaviour whose particular element
might vary according to demographic, economic, social or ideological
conditions, anymore than it would be seen as a collection of (scientific,
religious,

moral)

representations

which,

though

diverse

and
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changeable, are joined to an invariant reality.

^"'Michael Foucault, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', Paul Rabinow, ed., The Foucault Reader,
Pantheon, New York, 1984, p. 102.
^^/6id,p.l03.
^^Christopher Falzon, Foucault and Social Dialogue, Routiedge, London, 1998, pp.44-45.
^^Michael Foucault, Preface to 'The History of Sexuality', vol. 11, Paul Rabinow, ed.. The Foucault
Reader, Pantheon Books, New York, 1984, p.333.
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An understanding of the role of historical dialogue, or the ordering and interpretation
of power/knowledge,^^ gives rise to the possibility of the transformation of ways of
thinking about history.^^ As Michel-Rolph Trouillot in his work Power and the
Production of History suggests, the challenge is not to determine what history is - but
how history works.^^ Trouillot's thinking is an extension of the ideas of Foucault. It is
specifically relevant to this thesis because an understanding of how forgetting enters
history is also a story about how alternative oral narratives may be inscribed in the
silences.

For what history is changes with time and place or, better said, history
reveals itself only through the production of specific narratives. What
matters most are the process and conditions of production of such
narratives; only a focus on that process can uncover the ways in which
the two sides of historicity intertwine in a particular context. Only
through the overlap can we discover the differential experience of
power that makes some narratives possible and silences others .^°

In his work on how European historiography silenced indigenous stories of the
Haitian Revolution, or rather those narratives that were not consistent with European
Imperialism, both colonial and contemporary,

Trouillot makes two points. The first

is that the intentional distance created by historians between process and knowledge
actually denied the socio-political reality of Imperialism by privileging a type of
abstract 'scientific professionalism' that declared a debate about the meaning of the
slave revolt in Haiti, and the defeat of French colonialism, as lacking in evidence, or
"^9 —n

worst, relevance.

This was because dates and deeds devoid of analysis about the

defeat of the French themselves actually distinguished the Haitian Revolution. As
Trouillot comments, "the [Haitian] Revolution was considered unthinkable even as it

^'^Ibid., p.45.
^^Ibid., p.52.
Trouillot, op.cit., p.23.
^°Ibid., p.25.
• Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism, Chatto and Windus, London, 1993, pp.9-10.
Trouillot, op.cit., p.89. The key dates in the Haitian Revolution were the mass insurrection of 1791,
the crumbling of the colonial apparatus in 1793 and the proclamation of Haitian Independence in 1804.
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was happening. For this reason it was relegated to history's 'backbumer' by the
overwhelming ideologies of racism, slavery and colonisation".^^
This is reflected in the fact that there is little debate to be found in the colonial
records - in France, England or the Americas - of the right of black slaves to political
self-determination, and certainly little discussion about the possibility of achieving it
by armed revolt.

At the time, the implications of Haitian Independence for other

slave regimes, such as in the Southern States of the U.S., was so undesirable that it did
not appear to enter the consciousness of either colonial or metropolitan European
social commentators. As Trouillot suggests, "worldview won over facts, white
[European] hegemony was natural and taken for granted".^^ In fact, an alternative
history of the period remained in the domain of the unthinkable well into the 20th
century.

This is because a Negro-slave conquest of a European power could not be

allowed to challenge the global order of colonialism, and for that matter the emerging
influence of the United States as a slave state and world player. A slave revolt that
overran the pre-eminent colonial power of the day (France) and established the
world's first independent post-colonial nation state was rather relegated within history
writing to one of three short explanations, namely - 'it did not really happen', 'it was
not that bad', or that 'it was unimportant'. It fact for over two hundred years the
Haitian Rebellion of 1791 and the Revolution that followed only mattered in
European historiography as a pretext to talk about something else.
Trouillot's second point relating to the Haitian Revolution is that the setting of
chronological boundaries imprisoned that particular history within an immovable past,
when it was also clearly part of a contingent present.

Even though the period 1776-

1843 is referred to as 'The Age of Revolutions', with the American War of
Independence marking the epoch, at the very same time this corpus remained silent on
another political revolution of that same age - the Haitian Revolution of 1791-93. The
Haitian Revolution has, in marked contrast, rather strangely been consigned to the
annals of 'medical history'. For example, in Haiti the victor was claimed to be disease
- in particular malaria. This was despite the fact that Napoleon lost 19 generals and
^^Ibid., p.98.
^^Ibid., pp.88-89.
^^Ibid., p.93.
^^Ibid., p.89.
^'^Ibid., pp.96-97.
As Marx stated: "The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the
living", Marx, 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', op. cit., p.595.
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more soldiers in Haiti during combat than later perished at the Battle of Waterloo.
Further, the fact that France surrendered a valuable colony to a black army, and that
this loss contributed to the end of the dream of a French empire on the American
mainland, appears to hardly warrant an historical footnote. These observations
strongly support theoretical assumptions about power relations within the process of
•

• *
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history wntmg.
The intentional distance created by historians between process and knowledge
and the hermetic treatment of the socio-political significance of history as exclusively
'past', erroneously declares historical narrative, such as the Haitian story of
independence from France, to be one fiction amongst others. What made the narrative
of French colonialism and racism powerful enough to pass as accepted history even
today? Second, if history is merely the story told by those who won, how did the
French colonialists win the right to impose their version of Haiti's colonial history in
the first place? And how has this been perpetuated?''^ The answer is that: "The
subjectivity of historical actors is an integral part of the event and any satisfactory
historical description of if'."" Concrete objects - archives, buildings or monuments,
even theoretical interpretative stmctures, limit the range and significance of an
historical event. They do not determine in the first instance the 'historical-ness' of a
narrative. This is why no fiction, nor for that matter myth, can pass for history - it is
ultimately the socio-political process, both historical and contemporary, that sets the
context for all narratives and determines their admissibility first as evidence and
second as history.
People are also subjects of history the way workers are the subjects of
a strike: they define the very terms under which some situations can be
described ... [T]here is no way we can describe a strike without
making the subjective capacities of the worker a central part of the
description.'*^

^Trouillot, op.cit., pp.99-100.
^^Ibid., pp.5-6.
^^Ibid., p.24.
Ibid., p.23. See also W.G. Runciman, A Treatise on Social Theory, Volume 1: The Methodology of
Social Theory, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp.31-34.
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The emphasis placed on oral testimony as evidence determines what role memory will
be permitted to play in any given historiography and shows how a comparison of
different types of narrative remembering can illustrate different aspects of the process
of history. It is the conceptual framework for considering distinctions between types
of narratives and the respective sources of evidence on which they depend for
currency that best defines my analysis. This easily expands to include the exploration
of metanarratives, not just those that intersect with historical questions in terms of
their 'past-ness' per se.

Oral histories did not fix the past in the way many sources generated at
the time did. For the first time, historians assisted in creating the
sources in the present and so became aware of the retrospective and
fluid character of both memory and narrative. For this reason oral
history is inherently radical, and participatory - it recovers the voice of
those previously hidden to history.''^

As Edward Casey argues in Remembering: A Phenomenological Study, recovering
lost voices per se tells the historian very little.''^ The contribution of memory is about
more than remembering and the practice of interviewing. It is about the social
dimension of an historical account.''^
As a unique or discrete historical source, the human functions of "recognizing,
reminiscing and reminding"'' are complex. They are 'remembered' and in being so
they become 'memories' - "with all this entails, not merely of the consistent, the
enduring, and the reliable, but also the fragile, the errant and the confabulated".''^
What oral material contributes is not necessarily limited by exclusive questions of
accuracy or authenticity, but rather oral testimony, as with philosophies, have the
potential to both define the field of interest and expose power relationships.

"^'Hamilton, P. 'The Knife-Edge: Debates About Memory and History', Memory and History in
Twentieth-Century Australia, op.cit., p. 14.
Casey, op.cit., p.x.
^Trevor Lummis, 1987, Listening to History, Hutchinson, London, 1987, p.28.
''^Casey, op.cit., p.xi.
^Ibid., p.xii.
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The basis oral history introduces into history is wholly welcome
because it will necessarily direct the historian's attention to the
fundamentally conunon things of life: the elements of individual and
social experience rather than upon administrative and political
chronologies. It makes it possible for the historian to define his [or her]
subject in the same way as the sociologist or social anthropologist, and
to pick his [or her] themes before he [or she] starts in the light of their
substantive importance, rather than to leave himself [or herself] at the
mercy of his [or her] documents.''^

Having placed memory within a process of power, it is at this point that I can begin to
deconstmct the components of memory by dissecting it into primary and secondary
remembering. (Primary remembering is 'how to do' and is therefore not within the
interest of history but psychology.) Secondary remembering, on the other hand, can be
broadly defined in three parts as, 'simpliciter' (or the recall of single, mostly unrelated
events), 'remembering that' (or states of affairs) and remembering 'certain things that
were the case'.''^ This suggests that memory has an indefiniteness that relies on a
limitless array of external factors such as other memories, or social stimulus from the
present, or in fact even other people's remembrances - including parents, peers or
contemporaries. However all memory is susceptible to what Casey calls "greatest
interest or stress", or the distinction between different emphasis as in extenso, or
drawing together diverse parts of memory, and in pleno, or the detail that depends on
the high points of cursory recollection^^ - one peripheral and one central,
substantially, commentary or recall.
It was the Greek philosopher Aristotle who first made the distinction on which
the case for different types of memory rests. He identified the important features of
the passivist paradigm in which remembering was reduced to a passive process of
registering and storing incoming impressions - the mental archiving of information.
Both the ancient Greeks and Romans wrote about and were pre-occupied with
mnemonics, or the art of remembering, and with its corollary - a self-contained

Trevor Lummis, op.cit., p. 16.
Casey, op.cit., pp.60-64.
Ibid., p.26.
^^Ibid., p.27.
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memory of forgetting or aporia (in popular verbiage 'writer's block').^^ This was to
be resisted through the archival storage of memories in the human mind. Roman
students, Klein notes, were trained to fight aporia through 'memory theatres', which
were intended to keep knowledge from drifting into oblivion.^'^ Altemately, there is
the countervailing tradition of 'activism'. This involved "the creative transformation
of experiences rather than its internalised reduplication in images or traces constmed
as copies".' Activism is a conviction that recollection is "rehearsal and retrieval".^^
This undermined the absolute aspects of memory by constmcting a link between
memory and personal past and by associating it with an image - essentially by linking
it with perception.^^ However, it was Plato's view of memory that has come to
represent most Westem observations about the essential subjectively, or more
correctly, the perceived fallibility of human memory.
The competing traditions of activism and passivism have remained remarkably
enduring, and discrete, since ancient Greece: activism - mystical (subjective) in the
sense of a re-viewing of memory; and passivism - mechanical (archival), defined by
the invention of duplication technology from writing on stone and paper to computers.
There is in fact a direct philosophical continuum between the thinking of Aristotle and
Freud in terms of activism and contemporary psychoanalysis and Plato, and the
Jewish Holocaust historian Lawrence Langer, in terms of the similarities between
mnemonics and the in pleno, or out of time characteristics of durational remembering.
The main assumption behind chronological remembering is, however, that a
certain type of memory makes a profound difference to how we relate to the present.
In this form we do not repeat the past as self-identical, as strictly unchanging or
invariant. As Casey argues, "the past is reclaimed as different in its amends; each time
we remember we redefine or refine".

^^Richard Sorabji, trans., 'Aristotie, De Memoria et Reminiscentia', Aristotle on Memory, Duckworth,
London, 1972.
^^Klein, op.cit., p.302.
Casey, op.cit., p.l5.
Ibid., pp.15-16. Casey was referring to the work of Pierre Janet, L'evolution de la Memoire et de la
Notion du Temps, Chahine, Paris, vol. 1, 1928; Sigmund Freud, 'Construction in Analysis', Standard
Edition 23, London, 1964, 257-69; C.F. Bartlett, Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social
Psychology, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 197-214; Jean Piaget and Barbel
Inhelder, Memory and Intelligence, A.J. Pomerans, trans., Basic Books, New York, 1975, pp.1-26.
^^Casey, op.cit., p.99.
^''ibid., p.286.
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Body memories, place memories and commemoration. A centrifugal
motion outward from the individual into a community of worlds filled
with perceptual objects, historical events, signs and texts, rituals and
other people ... a density of involvement ... [or] thick autonomy. We
are what we remember ourselves to be.^^

Memory, however, is not mental collecting and keeping. It is rather "a gathering in
and a bearing the past in mind".^^ All memory, regardless of orientation or emphasis,
seeks to preserve its substance within. It is the retrieval of memory and its use as an
historical source that is the issue. Chronological memories are not "brought like
captives into such an archive". They are rather drawn into the "matrices of already
funded experiences".^^

In this capacity the notion of matrix points to another aspect of
memory's in-gathering activity, namely, its proclivity for arranging its
contents in ordered groupings and for finding a location, a specific
tropos, for these groupings within the vast keep that we denote by the
mass noun 'memory'. The density of memory's material inherence in
the subject is here matched by the elegance and economy of its formal
arrangements. When we take into account its duel dimensionality, we
are led to conceive the in-gathering action of remembering as a
material matrix (in depth) of formal matrices (located within this same
depth).^'

This sense of chronological memory is represented in Klein's story of 'Borge's
Father', where the dialogue illustrates a moment of literary insight: "So every time I
recall something, I'm not recalling it really, I'm recalling the last time I recalled it.
I'm recalling my last memory of it".^^ If this logic is to be accepted then it is
impossible to isolate pure durational accounts from chronological ones although
different emphasis can be identified from within any given testimony. To illustrate
^^Ibid., p.288.
^^Ibid., p.294.
^Ibid., p.294.
^^Ibid., p.294.
Klein, op.cit., p.318.
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this point I want to raise three examples that illustrate the points I have made about
memory thus far. The first is the research of Langer in, Admitting the Holocaust.
This examines the individual and experiential aspects of duration. The second is an
examination of the transcripts of Marcel Ophuls's 1971 film documentary about
Vichy French collaboration with soldiers of the Nazi occupation.^'' This looks at social
currents and memory. The third is a discussion of Alexander Wilde's 'Intermption of
Memory: Expressive Politics in Chile's Transition to Democracy',^'^ which examines
politics as a vehicle for mass recollection.
In the first of these three examples, Langer writes, "chronological current
flows between the permanent banks of historical narrative"

- with language as its

most powerful medium. Langer asks his readers to examine the term 'survivor'
instead of 'victim', 'martyrdom' instead of 'murder', and so on, or what he refers to
as "a discourse of consolation".^^ Defined by one of its most basic objectives,
according to Langer, chronological memory is a manageable version that displaces the
nightmares of violence. However, such a version can easily become a naive contrast
between good and evil or heroes and villains. This is what Langer describes as "[the]
persisting myth about the triumph of the spirit that colours the disaster with a rosy
tinge that helps us to manage the unimaginable without having to look at its naked and
ugly face".^^ While it can be said that chronological time is characterised by the ebb
and flow of socio-political currents, durational time is different.^^ According to
Langer:

If we are to trast [book] titles, memory itself is not neutral. 'Between
Memory and Hope' implies one agenda; 'The Ruins of Memory',
another. One tries to edify; the other, to plunge us without life
70

preservers into the maelstrom of the disaster.

Langer, Admitting the Holocaust, op.cit.
^''Marcel Ophuls, 'The Sorry and the Pity', Documentary Film Transcript, Paladin, Paris, 1972.
^^Alexander Wilde, 'Interruption of Memory: Expressive Politics in Chile's Transition to Democracy',
unpublished paper presented to The Working Group Institute for Latin American and Iberian Studies,
Colombia University, 27 to 29 August 1998, pp.27-29, courtesy of Klaus Schriener.
T^anger, Admitting the Holocaust, op.cit., p.l6.
67
Ibid., p.7.
Ibid., p.3.
''Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 13
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Lyotard, for example, argues that chronology has no place in the living memory of the
Jewish Holocaust, "where [in the lives of survivors] the present is the past and the
past is always presenf .^' Chronology amehorates the pain of the subject. It is not
necessarily the experience of those who survived the Nazi death camps who lived to
retell their stories. It is the working out of a particular belief system about what the
Holocaust means for society in the present. It might be a story of Jewish migration to
the United States, or the right to exist of the State of Israel. It is not necessarily the
story of survivors.
Langer agues that narrated ordeal must be allowed to maintain an 'out of time'
quality which is distinguished by a casting back, or a positioning of the person in
time, rather than by the intervention of rationalising commentary on the part of the
subject, or for that matter, the historian.^^ Duration, he argues, must be, as far as
possible, distinguished in history by its methodological and theoretical isolation from
chronology. This is because chronology can present the historian with the analytical
temptation to change the nightmare of an individual into philosophical and therefore
historical reconciliation.

In the realm of durational time, no one recovers because nothing is
recovered, only un-eovered and then re-covered, buried again beneath
the fraitless straggle to expose 'the way it was'. Durational memory
cannot be used to certify belief, establish closure, or achieve certainty.
Hence chronological time is needed to intmde on this memory by those
who insist on rescuing belief, closure and certainty from testimonies
about the disaster. Durational time resists and undermines this effort.

An example is the popular treatment of what Langer identifies as the "Auschwitz
death as a beautiful death myth", which evokes unrepresentative literary forms such as
"sacrifice" and "martyrdom".^'' For Langer, duration is a form of ever-present past, or
"hermetic grave",^^ and chronology is in contrast a form of "psycho-historical
71

Jean-Francois Lyotard, Heidegger and the Jews, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1990,
p.xxii.
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Lawrence Langer, Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory, Yale University Press, New Haven,
1992.
'Ibid.,p.\5.
'^%id., p.l9.
^^Ibid., p.lS.
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sanctuary".

In other words, duration remains fixed in its horror, while chronology

tends first to seek for and then offer an escape. A discussion of the Americanisation of
the Holocaust is a case in point.^^ This is distinguished by themes such as Jewish
resistance, the triumph of sacrifice over evil, and highly controversial questions about
the Holocaust as the original and continued raison d'etre of the State of Israel vis a vis
the Palestinians.
The second example of chronology and duration is taken from Marcel
Ophuls's 1971 documentary The People of Trance under the German Occupation:
The Sorrow and the Pity,

in which Ophuls interviewed the residents of the French

town of Clermont-Ferrand who could remember the German occupation and who
agreed to speak about their experiences. Ophuls contrasted testimonies of French,
German and British government officials, writers, farmers, artists, and local resistance
veterans of the Nazi occupation. Themes of chronology are highly evident in the text.
This conveys that in the 1970s the issue of wartime collaboration was still very
7Q

painful.

Almost all accounts are moderated by commentary, mostly some form of

complex justification. There is intensity in the interviews that displays a chronological
melodrama as collaborators, as well as bystanders, attempt to explain their actions.
The film makes it clear that people still choose sides despite the passage of time inevitably the winning side. In Clermont-Ferrand the contest is exactly for the neutral,
safe, middle ground, but not necessarily as a place to escape from the past, but to hide
from the present. Ophuls's question is: What do the past and the present share in
shaping the manner in which questions about memory can be conceptualised?
Expressly durational accounts, almost devoid of commentary, are the rare
exception in Ophuls's film. They are easy to identify because they are painful and
descriptive. For example the oral testimony of Louis Grave, farmer, Resistance fighter
and concentration camp survivor, can be contrasted with the chronological
justifications of Christian De La Maziere, former French volunteer in the French
Division of the German Waff en S.S.
^%id., p.2l.
^^Ibid. See chapter 13, 'The Americanisation of the Holocaust on Stage and Screen', pp. 157-77.
^^Ophuls, op.cit.
™This sentiment remains very contemporary. A 2002 published information brochure on the city of
Dijon near Clermont-Ferrand does not mention World War II at all, but rather takes up the narrative of
'the modern period' from the 1950s. Likewise the widespread official celebration of 'heroes of the
Resistance' in Dijon by the use of street names to celebrate individuals actually silences the fact that
many French citizens collaborated with their Nazi occupiers and that much of what is written about the
popularity of the Resistance is myth.
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Yes, I saw a lot of misery. I saw a convoy of prisoners coming from
Hungary - I think it was Hungary, anyway - there was [sic] fifty
thousand of them. Well I was sent out to take them soup, it was near
the movie theatre in Buchenwald, there was even a movie theatre in
Buchenwald, there was everything, even a brothel, and that's the
tmth. So I brought them the soup - they overturned the things; they
got down on their knees in the middle of the mud. There was about a
foot and a half of mud ... well maybe not a foot and a half, but almost
a foot and a half anyway. Well, they all ate the soup right there in the
mud, poor guys ... and four days later they were all wiped out. [Louis
Grave].^°

[Did the French surrender shock you?] Of course not, since it was
precisely the fatal consequence of a certain policy ... and those were
going to be the themes of the Vichy Government's propaganda. If we
have been defeated, then the fault lies with the political parties, which
have tom the country apart over the years. [Christian De La Maziere].^'

The film puts collaborators and former German occupiers alike into embarrassing
situations, and by extracting compromising statements about their experiences,
R9

exposes inconsistencies with other sources.

For example, documentary evidence

from the film suggests that Vichy's interest in collaboration far exceeded the
'necessities' of shielding France.

Ophuls uses testimony to tell a story of social

tension over memory in the France of the 1970s more than he does about
collaboration during World War Two. It is, as Foucault states, a story about power. In
fact, testimony from Clermont-Ferrand actually tells very little about 'what happened'
in the 1940s. Ophuls's sources not only expose chronological sentiments, but also
challenge the powerful contemporary myth that most French people were 'behind the

^%/rf.,p.l04.
Ibid., p.25.
Ibid., p.xi. These include: that Vichy protected France from "a worse fate" (which is likely to be
'Communism', but is never explained), that it actually 'protected Jews' and that it served as a
'sacrificial shield for the survival of French civilisation'.
Ophuls, op.cit., p.xi.
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Resistance', when the vast majority simply, quietly went about their rather ordinary
everyday business of collaborating with the enemy.^"*
The third illustration is from Chile, hi outlining the traditions of Latin
American democracy that predated General Augusto Pincochet's overthrow of the
AUende socialist govemment in 1973, and the harsh military mle that followed the
coup (1973-90), Wilde draws attention to deep divisions in Chilean society. He
declares contemporary Chile to be a "nation of enemies",^^ straggling, but unable to
distinguish between the normalisation of dictatorship under Pincochet, and the
memory of pre-existing traditions of democracy. ^^ Consistent with Trouillot, Wilde
states that the dialogue between memories is set by the context - in his example the
resistance of military culture to change, official ceremonies, national holidays, book
publications, the discovery of remains of disappeared persons, the trial of an official
of the former regime and so on. He argues that there is a pattern of events that triggers
87

collective memory, which is beyond the control of government.
It is the power of what Wilde calls "interraptions" that disturb the potential for
durational memory.^^ Wilde writes that the process of permitting durational memory
to surface was, however, set in place with the inauguration of the post-dictatorship
government of Patricio Aylwin (1990-94). Significantly the Aylwin govemment
initiated a series of expressive ceremonies intended to begin the process of healing
Chile's social and political divisions. The televised coverage of Aylwin's inauguration
from the national stadium, a notorious place of detention from which the Chilean
secret police 'disappeared' hundreds of Allende supporters following the 1973
Military coup, demonstrates the process. Wilde writes:
Through an imaginative program of speeches, dance, personal
testimony, and public recognition of figures long proscribed from

Ibid., p.xi.
^^W\\de, op.cit., pA.
^^Ibid., p.l. "The truth is that there are no regulations that can prevent us [from displaying these
pictures] with the respect we have shown, with the silence we have maintained during the whole time
... [W]e are not offending anyone. And this [Senate] is also a place of the historian memory of Chile,"
Senator Jaime Gazmuir, Valparaiso, 11 March 1998.
*^In Australia this is represented in the work of Alistair Thomson on Anzac memories and the social
triggers for the permitting of various war memories to emerge. Alistair Thomson, 'Embattied
Manhood: Gender, Memory and the Anzac Legend', in Memory and History, op.cit., pp.158-73.
^Vilde, op.cit., p.2.
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national life, the ceremony attempted to acknowledge a long period of
collective suffering and exorcise the sinister site.^^

Wilde argues that the symbols of national identity, strongly associated with Chile's
pre-Pincochet political institutions and democratic traditions, re-emerged not as a
chronological commentary on dictatorship, but as a form of collective durational
remembering set in place by example, by the use of guides to memory, or 'templates'.
This demonstrated how ordinary people could cast their living memories back in time
to a pre-Pincochet past, through the medium of expressive politics.^° A comparison
can be found with Thomson's description of the way in which a particular Austrahan
war veteran asserted his memories of World War I.

Many of the men I interviewed told their stories as an unfolding life
story with a smooth, sequential flow. Percy's remembering is more like
the anecdotal style of a stand up comedian. The anecdotes also conflate
his own story with that of the men of his battalion - it is usually the
story of 'us' rather than T ... but on closer reading shows that each
story has a punch line or tag that has helped Percy fix it in his
memory.^'

Is forgetting then simply a process of distraction, "where one memory allows another
memory to be removed in plain view, without complaint - forgotten"?^^ Is it a
function of mass popular memory to "map erasures" - the sensation left by the "unfind-able"?

Is it as Klein suggests, that nostalgia plays a role in forgetting by

convincing the subject that something has been forgotten because it can't be
remembered - "a psychological container for the anxieties of the present"?^'' Or is it a
form of mass delusion - the idea of a shared memory of an event that never
occurred?^^ On the contrary there is a pattern to forgetting. This pattern is inscribed in

^'ibid., p.5.
^Ibid., p.l2.
Thomson, 'Embattled Manhood: Gender, Memory and the Anzac Legend', op.cit., p.l61.
Klein op.cit., p.2.
'^Ibid., p.lO.
^%id.,p.U.
'^Ibid., p.\2.
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the continuum of historical production. ^^ My purpose however has not been to isolate
each of the components of forgetting as somehow separate, but to explain that, "not
all silences are equal and why they cannot be addressed in the same manner".^^

Any historical narrative is a particular bundle of silences, which vary
accordingly ... I only reposition the evidence. The result of a unique
process, and the operation required to deconstract these silences will
vary accordingly.^^

On one level silences arise due to the uneven power in the production of sources, the
generation of narratives, and the access to archives. However, as established, a lack of
evidence does not necessarily disqualify a particular story, because the significance of
the story is already inscribed in the silences. Thus a narrative can be more
conspicuous by its absence. It is in fact revealed through the tensions inherent in the
contrast between chronology and duration, between propaganda and testimony, and
between competing political philosophies and worldviews.
Here lies the relevance of a theory about power and the production of history.
The victory of the New Order regime over communism and Sukamoist ideology is not
just a narrative about a particular victory, but a process by which the story of victory
silences other stories. It is about who has the right to determine the conceptual
boundaries of what constitutes evidence, what is historical, and what then remains
outside of history. History is always produced in a specific context. By repositioning
evidence, or re-creating the circumstances of knowledge's emergence, a new narrative
is created. As this new story of 'what happened' develops it reveals a great deal about
counter narratives and how they are silenced. The context produces different types of
memory, which in turn reveals complex social, political and historiographical patterns
of power and ideology.
As the next chapter will demonstrate, the means of creating new stories and
subverting counter narratives starts at the source, at the point of fact creation, within
the terms set by the political context - in the story of forgetting the violence of 1965,
by means of a powerful ideology.

'%id., p.26.
^^Trouillot, op.cit., pp.26-27.
'%id., p.27.
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Chapter Two
Anti-Communism as Context
Pattems of memory associated with 1965 cannot be comprehensively understood
without first explaining the origins, pervasiveness, impact and durability of anticommunism as a regime-generated ideology of repression, social re-engineering and
memory manipulation.' This ideology exhibited three discrete phases in the period
between 30 September 1965, the stage-managed General Election of 1971 and the end
of New Order rale in May 1998. The first was the destmction of the senior
organisational and cadre stmcture of the PKI and the killings. The second was
characterised by the collaboration of a broad coalition of anti-communist forces in cooperation with sections of the Indonesian military and typified by the use of anticommunism as a point of ideological linkage between allies. A third phase appeared
once the New Order no longer required the support of this coalition. This emerged
once the Suharto group felt that their position, vis-a-vis Sukamoist elements within
the armed forces was secure and involved the use of anti-communism as a weapon of
intimidation directed against most forms of political dissent. Anti-communist
ideology was to characterise New Order mle right up until, and even beyond the
9 ^^

resignation of President Suharto. This ideology provided the New Order with an
enormous range of repressive possibilities.
This chapter argues that these manifestations of anti-communism determined
which accounts of 1965 were admissible, first as evidence, and second as history. The
New Order viewed communism metaphorically, like a fire within a rice chaff mound
- unseen but active. The regime strongly maintained that communism was an everpresent threat to the nation and that this demanded the utmost vigilance of all
Goodfellow, Api Dalam Sekam, op.cit.
^Quoted in Associated Press On-line http://aap.com.au/activemedia/Level3/newsbulletins.htm site
accessed 14 March 2000. 'Wahid backs probe into 1960s massacre'. "Indonesia President
Abdurrahman Wahid has said he would support an unprecedented judicial probe into the massacre of
hundreds of thousands of alleged communists in the late 1960s. Hundreds of thousands of Indonesian
leftists were slaughtered in the aftermath of an abortive coup in 1965. The purge was conducted by
Major General Suharto, who later took over as Head of State from former President Sukarno. Wahid
said the government's task was to follow up the findings of the investigations and to punish those who
are found guilty." See Rizal Maslan, 'Bakorstanas Bubar, 3 Mati dan 87 Kolonel Menganggur', Detik,
10 April 2000. Significantiy, it has only been since the election of the administration of Abdurrahman
Wahid that the Indonesian government has begun to address the plight of those Indonesians who
continue to be disadvantaged because of the stigma of the label 'communist'. The state security
organisation Bakorstanas, which was responsible for the surveillance of ex-PKI members in the 1990s,
was disbanded in early April 2000.

52

hidonesians, in particular members of the armed forces, the civil service, and the
urban elite. Over time, the govemment consistently argued that their heavy-handed
approach to the latent danger of communism was designed to prevent the smouldering
embers of mass-based politics from re-igniting dormant social tensions. The regime
promoted the myth that communism by its nature was devious, surreptitious, and
protean. This was despite the fact that there was little evidence to suggest that during
the New Order era the PKI existed in any effective form.
The message established by anti-communism was contrary to what most
Indonesians remember of the PKI before the massacres. As sets of oral testimonies
will demonstrate, there are contradictory memories regarding what people recall of
the PKI as an institution of high social standing, particularly at village level, and
communism as a spectre of doom. Anti-communist mythology established Marxism
as a force of political evil, as opposed to the then legal and respected organisation
known as the PKI. Anti-communism constituted the essential context by which
memories of 1965 were formed and negotiated. For instance, stories of death squads,
mass graves, headless corpses, miraculous or supernatural escapes from the military,
the torment, endurance or tragedy of 'innocent victims' and the complex justifications
of perpetrators are all influenced by anti-communism. However, these memories are
shaped by this ideology in different ways and at different points of the New Order
story.
In the first instance anti-communism played a dominant role in how the
killings were formed as a remembered event. As Trouillot comments, the first
opportunity for a silence to enter any historical discourse is at the point of fact
creation. In the second instance anti-communism determined what was possible to be
recalled in the present because of the veracity of the government's anti-communist
purges of the mid-1990s. What the post-coup propaganda campaign did was to disturb
the historiographical flow of the period of the killings by generating a silence in the
discourse well before an official narrative emerged. This compromised the manner in
which certain sets of facts were collected, archived, retrieved, and then made available
for later analysis. This allowed for the exclusive emergence of regime-generated
propaganda as 'history'. This meant that only those highly subjective accounts
consistent with anti-communist ideology could be re-told. These remembrances
flourished at the expense of durational remembrances of the killings. For this reason
anti-communism determined the absolute terms of reference by which the events of
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1965 could be conceptualised and reproduced in eyewitness accounts. Durational
memories are influenced by the terms of the event itself - the horror and intimidation
engendered by the physical violence of the killings. Chronological remembrances, on
the other hand, have been shaped by over 33 years of the fear of being labelled
politically evil.
The foundations of anti-conmiunist ideology, or destmction, collaboration and
coercion were actually well established by late 1965, rather than by the zenith of New
Order power sometime during the mid-1980s.^ There were in fact strong anticommunist sentiments among certain layers of the population, including large sections
of the army, dating back to the Indonesian Revolution. These prejudices were
entrenched during the PKI's aksi sepihak, or 'unilateral land redistributions', of the
early 1960s. Under Suharto's careful guidance the post-coup propaganda re-ignited
these sentiments with the killings actually commencing on 1 October 1965 and
rapidly escalating over the month of October 1965. The so-called Angkatan 66 or
'Generation of 1966' anti-communist students, academics, and business people's
collaboration with the TNI was in place during the anti-Sukarno demonstrations of the
same month. This set an example of the benefits of working with, and not against,
military power (as demonstrated by the way in which some, but certainly not all, anticommunist student leaders from the period were richly rewarded with education and
other opportunities by Suharto).
The 1971 General Election formalised New Order power as constitutional, and
therefore seemingly legitimate, rather than what it had been in reality - a physical
military victory. Furthermore, the repressive intentions of the New Order state,
particularly as exhibited in the mid-1980s, were actually the corollary of anticommunism, not a new phenomenon. Anti-communism in fact developed during the
period of killings. This is illustrated in popular newspaper sources discussed in later
chapters. The point is that these forces provide the context for memory and the
conceptual framework for remembering.
While the ideology of anti-communism has had many bureaucratic
manifestations over the years of New Order rale, its essential character remained
consistent. According to the New Order, communism was evil, foreign, antiIndonesian and even anti-God. It was also deemed to be anti-modern. Therefore it was

"Goodfellow, Api Dalam Sekam, op.cit., chapter one.
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considered to be opposed to the notion of a continuously improving future. (The
'future' is a powerful sentiment in post-Independence Indonesian society and is
frequently reflected in literature. A prominent example is the central character of
Pramoedya Ananta Toer's 'Bum Quartet' - Minke). There is also a strong link
between this term and another New Order key word, or lexicon, namely
pengkhianatan or 'treachery'. Sudjatmiko, for instance, argues that the destmction of
Indonesian communism in 1965-66 actually allowed for modernity to emerge in
Indonesia (a la Suharto) and that the alleged inappropriateness of communism for an
Indonesian context was fully responsible for its own downfall.'' In a similar way
Sulistyo argues that PKI mobilisation over the question of land reform was
provocative,^ while Goenawan Mohammad argues that Sukarno's insistence that
everything critical of the PKI was komunistofobia, or 'fear of communism', was
"designed to castigate Indonesian political groups who showed an aversion to the PKI
and rejected attempts to forge a united front with the Marxist-Leninists".^ The
provocative actions of the PKI were said to be responsible for unsettling the
Indonesian people, both in 1965, and today.
Another persistent theme found in the work of Sudjatmiko and others has been
the post-massacre justification of the violence as a case of 'kill or be killed'. This
slated the PKI as vengeful. The Islamic religious Right, especially those who
participated in the violence against PKI members, continues to strongly support this
opinion.^ A contrary, but not opposite view, is argued by Ruth McVey, who suggests
that the rise of the New Order marked the death knell of a progressive, egalitarian,
democratic,

gender-balanced,

post-Revolutionary

and

uniquely

Indonesian

modernity.^ (Although the Sukarno dictatorship could be both progressive and
Sudjatmiko, op.cit., p.237.
Sulistyo, op.cit., p.236.
^Goenawan Mohammad, 'Remembering the Left', Indonesia Today, Grayson Lloyd and Shannon
Smith, eds, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2001, pp. 130-31.
^Goenawan Mohammad, Sidelines: Writings from Tempo: Indonesia's banned Magazine, Hyland
House, South Melbourne, 1994, pp.201-4. See also van Langenberg, 'GESTAPU and State Power', in
The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.49. It has now been established that the CIA provided their own
'death list'. This involved the provision of names of at least 5,000 PKI cadres to the Indonesian military
following the coup. In a twist to the 'kill or be killed' assertion of the anti-communists, CIA agent
Robert Martins, who complied the list, claims the justification for his actions was, "wasn't it a case, in
Lenin's favourite phrase [of] them or us?"; Kathy Kadine, 'Interviews with ex-CIA and US Consular
Officials', reproduced in Indonesian News Service, July 1990, pp. 1-20.
^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. This includes Kidul Catholics who in 1965
identified with the anti-communist politics of the Yogyakarta Kaliurang seminary, which was vocally
anti-communist, and which is reported in testimonies as having actively participated in the killings.
McVey, 'Teaching Modernity', op.cit.
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vengeful.) The violence was therefore symbolised by the army high command not in
terms of its horror, but as a sacred batfle between the inappropriate and the
appropriate, between Marxism and anti-communism, between a tumultuous past and a
brighter future. This neutralised the hitherto enviable reputation of the PKI for
disciphne, honesty, and integrity. October to December 1965 was, as McVey
suggests, a "psy-war".

It was a battle of political ideologies purposely reduced to a

simplistic contest between good and evil. In addition, because of the alleged
involvement of GERWANI in the slaying of the generals, it became a battle between
men and women, and between notions of gender equality and inequality ultimately
leading to a regressive realignment of the subservant role of women in paternalistic
and hierarchical Javanese society."
The origins of New Order anti-communism first emerged as a reflection of a
particular worldview held by a social faction of the New Order priyayi^^ or 'whitecollar nobles' - in particular the officer corps of the TNI from which the New Order
clique of the Indonesian military was substantially comprised. Significantly, this
group was, and continues to be, made up of the upper stratum of the ethnic Javanese
majority who have dominated the indigenous elite in the archipelago since the early
days of Dutch colonialism, and ABRI's officer corps since the Indonesian Revolution
1 o

(1945-49).

This attitude was typified by Dutch colonial ideology, namely, rust en

orde or 'peace and order', or what was later identified by academics as the
beamtenstaat,^^ or the ideal of the East Indies Empire ran as an efficient bureaucratic
machine. Contemporary indigenous elites viewed political culture through the prism
of over 300 years of social accommodation - between themselves and their European
colonial masters.

'"Ruth T. McVey, 'The Great Fear in Indonesia', unpublished paper, 1994, p.9.
See Wieringa, op.cit.
'^Or white collar Javanese nobles. These 'native' elites were a particular invention of the Dutch
colonial state. During the 16* to 19* centuries the definition of elite was broadened as the need for
loyal, indigenous state functionaries increased with the VOC and then Dutch colonial state's expansion
of trade. Clifford Geertz refers to the priyayi as 'gentry'. See Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java,
Free Press, 1976, Glencoe, 111., p.228. Also Heather Sutherland, The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite:
The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi, Heinemann Educational Books, Melbourne,
1979, p.7.
"Said, S. Genesis of Power: General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics 1945-1949,
Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1991, chapter 2, and Jenkins, op.cit, pp.1-52.
'''McVey, 'The Beamtenstaat', Interpreting Indonesian Politics: Thirteen Contributions to the Debate,
Benedict R. Anderson and Audrey Kahin, eds, Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, no. 62, Ithaca, New
York, 1987.
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The New Order priyayi, like their colonial antecedents, maintained that control
could only be imposed over the allegedly unsophisticated and volatile masses through
a mixture of paternalist and authoritarian means - of both a bureaucratic and military
nature. The repressive ideologies of European colonial and native elites towards 'the
masses' were practically indistinguishable. Actually, the suppression of the anarchic
popular will by the New Order after 1965 demonstrated a remarkable retum to the
attitudes of the Dutch. The mobilisation of communal forces - Islam during the
colonial era and communism during the post-Independence period - were seen by
both colonial and post-Revolutionary elites as an intolerable challenge to the
established order. McVey makes the point that there was, however, one important
difference between the Dutch beamtenstaat and the New Order: "In the New Order
the military had a hegemonic role, whereas the late colonial regime was undisputedly
civilian. These contrasts, however, disguise another fundamental similarity, the fact
that both mihtary and colonial mle rested openly on force".
Crouch, for example, argues that although the officer corps of ABRI
maintained that they were the guardians of the 'People's Revolution of 1945', as the
core element of a popular guerrilla war, the army hierarchy under General Sudirman,
and later under figures such as Generals Yani, Nasution and Suharto, were
conspicuous by their lack of interest in formulating any sort of popular postRevolutionary democratic ideology.'^ Their pre-occupation was position and control achieved by force. Sundhaussen also points out that although many priyayi dropped
hereditary titles in an attempt to demonstrate their egalitarian credentials, this did not
mean that they had adopted egalitarianism as an ideology. Rather there existed a "real
line of social division between the illiterate, unsophisticated and tradition-minded
peasantry and urban work-force, who were willing to be led, and the literate,
educated, often culturally very refined people determined to lead".'^

^^Ibid., pp.84-85. See also Robert Cribb, ed., The Late Colonial State in Indonesia: Political and
Economic Foundations of the Netherlands Indies, 1880-1942, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1994.
'^Crouch, Army and Politics, op.cit., p.36. See also R.E. Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography,
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001.
'^Ulf Sundhaussen, The Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics 1945-1967, Oxford University
Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1982, p. 17.
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The Dutch had already expanded the definition of priyayi well before the
Revolution. They were simply responding to the demand for indigenous elites to work
co-operatively in their task of consolidating the East Indies Empire. This was
particularly relevant in the export cash crop lowlands of DIY and Central Java, where
the Dutch controlled the population by granting limited autonomy to the Kratons of
Yogyakarta and Surakarta under threat of military annexation. Native functionaries
and later Javanese military officers under Dutch and then Japanese Imperial command
began to see themselves as members of a distinctive priyayi aliran or 'elite social
stream'.'^ They therefore began to identify subjectively with the style, values, and
ideology of the hereditary priyayi, not objectively with the royal households of
Central Java. The description by Pemberton of Surakarta Javanese court style
emerging from royal Dutch protocol in the 1870s as "cultural cross-dressing", reveals
many aspects of this long-standing contestation between native form and colonial
substance.'^
It was Dutch colonial administrative ideology, in particular Dutch education,
military training and statecraft, presented it in terms of pure Javanese tradition that
created, the worldview of the contemporary priyayi class. The army officer corps
maintained that these values were rooted in Central Javanese culture, despite the fact
that these same values, or what Anderson referred to as "order, mle and hierarchy",'^^
can be demonstrated as less than 'traditional' .^' In order to traditionalise this deeply
rooted colonial legacy, the New Order packaged-up their ideology in a distinctly
indigenous form. The identification of the Suharto family with the lavish court culture
of Surakarta, Central Java, and the frequent use of terms such as tata tentram karta
raharja, or 'order, peace, propensity and good fortune' came to represent in a
culturally appropriate Javanese way what was to the Dutch a longstanding preoccupation with 'order'. As Geertz comments:

Here was a class whose ethos was deeply at variance from that of the
peasantry. It conceived of life in terms of hierarchy and power rather
than in terms of simple communal democracy; in terms of privilege
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Geertz, The Religion of Java, op.cit., p.229.
Pemberton, op.cit, p.l 10.
^''Benedict Anderson, 'The Language of Indonesian Polities', Indonesia, no. 1, April 1966, p.98.
21

O

Sutherland, op.cit., p.7.
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rather than

mutual

obligations; in terms

of ostentation

and

aggrandizement rather than subsistence and communal obligations.^^

The army officers who have mled Indonesia in either a military, or what was
frequently referred to as a 'functionally civilian' capacity, since 1945 actually
exhibited less interest in identification with 'the masses', than their own social
mobility. Between the officer corps of the TNI and the mass of the Indonesian people,
a great material and ideological gulf existed well before 1965. The army hierarchy, as
part of the urban elite, was concentrated in the national political centre. The peasantry
was dispersed throughout the mral hinterland. The urban poor were mostly found in
the kampung, or semi urban village system that typified most of the medium and small
cities and towns of DIY, Central and East Java. The elite enjoyed the material benefits
of city living. The life of the peasantry and the urban poor was characterised by
subsistence. This disparity was well established long before the New Order formed
their distinctive elite ideology of anti-communism.
Attempts by Anderson and Geertz to characterise priyayi self-identification
have been concemed with a discussion of 'other' and 'self. This is characterised by
qualities that the priyayi believe distinguished them from the abangan - or 'the
nominally Islamic rice farming peasantry' - formerly the key constituency of the PKI.
According to Geertz, this involves the concept of the avoidance of any act suggesting
disorder or a lack of self-control. In priyayi ideology the difference between humans
and beasts is that the former "know order".^^ Anderson, on the other hand, argues a
different assumption based on self-identification, in particular the concept of 'halus'
or that quality that defines one as being Javanese - in fact being fully human namely, self-control. The opposite of halus is kasar. Kasar is the natural state of
humans. It is characterised by a lack of control, irregularity, imbalance, disharmony,
. 2 4

Ugliness, coarseness, and impurity.
Significantly, durational modes of remembering of the violence in 1965, or
raw unmediated memory, was almost immediately perceived by the New Order to
engender conflict and disorder simply because this was deemed to be in conflict with
official history, which was crafted, refined, and manipulated prima facie, to avoid
^^Geertz, op.cit., p.234.
^^Ibid., p.247.
''Anderson, Language and Power, op.cit., pp.50-51.
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'conflict' (read opposition). It was therefore simply kasar for people to recall the PKI
in a favourable light. Any deviation from official views of early Old Order political
culture, or more precisely, 'what happened' in 1965, was declared to be, in effect,
kasar - and therefore cmde, immoral, illegitimate, and relevant to this study, ahistorical. In fact New Order counter narratives were claimed to engender the worst
type of disorder, namely disorder from below. Pemberton uses the example of the
influence of Mrs Suharto on her husband to adopt Surakarta Court form and values the antithesis of Javanese peasant culture. In On the Subject of 'Java', Pemberton
describes Madam Tien Suharto's opening of the 'Beautiful Indonesia in Mini' park on
20 April 1975:

Addressing the dedication ceremonies, Mrs. Suharto stressed the idea
of a cultural inheritance (warisan kebudayaan), a quasi-spiritual form
of inheritance, which, if left unguarded, might be destroyed by the
lowly, and purely material demands of a developing people. '

The connection here is with an implied right to the socially appropriate 'historical'.
According to New Order ideology implicit in Mrs Suharto's statement, issues of
'culture' and 'history' were far too important to be simply left to the lumpen
proletariat - the same so-called 'kasar abangan' who by and large constituted the
mass base of the PKI.
In contrast to priyayi notions of self and state were both Sukamoist ideology,
and the progressive policies of the PKI.^^ Sukarno's political vision can be
characterised by 'Marhaen-ism', according to which the typical Indonesian resembled
the character of a man Sukarno claimed he once met, called 'Marhaen'. Marhaen was
the ordinary Indonesian, the nominally independent peasant or artisan who had been
repressed economically by the excesses of colonialism and capitalist Imperialism.

^^Pemberton, op.cit., p. 154, quoting Kenang-kenang Peresmian Pembukaan Taman Mini Indonesia
Indah, BP5, Jakarta, 1975.
^®Rex Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform: 1959-1965, Centre for Southeast
Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, Victoria, 1972.
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The philosophy behind Marhaen-ism, like Sukarno's 1926 Nationalism, Islam
and Marxism (a Sukamoist concept representing the acronym for the political
synthesis of 'nationalism', agama or 'religion' [Islam] and 'communism') looked for
ideological similarities between Islam and communism as represented in the
peasantry, and nationalism as represented predominantiy by the urban proletariat and
large sections of the elite.

The formulation of Sukarno's early Guided Democracy

ideology, such as NASAKOM, was, however, more concemed with political control
and the future accommodation of the PKI within the Cabinet. This represented the
potential exclusion of senior Right-wing generals from the mechanisms of power.
The NASAKOM formula channelled fmstrations, such as deteriorating basic
state infrastmcture, poverty and starvation, as well as the psychological effects of
colonialism, into a populist straggle against a vaguely defined 'Imperialism', without
specifically addressing the Indonesian economic collapse of 1963-65. Sukarno's
populism treated the symptoms of discontent with highly charged political rhetoric
characterised by strident anti-Western foreign policy. This exacerbated economic
disintegration because it cut off sources of aid and trade. Furthermore, the advent of
hyperinflation during the early 1960s caused Sukarno's rhetoric to assume real sociopolitical implications. The deteriorating Indonesian economy created the volatile
situation of drastically reducing the living standards of most ordinary Indonesians.
Under these circumstances the PKI were increasingly pressured by their mral peasant
and urban proletariat constituents into pursuing a more militant position on behalf of
their material interests.^^ As the political and social temperature rose in early 1965,
the PKI and the military emerged as key challengers to executive power, with
Sukarno in decline, and organised Islam temporarily marginalised.
^^See Sukarno, Nationalism, Islam and Marxism, Karel H. Warouw and Peter D. Weldon, eds, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1984, pp.35-62. For a discussion of the origins of Marhaen-ism
see John Ingleson, Road to Exile: The Indonesian Nationalist Movement 1927-1934, Heinemann
Educational Books, Singapore, 1979, pp.150, 166, 188 and 190-92. "Sukarno's own explanation of
how he coined the word 'Marhaen' is a delightful story and an imaginative product of his revolutionary
romanticism. According to Sukarno, while cycling through the countryside south of Bandung he met a
farmer who was tilling his field. The farmer owned a small plot of land, which he tilled himself, a
simple house, a hoe, shovel and plough. The farmer just managed through hard work to feed and clothe
his family. When asked his name, the farmer, who Sukarno saw as typical of his people, answered
Marhaen." Ibid., p.l91. Finally, 'Berdikari' is from the combination of Indonesian words 'to stand on
one's own two feet', a Sukarnoist ideological stand on self-reliance free from 'economic imperialism'.
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'Rural Development and Class Contradictions on Java', The Journal of Contemporary Asia, no. 3, vol.
5, 1975,pp.327-35.

61
In the straggle for the welfare of the rakyat kecil or 'little people', many argue
that the PKI represented the socially adventurous cutting-edge of Sukarno's Guided
Democracy (1957-66). The PKI's social program was claimed by its supporters to
have held the most hopeful prospect for a reconstmction of society and the
development of a uniquely Indonesian system of democratic government. The PKI
maintained that their policies could sustain development, combined with attention to
mass welfare and the elimination of gross inequities and bureaucratic vices that
plagued (and continue to plague) the country. However, the most intolerable aspect of
communist ideology for the military was that it complemented, formalised, and
legitimated the core political traditions of the peasantry. These were characterised by
simple communal democracy, mutual subsistence, and communal obligations. The
PKI claimed that this vision of hope could be backed up by the power of its mass
base, its considerable organisational stracture and internal discipline,^° as well as the
patronage and support of Sukarno himself. It was ironic, however, that despite
Sukarno's appeal for unity, more than any other issue, NASAKOM forced the
physical polarisation of Indonesian society into pro- and anti-communist camps.
Instead of unity, NASAKOM caused a deep social raction. On the one side of this
ideological divide was the PKI and affiliate bodies, and on the other the priyayidominated officer corps of the TNI and a coalition of liberal democratic forces and
conservative Islamic landowners or santri.
However, in terms of the social and political context for memory it is more
important to establish what the pnyayz-dominated faction of ABRI believed
communism represented than to examine the PKI's social poHcy and political
objectives per se. For instance, from ABRI's perspective (or at least the significant
majority of those who held strong anti-communist sentiments within ABRI) the PKI,
with its capacity to organise the masses, was responsible for encouraging, even
enabling, anarchic anti-order. A potent example of this can be found in the PKI's aksi
sepihak or 'unilateral actions'.^' This sought to redistribute land from Islamic santri
landowners to land-less abangan peasants, particularly in East Java during 1963 and
1964.^^ Because of this, the PKI came to be regarded by the TNI as the archetypal

^°Rex Mortimer, Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965, Cornell
University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1974, p. 14.
Sulistyo, op.cit., p.236.
^^Mortimer, The Indonesian Communist Party and Land Reform, op.cit., pp. 12-24.
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anti-state institution - despite the fact that under Sukarno they were an integral part of
state ideology, and willing participants in Sukarno's authoritarian Guided Democracy.
While the values of the New Order priyayi and the antagonism of the PKI's
policies constitute one explanation for the strained relationship between the different
social, economic and political forces represented by the TNI and the PKI, the
development of a specific anti-communist ideology can only be fully explained in
terms of the events surrounding Lieutenant-Colonial Untung's failed 30 September
Coup. (This is not to mention the long-standing antagonism between the Siliwangi
division of the TNI and the PKI following the massacre of during the Madiun Revolt
of 1948.) Using the Untung coup as a pretext, anti-communism became more than a
reflection of a particular cultural worldview. In effect, it became an anti-ideology
ideology, used to neutralise the populist appeal of both Sukarnoist nationalism and the
power and appeal of the PKI as an institution. Ultimately, anti-communism had a
simple purpose - to reinforce ABRI's physical victory secured through the massacres.
The re-writing of history ensured that this victory over an old competitor for power
would be permanent.
As argued, the basis of this anti-ideology ideology is deeply rooted in
opposing worldviews, however its organised and systematic form is based on the postcoup propaganda campaign. At the core of this was ABRI's claim the PKI had
embarked on a deliberate course of subterfuge and treachery aimed at infiltrating
cadres into every stratum of society with the ultimate intention of overthrowing the
legitimate constitutional government. Anti-communist elements within ABRI alleged
that this strategy was consummated on 30 September 1965. The killings of the
generals were viewed by anti-communists as precisely this premeditated opportunity.
This had the effect of solidifying three centuries of priyayi class development into one
overwhelming 'typical event'. This drew a strong distinction between the legitimacy
and the decency of the military and the inherent indecency, anarchy, immaturity of the
PKI and the corollary to this - communist-organised treachery, murder, and mayhem.
These assertions were made despite convincing evidence that the PKI were committed
to a slow constitutional victory through the ballot box.^^ In fact key elements of the
PKI's senior leadership were well aware of the danger of provoking the military and
actually took steps not to antagonise them.'^''
•3Q

"Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, op.cit., pp.218-29.
van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, op.cit., pp.279-81.
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The propaganda narrative per se started with the discovery of the bodies of the
generals in a common well, called Lubang Buaya or 'Crocodile Hole', located on the
perimeter of Halim Perdanakusumah air force base outside Jakarta. TNI accounts of
exactiy 'what happened' on that night were exclusively published in two military
newspapers, Angkatan Bersenjata and Berita Yudha. Stories featured blurred
photographs of the decomposing bodies. These newspapers declared that the deaths
were "barbarous deeds in the form of tortures executed beyond the bounds of human
feelings".

(The official autopsy report significantly stated that no evidence of torture

or maltreatment could be found on the corpses.)^^ Remarkably, two weeks later on 12
November 1965, Suharto himself chastised journalists for their exaggerated reporting
of the story. In fact, he insisted that reports of mutilation were completely
unfounded.^^
Suharto's role in the coup is immediately called into question by comparing
his initially ambiguous response and his later strict adherence to the official line that
the PKI organised the coup and presided over the tortures, allegedly carried out by
members of GERWANI and Pemuda Rakyat, the communist-affiliated youth wing. It
appears that Suharto did not immediately recognise the mass-psychological and
strategic advantages of the story. However, within two weeks he had changed his
mind about the usefulness of playing up the mistreatment of the generals. The near
hysterical potency of the public burial of both the generals and General Nasution's
daughter, who had been killed in the kidnap attempt, was, from ABRI's perspective,
an outstanding propaganda victory.
There is evidence that the killings in DIY, Central and East Java actually
started on the day of the child's funeral - on 2 October. The state burial ceremony was
publicised in every major newspaper in Indonesia. The PKI were branded as bmtal
and indiscriminate in their attacks on 'good Moslems'. The effect was explosive. It
led to an outbreak of communal violence that ultimately led to the deaths of,
according to a wide range of sources, between 150,000 and 2,000,000 people before
March 1966.^^

^^Ibid.,p.nO-\3.
' Anderson, 'How did the Generals Die?', op.cit., pp. 109-34.
^fbid.
Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p. 12.
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The Lubang Buaya site was almost immediately converted into a New Order
shrine characterised by an enormous memorial, complete with giant statues of the
murdered officers and an even more commanding statue of a Garada (which replaced
an original smaller statue), symbolising state power. (Sukarno decreed funds in late
1966 to the Lubang Buaya monument as a symbol of his capitulation to a powersaving alliance with the military.)^^
The forces of political, social and historical change imposed by the victors,
and physically represented in the form and stracture of the Lubang Buaya monument,
depended on one clear propaganda message, established within weeks of the 30
September Coup, namely that the PKI leadership were totally responsible for the
transgressions committed on the late evening of 30 September and that PKI general
secretary, Aidit, and the entire PKI politburo (some of whom were in the People's
RepubHc of China and the Soviet Union at the time) were the dalang, or
'puppeteers',''° indeed the masterminds in a nation-wide conspiracy."' The propaganda
generated by the Lubang Buaya fabrications portrayed the PKI as crade, unprincipled,
even animal-like. As such, individual communists were marked for extermination.
With Sukarno politically neutralised, and the PKI leadership destroyed, the TNI set
about to first eliminate opposition, second to institutionalise anti-communism as a
permanent feature of state power, third to prevent the PKI from ever rising again in
the Indonesian body politic, and finally to install anti-communism as a bulwark
against all forms of present or future resistance to New Order rale, including any
resistance to official historiography.
Communism was labelled 'foreign' and 'atheistic'. Individual PKI supporters
were accused of black magic, hostility to Islam, and a predilection to violence.
Leaflets were circulated reminding santri villagers "thousands of Muslims were
murdered by the other side in the 1948 Madiun incident".''^ In this respect, not only
cultural traditions such as ethnic identity and traditional values were stressed but also
potent religious and historical prejudices. Rumours spread of nameless atrocities,
particularly against religious figures and the helpless. There were unsubstantiated
reports of communist youths collecting weapons and attacking villages. As far as the

'Schreiner, 'Remembering and Forgetting at Lubang Buaya', op.cit, p.l51.
Shadow puppet theatre.
"'Sulistyo,
chapter 2, 'Historiografi GESTAPU: Siapakah Pelakunya?'
Sulistyo, op.cit., cha
"^Kenneth
Kenneth R. Young, 'Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965', in The Indonesian
Killings, op.cit, p.11.
40c
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TNI propaganda was concerned, the outward puritanism of the communists was
revealed through the atrocities committed at Lubang Buaya to conceal the deepest
depravity. Not only the murder of the generals, but also the growing upheaval
associated with the post-coup massacres served to create an image of communism as
pure chaos, in fact "a demonic force whose destmction would be a service to the
nation"."^
Every communist was implicated. The physical destmction of the ideology
responsible for this intolerable affront to 'order' was declared necessary for the
survival of the nation. These assertions were strongly supported by Suharto.
Following the discovery of the bodies of the murdered officers, Suharto, then
KOSTRAD commander, issued a press statement that described what was to become
the New Order's enduring historical position on the coup and the beginning of the
silence associated with the killings. The text from the Indonesian Department of
Information document entitled General Suharto: Man of Destiny illustrates this view.

In unequivocal terms Major-General Suharto states [that] at 2100hrs on
1 October following the reoccupation of the Radio Indonesia building
that agreement had been reached between the Army, the Navy and the
Police to annihilate the 30 September Movement/PKI. Thus, from the
very first day, the tables had been completely turned. Due to the
farsightedness and firm tactical action of General Suharto he has been
able to create an atmosphere of security and calm, and heavy is this
task, for the Sukarno regime has left behind a hideous augean stable,
which ought to be cleaned. Stability in the political and economic field
is most imperative. Hence, all funds and forces available are aimed
towards the achievement of stability.

The statement demonstrates two important themes. First, it shows the importance
placed by Suharto on the physical annihilation of the PKI. Second, it shows the
central ideological significance of the term 'stability'. In the Suharto statement the
PKI is identified as the 'element' to be destroyed. This is because according to New

Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.29.
""Anon, General Suharto: Man of Destiny, Indonesian Government Department of Information,
Indonesian Department of Information Press, Jakarta, 1966, pp.9-11.
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Order rhetoric the PKI had proved itself, again, to be the physical, political and
historical manifestation of everything wayward in Lidonesian society. Significantly,
not so much the 30 September Coup, but the violence and social upheaval that
followed, was interpreted as typical of the anarchy that characterised the Guided
Democracy period - and communism. This belief was so strongly held by those who
identified with priyayi cultural values that having seized the political initiative, they
decided to desti-oy not only the PKI as a physical organisation, but any memory of
communism's positive socio-political role in the early 1960s. As Southwood and
Flanagan write:

The success of this exercise was a complete recreation of history, a
supposed plot by middle ranking officers against the army leadership
became a bloodthirsty conspiracy of the entire PKI (and any other
unsuitable organisation) to overthrow the President and menace the
Indonesian people."^

The coup was, for instance, almost immediately referred to by the acronym
GESTAPU for Gerakan September Tigapuluh, or 'Movement of 30 September'. This
term was coined by the Director of ABRI's newspaper Angkatan Bersenjata,
Brigadier-General Sugandhi, with the intention of "investing it with the aura of evil
associated with the term Gestapo".^^ The abbreviations of 'GESTAPU' and 'PKI'
were then inseparably linked in the propaganda so that henceforth the Army promoted
G30S/PKI as if the actual association of the abbreviations constituted proof of the
complicity of Indonesian communism in the Untung coup.'^''

Southwood and Flanagan, op.cit., p. 130.
^van Langenberg, 'GESTAPU and State Power', The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.46. An alternative
term coined by Sukarno was GESTOK, Gerakan Satu Oktober, or 'Movement of 1 October'. This was
not promoted by the military because it drew attention to the Suharto counter-coup and took public
attention away from the alleged involvement of the PKI. It also failed to capture the public imagination
in the way that the highly emotive GESTAPU did.
During fieldwork the term GESTAPU was favoured by persons born after 1965 with persons
connected to the PKI using the more ambiguous Peristiwa Enam-lima or 'the special event of 1965'.
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With the propaganda initiative of Lubang Buaya in hand, the army elite moved
to strengthen their strategic position against dissenting units of the armed forces,
particularly a large section of the Central Java-based Diponegoro division that had
shown sympathy for the Untung coup, and later the East Javanese Brawijaya division,
which continued to show support for NASAKOM, even after the resignation of
Sukarno in March 1966."^ The Suharto command also deemed it necessary to
establish a strategic advantage over Left-wing forces by the use of Islamic and other
paramilitary groups. This is demonstrated by the co-operation between the
Paracommando under the command of General Sarwo Edhie, and the youth wing of
traditionalist Islamic Nahdatul Ulama, ANSOR and its para-military wing, BANSER.
"PKI activists were arrested and shot by troops while the non-military auxiliaries
killed indiscriminately anyone identified as a communist or sympathiser."''^ The key
point is that anti-communist ideology was a prominent feature of the TNI's backlash
from the first days of the military counter-coup and the Paracommando sweep of DIY,
Central and East Java in November and December 1965 and Bali in January 1966.
While it is tme that anti-communist ideology was characterised by ever increasing
degrees of pervasiveness, particularly during the 1980s, the question is, when were the
foundations laid that established the patterns of memory associated with the killings?
Immediately following the coup, in the period between October and November
1965, the first manifestation of anti-communism as a weapon of intimidation appeared
as the term terlibat or 'being involved in the G30S/PKI coup'. Anyone identified, or
in fact simply accused of being 'involved', was arrested, imprisoned or killed.
Following the massacres and the banning of the PKI, when the New Order were less
concemed about a resurgence of communism, the Suharto group began to focus
attention on eliminating Sukamoist elements from the junior ranks of the armed forces
using the same modus operandi. This targeted pro-Sukarno divisions such as the
Marines, as well as Sukarno's personal guard. Again the terminology changed to
reflect a new phase, namely those who had acted dibi72a oleh PKI or 'under the
influence' of army- infiltrated PKI elements.
The effect was to widen the criteria in order to capture non-communists who
were in sympathy with Sukarno during a time when the 'Generation of 1966', who

"^Sundhaussen, op.cit, p,215. Of the seven Diponegoro infantry battalions present in Central Java on 1
October 1965, five threw their support behind the Untung coup.
Ward, 'National and Local Influences', op.cit., p.86.
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initially supported the military, were beginning to seriously question the undemocratic behaviour of Suhaito.^° As Bourchier comments: "The scouring had
created a reservoir of bitterness amongst pohticians, soldiers, and civil servants whose
pro-Leftist or Sukamoist credentials branded them utterly unemployable".^' While
anti-communist propaganda was well estabhshed by March 1966, the Mahmillub or
'Special Military Courts' originally set up in 1963, were used as a device to try the
coup plotters in late 1965, gave anti-communism a deeper level of legitimacy. It also
used the public fomm this created to call into question the character of Sukarno
himself, or in fact the character of anyone who openly supported his policy of
NASAKOM. It was at this time that communism was labelled 'kasar'. For example,
the news dailies Api Pantjasila and Angkatan Bersendjata discussed Sukamo's
womanising and extravagant lifestyle openly during the Mahmillub and linked this to
similar allegations levelled against surviving members of the PKI politburo.^^ The
purge was wide-ranging. As Schreiner points out, during the first month of the
Mahmillub, most of the eye-witnesses to the coup, or senior Guided Democracy
figures who were prepared to give a contrary report, were either killed or their
testimonies suppressed. It was during this time that the new power holders
deliberately destroyed records that may have implicated the military in the killings reports, dispatches, and in fact complete libraries of contemporary books and
manuscripts.^^
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the New Order again shifted the focus of its
surveillance activities and the form of anti-communism to reflect a concern with
elements within the civil service suspected of being in favour of civilianising the
army's role in the bureaucracy. The terminology again mutated, this time
characterised by bersih diri or allegations of being 'personally un-clean of
communism'. This was expanded to include those who did not have a bersih

^°A striking example of this failure can be found in the work of ex- and now present editor of Tempo,
the 'Generation of 1966 New Order Radical', Mohamed, Sidelines, op.cit.. The author persists in
perpetuating aspects of New Order propaganda about the circumstances surrounding the
Suharto/KOSTRAD counter-coup of 1 October 1965. This is despite the fact that, as a member of the
liberal (anti-Communist) intellectual elite, he would have been aware of serious challenges to the
existence of the Supersemar document or the authenticity the New Order version of 'what happened'.
See in particular the chapters entitled 'The Closing of the Newspaper', pp.101-2; 'After van den
Bosch', pp.175-76; 'October', pp.199-200; 'PKI', pp.201-2 and 'The Believer', pp.203-4.
Bourchier, op.cit., pp.9-10.
^^Aboeprijadi Santoso, 'German historian discusses Sukarno in a troubled time'. The Jakarta Post, 5
June 2001, p.2.
^^Schreiner, 'Remembering and Forgetting at Lubang Buaya', op.cit, p.l50.
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lingkungan or 'social environment free of links to the unclean'. This policy continuum
culminated in the most broad-reaching campaign of New Order anti-communist
paranoia, namely keterpengaruhan. This was aimed specifically at student groups but
had the effect of being all-encompassing.
This new term was described by the New Order as: "the state of being
influenced by anyone who had been influenced by communism, or in fact showed any
attitude that resembled or assisted PKI strategy".^'' This effectively made all forms of
dissent synonymous with the commemoration of the memory of what the New Order
claimed the PKI represented - un-redeemable political evil. The social and political
effect was to formally link the events of 1965 with contemporary New Order political
crime, in particular 'subversion'. The intimidation associated with keterpengaruhan
had a far-reaching influence that extended to the realm of both private and public
remembering. Anything associated with the PKI and NASAKOM was declared taboo.
This especially included favourably inclined memories of these institutions. The
outcome was that anti-communism continued to hold real power over the popular
memory of the entire early New Order period.
To illustrate the efficacy of anti-communist ideology, nowhere was the silence
more clearly defined than in the 1000 page, two volume, bi-lingual, 50 Years of
Indonesia published as New Order power was beginning to decline during 1995.^^
This massive pictorial history of Indonesian nationhood, from the Declaration of
Independence in 1945 until the 50* anniversary celebrations in 1995, is conspicuously
divided between volumes by the 30 September Coup. The end of volume one begins
with a critical analysis of Guided Democracy, which carefully defines the chaos that
characterised the end of the Sukarno era and the coup as part of the one political and
historiographical package. Guided Democracy is claimed to have been the vehicle that
led the nation to economic rain,^^ and also allowed the PKI an opportunity to attempt
to overthrow the state.^^ The theme of the 'un-Indonesian-ness' of communism
precedes the final section entitied: 'Night of Disaster', where the entire New Order
propaganda story is laid out, complete with photography of all the main scenes.
^"'New Policy on Civil Service Screen Tests', The Jakarta Post, 28 July 1990, p.3.
^^Tim Penyusun, Buku 50 Tahun Indonesian Merdeka, 50 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka: 1945-1995, PT
Citra Media Persada, Jakarta, 1995. (Note: because of production delays this volume was not available
until 1996.)
^^Ibid., p.391. The poem 'Black October' by Taufig Ismail entitled, Syair Orang Lapar or 'Poem of
Hunger Stricken People', is included in the volume to remind people of Sukarno's legacy of economic
mismanagement.
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including the murdered generals, the exhumation of their bodies and the emotioncharged state funeral of 5 October. "^^ This section includes a poem by Taufiq Ismail
entitied 'Black October' in which the story of General Nasution's murdered daughter
is retold.^^ It is clearly re-produced in 50 Years of Indonesia with the intention of
rekindling official memory of the 30 September Coup.
In the second volume, 1965-95, the narrative begins with a section entitled
'Destroying the G30S/PKI: It Started at KOSTRAD'. This places Suharto at the
centre of the successful military action to crash the plotters and save the nation from
communism.^^ This continues through the arrests of prominent communists, the
mihtary-sponsored trials and the mythologized support of the 'Generation of 1966',
and on to the mythological New Order relationship between 'the armed forces and the
people'.

Nowhere are the killings raised; the coup becomes the pivotal point of all

historical representations - the killings are silenced.
In these commemorative volumes, other forms of New Order violence are also
silenced. For example, the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975 is referred to as
a 'legitimate integration'. There are no references to the bmtality that typified
Indonesia's 20-year occupation of the former Portuguese colony.

On the other hand,

in volume one, entitled 'The Indonesian Revolution', ^ the Westerling Coup,

the

^fbid., p.403.
^^Ibid,. pp.401-15.
^^Ibid., p.4l5.
Ade's blood, the littie girl
Dripped down his father's walking stick
Bearing the weight on the cemetery
Enduring the suffering
But still stood defiantiy
A sharp bamboo blade pierced the sky
Incising the nebula
Sending the drizzle
Whispering
Ceaselessly
Your name
We woke up in the October dark hours
Breaking away from the fog of illusion
Years went by, the crowd asking for justice
Can you hear the earthquake coming?
^Ibid., vol 2, pp.\2-l3.
^''Dwitunggal Baru: ABRI dan Rakyat' or 'The duumvirate: the armed forces and the people'. The
term 'Dwitunggal' was coined by Sukarno to mean 'the unity of Sukarno and Hatta'. It was
appropriated by ABRI in 1966 as part of the 'New Order'.
See James Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, Jacaranda, Milton, Australia, 1983.
Buku 50 Tahun Indonesian Merdeka, op.cit., pp. 11-280.
^Ibid., pp.272-76.
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Republic of South Maluku Rebellion,^^ the Darul Islam Rebellion,^^ and the
PRRI/Permesta civil war in West Sumatra^^ are all illustrated as 'violent events'. The
effect is to portray the 'Old Order' as unambiguously violent. The New Order is
characterised by images of economic development and political stability under the
conspicuous leadership of Suharto. Like the Lubang Buaya myth, anti-communist
ideology, and even the celebration of Indonesian nationhood, constituted a type of
historiographical foundation that laid out the terms of remembering.
What ensued over the 33 years of New Order mle was that anti-communism
prospered as a bulwark against challenges to official values and the economic
advantage that accompanied widespread crony capitalism, or kolusi, korupsi dan
nepotisme - 'collusion, cormption and nepotism'. To this end ABRI maintained that
the duel sociopolitical-military function of the armed forces and the relegation of most
hidonesians to the position of a highly controlled a-political 'floating mass' provided
the only solution to the chaos associated with Guided Democracy mass-base politics
generally, and communism specifically. The anti-communist purges that characterised
the 1980s were a reflection of a reactive and defensive response to any criticism of
this position. (It is significant that the term 'Guided Democracy' was seldom used by
the New Order to describe the final seven-year period of Sukarno's presidency, rather
the term 'Old Order' is employed to create distinctions and contrast.)
Effectively, anyone who was even accused of links to communism was
targeted. Superimposed over this were two processes. The first is what Tanter referred
to as "militarisation, comprehensive domestic political surveillance and intermittent
but persistent state terror and rehearsals of memory".^^ This involved public
rehearsals of the government's carefully crafted version of what happened in 1965 the 'trae' explanation of events, exemplified through historical sites such as the
Lubang Buaya Monument, The Museum of Communist Party of Indonesia Treachery
(opened in 1992), the Yogya Kembali Monument (which will be discussed at length in
chapter five) and the commissioning of the TNI's internet home page in 1995, just to
make certain that the 'evil of communism' was not lost on the cyberspace

^'/fcjd., pp.281-84.
^^Ibid., pp.285-92.
^fbid., pp.337-42.
^^Richard Tanter, 'The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence Organisations in the Indonesian State', in
State and Civil Society in Indonesia, Arief Budiman, ed., Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Monash
University, Clayton, Victoria, 1990, p.214.
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generation.^^ This ensured that the rituals of commemorating the events of 1965 were
observed rather than individual memories of the violence. Examples include some of
the plethora of anti-communist rituals including 'Heroes' Day', 'The Sanctity of
Pancasila Day', 'National Stability Day', and the yearly compulsory viewing of the
propaganda films Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI or 'The Treachery of the G30S/PKI' and
Djakarta 1966: Supersemar. In effect, ex-comimunists or tapols (from tahanan politik,
or 'political detainee') assumed the role of walking exhibits of official narrative - a
living, silent interface between the all-powerful anti-communist state and a weak civil
society. This commitment to ritual remembering is clearly demonstrated in a speech
Suharto made on Armed Forces Day 1988 when he said:

We are all determined that the national tragedy which culminated in
the G30S/PKI revolt be our last bitter experience and will not be
repeated again. We must reinforce this determination every time we
commemorate ABRI Day and the Sanctity of Pancasila Day on 1
October.^°

Suharto's quasi-religious insistence on never-forgetting what it was to officially
remember 1965 was reinforced at every level of society, not only to the general
public, but to all Indonesian school children through standard-issue history texts such
as Sosiodrama Pelengkap PSPBJ^

AS

previously raised, this document required

children to re-enact the events of 30 September through the medium of role-play and
participatory drama. This was 'un-remembering' on a national scale.
State intervention in the process of forestalling ideological threats from both
the broad Left (communism) and the religious Right (militant Islam) was formalised
in 1978 when the New Order instigated a process of compulsory indoctrination for all
citizens in the state ideology Pancasila. The courses, called P4, from Pedoman
Penghayatan dan Pengamalan

Pancasila, or 'Pancasila: Guidelines for the

implementation and experiences of Pancasila', were introduced into all work places,
government offices, university campuses and schools. By 1983, all political parties

^Vickers, 'Reopening Old Wounds', op.cit., p.783.
'^^Angkatan Bersenjata, 6 October 1988, Indonesian News Service, no. 149, November 1988, p.3.
Op.cit.
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were required by law to adopt Pancasila - as defined by P4 - as their sole ideological
foundation. However as Ricklefs suggests:

Repeated episodes of student protest also showed that, for the
politically sophisticated and courageous, P4 courses did little to inspire
greater affection for the regime. In fact, evidence of the govemment
elite enriching itself from the development process was probably a
more powerful factor in shaping popular views of the government. '^

P4 was pervasive because it could be backed up by rehearsals of memory. An
example of the use of state-controlled violence as a means of firming New Order
ideological power was the execution of Mohammed Munir in 1985.
Almost 20 years after the military came to power in Indonesia the regime
executed the former-leader of the SOBSI Federation of Indonesian Trade Unions.^^
Munir was arrested in 1968 but not brought to trial until 1973 when he was convicted
and sentenced to death under 1963 anti-subversion laws. On 14 May 1985 he was
taken from his cell, and without explanation, shot. On 19 July 1985 there were further
executions of Rustomo, Gatot, Lestario and Djoko Untung - all former senior
members of the PKI in East Java.^" It was unclear whether the government had other
agendas, or if the condemned had simply come to the end of a long, tedious and
inhumane process. (This also highlighted general problems with the judicial process
in Indonesia.) What the imprisonments and executions did, however, was to illustrate
the continued power and convenience of state violence and anti-communism.
At the time it appeared that these executions were also intended to balance up
the imprisonments of Islamic fundamentalists, or rather as a general reminder that the
New Order could neutralise any person or group found guilty of opposing any aspect
of Suharto's mle. In the case of those executed in 1985, the prosecution alleged that
the condemned had tried to replace Pancasila, that they had aroused hatred against the
government, and that they had denounced the family planning program.
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Ricklefs, op.cit, p.306.
^-^SOBSI was affiliated with the PKI.
^"Elizabeth Marlow, 'Executions in Indonesia; Jakarta Justice', Inside Asia, September to October
1985, p.15.

74

Others were charged and sentenced for 'insulting the President', or arrested for
distributing subversive leaflets, cassettes, posters or speeches that challenged the New
Order's version of events such as 1965 or the 1984 Tanjung Priok riots.^^ At this time
the government also broadened its criteria for what constituted an enemy of the state
from simply a 'communist threat' to a threat of 'Islamic communism'.
As far as the issue of 1965 detainees was concemed, several hundred 'category
A' political prisoners were still incarcerated after the general amnesty of the mid1970s. However, by December 1977 the government decided, under intense
international pressure, to release those prisoners it could not bring to trial. This was
not the end of the matter. In 1978 over 100 former members of the PKI, who had fled
to the outer islands after 1965, but had returned to Java after the amnesty, were
arrested and charged.

In fact there were executions of former Cakrabirawa palace

guards on 15 October 1988. At this time there remained four former leading PKI
members, six members of Cakrabirawa and a former Indonesian air force officer
under sentences of death.

These men continued to languish in prison until the end of

the Suharto era.
The executions of ex-PKI members further distinguished the violent potential
of anti-communist ideology. The official campaigns made reformist sentiment in the
civil service and the pro-democracy aspirations of students synonymous with
communism. The fear generated served as a warning to progressive elements within
the bureaucracy not to tamper with 'the family principle', defined as the 'big ABRI
family', of the New Order-controlled State Party - GOLKAR, KORPRI or the civil
service, and the combined armed forces under Suharto, including the ABRI-controlled
police force.^^ These manifestations of anti-communism served as an example to nonelite sections of Indonesian society as well.
It was, in effect, a warning to all sections of society not to challenge the
relationship between the raler and the raled, the priyayi authoritarianism on which
that relationship was based, or the historical legitimacy on which both rested - the
involvement of the PKI in the coup, the Lubang Buaya propaganda, and the highly
questionable 'constitutional' transfer of power between Sukarno and Suharto on 11
'^^Ibid.
Ricklefs, op.cit., p.306.
"'More Executions', Tapol Bulletin, no. 90, December 1988, pp. 11-12.
^^Michael van Langenberg, 'The New Order: Language, Ideology, Hegemony', in Arief Budiman, ed..
State and CivU Society in Indonesia, Monash University Press, Clayton, Victoria, 1990, p. 138.
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March 1966. In this way students demanding keterbukaan or 'openness in
government' were declared either 'communists' or 'communist-inspired', or in the
case of the bureaucracy 'influenced by something that had been influenced by
communism'. The way in which anti-communism was used can be seen in the vicePresidential re-election of GOLKAR chairperson Sudharmono - who was alleged by
sections of the army to be in favour of 'civihan-ising' ABRI's role in both the
bureaucracy and within ABRI itself
In the first example the conservative Murdani faction within ABRI singled-out
Sudharmono, then serving vice-President under Suharto, because they believed that he
was responsible for advocating a split in the 'big ABRL family'. In reality
Sudharmono, a Suharto loyalist and a conservative himself, was proposing no such
thing. It was just that the Murdani group were incensed at Sudharmono's elevation in
the context of General Murdani's sacking earlier that year. For the Murdani group this
represented the first serious signs of Suharto's alienation from the armed forces and
the decline of military influence within the New Order.
The campaign started when anonymous pamphlets began appearing all over
Jakarta accusing Sudharmono of being a 'crypto-communist' and a member of a procommunist unit during the Indonesian Revolution.^^ In terms of the broader
implications of this campaign most people in fact had a 'PKT link with some family
member, and so the move against Sudharmono provided a convenient means of
targeting everyone and anyone.
The widely distributed pamphlets insinuated that Sudharmono was a protector
of communist elements within his own department. These claims rested on the fact
that a number of Sudharmono's advisors had received their qualifications from Soviet
universities during the Sukarno period.^° Because these individuals had escaped
detection under the govemment's bersih diri provisions, it was suggested, although
never publicly raised, that Sudharmono had extended his protection to them. This
included the head of GOLKAR'S Department of Agriculture, Sartojo Prawirosurojo,
who was found to have been a member of the Left-wing organisation Barisan
Sukarno, or the 'Sukarno Brigade', as well as the speaker of the Provincial Assembly

™J. van de Kok, R. Cribb and M. Heins, '1965 and all that: History in the Politics of the New Order',
RIMA, no. 25, vol. 2, 1990, p. 10.
*°Motek, 'Reviving the Communist Threat', Inside Indonesia, no. 16„October, 1988, p.6.
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of East Java, because his father had once been a member of the Left-wing teachers'
union, PGRI - Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia non-vaksentral^^
The immediate effect of the campaign was to shift the ideological centre of
gravity further to the right as Sudharmono fought to establish his New Order anticommunist credentials. However, what the campaign did was set in motion the most
repressive and extensive purge of alleged communists seen since the first days and
months of New Order rule.^^ In particular the campaign deemed that government
employees should not only be innocent of any personal involvement with the PKI, but
also come from a family environment in which no relative, or indeed associate, had
been involved in Left-wing politics during the Sukarno era. This meant that
potentially everyone was guilty of something. This campaign targeted all 175,000
'category C

political prisoners, their families, friends, associates and even

acquaintances. However, what it was intended to do was to remind Indonesians about
the danger of communism (read the repressive power of anti-communism) and the
potential of the govemment to silence any critic.
This campaign reached a crescendo in mid-1990 conveniently leading up to
the 25* anniversary of the 30 September Coup. On 17 April 1990, bersih diri was
replaced with keterperigaruhan. This revitalised both the threat of communism and
the role of the state security apparatus in dealing with dissent at a time when the label
'communist' was beginning to reach its use-by date. In the late 1980s, in some circles,
'communist' had in fact become a form of jocular abuse between young people, such
as PKI-Lu or 'you no good commie'.^^ This arose from the absurd situation where
govemment officials began to blame the most ridiculous events on communism. For
example, fires that destroyed high-rise buildings and floods were blamed on 'PKI
remnants'; pickpockets and chicken thieves were linked to the PKI and natural
disasters attributed to Marxism. Pornographic film and comic book merchants were
slated for propagating "a banned ideology".^" Even a type of ant was referred to as
semut PKI or the "PKI ant" because of its savage bite.
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van de Kok, Cribb and Heins, op.cit., pp.8-11.
*^'The Clean-Self and 'Clean Environment', witch-hunt', Tapol Bulletin, no. 90, December 1988,
pp.14-16.
^%id, p.35.
The Jakarta Post, 21 November 1987, p.3.
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Keterpengaruhan was, however, no joking matter. Its effect destroyed careers
and prospects - and it sustained anti-communism. Keterpengaruhan became a Sword
of Damocles suspended over the head of any dissenting person or group - within or
outside the bureaucracy. In terms of historical memory it played a profound role in the
way 1965 was remembered as a chronologically mediated event - particularly by
those with the most to lose, including people who held minor government positions,
or those within ABRI ranks. This also included the children of people in such
positions, or those who had distant family members who were disqualified from
seeking or holding public office, under the New Order's criteria of being 'influenced
by communism'.
The second aspect of anti-communist administrative policy to affect people
was to equate contemporary youth radicalisation with the PKI. In response to student
activism, particularly on university campuses during 1977 and 1978, the Education
Minister, Daud Yusuf, issued an administrative regulation that enforced Normalisasi
Kehidupan Kampus, NKK, or the 'Normalisation of Campus Life'.

This involved

the closing down of the student press (the only free press in Indonesia at the time). It
also included the very real threat of individuals being placed on a 'student black list'
by the state security organisation - BABCIN. The government in fact took the student
movement very seriously. Dewan Mahasiswa or 'Student Council' activities were
frozen in January 1978. Elected councils were dismissed and replaced with student
faculty bodies that were easier for the military to control.
The entire higher education system was then 'bureaucratised' so that all
students' activities conformed to NKK and P4. The effect was to distract students
from "sharpening their critical and creative skills".^^ To ensure compliance the
govemment funded student regiments, which were "more military than the
military".^^ These groups received formal training, were given impunity to act against
campus-based "trouble makers", and received the full protection of the local military
command. Their brief was to "neutralise or stabilise the campus from being abused as
political arenas".^^ It took a decade for the Indonesian student movement to recover.
When students resumed protest in the late 1980s their activities were again met with
How the Sins of a Father Destroyed a Career', Tapol Bulletin, no. 95, October 1989, p. 14.
"'White Book of the 1978 Student Protest', Indonesia, no. 25, April 1978, pp.151-66.
Marianto, op.cit, pp.93-94.
'^Ibid.
^Ibid., p.97.
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the full force of anti-communist ideology. What became known as the Yogyakarta
student subversion trials was played out in this context.
The Yogyakarta student subversion trials were the govemment's first attempt
since the early days of New Order mle to try dissenters under the pre-Suharto AntiSubversion Law. Since the 1970s this had been used exclusively against Muslim
activists opposed to the state ideology.^' However, these Laws were re-activated to
complement charges of keterpengaruhan. The trial proceedings illustrate how anticommunism was employed by the govemment in order to teach students an even more
draconian lesson than NKK, particularly about challenging the political power, or
legitimacy, of the New Order elite.

The thrast of accusations was that a group of

students had shown an attitude that resembled and assisted PKI strategy by advocating
and disseminating the writings of dissident novelist, and former political prisoner,
Pramoedya Anata Toer. They were, according to the govemment, "the same as PKI".
Supporting this charge, the Attorney General, Sukarton Marmosudjono said
that Pramoedya's writings were "a danger to national unity, against the family
principle, and pitted one Indonesian against another". According to Marmosudjono, it
was therefore "clearly communist doctrine".

In Kompas, General Sudomo, then

Minister for Security and Internal Affairs, attacked both Pramoedya and the students
by stating: "He [Pramoedya] had targeted former PKI members and lower class
people [students and farmers] who are mostly narrow-minded, due to their simple way
of thinking".^'* This was a clear reflection of priyayi patemalism. The blend of priyayi
ideology and the repressive aspects of anti-communism could likewise be seen in the
comments of General Murdani, who in 1989 was quoted as saying:

Couldn't students formulate what they sought in civilised rather than
dirty words? A leader is not someone who shouts filthy and abusive
words ... so they have to behave themselves ...Why be dubious?
There's nothing to it, you don't have to get scared. Those who get
'thrashed' are those who act unconstitutionally. PKI, which was
'•'Indonesian Subversion Trial in Yogyakarta', Amnesty International Summary, August 1989, pp. 1-9.
The anti-Subversion Law was first issued as Presidential Decree Number 11, 1963 by President
Sukarno. In 1969, by an act of the Indonesian Pariiament, the anti-Subversion Law was re-enacted and
again declared to be 'constitutional', with no changes made to the wording of the original Act.
92 <
"^'Giving Students a Lesson', Tapol Bulletin, no. 97, February 1990, p. 15.
93
''Jakarta Post, 6 June 1988, quoted in Indonesian News Service, no. 113, June 1988, p.l.
94
^Kompas, 9 June 1988, quoted in Indonesian News Service, ibid., p.l.
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unconstitutional, yes, we thrashed it. After fifty-five years of
independence, we thrashed them all.^^

The student subversion trials in Bandung and Yogyakarta, were a test of the New
Order's resolve to suppress both student activism and the pro-democracy movement.
The charges of 'communist influence' had two objectives. The first was to contain the
growth of student radicalism - which had clearly recovered from the NKK
suppression of the late 1970s. The second was to break the ideological, physical and
historical link with a pre-Suharto past. In short, it was to ensure that the New Order
story continued to dominate popular consciousness.
For example, in addition to the charge of possessing and selhng banned books,
one student was charged with holding 'improper views' on the events of 30 September
specifically that the coup was an internal ABRI affair, rather than a 'traitorous act of
the PKI'. Another student was charged with being a supporter of a communist study
group and of being an Islam komunis or 'Islamic communist'. To secure release,
students were required to identify each other as communist cadres.

All of this was

ostensibly aimed at the one and a half million 'communist sympathisers' who were
detained after the coup. This provided the New Order with the means of perpetuating
the terror, and reinforming the reality of ABRI's physical victory.
For most untried 1965-66 political detainees, the Suharto years were
characterised by 'collective punishment'. Before 1995 when the ex-tapol label was
removed from identity cards, tapol had no right to compensation for destroyed or
confiscated property; they were barred from employment in any government
department, the

media, political parties, strategic industry

or

state-owned

corporations; they could not vote nor be elected to public office; they were banned
from obtaining a passport and from travelling overseas (except under special
conditions to take the Hajj to Mecca); they could not move freely between cities
within Indonesia, nor obtain credit from a bank; nor could they receive employment
entitlements from positions held prior to 1965.

^^Kompas, 19 September 1989, quoted in Indonesia News Service, no. 226, December 1989, p.4.
*'0n Trial for Setting an Example', Tapol Bulletin, no. 94, August 1989, pp.9-19.
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Furthermore, under Govemment Regulation Number 6 of 1976, a screening
process was established to ensure that all candidates for govemment, official or
'sensitive' positions were subject to the clean environment check mentioned
previously. According to the government's intemal security apparatus, this was to
ensure that any candidate for a sensitive position came from an environment 'free
from communism'.^''
In a similar way, and in obvious reference to concerns about student
radicalism, there was an air of political camival about the way in which the New
Order selected the targets and then applied their remedy of anti-communism. For
example, on 25 September 1995, five days before the 30"' anniversary of the events of
September 1965 (during the Indonesian State's 50* anniversary celebrations)
Attorney General Singgih banned the memoirs of one-time Sukamo Cabinet minister,
Oei Tjoe Tat, on the grounds that it "fomented false opinion, primarily among the
young generation, so as to create public unrest"."^^ According to Arief Budiman there
were good reasons for the New Order's response to Oei's comments about the role of
the 'Generation of 1966'. Without the mythologised contribution of students in 1966,
the story of the rise of the New Order would have been the story of a military coup
against Guided Democracy, not a democratic backlash by liberal-progressive students
against the ideological stagnation of Sukamo and the PKI.^^ The terms of the New
Order response were, however, already well in place. The New Order's anticommunist remedy again ensured that there would be 'a total correction' of both
political practice and historical thinking.
After December 1965, anti-communist ideology ensured that a pervasive
silence descended across both the public discourse and the remembering of victims
and the perpetrators of the 1965 violence alike. After this time there was only one
public voice enunciating the historical orthodoxy of the period - and this involved the
30 September Coup, never the killings.'°° From the New Order's perspective, official
memory ensured that Indonesians came to accept that almost everything that the New
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Cohen, 'Total Correction', op.cit., p.22.
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Order stood for was correct and that all that preceded it, or in fact challenged it, was
in error.'°' Again, during the Suharto era one overwhelming historical theme can be
identified. That was, everything that was not consistent with New Order ideology,
political practice or economic interests were declared 'inspired by communism'. As
the case of the Leftist PRD demonstrates, transgressions were strategically,
selectively, and bmtally crashed. This response included the use of considerable state
resources designated for the reproduction of New Order historical consciousness. As
the head of the armed forces. General Feisal Tanjung said in 1995 on the 50*
anniversary of the formation of ABRI:

I am appealing to all layers of society not to let down your guard
against the latent dangers posed by the remnants of the PKI... Various
activities [conducted by former communists] [had] sought through the
dissemination of news, to twist the nation's history and to discredit the
New Order govemment. "^^

This chapter has demonstrated the role of power and ideology in the story of 1965 as
the context in which history was made. As further chapters will demonstrate, the
context determines which historical accounts enter history and which are silenced.
The next two chapters will use the analysis developed previously to show that
different types of memory say different things about 1965. Observations made in
chapter four will then be contrasted with evidence from the time of the killings. This
will begin to unravel the answer the question of how the killings of 1965 were
silenced for over 33 years. This discussion will further illuminate the causes and
characteristics of the process of forgetting, from the point of fact creation to the
creation and promotion of New Order myths, to the retrospective evaluation of
historiographies as defined in the previous chapter.

'"'Discussion with a local Taxi Driver, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. The driver said that under
Suharto: "Putih menjadi hitam dan hitam menjadi putih", or "everything that was white had become
black and visa versa".
The Jakarta Post, 5 October 1995, p.2.
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Chapter Three
The Field of Study
The government's warning about the danger of resurgent communism was clearly in
the mind of the author of the history of the Kidul Catholic parish, published in 1997
at the height of New Order anti-communist ideology. Paroki [Kidul] Yogyakarta:
Masa Lalu, Masa Kini dan Masa Depan, or 'The Parish of 'Kidul': The Past, Today
and the Future', dedicated only one short section to the violence. However, within
this paragraph are a number of subtle diversions, encryptions, and silences.' For
example the period of the killings is diplomatically described as having "sufficient
profile not to have to elaborate further".'^
The work refers to the Ikatan Petani Panca Sila, or 'Followers of the Panca
Sila Farmers' (the suffix Panca Sila being code for followers of most anticommunist groups at the time) but does not explain or define the role of the group in
the violence. The next section is a paradoxical statement that records that: "The
people played a major role in the annihilation and many sought refuge in the
church". This is an ambiguous word play that purposely leaves the definition of
historical actors, commentary and analysis completely unresolved, or rather silenced.
This is consistent with the examples raised by Trouillot. As with the history of the
Haitian Revolution, the Kidul church's involvement in the killings is inscribed in the
silences. And like the history of the local parish, much of the story of Kidul in the
violent months following the coup is located in the space between the facts.
Between June and late October 1997 I rented a small house on the banks of
the river that geographically defines the area of my fieldwork - the village
community of Kidul, a kampung in the Special Administrative District of
Yogyakarta, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta or DIY. During the mid-1960s, many
residents of Kidul either actively supported or were in sympathy with the PKI.

^Paroki 'Kidul' Yogyakarta, Catholic Church, Yogyakarta, 1997, p.25.
^This is represented by the comment: "When the G30S/PKI erupted the people did not feel safe, and
sought refuge in the church and in fact slept there", p.25.
^Probably ANSOR or Pemuda Katolik - the youth wing of the Indonesian Catholic Church. I am
indebted to Robert Cribb for drawing this to my attention. No record of a formal organisation called
'Petani Panca Sila' can be found in the literature.
Paroki 'Kidul' Yogyakarta, op.cit., p.25.
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The leader of the larger community group that incorporates the villages
around Kidul commented in 1997 that of 100 family groups, some 20 household
heads had been members of the PKI or affiliate organisations, predominantly SOBSI
(unions) and BTI (peasants).^ Most of these family leaders were reported to have
been well educated - many had graduated in a variety of fields, including
agriculture, education, law, engineering and medicine from Gadjah Mada University
during the late 1950s and early 1960s. They were, however, simply identified by the
village head as 'Ex\ One resident made a point of saying: "there wasn't one family
in Kidul in the early 1960s without some connection to the PKI". She added, "it is
difficult for anyone to point the finger, even today".^ Another person confided that
she remembered the PKI in Yogyakarta had a policy of targeting prominent people
in particular communities, and that because Kidul had a large number of resident
artists and educators, interest in the kampung was extensive.^
Interviews reveal that many, perhaps most women in Kidul, had been
members of the PKI-aligned GERWANI. In part, this was because of GERWANI's
reputation for honesty and the clear organisational goals of "independence, hard
o

work, and education". According to a prominent member of the community who
lived in Kidul at the time, "it [belonging to GERWANI] was what was expected of
all women. In Kidul and in many areas of Yogyakarta at the time, it was normal".^ In
addition to GERWANI, the PKI-affiliated People's Cultural histitute, or LEKRA,
also enjoyed a substantial presence. This further contributed to the polarised political
complexion of the kampung and in fact most of the small towns and cities of DIY at
the time.'°
In the early 1960s, many artists associated with LEKRA chose to live in
Kidul. They were academic staff, students or graduate practising fine artists from the
former Gampingan campus of the Indonesian Fine Arts Academy, Akadami Seni
Rupa Indonesia or ASRI. Artists chose Kidul because it was quiet and rents were
^Confidential interview with the Head of the second tier of village organisation in Indonesia based on
a system implemented by the Japanese Army during Worid War Two, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August
1996.
^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
^Wieringa, The Politicisation of Gender Relations in Indonesia, op.cit., pp.248-83.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
'°I am indebted to Robert Cribb for pointing out that while Indonesian politics was considered Left of
centi-e through the 1950s any moderation on the part of the PKI, which might have fitted the 1950s,
was probably lost by the 1960s.
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less expensive than in the city. This remains the case today. The area was also
popular because semi-mral kampung life sustained a bohemian atmosphere that
complimented LEKRA's penchant for social reahsm. Indonesia's greatest artist,
Affandi, himself a one time PKI-sponsored member of the National Constituent
Assembly (MPR) between 1956 and 1959, often visited Kidul in the late 1950s and
early 1960s to meet friends. He reportedly "took great pleasure in mixing with local
residents"."
Passive support for the PKI in Kidul was reported as simply benefiting from
social, agricultural, cultural or educational projects carried out by Party members in
co-operation with locals.'^ "By mid-1965 almost everyone in Kidul had at some time
participated in a PKI-sponsored activity".'^ To this end well-organised local PKI
officials were known to have kept accurate attendee records of all village-based
programs.

This practice was later to speU disaster for hundreds of thousands of

people across the Indonesian archipelago. This was also the case in Kidul, where at
some time between October and December 1965 the RPKAD interrogated most
people who were recorded as having participated in these activities.'''
Combined with the trauma associated with often-vague stories about arrests
and interrogations, incorporated within the key coordinates of official history, and
within the period of this study, the govemment was easily able to remind local
people that state-sponsored violence could be effectively brought to bear against all
'communist-inspired dissent'. Indeed the Yogyakarta student trials of 1997
illustrated an important point related to these interrogations that was not lost on the
people of Kidul, especially the university student population that use poorer areas of
Yogyakarta as cheap bed-sit accommodation. It demonstrated anti-communism as a
weapon of intimidation to a new generation. The basis of this new manifestation of
anti-communist ideology was that intellectual freedom could be denied by equating
any form of critical thinking, especially social and economic analysis, with Marxist
doctrine.'^

"Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, November 1997 and from an interview with the artist's
daughter, Kartika Affandi, Yogyakarta, October 1999.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
''ibid.
'^Ibid.
'^'The Reality: The Trial of Coki Bonar', Inside Indonesia, no. 24, October 1990, p.8.
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This was demonstrated by a general reluctance of young people, in fact
almost everyone in Kidul in 1997, to discuss political issues of any complexion except in private, and then under conditions of strict anonymity. In fact many people
were terrified. The fact that during interviews students immediately fell back to the
propaganda line regarding the 30 September Coup and the PKI is evidence of the
effectiveness of the government's strategy of intimidating a new generation who had
not experienced the violence first hand. I encountered only one family in Kidul with
teenage children who themselves had any insight into the killings. This was because
one of the teenagers' relatives had been a victim of the violence and had also been
willing to share his experiences. The children's parents consented to the interview,
but were nonetheless extremely nervous.
The general area of Kidul first entered Indonesian history as the reputed
birthplace of Sultan Agung (1613-46), raler of Islamic Mataram and Java's greatest
warrior king,'^ and as a place where Yogyakarta Sultan Hamengkubuwono IV "once
rested".

Since the 1600s the district has been known for its chalk hill, which was

mined for hundreds of years to produce the base for whitewash before the resource
was depleted early in the 20 century. (Kapur, as it is known, had been a source of
considerable wealth for the courts of Sultans Hamengkubuwono IV (1812-22) and
Hamengkubuwono V (1822-36) then under the guardianship of chief minister
Danureja, who appropriated kapur revenues to maintain his place at court as Dutch
advocate during and following the Java War of 1825-30).'^
Local oral history narratives suggest that the area remained a rather
neglected, poor raral district well outside the formal city boundary of Yogyakarta,
until it rose to brief prominence in late 1948 during the Second Dutch Police
Action.^*^ Older members of the community can still recall Kidul as the site of fierce
fighting between General Sudirman's guerrillas and Dutch commandoes. The former
Dutch 'base camp' can still be seen adjacent to one of the many bridges that cross

'^Ricklefs, op.cit., pp.43-48.
'^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
'Vincent J.H. Houben, Kraton and Kumpeni: Surakarta and Yogyakarta, 1830-1970, KITLV Press,
Leiden, 1994, pp.132-35.
^°0n 19 December 1948 the Dutch launched their 'Second Police Action'. This was a Military and
diplomatic disaster for the Dutch. The loss of Yogyakarta to the invading forces led to a strengthening
of the United Nations' support for the Indonesian Republic. Fighting then raged around Yogyakarta,
including the area of Kidul, until a cease-fire was agreed to on 1 August the following year.
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the River Bedog.^' There is physical evidence of a former Worid War Two Japanese
bridge destroyed in the fighting. Local accounts indicate that a major battie for the
control of the area occurred in March 1949. One elderiy resident reported that after
the fighting she tended a wounded Repubhcan soldier.^^ In the late 1970s a large
number of small manufacturing businesses set up in the area. Because of the
increased economic activity, BCidul became known as Kota Malam or 'Night City,' as
business operated night and day. This was until the end of 1997, when most firms
were forced into bankruptcy by the Asian economic collapse.
The community of Kidul is considered a completely unsuitable place to live
by some members of the broader community, although, in 1997, intense pressure on
urban land was beginning to challenge this view. Residents who live in more
salubrious parts of the district often commented that the riverbank and the graveyard
environs were fit only for pariah or 'the underclass' (literally the untouchables).^^
Not surprisingly the area adjacent to the graveyard is believed by neighbouring
community members to be inhabited by the descendants of prostitutes (and by
implication, present practitioners).
In 1997 most male members of this section of Kidul were described as
berpension or literally 'on a pension', but were actually chronically unemployed,
with the exception of the local GOLKAR representative who has a small tailoring
business that under-employed around 15 women. Many of the husbands of the older
women were specialists in ma lima, Javanese for the 'five 'm's" of excessive
"eating, drinking, drag taking, gambling and womanising".^'' The unemployed of the
kampung were said, by other community members, to be experts in nonkrong,
Javanese for "sitting on the ground, staring into space, and doing nothing for long
periods of time".^^ During fieldwork in 1997, amongst residents of the larger district,
the graveyard and riverbank community was the butt of an almost continuous stream
of deprecating jokes. The elderly woman, who tended the wounded guerrilla in 1948,
was described many times as "a veteran". It was explained that she: "fulfilled a
unique role in comforting men on both sides of the conflicf.
^'in old Javanese, or Jawi, bedog means 'to hunt with dogs'. The remains of two footbridges blown up
by Indonesian Revolutionaries can still be seen in the riverbed.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^^Ibid.
^''Mangan, minum, madat, main, madon'. Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^^'Ahli nonkrong'. Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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The literature is rich with examples of similar communities in Central Java.
For example, the riverbank community in Patrick Guinness's Harmony and
Hierarchy in a Javanese Kampung bears a remarkable similarity to the riverbank
quarter in Kidul. Like Guinness's field of study, Kidul expanded from raral village
to semi-urban kampung from the mid-1940s.^^ Despite deaths from starvation,
sickness and war, the population in Guinness's study, as with Kidul, expanded
because of an influx of civil servants brought to Yogyakarta during the Indonesian
Revolution, particularly while Yogyakarta was capital of the Republic.^^ However as
Guinness suggests, all writers note the social differentiation of kampung residents
from the rest of the urban population.

The original use of kampung in the city was for the native quarter in
the Dutch colonial capitals. The Europeans lived in areas that had
wide paved roads and westem-style housing. The natives Hved in the
kampungs. The racial connotation is no longer there, but the social
differentiation remains. Now the Indonesian elite inhabits the areas
that were once the exclusive domain of the Europeans. The orang
kecil, [or] 'the little people', remain in the kampung?'^

Robert R. Jay's Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto provides
clues as to the possible involvement of the PBQ, GERWANI and Pemuda Rakyat in
kampungs like Kidul in the early 1960s.''° Jay comments that in Modjokuto [Pare]
the PKI were active in areas as diverse as Javanese mysticism (including 'curing
cults'), the 'Indonesian Farmers' Front' and 'The People's Boy Scouts of
Indonesia'. Jay also notes the polarisation of Indonesian society, with the influence
of the PKI countered by Muhamadyiah, Aisjah, (the Muhamadyiah Woman's
Auxiliary), Pemuda Islam, Masjumi Youth Auxiliary, Sarikat Tani Islam Indonesia

^^Patrick Guinness, Harmony and Hierarchy in a Javanese Kampung, Asian Studies Association of
Australia, Oxford, 1986, pp.84-108.
^^/W^.,pp.l4-18.
^'^Ibid., p.7, quoting Dennis Cohen, 'Poverty and Development in Jakarta', University of Wisconsin,
PhD thesis, 1975, p. 18.
^"Robert R. Jay, Javanese Villagers: Social Relations in Rural Modjokuto, MIT Press, Cambridge
Massachusetts and London, 1969.
^fbid., pp.425-27.

or 'The Islamic Farmers' Union of hidonesia', Hizbollah acting as part of the
Revolutionary War Veterans' Association, and the Islamic Boy Scouts.^^
This situation is, however, only vaguely suggested in the data collected in
Kidul, which does not mean that Modjokuto and Kidul are necessarily different. On
the other hand, the work of Supomo Surjohudojo, including Traditional Yogya in the
Changing World, and Life in a Javanese Village^'^ describe many, but certainly not
all, aspects of life in Kidul. The kampung style of settiement is, however, very
characteristic of town and city life everywhere in Java. For this reason the
observations, assumptions and analysis of kampung life in the community of Kidul
represent the possibility that Kidul shares social and historical processes with other
kampung communities in the PKI's former heartlands of DIY, Central, East Java and
Bali.
It is significant that the same silence that characterises the story of the
killings within Indonesia

also permeates the foreign

literature on urban

anthropology. For example, Peter J.M. Nas's The Indonesian City does not mention
the contribution of the PKI to village-based infrastmcture programs, choosing
instead to begin analysis in 'Urban Kampung Improvement' with the New Orders'
Third Five-Year-Plan or REPELTA III.

Nor does it mention social tensions based

on an individuals' former detainee status within communities.' In Guinness's work
the violence is only referred to once, and this is in the author's conclusion. This
oblique reference leads to the assumption that in the years of both Nas's (1975-78)
and Guinness's (1984-86) fieldwork, the trauma associated with the violence
militated against such a course of research.
This claim of Kidul being representative is, however, open to question. Is the
experience of people in Kidul regarding the forgetting of 1965 the exception that
proves the rale? As illustrated in the previous chapter the literature is also
characterised by silences about the phenomenon of forgetting in other Indonesian

^^Ibid., pp.428-29.
^^Supomo Surjohudojo, Traditional Yogya in the Changing World, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies,
Working Paper no. 7, Monash University Press, Melbourne, 1976.
^"Supomo Surjohudojo, Life in a Javanese Village, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Working Paper
no. 1, Monash University Press, Melbourne, 1993.
^'Peter J.M. Nas, The Indonesian City: Studies in Urban Development and Planning, Foris
Publications, Dordrecht, Holland, 1986.
^^It was reported that PKI cadres from Gadjah Mada University were responsible for riverbank
stabilisation work in Kidul during 1965, and that GERWANI were "very active" in assisting poor
mothers and their children. Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
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communities. Nevertheless there are clues to be found. As Guinness comments of his
own field experience, like van Langenberg's assertions in The Indonesian Killings,
the impact of the violence on most local communities was profound.

The post-1965 cataclysmic slaughter and persecution based on these
religio-political rifts took place within both village and urban
communities in Java, and the establishment of the New Order has
altered the direction of social change in much of Indonesian society.37

For instance, Sullivan's research on gender relations in urban Java is explicit in its
references to the aftermath of the violence, if not the killings themselves.^^
Significantiy, Sullivan's neighbourhood of 'Sitiwara' does actually bear clear
similarities to Kidul. For example, as with Kidul, around ten per cent of the Sitiwara
population were Christian, mostly Roman Catholics, many of whom were female,
with abangan husbands. In Kidul most of these women converted to Catholicism
post-1965 as a means of distancing themselves from the atheism associated with the
Left in general and with the PKI and GERWANI in particular."^^ In Sullivan's study,
it is noted that just five months before the 30 September Coup, Sitiwara women
changed their allegiance to GERWANI from the middle-class umbrella organisation
PERWANI, Persatuan Wanita Negara Indonesia, or 'The Union of Indonesian
Women'. This same process occurred in Kidul, although exactly when and under
what circumstances is not revealed in interviews. It was only ever conveyed that in
Kidul, during the mid-1960s, GERWANI were sangat aktip, or "extremely active".''^
As with Kidul, most of Sitiwara's GERWANI women were arrested,
interrogated, blacklisted and consequently forbidden to hold official posts or offices.
They were also obliged to report regularly to officials. Additionally, these women
were issued with special identity cards that clearly showed their former political
status. This further restricted their activities and movements."" In Kidul, one family
with former GERWANI connections, who were subject to regular inspections by the
military (this was usually to solicit a bribe), politely requested that I never come un-

37

Guinness, op.cit, p. 169.
Sullivan, Masters and Managers, op.cit.
^^Ibid., pp.24-25.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, October 1997.
Sullivan, Masters and Managers, op.cit., pp.60-61.
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announced. They specifically asked me never to knock on the door because "this
made their hearts pound"."^ (Knocking is not a usual Javanese or Balinese practice
but appears in this instance to have been adopted by the military.)
The former GERWANI leader in Sullivan's fieldwork, 'Bu Tri', likewise
bears a remarkable similarity to one of my neighbours, whose husband was
imprisoned for seven years in East Java following 1965. This person had to regulariy
report to the authorities while her husband was imprisoned. This was up until 1995
when she was informed, without explanation, that this was no longer required. As
with Sulhvan's respondent, this woman also converted to Catholicism during her
husband's incarceration."^ The interviews with former GERWANI members in
Saskia Wieringa's work, The Politicisation of Gender Relations in Indonesia, and
Sulhvan's data, show a similar, although not ubiquitous willingness on the part of
subjects to have their story told, or as Wieringa comments, "retum their history to
them".

In this respect Kidul differs considerably in that most people wished to

conceal their former membership of GERWANL*^
However, Sullivan, in contrast to Wieringa, does note the impact of negative
sanctioning on kampung cohesion in respect to general social interactions with
former members of the PKI, affiliates, or sympathisers.''^ In Kidul a number of male
household heads that were formerly blacklisted were actually not former PKI. Rather
they had been members of PKI affiliates such as Himpunan Sarjana Indonesia or
'The Indonesian Association of Scholars'. Some were identified as Left-wing Partai
Nasional Indonesia or PNI (the Party of Sukarno). Even disaffected PNI, who had
joined Partai Indonesia, Partindo, or 'The Indonesian Party', when it was reestabhshed in 1958, were marked as 'PKI'.''^ In fact, in Kidul, one former member of
the Progressive Teachers' Union was amongst this blacklisted group, and was
therefore expected to bear the burden of official sanction and social isolation as if he
were 'PKI'.''^ This person decUned to be interviewed.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
Sullivan, op.cit., pp. 106-7.
''''Wieringa, The Politicisation of Gender Relations in Indonesia op.cit., p.xxxii.
Ibid., pp.xxiii-xxxiii and pp.287-96.
Sullivan, op.cit pp. 106-7.
''Van der Kroef, op.cit, p.99. "After 1963, Partindo became in effect a kind of tactical satellite of the
PKI, useful to the Party in influencing the PNI with which Partindo retained informal relations,"
p.214. By 1963 Partindo radicalism and PKI infiltration had made Partindo into an informal
communist front organisation, p.316.
"^See Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., chapter 7, 'Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary
Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially East Java', pp. 169-76.
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hi terms of research practice, to seek interviews in a socially insensitive
manner would have further disadvantaged these men and women and their families.
It would have also directiy challenged the fine balance of social cohesion inherent in
the Javanese social norm of "good neighbouriiness" manifested as the avoidance of
conflict."^ As Stange suggests: "The Javanese will go to extremes in their efforts to
avoid roughness of interaction. They will almost always deny difficulties rather than
allow dismption of rukun or social harmony"''^ by lack of self-control, which Geertz
suggests is considered by the Javanese as behaviour fitting only for those "not yet
Javanese - i.e. the mad, the simple-minded and children".^' The possibility that
interviews could lead to a disraption of rukun meant that while most participants
were very happy to talk to me, they nevertheless made it clear that they did not wish
material to be recorded or utilised in anv form. This included many local women
who had previously been members of GERWANI.
There are a number of explanations for the concern associated with holding
documents such as interview transcripts.

Within Indonesia most sources such as

magazines, newspapers and official reports from the period October 1965 to March
1966, were either destroyed outright, quarantined in locked archives, or neglected in
piles of decomposing material in 'special sections' of municipal libraries." The
worst period of archive destmction appears to have been from December 1965,
during the Mahmillub, or 'Special Military Tribunals' when documents that may
have implicated Suharto elements in the coup, or exonerated Left-wing groups or
individuals, were burned. For example, in Kidul, the public newspaper reading
board, an important facility in a poor community for the free dissemination of views
and ideas (and which could be remembered as existing before 1965), was taken
down "some time after that [1965] and never put back again".

''^Sullivan, op.cit, p. 108.
^°Paul Stange, 'Configuration of Javanese Possession Experience', Religious Traditions, vol. 2, no. 2,
1979,pp.39-54.
51

Geertz, The Religion of Java, op.cit., p.247.
^^My landlady was in fact extremely nervous about holding duplicate copies of computer disks with
interview files on them, and went to a lot of trouble to hide them in a place that would have been
difficult to uncover should the house have been searched.
^^I was told by an employee of the library that anything from 1965 had either been destroyed or was
locked up in a section that berbau PKI, or 'smelt of communism'. I paid a 'special administrative fee'
to gain the sources used in this chapter. I also found one copy of Harian Rakyat, which was in the
folds of another newspaper. Library staff who looked very nervous immediately confiscated this.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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From the first week of October 1965 most Left-wing publications were
systematically banned, beginning with the PKI's Harian Rakyat on 2 October 1965,
extending to most Left-wing regional papers, such as those in Surakarta, Klaten and
Yogyakarta. This followed the progress of RPKAD and Siliwangi divisional forces
into DIY from Semarang on 17 October 1965.^^ However, the fate of most
documentary sources from the period was that they were simply removed and
destroyed by library staff on orders of the military. This included Sukamo-controUed
Department of Information speeches and policy documents, most Left-wing
newspapers and magazines and all PKI-related literature. This especially included
reports of what happened in Yogyakarta during the period before the military
assumed effective control in early November 1965.
In addition to the destmction of evidence that may have implicated the
Suharto group in the coup, there was also a level of general anti-communist selfcensorship established early in the New Order period. (This later became a
prominent feature of political culture under Suharto.) It was reported that large
volumes of Leftist literature were destroyed as part of a bubarkan diri or 'self
disbandment drive'.

For instance, one Kidul resident described how he kept some

banned literature carefully hidden until 1997 when he destroyed the remaining
material in his possession related to the PKI. This occurred because of the fear of
incriminating his adult children during the keterpengaruhan purge of 1995-97.
In fact, by the early 1970s, most PKI and large amounts of Sukarnoist
literature had been destroyed. Certain primary documents, such as nationalist
political tracks, Guided Democracy monographs and Sukamo speeches were only
available privately to foreign researchers who were, in the most part, interested in
collecting for overseas library archives. It was explained by one book seller that,
"possessing communist literature still carried the death penalty, and it is important
CO

[for both of us] to be extremely discrete". It was pointed out by the senior librarian
Anderson and McVey, Preliminary Analysis, op.cit, p.61.
^^'Dimana-mana PKI Setempat, Bubuarkan Diri', Minggu Pagi, no. 35, 28 November 1965, p.8.
"'Dauzan, War Veteran-turned Mobile Librarian', The Jakarta Post, 20 August 1997, p.l. Selfcensorship is illustrated in a 1997 report of one library in the Yogyakarta Islamic district of Kauman,
The article described how the Librarian, Dauzan Farook, cut out offending sections of articles from
books and newspapers and replaced them with paragraphs from material that did not 'soil young
people's minds'. The article described how the librarian "removed photographs and articles" he
considered "un-educational" and sometimes glued in "good stories containing religious messages".
^^Yogyakarta central book market August to December 1996. During this period I was able to
successfully purchase fading Republic of Indonesia Department of Information documents from the
Sukarno era.
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at one Yogyakarta public library that this level of concern was justified because the
period 1965-66 masih berbau PKI or "still smelt of communism".^^ The extent of
this censorship was home out by the fact that only one of Yogyakarta's five
municipal libraries held any literature associated with October to December 1965,
the period in which most of the killings took place. The fact that copies of Minggu
Pagi and PRABA from late 1965 were still archived in the central library on Jalan
Malioboro came as a complete surprise to library staff^° These particular
publications will be examined in detail in chapter five.
Many important interviews actually took place following a weekly secret
men's meeting in the vestry at the Kidul church. In the tradition of liberal
Catholicism, these sessions were dedicated to discussing politics. Several outside
guests were political activists. One was a member of the then outlawed Partai
Rakyat Demokrasi, People's Democratic Party or PRD, who was forced into hiding
after the March 1997 crackdown on their activities and the arrest of their leader
Budiman Sujatmiko. In mid-1997 the church gatherings created an opportunity for
some people to participate in criticising the Suharto regime and even to discuss the
events of 1965. This occurred to the extent of "allowing a small number of people to
divulge the contents of their hearts and to openly deal with feelings of revenge on the
part of those wronged by false accusation during 1965".^ This new development
lasted for about three months. The parish priest believed that the eventual downfall
of Suharto would lead to "mass revenge taking" and that the church sessions were
"his contribution to making sure it didn't happen in his parish".

These sessions

were completely confidential. Note taking was inappropriate.
As far as the broader Kidul community was aware, the reason I was in Kidul
was to take up a three-month teaching position at the Universitas Islam Indonesia,
Islamic University of Indonesia - Yogyakarta or UII. This gave me the status of a
scholar. (For many local Moslems this indicated that I was 'pro-Islam'.) Therefore I
'^Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
*An example of some of the scores of original speeches of Sukarno I collected, and which are now in
the collection of the Centre for Asia-Pacific Transformation Studies, at the University of WoUongong,
include the following: Presiden Sukarno Pada Hari Kemenangan Buru: Kapitalisme Dan
Imperialisme Adalah Djahat, Departemen Penerangan R.I., 1964; and Revolusi Kita Adalah Revolusi
Sosialis, Departmen Penerangan R.I., 1962. These small booklets were widely distributed to all
schools and public libraries in Indonesia and were part of the ideological education of all Indonesians
prior to September 1965. These booklets are extremely hard to find now, and were not available
through any public institution during the New Order period.
^'Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^^Ibid.
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was considered to be a person of high standing in a culture dominated by social
hierarchy and a respect for education.^^ hi fact on my first day in the kampung I had
to formally report to the kapala desa or 'village leader', and to the GOLKAR
representative, to have my visa verified and to explain the reason for my visit. I was
then introduced at the weekly meeting of male household heads and attended each
meeting thereafter.
My rented home was recommended as a quiet place in a 'typical kampung'.
My landlady took responsibility for introducing me to members of the conununity
and for setting up formal introductions and interviews. It took several visits from
intermediaries to establish my reputation and then several further relationshipbuilding meetings before I could ask specific questions related to my research topic.
There were a number of residents who made it clear, through third parties that they
would welcome me as a neighbour, but that they did not want to talk about politics.
In Kidul berpolitik or 'being political' was the accepted code for asking questions,
and for that matter, not asking questions, about 1965.
For all of these reasons, interviews were undertaken under the terms of strict
confidentiality and anonymity. It was explained in advance that names would not be
recorded and that individual experiences were important, but less important than
gaining rasa or 'a sense' of what it was like to have experienced 1965. It was made
clear to residents of Kidul that they were under no obligation to talk about anything
that they were uncomfortable with. Methodologically this was a challenging process.
This is because in Javanese culture, prentah alus or the concept of 'gentle pressure
from a social superior' (such as a scholar) normally elicits obligatory co-operation.
However, it must also be noted that the resistance tactic of avoidance, or the telling
of false or misleading stories, was also revealed in my fieldwork. For example one
household head explained how his father was briefly arrested and interrogated in
November 1965, when in reality it was reported to me by other community members
that this person's father, now deceased, had cooperated with RPKAD to identify
specific PKI figures in the kampung.

^^My neighbours were very pleased that I was interested in learning the Javanese language, however
out of respect they would only speak with me in high Javanese or kromo, while the lingua franca of
the kampung was low Javanese or ngoko. Therefore I made very littie progress in conversational
Javanese.
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The primary methodological approach of my fieldwork was to encourage
participants to express themselves without the requirement of rationalising their
position or estabhshing closure. Most questions centred on the main theme of the
violence, although often subjects were interested in answering different questions, or
in fact posing questions of their own. For example, in two of the interviews,
participants chose to reveal and then discuss memories of imprisonment, not arrest or
mistreatment.^" Most people interviewed wanted to talk about how 1965 affected
their lives since - not about the actual events of October and November 1965. Some
people wanted to ask me questions about 'what really happened'.
The main difficulties of organising kampung-hased interviews in 1997 was
that there remained a serious social stigma associated with having been identified as
terlibat or 'involved' in the coup. In fact to even discuss the coup, or especially the
killings, was perceived to indicate an unhealthy sympathy with the plight of former
PKI. To avoid the shame associated with having to explain this, a number of
residents elucidated that their homes were 'too simple' or 'humble' for 'sir' to visit,
and that they were malu or 'ashamed' to receive a visitor under such circumstances.
It was conveyed privately that these people were not necessarily concerned about
their reported lowly social position. Rather, their response was the result of
attempting to conceal their former status as political prisoners, or the relatives of
former PKI members, not their material or educational status. In fact most of these
families were relatively affluent. They rather preferred to generate a face-saving
excuse.^^ This phenomenon of social shame can be seen in other work, notably
Article 19: The International Centre Against Censorship, which recorded the
following interview with a former political prisoner:

Every day the authorities throw something rotten in our faces. You
are bad, they say, you are dirty. Yet, I still don't know what I have
done wrong. I, like many others, have never been formally accused of
anything, or tried. It is sad that after all this time the government still
will not allow us to clean our faces.
^"it was essential that I reiterated to subjects that anything revealed to me was done so voluntarily and
in the strictest confidence.
^'Sailendri, 'Shame', Inside Indonesia, no. 43, June 1995, pp.10-11.
^^'Surveillance and Suppression', Article 19, no. 43, September 1995, p.5. See also 'Muted Voices:
Censorship and the Broadcast Media in Indonesia', Article 19, June 1996, and 'In the Censors
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Once interviews were granted, the presence of a tape recorder made people so
nervous that nothing of substance was raised or discussed. This approach was
attempted on several occasions. The use of a tape recorder in fact almost resulted in
the local GOLKAR operative reporting me to the military for 'suspicious activities'.
The only reason this man didn't follow through was that he was afraid of the head of
the Muhamadyiah Mosque who had taken a particular liking to me and saw me as a
potential convert to Islam. Accordingly this was abandoned as a technology for
recording interviews. Manual note taking was, however, acceptable to practically
everyone, except, as previously mentioned, participants who indicated that they were
happy to talk privately, but would not give their permission for records to be kept.
As far as possible notes were taken in Indonesian and translated into Enghsh
immediately interviews were concluded. (A trasted neighbour rendered assistance
translating Javanese idioms or when elderiy participants wished to express
themselves in Javanese. In itself this constituted a process of 'regularising' the use of
language.) Following journalist conventions, reconstmcted notes were therefore as
much testimonial narrative as verbatim script. This allowed for the both the context
and meaning of the testimony to be recorded without causing distress to the
participant. In 1997 this was the only safe or satisfactory means of recording the
experiences of ordinary people, many of whom were initially terrified at the prospect
of sharing their memoires of the violence with a foreign researcher.
This was because 1997 was a time when keterpengaruhan was having a
profound effect on the way people were prepared to remember the past. The anxiety
over data collection, of any type, became particularly relevant after I gave a public
seminar on the topic of the history of the killings at Gadjah Mada University on 10
September 1997, which was reported the next day in the Yogyakarta daily Bemas.
This was the first local article to mention the forbidden words 'victims of 1965'.^^
After the Bemas story a number of contacts said that they felt it best if we
'didn't talk about 1965 anymore', but that I was still welcome to visit, especially if I
brought my children. These people were concerned about attracting the unwelcome
attention of the authorities during a time of great social and political uncertainty. One
man did ask me not to use the material I had previously recorded with his consent. I

Shadow: Journalism in Suharto's Indonesia', The Committee to Protect Journalists, posted November
1991.
'Sejarah Gelap Akan Terungkap', Bernas, 11 September 1997, p.2.
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complied with his wish. A small number of participants actually requested that I
speak to them after the Bemas article. This is because they "felt it was a good time to
talk about their experiences".^^
This sence of flux reflects the fact that this oral history project is more than a
method for gathering information; it is itself a form of history. According to Paul
Thompson oral history is both method and practice. For this reason oral history
research in the kampung of Kidul during 1997 also constitutes a tool for discovering
exploring and evaluating the nature of the process of historical memory, or according
to Thompson,

[H]ow people make sence of their past, how they connect individual
experience and its social context, how the past becomes part of the
presnet, and how people use it to interpret their lives and the world
around them".^^

Most significantly, oral history is predicated on an active relationship
between historians and their sourses, which can transform the practice
of history in several ways. The narrator not only recalls the past but
also asserts his or her interpretation of that past, and in participatory
oral history projects the interviewee can be a historian as well as the
source. Moreover for some practitioners oral history has not just been
about making histories. In certain projects a primary aim has been the
empowerment of individuals or social groups through the process of
remembering and reinterpreting the past, with an emphasis on the
70

value of the process as much as historical product.
A main highway now divides Kidul. Practically all of the residents on the
westem side of the road are members or followers of the 20 million strong modernist
Islamic organisation - Muhamadyiah.^' Closer to the river, the 60 million strong
traditionalist Islamic organisation - Nahdatul Ulama, has built a mosque in direct

^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, October 1997.
Thompson, op.cit., p.3.
Ibid., p.ix.
''See Howard M. Federspeil, 'The Muhamadyiah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in
Indonesia', Indonesia, no. 10, October 1970, pp.57-80.
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competition to the older and well-supported Muhamadyiah place of worship.^^ On
the eastem side of the highway most residents are Catholics who converted from
Islam immediately after the upheaval of 1965-66. The Kidul Cathohc church was
built during the late Colonial era. It is well attended by over 1000 worshippers
weekly. In 1966 the Suharto government, under pressure from Muslim groups (who
had supported the military during the massacres), insisted that all Indonesians
declare themselves adherents of one of five officially recognised religions - Islam,
Hinduism, Buddhism, Catholicism or Protestantism, h was a strategy that was
designed to drive people from communism to Islam. In Kidul and elsewhere it
backfired. Like many areas of DIY, widespread conversion to Christianity may have
been a backlash against the behaviour of para-military Islamist ANSOR gangs in the
killings.
In reality the reasons for these conversions were many. The New Order
propaganda story declared communism synonymous with atheism. For this reason
Indonesians who were unwilling to identify with Islam (particularly in light of the
activities of ANSOR), or those who identified with mystical indigenous sects, such
as Kebatinan, chose instead to nominate Christianity as their official religion. As
Ricklefs points out, Christianity's less severe ritual obligations undoubtedly played a
role as did, of course, genuine conversion. Conversions were heaviest in urban areas.
In Yogyakarta for instance, Christians post-1965 constituted nearly 15 per cent of the
population.^^ Significantly, most of these new converts were Javanese, rather than
ethnic Chinese Indonesians. This was reflected in the Kidul church, where the parish
population was almost exclusively native Javanese, with the evening Mass and home
meetings conducted in the Javanese language.
The parish priest explained that Catholicism actually: "permitted the Moslem
abangan peasantry to be better Hindus, and that Islam was essentially foreign to the
cultural roots of DIY".^'' The priest commented that his role was in part the
equivalent of the scholar-priest in the Hindu religion of ancient Java - the faith that
predated the arrival of Islam from the Middle East in the 14* and 15* centuries, and
which overpowered the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit. (Despite the rise of Islamic
Mataram and the continued process of Islam-isation throughout the Indonesian

^^^s&, op.cit, pp.116-22.
"Ricklefs, op.cit., pp.308-09
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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archipelago, Hinduism remains an important influence in the subjective belief
systems of many people in Yogyakarta, regardless of the fact that most people
identify administratively with Islam. ^^ (The work of Hefner in the Tengger region of
East Java demonstrates how difficult it is to define the process of 'Islam-isation' in
Java.)^^
The priest confirmed that in 1965 most people in Kidul were abangan and
that many people supported the PKI because of their practical village-based
programs. He also commented that in 1965 Muhamadyiah, which originated in
Yogyakarta,^^ had littie influence and no physical presence in Kidul, despite the
movement's growing popularity elsewhere in Yogyakarta.^^ The priest suggested
that in 1965 many people in Kidul were fully kebatinanJ^ Stange, in his writing on
the topic of Javanese spirituality, does not speak of one kebatinan but rather literally
hundreds of kebatinan movements, which are characterised as 'Javanese' not only
because they are practised by ethnic Javanese, but because their beliefs are rooted in
an "ageless tradition of spiritual wisdom that predates even Indie influences''.^^ Kyle
notes that many Javanese mystical practices are most likely rooted in pre-historical
Javanese shamanic culture, for instance the figure of the dukun, or "healer, medium
or sorcerer", and the notion of kesurupan, or "spirit possession, ancestor worship and
animist ritual".^'
Three men in the Kidul community had been imprisoned for long periods.
This included an ex-LEKRA artist, a former high school teacher who became a tailor
after his release from prison in 1973 and a former GERWANI cadre from Klaten
whose husband, now deceased, had been wrongly accused of PKI membership and
sent to the prison gulag of Bum Island. One man, a former official with a PKIaffiliated union, had mysteriously evaded interrogation and arrest. In addition, there
Mark R. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta,
The Association for Asian Studies, University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1989, pp.215-40.
'^Robert W. Hefner, Hindu Javanese: Tengger Tradition and Islam, Princeton University Press, New
Jersey, 1985, pp.3-22.
'^Muhamadyiah, the largest of Indonesia's 'Modernist' Islamic organisations, was founded in the
Yogyakarta Kauman in 1912. See Woodward, ibid., p.113. See also the special Inside Indonesia
edition 'Imagining Islam', number 52, October to December 1997.
'^Confidential interviews, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August and October 1997.
^Robert J. Kyle, 'Rethinking Javanese Mysticism: A Case Study of Subud Mysticism', unpublished
BA hons. thesis, ANU, Canberra, 1995, p.7.
^°Paul Stange, 'Legitimate Mysticism in Indonesia', RIMA, vol. 20, no. 2, summer 1986, pp.76-117.
*'ln the millennium before the arrival of Indian cultures, the Javanese village developed a ritual
culture based, inter alia, on rice planting cycles. In the 4* century AD merchants and priests from the
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was the ulama of the Kidul Muhamadyiah mosque, as mentioned a man named
Sumitro, who had been the most senior member of the PKI in Kidul in 1965, but who
had escaped imprisonment or death or because of his dramatic re-commitment to
Islam and "his zealous efforts in eliminating communism from the kampung".^^
Many abangan in Kidul referred to this man in guarded gossip as kepala besar PKI
yang mantan or "the big boss former communist of Kidul".^^
The complexity of oral history research in Kidul at this time is illustrated by
the following interview. The fact that Sumitro, mentioned above, was the most
senior PKI cadre in Kidul in 1965, was reported to me by neighbours almost as soon
as my research intentions became known, and later by almost everyone I met who
was previously connected with the PKI. All of these people wamed me not to ask
Sumiti-o anything about the past. One of the best sources of information and
testimony in Kidul, my neighbour, gave me a stern warning about discussing
sensitive issues. Consequentiy, discussions with Sumitro concentrated on issues to
do with my interest in Islam. We did not talk about 1965.

Watch out for Sumitro [said my neighbour]. He is a GOLKAR agent
and a spy for the army. He is very ambitious and is always looking for
ways to increase his standing with the military. Ask questions, but be
very, very careful. There are a few ex-communists, high officials,
who can be trasted, but there is one who cannot, a chameleon. This is
Sumitro. He was once one of the most senior members of the PKI in
Yogyakarta. Now he is the most fanatically anti-communist Moslem
in Kidul. In fact all of his children are fanatics. The chameleon is
always looking for ways of proving his anti-communist credentials.
He would not hesitate to call the Army should you show too much
interest in anything to do with that period - Sukarno, the PKI,
LEKRA, and GERWANI - anything. Be like a chameleon too, and
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only talk about Islam when you are with Surmtro.
Indian sub-Continent introduced both Hinduism and Buddhism and gradually indigenous Javanese
beliefs and Indie cosmologies began to fuse.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
^^Ibid.
^''Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, July 1997. "Hati-hati dengan Pak Sumitro. la agen
GOLKAR dan mata-mata tentara. la sangat ambisius dan selalu mencari cara untuk menaikkan
pangkatnya di militer. Tanya saja sama dia, tetapi harus sangat hati-hatl Di sana ada beberapa
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As mentioned, the reporting of my seminar at Gadjah Mada University
actually invigorated a number of private discussions about 1965. This constituted a
definite influence on the course of research.^^ There is no doubt that the asking of
specific questions changed the way people in Kidul negotiated the past. Many said
they were grateful of the opportunity to speak because it literally "revealed the
contents of their hearts".^^ Most indicated that it was "the first time in 30 years that
they had discussed 1965 with anyone".^^
During this time, one Kidul resident, a dismissed schoolteacher and former
member of the PKI, was under intense pressure from his adopted son, who held a
prominent position in the bureaucracy, to keep a very low profile. In May 1997 the
ex-teacher became the target of a vicious personal attack, focussing on his former
communist connections, by a local competitor - another tailor, the Kidul GOLKAR
operative (the same person who threatened to report me to the military). All of this
greatiy heightened the tension associated with connections to communism and
memories of 1965. This was also an election year for seats in the DPR-MPR (with
Suharto convincingly re-elected in March 1998).
The May poll saw rising tensions over electoral fraud, the boycott vote of
many urban PDI-P voters, and the increasing un-popularity of the regime (despite
achieving a remarkable 74 per cent vote for the State Party - GOLKAR), and in spite
of a concerted campaign of kuningisasi, 'yellow-isation', or the buying of GOLKAR
votes by the government in mral and kampung areas, including Kidul. In fact, large
numbers of breeding sheep were distributed to Kidul electors during the campaign by
GOLKAR, ostensibly to build up the productive capacity of the village. It was
reported that all of the animals were roasted and eaten within a month of the

orang ekskomunis berpangkat tinggi yang bisa dipercaya, tetapi ada satu orang yang tidak, dia
bunglon. Yaitu Pak Sumitro. Dulu dia adalah salah satu anggota PKI paling senior se-Yogyakarta.
Sekarang ia adalah Muslim antikomunis paling fanatik di Kidul Semua anak-anaknya juga fanatik.
Bunglon itu memang selalu mencari cara untuk membuktikan surat bebas komunis miliknya. Ia tidak
segan-segan memanggil tentara kalau kamu menunjukkan ketertarikan yang besar terhadap hal-hal
yang ada kaitannya dengan masa itu - Sukarno, PKI, LEKRA, GERWANI, atau apa pun. Jadilah
seperti bunglon juga, dan bicaralah tentang Islam kalau kamu dengan Pak Sumitro."
Possibly the 'Hawthorne Effect' of researchers influencing the views of their subjects was in play.
In a (1927-33) productivity study in Western Electric's Hawthorne plant near Chicago, researchers
discovered that their own presence affected the outcome of their study. In this case, so long as the
study was in progress, productivity increased. The term 'Hawthorne Effect' was thus coined to define
the influence of the researcher's presence on the outcome of the study.
Confidential interviews, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^fbid
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GOLKAR victory.

This very human story constitutes part of the rich and complex

tapestry of my place of fieldwork, a small kampung community in DIY, conducted in
the twilight of New Order power, following the re-election of an increasingly fragile
New Order legislature in June 1997.
My oral history narrative begins with two elderly spinster sisters - Tukiyem
and Ponikem who live in a basic slum home in one of the poorest areas of Kidul. In
gathering testimony associated with the social and political upheaval of 1965, I
asked about their memories of the Sukamo era, and by subtie inference about the
violent events of 1965-66. Despite the fact that one of the sisters' husbands, a becak
driver, had been shot and killed by soldiers of the RPKAD in November 1965. (The
Paracommando later changed its name to KOPASSUS or the Indonesian Special
Forces.) One sister replied that everything always had been, was, and always would
be, "fine". When I asked whether they had ever had any trouble in Kidul, particularly
during the mid-1960s, the other sister answered in Bahasa Indonesia, lumayan,
selalu lumayan tuan, or "fine, fine, always fine, sir", as the other quietly sighed in
Javanese, sing wis, ya wis, or "what is past is past".^^
Sing wis, ya wis is a kromo or high Javanese expression. When enunciated in
a soft and controlled tone it literally means that, "whatever you have done to me it is
behind us; all is forgiven - but not forgotten - therefore the offending issue should
not be raised again". This expression is imbued with great irony. This is because if
sing wis, ya wis, with particular emphasis on the words 'wis wis', is pronounced in
the harsher tones of ngoko, or lower Javanese, it means something completely
different. Rather it warns: "watch yourself, I have not forgiven you at all, although it
appears that I have".^°
The expression sing wis, ya wis is not as it appears prima facie. Like many
Javanese idioms it is purposely ambiguous in that it is predicated on the Javanese
social norm that the more subtie, or sophisticated the message, the more profound its
meaning and the greater its impact. In this case sbig wis, ya wis can be interpreted as
a guarded commentary on New Order orthodoxy - buried in levels of language and
altemative possible interpretations. Sing wis, ya wis is the culturally appropriate

Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^^Confidential interview Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
'"^y appreciation to B. Rahmanto of Sanata Dharma University for explaining the meaning of this
term.
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means by which something powerful is said by not saying it. Like the history of the
Kidul Catholic Parish, sing wis, ya wis points to a process that is actually inscribed in
the silences. There is no question that what is explicitiy surrendered in interviews
contributes to the body of knowledge about 1965. However what is omitted or
concealed also tells stories - by revealing the existence of historical silences and the
character and extent of the process of forgetting - primarily the New Order's careful
management of the chronological memory of the 30 September Coup, and the
suppression of durational detail about the killings.
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Figure 1. Minggu Pagi, no. 18,1 August 1965.
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Figure 2. MiVi^^ii Pa^i, no. 35,28 November 1965.
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Figure 3. Street Poster, featuring Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX and LieutenantColonel Suharto, Jalan Malioboro, Yogyakarta, August 1997. S.O 1 Maret: Bukti
Manunggalnya ABRI Dengan Rakyat - 'The General Attack of 1 March: Proof of
the Unification of the Indonesian Armed Forces and the People'.
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Figure 4. Lieutenant Colonel Suharto, with red scarf and 'trade mark' Australiamade Owen Gun, represented leading the 1 March 1949 Attack, Yogyakarta, in a
widely-distributed comic of 1980. Merebut Kota Perjuangan {S. U. 1 Maret 1949),
Sinar Asih Mataram, Jakarta Selatan, 1980, p. 40.
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Figure 5. Hendra Gunawan, statue of General Sudirman, solid granite, 1953.
Yogyakarta Provincial Legislature, Jalan Malioboro, Yogyakarta.

109

Figure 6. Dody, Komik Merdeka - 'Freedom Comic', Taring Padi,
Yogyakarta, 1998.
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Figure 7. Logo symbol, YPKP, Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965-66
- 'Indonesian Institute for the Study of the 1965-66 Massacre', 1999.
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Figure 8. Djoko Pekik, Indonesia 1998: Berburu Celeng - 'Indonesia 1998:
Hunting the Wild Boar' (5m x 3m, oil on canvas).
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Chapter Four
The Coup and the Killings:
Chronology, Duration and Myth within Oral Testimonies
The theory and method developed in previous chapters now has implications for how
oral narratives complied in Kidul during 1997 are interpreted and analysed. As this
chapter will demonstrate, chronological accounts and myth predominate in interviews
conducted in 1997. This illustrates that much of the story of 1965 has been concealed,
omitted, or modified. Data collection actually illustrates the nature and extent of
historical silences.
The process of oral history research in Kidul is problematic. For instance, no
one was able or willing to say exactly how many people had been arrested beyond the
ex-PKI members confirmed through direct interviews, while, in contrast, it was stated
that by late 1965 almost every family had been interrogated to determine if they had
been "involved".' It was reported that only one person was killed in the kampung of
Kidul during the Paracommando sweep of November 1965, although this event
continued to have a strong impact on the victim's family, who were completely
unwilling to discuss anything to do with 1965.^ Further, while it was expressed on a
number of occasions that Kidul had been a PKI stronghold, in fact a "communist hot
spot",^ only a small number of respondents surrendered information about their own
involvement in Left-wing politics. There is no available documentary evidence to
confirm or deny the extent to which the PKI were involved in Kidul itself, although
there is reliable data on regional voting patterns in the 1955 election in which the PKI

'Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^This was the becak driver reported in the previous chapter.
^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. My neighbour informed me, in response to a
question I asked weeks before, that Kidul had previously been a communist 'hot spot' during the
Sukarno era. She said that there were several PKI 'base-camps' in Kidul and that many high-ranking
PKI officials had lived in the community. This included a number of prominent LEKRA members.
She said; "Affendi himself had often visited Kidul to see friends" and could often be seen driving his
brightly coloured car along the road in front of her house. She said that there were more former
communists in Kidul than any area in Yogyakarta, but that they kept to themselves. My neighbour said
that there were several hundred ex-prisoners, or the families of ex-prisoners in the district and that in
Kidul, there were "around 20 ex-PKI or LEKRA". I asked whether she could introduce me to any of
them. She strongly replied that she would never directly pass this sort of information on to anyone, and
that if I wanted to talk to someone who had been on Buru, or imprisoned anywhere for that matter, she
would have to make sure that everything was in order first, or else I would have to find them out for
myself.
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polled nearly one third of the vote in Central Java."^ (hi municipal and provincial
elections held from June through August 1957, PKI votes in DIY and Central Java
nearly balanced the combined strength of the PNI, NU and Masyumi.)^ The
reluctance of most subjects to talk about the exact details of the PKI's former
achievements in what appears to have been an area of strong PKI support is itself
evidence of the silencing power of the New Order's propaganda project. In fact, in
1997, even mentioning the name 'PKI' attracted official censure.
An early illustration of equating organised opposition with communism in the
PKI's former heartland of DIY, Central and East Java was demonstrated by ABRI's
response to a 1960s peasant-based movement that sprang up around the border area
between the towns of Randublatung and Ngraho. The sect was led by a mystic named
M'bah Suro. Between 1962 and 1967 the Suro Movement attracted a following
estimated at half-a-million people. In the months after the worst of the killings,
thousands of people from all over Java fled as refugees to Suro's camp. In July 1966
Suro explained: "In times of upheaval ... leaders who promise protection, immunity
and a feeling of safety will be seen as a social umbrella for groups in deep distress.
They await someone who can take the lead".^ While Suro never mentioned the PKI in
his speeches, and there is no evidence that he was associated with politics, he did
however identify the New Order coalition as the murderers of his countrymen and
women. He then ill-advisedly declared that: "the spirits of these slain were still active
and looking for revenge".^ From the New Order's perspective, Suro's 'army' were
Q

dangerous cadres in a Java-wide communist re-orgamsation.
On 5 March 1967 the Suro Movement was crushed by units of the
Paracommando and the Diponegoro Division. The victory was achieved with great
loss of life. The camp itself was destroyed so that no trace was left.^ The movement
was not only physically destroyed, but also silenced. Suro was neutralised because
his movement represented a potential focus of opposition, not because it was
communist-inspired. This case characterises the use of the 'communist label' as a
weapon of repression at the very start of Suharto's rule. Interestingly, ten years later
"Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, op.cit. The PKI won overall forth place in the 1955
General Elections, pp.222-29.
van der Kroef, op.cit., p.93.
^'How Faith Healer M'bah Suro Was Crushed', Tapol Bulletin, no. 80, April 1987, pp.18-19.
'David Mitchell, 'Communists, Mystics and Sukarnoism', Dissent, no. 22, autumn 1968, p.29.
*Abu Hanifah, Tales of a Revolution, Melbourne, Angus and Robinson, 1972, pp.74-75.
^'How Faith Healer M'bah Suro Was Crushed', op.cit., pp.18-19.
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the Jakarta-based mystic Sawito attracted similar attention for his perceived potential
to unite conmion dissent under a messianic leadership. In a similar way to Suro, the
political dimensions of what became known as the 'Sawito Affair' were brushed
aside by the regime,'° branded with vague allegations of being communist-inspired.
General Widodo for example, then military commander of Central Java, charged that
Sawito was

associated

with

a Moscow-sponsored

scheme to

re-establish

NASAKOM."
As argued in chapter one, there is no such thing as a pure form of memory,
but rather a blending of emphases. This does not negate the process of making
comparisons between duration, chronology and myth. Nor does it lessen the
authenticity of eyewitness accounts. Rather the interviews raised in this chapter
expose tensions within the process of historical production. One feature of oral
narratives complied in Kidul during 1997, with notbale exceptions involving stories
'imported' from outside the kampung, was that people in PCidul indicated they
seldom, if ever, spoke about their local memories of 1965, even to their families. The
question this chapter will address is, when people did speak, what sort of things did
they say?
With echoes of Ophuls's work in Clermont-Ferrand twenty years after the
Nazi occupation of France, one resident commented of the situation in Kidul:

It [the violence] was over and we just wanted to get on with our lives.
At first people were afraid to be identified with the PKI. But as the
years went by it just became normal not to talk about it, and then it
was as if it didn't happen at all.

10

Bourchier, op.cit., pp.7-8.
"/ft/of., p.33. However as Bourchier comments: "Research saps the affair of its millenarian flavour and
reveals a more conventional political substratum - namely well-considered opposifion to New Order
rule".
'^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "[Kekerasan] itu sudah berakhir dan kami
hanya ingin meneruskan hidup kami. Pada awalnya orang-orang tidak mau dikaitkan dengan PKI
sebab mereka takut. Tetapi, setelah beberapa tahun berlalu, kami menjadi biasa tidak bicara tentang
peristiwa itu, dan kemudian seolah-olah tidak pernah terjadi apa-apa." There is an interesting parallel
here with the work of Ophuls raised and discussed in my Introduction, concerning oral testimonies of
ordinary French civilians under the Vichy government of wartime France in respect to the
normalisadon of Nazi collaboration.
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In examining the literature, Cribb noted in 1990 that only three substantial accounts
of the killings had been prepared by hidonesians (aside from official reports),'^
although as Gerry van Klinken suggests, in the post-Suharto period the hidonesian
historiographical landscape has become rich with an emerging debate about different
perspectives on remembering.'^ At an academic level this debate has produced
provocative autobiographies such as Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi, or
'Stmggle of a Communist Muslim'.'^ hideed, in 2001, Inside Indonesia dedicated an
entire issue to the problems of rewriting history in post-Suharto Indonesia.'^
However, during the New Order era, Lidonesian accounts were characterised by a
small number of 'typical' narratives, such as 'Rural Violence in Klaten and
Banyuwangi', produced by the Centre for Village Studies Gadjah Mada University;
the anonymously authored 'Additional data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in
hidonesia. Especially in East Java'; 'Survival: Bu Yeti's story' and the translated
contemporary newspaper accounts of killings in the Purwodadi area of Central Java'^
- aU reproduced in The Indonesian Killings.^^
The essay by exile Pipit Rochiajat, 'Am I PKI or Non-PKI?''^ is, for example,
a mixture of analysis and recall. The first section is a critical treatment of the social
and political environment in Indonesia before 30 September 1965. Ben Anderson
describes Rochiajat as an incidental target of the PKI's campaign against his father, as
a participant-observer of the bloody purges (in which some of his best friends became

10

Reports published outside of Indonesia were characterised by a 'what happened' compilafion of key
documents. See 'Selected Documents Relating to the September 30 Movement and Its Epilogue',
Indonesia, no. 1, April 1966, pp. 131-203.
Gerry van Klinken, 'The Battle for History after Suharto', Critical Asian Studies, vol. 33, no. 3,
2001, pp.323-50. Also, Syamdani, ed., Kontroversi Sejarah Di Indonesia, Grasindo, Jakarta, 2000,
A.M. Hanafi, Menggugat Kudeta Jenderal Soeharto: Dari Gestapu ke Supersemar, Mont Blanc, Lille,
1998. (van Klinken notes that this author had previously written a pro-Suharto book in 1996, which
shows the convenient transformation in thinking about history, van Klinken, op.cit., p.346.)
Hasan Raid, Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi, LKPSM/Syarikat, Jakarta, 2001.
Hilmar Farid, 'Out of the Black Hole: After the New Order, the lid on Indonesia's Past is beginning
to lift'. Inside Indonesia, no. 68, October to December 2001, pp.4-5; Kate McGregor, 'A Soldier's
Historian', op.cit., pp.8-9; and Ann Laura Stoler, 'Untold Stories', Inside Indonesia, no. 68, October to
December 2001, pp.6-7. Stoler however suggests that: "Popular and local histories of the 1950s should
not be overshadowed by the horrors of 1965. Both are part of the multi-layered reality of people who
have lived a range of post-colonial moments, who retain different senses of what made Indonesia's
history, and who trust in different ways of telling that story".
Originally published as Maskun Iskandar, 'Laporan Dari Daerah Maut Purwodadi', Indonesian Ray a,
10-15 and 17 March 1969; and Jopie Lasut, Sinar Harapan, 14, 17, 18, 20 and 21 March 1969.
'^Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.121-58, 169-76, and 227-40.
Rochiajat, op.cit.
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local executioners), and a victim of the destruction of the local PNI (of which he was
a member).^°

The events of 1 October 1965 are something difficult, impossible to
forget. The atmosphere was so tense, as though everyone was
expecting something [catastrophic] once the take-over of power in
Jakarta had been broadcast. All Kartawidjaja said to his family was:
"Watch out, be careful. Something's gone very wrong in Jakarta".^'

In contrast to reports that deal exclusively with the situation in Jakarta, 'Rural
Violence in Klaten and Bunyuwangi' demonstrates a strong connection between the
actions of the PKI in the Aksi sepihak (from February to March 1965) - in places like
Klaten - and the violence.^^ The report, which is decidedly anti-PKI, is characterised
by vague descriptions of non-specific violent acts. This includes the myth of 'kill or
be killed' that later appears in the official accounts," ambiguous descriptions of
clashes between rival youth groups representing pro- and anti-communist interests,^'*
the kidnapping and "cruel treatment" of villagers by communists, and reports of a
"wave of communist-initiated terror".^^ The report ends with the fohowing
justification for the anti-communist killings that were to follow:

Such were the events that took place in Karangasem preceding the
killing of thousands of PKI members and sympathisers by noncommunists. These events were not only the beginning of a tidal wave
of mass action but they were also the beginning of a wave of revenge
against the PKI and its mass organisations."

On the other hand, 'Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia,
Especially in East Java', like 'Am I PKI or Non-PKI?', is a first-hand account of the
violence. Both tell stories about individual victims and very specific atrocities. The
Ibid., Afterword by Benedict R. Anderson, pp.53-56.
^^Ibid., p.42.
^^/feW., pp.121-58.
fbid., pp.]2\-24.
24

W . , pp. 132-33.

^^Ibid., pp.136-44.
^%id., p.l57.
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former is pro-PKI, or at least sympathetic to the plight of victims. While the
authorship and contributors are unknown, this paper is likely to be a compilation of
eyewitness accounts by Indonesian exiles in Europe.^^ hi the text there are reports of
the targeting of GERWANI women for sexual abuse while in custody (confirming
many of the assertions of New Order misogyny made by Wieringa),^^ murder by
torture, mutilation of corpses, mass graves, suspects being rounded up and
transported to execution sites, burial holes, and the concealing of mass graves by the
planting of trees.
Finally there is a great deal of effort given to establishing the complicity of
the military in co-ordinating the violence and the specific role of ANSOR.^^
'Additional Data on Counter-Revolutionary Cruelty in Indonesia, Especially in East
Java' thereafter became a form of 'typical historiography', referred to in foreign
literature whenever the necessity arose to describe the killings. This report is the flip
side of the officially sanctioned Gadjah Mada University report that became, in a
similar way, typical of the New Order's treatment of the violence. However the
difference is that the latter is a chronological account based on New Order political
imperatives, the former almost exclusively durational, written from the safety and
relative freedom of The Netherlands.
An interesting commentary on Wieringa's work is that while research
participants in Kidul all readily identified GERWANI with the PKI in terms of
affihate status, Wieringa's subjects did not. Throughout the 1970s anything
associated with the Left, for example, the progressive Partai Indonesia or Partindo
was referred to as 'PKT with no differentiation. The literature, however, clearly
indicates that GERWANI "did not administratively identify with the PKI, and
accepted non-communist members as well as PKI members".^*^ From 1945 to 1965
GERWANI defined itself as an organisation that was non-party political, but which
did contain political views. The extent to which both the Suharto regime and exGERWANI members identified with the myth of formal GERWANI-PKI affiliation
is testimony to the effectiveness of New Order vihfication. Leclerc notes that 'the
"/W^.,p.l69.
^Vieringa, The Politicisation of Gender Relations, op.cit. See also Steven Drakeley, 'Torture, Terror
and Flirtafion: The Misogynous Myth of Lubang Buaya and the Mass Killings in Indonesia', Paper
presented to the Forth Women in Asia Conference, University of Melbourne, 1-3 October 1993,
quoting The Djakarta Daily, 5 and 20 November 1965.
Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp. 169-76.
Vieringa, The Politicisation of Gender Relations, op.cit., pp.335-38.
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communist women' served as a metaphor for the entire Indonesian Communist Party
in terms of references to pengkhianatan or 'betrayal', kekejaman and keganasan or
'cruelty', kebiadaban or 'savagery', kebiriatangan or 'bestiality' and the adjective sadis?^ In fact Leclerc notes that the TNI's allegations of savage conduct resulted in
ordinary GERWANI members' practical expulsion from the human race.

As a Party, the PKI is portrayed as emphasising women's dangerous
sensuality in political respects and imbuing them with bestial insanity.
The PKI's policy is said to have been to incite women against men
and turn them into mistresses of castration and torture. The
politicisation (virilisation) of women was the only accusation launched
by the political masterminds plotting against the PKI. They linked the
murders [of the generals] to this virilisation: the free women of the
PKI no longer tolerated men watching them, and scratched out their
32

eyes.
In fact, the Lubatig Buaya propaganda was just the forerunner of a campaign to
demonise GERWANI in the same way that ABRI had demonised the PKI. Quoting
the pro-ABRI Djakarta Daily of 5 November 1965, it was alleged that the PKI had
established an organisation called the Kantjing Hitam or 'Black Button' comprised of
"seductive members of GERWANI, enchantresses [whose task it was] to lure leaders
of other parties by offering themselves to [and thereby persuading] men to follow the
PKI program".^^ Two weeks later the newspaper reiterated this claim by stating that
'documents', alleged to have been confiscated from the underground PKI, supported
ABRI's claim that beautiful GERWANI women were to be used to "weaken the
spirit" of nationahst and Muslim youth.^"^

^'Jacques Leclerc, 'Girls, Girls, Girls, and Crocodiles', in Henk Schulte Nordholt, ed., Outward
Appearance: Dressing State and Society in Indonesia, KITLV Press, Leiden, 1997, p.299.
^hbid., p.303.
^Vim F. Wertheim, 'The Truth about GERWANI: The Gender Aspect of the Suharto Regime', at
http://www.xs4all.nl--peace/pubeng/inter/gw.html site accessed August 2002. Wieringa, op.cit.,
pp.201-2, also makes the point that while Sukarno instructed all mass organisafions to link themselves
to a political party, a situation which the leaders of GERWANI professed and which they intended to
formalise at the organisafion's Fifth Congress scheduled for December 1965, at the time of the arrests
of GERWANI members they were not affiliated with the PKI.
'%id
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hi response to these pressures, two themes emerge in another account,
'Survival: Bu Yeti's story'.^^ The first is the desire of a former GERWANI organiser
to protect her children from recrimination and second, social relations "re-forged by
the trauma of the coup".

These same sentiments were reflected in many of the Kidul

interviews. In these cases testimony represents a dialogue within a core of durational
memories typified by accounts of betrayal by neighbours, colleagues, workmates,
competitors, even family and friends, abuse in prison, and then complex attempts to
conceal this. Bu Yeti's story is also an example of the crossover between different
types of memory. The interview is confidential, retrospective and introspective. It is
also painful and cathartic in that it is a commentary on contemporary social
dislocation rather than just memories of 1965. Significantiy, there is a significant
contradiction within Bu Yeti's testimony.

I have wiped out the past now. I have no contact with former friends. I
have been asked to be politically active again, but I said no. All I want
to think about is my family.'^^

The inconsistency is that Bu Yeti cannot forget. However, neither is she free to
remember. This same pre-occupation

with protecting family members by

concealment is expressed in interviews with people in Kidul. This is likely to be a
consequence of the keterpengaruhan purge of the mid-1990s, as much as it is a
response to a long-standing sentiment of fear and trauma dating back to the killings.
For example, although remarkably well informed about national politics, and a
former member of GERWANI, one person in Kidul declared her family was now
"politically neutral". However on a deeper level the respondent explained that she
had never recovered from the trauma of 1965, and that she had instructed her children
about the dire consequences of getting involved in politics. She said that during the
May 1997 Elections rival supporters drove their motorcycles sans mufflers, along the
main road leading into Yogyakarta in a demonstration of mass defiance against
opposing political groups and the authorities, and that to show the wrong hand-sign
during the campaign was enough reason for opposition youths to beat a person to

35,

Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.227-40.
^%id., pp.227-28.
^^Ibid., p.239.
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death. The woman said: "It felt just like 1965 was coming back again".^^ It was,
however, the present-day consequences of the past that this person, and most people
in Kidul in 1997, feared. Many people when asked had some sort of story to tell, but
were only prepared to speak under terms of strict confidentially, and even then
obliquely and in predominantly chronological terms.
Within the literature, the reluctance to talk of the violence to foreign
researchers by other than the most anonymous means is well documented. Lea
Jellinek in her study of poor kampung dwellers in Jakarta describes a "deep
reluctance of residents to discuss the killings or to even admit any knowledge of
them".

Likewise, 'I Am a Leaf in a Storm' was recorded by Anton Lucas under

terms of strict confidentiality. Fear of the authorities was not restricted to the
generation who directly experienced the violence, or in fact to families with
communist credentials or connections. This is because most Indonesians have family
connections with Left-wing politics. Even vocally anti-communist figures in Kidul
would surrender information about a relative (usually on 'the other side of the
family') who had been a member of the PKI, but would usually not name them.'^'^ The
implication of family connections with the past is illustrated in the following
interview.
'Satryia' is a university student. He had been a member of the Gadjah Mada
University campus branch of the then banned Leftist PRD, or People's Democratic
Party. He could not explain why, but his name was not submitted to police during the
crackdown on the PRD in early 1997. Consequentiy, Satryia avoided interrogation
and arrest. He said that his father had been a 'neutral' TNI officer who survived the
trouble in 1965 to remain on active duty until his retirement in 1982. He said his
father was involved in rounding up communists in Yogyakarta in October and
November 1965, but that his father seldom spoke about it. Like most people, if
pressed, he confirmed that many family members (in this instance on his mother's
side) had been PKI.

^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. Each political party was allocated an
alternative day by the hard-pressed authorities to limit the opportunity for direct confrontation between
groups.
^'Lea Olga Jellinek, 'Kebun Kacang: An Oral History of a Poor Inner City Community in Jakarta from
the 1930s to the 1980s', PhD thesis, Monash University, 1987, pp.64 and 299. Quoted in Cribb, The
Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.3.
Confidenfial interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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[Conducted in English] I am worried about what happened to the PRD
because if the authorities can find a family link with the PKI then they
would use this as evidence that I had been, you could say, 'infected'
with communism. Then my treatment, should I have been arrested,
would be more severe. That is for sure. The experience has not
deterred me from political activity. I am now doing some work here in
Kidul with a non-official farmers' association. The PRD experience
has given me some wisdom. I think we were so enthusiastic in what
we were trying to do that we acted foolishly and exposed ourselves to
the military."^'

Some of these themes are also borne out in the oral history work of other researchers.
For example, in Dewi Ratnawulan's oral history project work-in-progress, the
researcher examines oral accounts of the experiences of women, in particular former
members of GERWANI in the area of Boyolali and Surakarta.^^ Before 1965, both
areas were PKI heartlands, one rural, and the other urban. Transcripts of these
interviews reveal both similarities and differences with fieldwork in Kidul conducted
in 1997 at the height of the political power of anti-communist ideology. However
both the Kidul research and that of Ratnawulan expose a constant fear of exposure to,
and consequences of, associations with the PKI."^^
The differences are that in Ratnawulan's post-Suharto research the subjects
were more willing, sometimes even enthusiastic, to directly criticize the Suharto
regime, and to declare it a rezim setan or 'satanic regime'."^ Ratnawulan was able to
ask some of her respondents' specific questions about the circumstances of individual
disappearances, recorded as names and specific fates. This differs considerably from
my 1997 Kidul fieldwork. For example, one subject in Ratnawulan's work was keen
to describe the exact details of the murder of a young PKI cadre who returned to the
village of Cepogo after the failed coup in order "to protect the good name of the
PKI"."^^ He was reportedly shot by a "former friend", who was specifically identified
by name and address as the murderer. The person then gave clear directions about

Confidenfial interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
Ratnawulan, op.cit.
I
''Ibid
44,
Ibid., p.7.
''Ibid.
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where the body was buried and reported that the young man, and another PKI
member, were buried in a single grave near the murderer's house. Other subjects in
Ratnawulan's work were very specific about their mistreatment and injuries during
arrest, about friends who had been killed and the circumstances of their deaths. Free
from the threat of state-sponsored violence, testimonies were more precise, less
diplomatic, in that subjects were more willing to be blunt by giving exact details."^^
The following testimonies complied in Kidul in 1997 are broadly defined as
durational. These testimonies use emotional and often highly descriptive language.
As later interviews will review they are the exception and not the rule. Major themes
within these interviews include the sudden and unexpected nature of the course of
events, summary arrests, experiences from prison, accounts of betrayal by neighbours
and even some sympathetic memories of the work of the PKI. My purpose here is to
isolate themes within testimonies, to compare these to existing literature, and to
discuss the purpose and outcomes of each account.
Significantly, there are no locally-based testimonies of headless corpses, mass
graves and dead bodies floating down rivers as expressed in 'typical' accounts
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter."^^ In Kidul these remembrances appear
to have been imported into the local community from places like Klaten in Central
Java or from Pasuruan in East Java, where the violence was reported to be more
intense. That is not to say that these are not among some of the most common
'memories' associated with the violence, it is just that many people interviewed
appeared to adopt these memories to describe what it is they felt (rasa) they
remembered about the violence.

'%id
^^Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p. 10 cites Jean Contenay, 'Another bloodbath?'. Far Eastern
Economic Review, 23 November 1967, pp.357-64. This shows rare photography of graves. For
mention of graves also see Brian May, The Indonesian Tragedy, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,
1978, p.l23; and Craig Bowen, From the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the PKI: A Short History of the
Indonesian Communist Party, Militant International Publication, Sydney, 1990. See photographs on
page 38 of a large group of men in an open grave awaiting execution, and men awaiting execution by
bayonet. Also, Appendix A, Excerpt from: 'By the Bank of the Brantas: An Eyewitness Account of the
1965 Killings, Injustice, Persecution, Eviction: A Human Rights Update on Indonesia and East
Timor', Asia Watch, New York, 1990, pp.87-90, and Rochijat, op.cit., pp.37-52.
^^Ricklefs, op.cit., p.307. For example, it was not uncommon for those at risk of arrest to flee to other
parts of Indonesia. Ricklefs noted that in 1978 over 100 former members of the PKI, who had fled to
the outer islands after 1965, but had returned to Java after the amnesty, were immediately arrested.
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These interviews include memories of Jakarta in mid-October 1965 and
accounts of the killings in the neighbouring city of Klaten, in East Java and in Bali.
However, the proliferation of these testimonies points to another explanation. Like
many urban areas in hidonesia the population of Yogyakarta is in a constant state of
flux. New people bring with them new stories. These stories contribute to the
development of myths, or rather the way in which memories of the violence are
transmitted as myth within local society.
It appears that at some time since 'Nur' moved to Yogyakarta in 1973, she retold her experiences of the violence in East Java to many of her neighbours in Kidul.
Nur said she would occasionally retell a particular story as a warning against getting
involved in politics. In 1965 she hved on the north coast of East Java near the island
of Madura. In the early 1960s the population was deeply divided between large
landowners and land-less peasants, and between those who supported the aksi
sepihak and those who were violentiy opposed to it, in particular santri landowners.
Nur is the daughter of a now deceased "pro-Sukarno, but anti-communist,
anti-fundamentalist Islam, abangan army officer".^° She said her father was forcibly
pensioned-off in 1969 because of his Sukamoist loyalties. Her mother had been a
Netherlands-trained teacher who spoke both Dutch and English. Sukarnoist politics
were an important part of her family environment, although her father maintained
strict neutrality in terms of party membership. Nur moved to Kidul in 1970 for
school. She described the Pasuruan area as one-third santri, two-thirds abangan,
although she said that political loyalties at that time were confused and that it was
"mixed up like rice and sand".^^ She said her father had been a Major in the infantry.
Under orders from the army high command, or as she reported "Suharto himself,
Nur's father was given responsibility for anti-communist operations in the area. She
said that her father had been forced to prove his loyalty to Suharto by organising the
arrest of communists. However, she also said her father had told her that no one
really knew who was a communist and who was not. She said that in the milieu,
soldiers killed each other, communists killed communists (for fear of exposure to the
TNI) and NU-ANSOR youth gangs killed everyone vaguely associated with the Left.
Nur emphasised that ANSOR "attacked the weak and defenceless first". This was

'Unilateral land redistribution policy of the PKF.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, June 1997.
^'ibid.
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followed by what she described as a well co-ordinated campaign against more
powerful people. According to Nur, revenge killings continued in Pasuruan, more or
less unabated, until 1968:

hi November 1965, I was nine years old. I was walking home from
school and I came across a massacre. All the victims had had their
throats cut and two young men were still alive in the ditch, but I'm
sure they died. When I close my eyes I can still see the blood pulsing
out of the neck of one of the men. The other man was still twitching. I
recognised one boy from the village. He had just been freshly killed. I
screamed. It was horrifying. I was so frightened that at first my legs
buckled under me so that I could not stand up. When I could get my
breath back I just ran. Since this time not a single day has gone by
where I have not relived that scene in my mind. ANSOR youths
openly boasted how they mutilated the bodies of their victims in
retribution for the deaths of the seven generals killed during the
GESTAPU. Thousands of people were killed in my area because of
the anger of the people. Many people of course know where these
bodies are buried but no one will ever say anything. The families of
the victims are still afraid. Pasuruan is known as a hot spot even today.
Most people are Madurese there, and we have bad tempers."'52

For Nur this experience of ANSOR was just the start of her association with the
killings. It appears that these stories were also re-told in secret over the years to
neighbours and that the reported horror of Pasuruan may have been partly responsible

Ibid. "Pada bulan November 1965 usia saya sembilan taliun. Saya sedang berjalan pulang dari
sekolah dan saya melihat pembantaian. Semua korbannya digorok lehernya dan ada dua orang
pemuda yang masih hidup di dalam selokan, tetapi saya yakin mereka pasti mati kemudian. Ketika
saya menutup mata, saya masih bisa melihat darah menyembur keluar dari leher salah seorang
korban, dan salah seorang lain masih kejang-kejang. Saya mengenali seorang anak dari desa. Ia baru
saja dibunuh. Saya menjerit. Sangat mengerikan. Saya begitu ketakutan, lutut saya lemas sampaisampai tidak kuat berdiri. Ketika saya sudah bisa bernapas kembali saya lari. Sejak saat itu tidak ada
sehari pun yang berlalu tanpa saya terkenang-kenang dengan peristiwa itu. Pemuda ANSOR dengan
terang-terangan menyombongkan bagaimana mereka memotong-motong tubuh para korban sebagai
balasan atas terbunuhnya tujuh jenderal dalam peristiwa GESTAPU. Di daerah saya ribuan orang
dibunuh akibat kemarahan rakyat. Tentu saja banyak orang yang tahu di mana mayat-mayat itu
dikuburkan tetapi tidak ada yang mau bicara. Keluarga para korban itu masih ketakutan. Sampai
sekarang pun Pasuruan sangat terkenal Di sana kebanyakan orang Madura, dan sifat kami kasar. "
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for frightening Kidul residents into concealing their own experiences of the violence
at a local level.

Night was the worst because the ANSOR gangs would go from house
to house looking for PKI to kill. My father said that when ANSOR had
worked through their lists of known and suspected communists they
just killed anyone they didn't like, like the Chinese shop owners, or
people who were accused of being communists because of old
grudges. Then the communists or the families of the killed
communists hit back the following night in revenge on ANSOR and
on it went. My father tried to shield us from what was going on but it
was everywhere. He was involved for sure. He was a soldier under
orders. He was so disgusted by what he had to do and by what he saw
that he took early retirement and left the army in 1969. Actually, he
was forced to retire because of his loyalty to Sukarno. What happened
to Bung Karno broke his heart. I myself have never recovered from the
trauma of seeing the dead bodies. Neither have most of my husband's
family who experienced the killings in the Klaten area. I do not think
that there is one day where I do not think about it. It was truly a civil
war but nobody is prepared to say this now. Actually, you are right, no
one does talk about it, at all. My father says that tens of thousands of
people were killed by the army or by ANSOR in our district alone. In
some areas I know it was very one sided - like Klaten, but in Pasuruan
the communists also did many horrible things. Perhaps this is why we
do not talk about it, because we do not want to remember it.^'^
53,

Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Malam hari adalah saat yang paling
buruk sebab gerombolan Ansor akan pergi dari rumah ke rumah mencari PKI untuk dibunuh. Ayah
saya berkata bahwa jika Ansor sudah selesai membuat daftar orang-orang yang diketahui dan
dicurigai sebagai komunis, mereka akan membunuh siapa pun yang tidak mereka sukai - seperti Cina
pemilik toko, atau orang-orang yang dituduh komunis karena dendam lama. Kemudian orang-orang
Komunis atau keluarga-keluarga orang Komunis yang terbunuh membalas orang Ansor itu di malam
berikutnya, demikian seterusnya. Ayah saya berusaha melindungi kami dari hal-hal yang terjadi di
luar, tetapi ini terjadi di mana-mana. Ayah saya jelas terlibat. Ia adalah tentara yang harus
menjalankan perintah. Ia begitu muak dengan perintah yang harus ia lakukan dan dengan apa yang ia
lihat sehingga ia minta pensiun dini dan keluar dari dinas tentara pada tahun 1969. Sebenarnya ia
dipaksa pensiun karena kesetiaannya pada pak Sukarno. Peristiwa yang menimpa bung Karno
memukul perasaannya. Saya sendiri tidak pernah sembuh dari trauma melihat mayat-mayat itu.
Sebagian besar keluarga suami saya yang mengalami peristiwa pembantaian di Klaten juga tidak bisa
sembuh. Saya kira tidak ada seorang pun jaman sekarang ini yang tidak memikirkan peristiwa
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However it is stories from neighbouring Klaten that appear to have had the greatest
impact on memory in Kidul. Most people interviewed downplayed the violence in
Yogyakarta, but were keen to surrender their opinions about how they imagined the
situation in Klaten - which is still considered by the authorities as 'a communist
area'. In one interview, a student from Klaten, who lived in Kidul, said that whenever
she had to deal with the bureaucracy they always paid special notice to the fact she
was from Klaten. The woman beheved that this was because officials were suspicious
that she may have come from "an unclean background".^"^
The notion that certain areas are 'more communist than others' is raised in the
following testimony based just outside of Yogyakarta. Paulus is a retired police
officer. He had been a member of the Partai Katolik Indonesia in the early 1960s.
Paulus was originally from Klaten and had returned home from Yogyakarta for
retirement. He was able to point out the exact area that was an abandoned Japanese
military airfield, but is currently an ABRI barracks and training facility. He said he
was an eyewitness to the rounding up communists. He said that after October 1965
the old airfield was used to classify Pemuda Rakyat - or members of the PKI youth
wing.

I watched the military cordon off the area with barbed wire and set up
spotlights on towers. Then large numbers of people were brought in by
truck. This went on for several weeks, mostly at night that I can
remember. Anyone who tried to flee was cut down with machine
gunfire. I saw many people attempt escape. They were killed. Because
the airfield was opposite my old house, I watched these activities. It is
a big area and very flat. Prisoners were put into groups. I guess now
that this was A, B and C. Category A were then taken away again in
trucks. The Pemuda Rakyat in Klaten was stubborn. Many faced up to
the military bravely. I say this for myself. I have no idea what
happened to the brave ones. I presume they were all killed. In
tersebut. Itu benar-benar perang sipil tetapi tidak ada yang slap mengatakan ini sekarang. Memang,
anda benar, tidak ada orang yang membicarakan hat ini, sama sekali. Ayah saya berkata bahwa di
daerah kami ini saja sepuluh ribu orang dibunuh tentara atau Ansor. Di beberapa tempat saya tahu
pembantaian itu sangat sepihak, seperti di Klaten, tetapi di Pasuruan orang-orang Komunis juga balas
melakukan hal-hal mengerikan. Mungkin inilah sebabnya kami tidak mau membicarakan peristiwa
tersebut sebab kami tidak ingin mengingatnya."
^''Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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November I remember there was a lot of gun fire, especially at night,
and I know from what people have told me that the mihtary dug big
pits to put all the PKI in. I also heard that some bodies were taken
away and thrown into the sea. At the time a close friend from the
military told me my name was on the ABRI list of suspects. Perhaps it
was because I was at one time a member of the Partai Katolik
Indonesia. I don't know. I was very frightened. I ran away to West
Java, and stayed away from Klaten for three months, until the situation
cooled down. Even now, if you are from Klaten, and you have to deal
with the authorities, for any matter, they pay special attention to you
and especially ask about your background.^^

With these broader issues in mind, the testimony of 'the artist' appears at times to be
durational, and at times chronological, with the subject clearly casting back to actual
events and then attempting to justify or understand the actions of his captors in light
of his experiences since 1965. The artist was arrested in mid-November 1965 for his
membership of LEKRA. At the time, he was considered one of a number of up and
coming graduates from the Indonesian Academy of Fine Art - ASRI, then dominated
by the School of Social Realism and by LEKHA.^^ When the military arrested the
man, he was in residence at the People's Painter's Studio, at that time the most active
fine art group in Yogyakarta. The artist said that as a LEKRA member he was
immediately accused of being terlibat. (The man's lecturer at ASRI, Trubus,
^^Confidential interview, Klaten, October 1988. "Saya melihat tentara memagari tempat itu dengan
kawat berduri dan memasang lampu sorot di menara. Kemudian ada banyak orang dibawa masuk
dengan truk. Hal ini berlangsung selama beberapa minggu, seingat saya kebanyakan di malam hari.
Orang yang mencoba kabur akan dihabisi dengan senapan mesin. Saya melihat ada banyak orang
yang mencoba kabur. Mereka dibunuh. Karena lapangan terbang letaknya berseberangan dengan
rumah lama saya, saya melihat kegiatan-kegiatan yang ada di sana. Tempat itu sangat luas dan datar.
Para tahanan dikelompok-kelompokkan. Saya kira ini yang sekarang disebut dengan A, B, dan C.
Kategori 'A' dibawa pergi lagi dengan menggunakan truk. Pemuda Rakyat Klaten benar-benar kepala
batu. Banyak yang berani menantang tentara. Saya bilang ini pada diri saya sendiri, saya tidak tahu
apa yang terjadi pada yang berani. Saya kira mereka semua dibunuh. Di bulan November saya ingat
banyak terdengar letusan senapan, terutama di malam hari, dan saya dengar dari orang-orang bahwa
tentara menggali lubang besar untuk mengubur semua PKI. Saya juga dengar bahwa ada mayat-mayat
yang diambil dan dibuang ke taut Pada waktu itu seorang teman dekat saya dari militer memberi tahu
saya bahwa nama saya ada di daftar orang-orang yang dicurigai oleh ABRI. Saya tidak tahu. Saya
sangat ketakutan. Saya melarikan diri ke Jawa Barat, dan menjauhi Klaten selama tiga bulan, sampai
situasinya mereda. Sampai sekarang pun, kalau anda berasal dari Klaten, dan harus berhubungan
dengan pemerintah, entah untuk urusan apa, mereka pasti akan memberi perhatian khusus dan
terutama menanyakan latar belakang anda."
'%\. Dwi Marianto, 'Surrealist Painting in Yogyakarta', unpublished PhD thesis, University of
WoUongong, 1998.
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'disappeared' sometime during October 1965, believed murdered. Another of the
artist's teachers, Hendra Gunawan, was gaoled for five years.) The artist himself
spent five years incarcerated in Vredeburg Fori:, on the main Maliboro thoroughfare
in Yogyakarta, at that time a political prison for 1965 detainees. (The Fort is now a
major tourist atti-action. There is no reminder of the site's former role. In fact, only
one person would confirm in interviews that Vredeburg was ever a political prison at
all.) The five years was followed by two years of home detention. As the following
transcript reveals, there is a sense that the informant does bring the interviewer back
to the present momentarily in order to consider if there is some form of logic behind
his mistreatment in prison.

For the first year or so of my imprisonment, we were made to sit
outside [because the prison cells were crowded to capacity] day and
night, in the sun, in the rain, in the cold, with our heads between our
knees. If we were seen [by the guards] to move or talk, we were
beaten - usually with a rifle butt, or just kicked, or stomped. I myself
was stomped on the head many times. For this reason I had calluses as
thick as 'this' [indicating 1cm] down both sides of my legs. I would
watch carefully out of the corner of my eye for the guards to be
distracted and then I would quickly change positions. At first, as best
as I could tell, there were around 500 inmates in Vredeburg, but this
number fell over the years as many died or were taken away. The
hardest time was the first few months. Many died. Because I was
young I was always on evening burial detail, which at least gave me a
chance to stand up and get outside. We buried around ten comrades a
day for a number of months. There was httle food and everyone was
sick. Anyone who held even the smallest shred of hope died. You have
to remember that we actually had done nothing wrong. Ironically it
was those who gave up all hope who survived. Like me. I said to
myself, I am in heh and that is that. Those who cried for news of
wives and children, or called out their protests over why they were
being treated so harshly, or because they were an innocent victim of
false testimony, quickly perished of a broken heart, or because they
could not stand the beatings and mistreatment. In the first year I was
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frequently tortured, for no reason that I could tell at the time. The
torturer never asked me to confess anything, or to betray information
about this or that. It was a matter of gratuitous cruelty and humiliation.
It was part of being in hell I suppose. I was frequentiy punched in the
face without warning. On several occasions one of the officers made
me place my fingers under the legs of his chair and then he sat down
violently. Actually I seem to remember that this happened a few times.
On one occasion this broke my knuckles, on another it snapped one of
my fingers. Perhaps this is because I was an artist and they wanted to
make sure I would never paint again. But I reaUy don't think so. They
were just bastards. And at the time I did not question why I was being
tortured.'^^

The man could not find work as an artist for nearly a decade after leaving prison. For
many years he sold lurik (a traditional style of cloth) door to door, and worked as a
tailor. The chronological complexion of the following comments is distinguishable
from the man's more durational memories of prison. This is the result of the infiuence
of anti-communist ideology, but it is also based on an attempt to use myth to place
his experiences into a rational framework.
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Kira-kira pada tahun pertama saya
dipenjara kami disuruh duduk di luar sepanjang siang dan malam, panas, hujan, dingin, dengan
kepala di antara lutut. Kalau kami terlihat bergerak atau bicara, kami dipukuli - biasanya dengan
popor senapan, atau cuma ditendang, atau diinjak-injak. Saya sendiri sering diinjak-injak kepala saya.
Oleh sebab itu di kedua kaki saya ada 'kapaV setebal 'ini'. Saya harus sering melihat dari sudut mata
kapan si penjaga lengah, baru kemudian saya mengubah posisi. Pada mulanya, seingat saya, ada
sekitar 500 penghuni di Vredeburg, tetapi dalam beberapa tahun jumlahnya sangat cepat berkurang
karena banyak yang mati atau dibawa pergi. Masa yang paling sengsara adalah beberapa bulan
pertama. Banyak yang mati. Karena saya masih muda saya selalu menghadiri pemakaman di malam
hari, sehingga setidak-tidaknya saya punya kesempatan berdiri atau keluar. Kami mengubur sekitar
sepuluh teman sehari selama beberapa bulan. Makanan sangat sedikit dan semua orang sakit. Semua
orang yang punya harapan, sekecil apa pun, mati. Ingat, sebenarnya kami tidak melakukan kesalahan
apa pun. Ironisnya, orang-orang yang sudah putus harapanlah yang malah bisa bertahan. Seperti
saya. Saya berkata pada diri saya sendiri, 'Saya ada di neraka, selesai'. Orang-orang yang ingin
mendengar kabar tentang anak-istrinya, atau berunjuk rasa mengapa mereka diperlakukan dengan
sangat kasar, atau karena ada orang-orang tak bersalah yang masuk akibat kesaksian palsu, dengan
cepat mati karena hatinya hancur, atau karena mereka tidak tahan menghadapi pukulan dan perlakuan
itu. Pada tahun-tahun pertama saya sering disiksa tanpa alasan yang jelas. Orang yang menyiksa saya
tidak pernah memaksa saya mengakui apa-apa, atau memberi informasi tentang ini atau itu. Ini
semata-mata merupakan kekejaman dan penghinaan. Saya kira beginilah rasanya di neraka. Saya
sering dipukuli di muka tanpa peringatan. Beberapa kali salah seorang petugas memaksa saya
meletakkan jari-jari saya di bawah kaki kursi dan dengan keras duduk di atasnya. Saya kira peristiwa
ini terjadi beberapa kali. Sekali waktu sendi jari saya patah, kali lain salah satujari saya yang patah.
Mungkin ini karena saya seorang seniman dan mereka ingin memastikan bahwa saya tidak akan bisa
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After I had been in prison some years and conditions improved
somewhat, the Major in charge of Vredeburg told me that the reason
we [those associated with LEKRA] were not all killed after our arrest
was that Sukamo himself personally intervened on our behalf. "Kill
the engineers and lawyers", the Major told me Sukamo said, "we
have too many of them any way. But spare the artists". I don't know
if this is tme, but ABRI believed it was tme. Actually I know this,
that the Military were more lenient to artists than to others. I was
actually married in gaol in 1969 and released in 1970 with a further
two years with the status of a detainee. For many years after I was
released the Army or the police would tum up at any hour of the day
or night to question me because I was ex-LEKRA. Often I was taken
away. Often I was questioned, sometimes not. Perhaps they didn't
realise that in 1965 I was only a young man and not really a
significant

LEKRA person

at all. We were always under

surveillance, especially after I started to become more successful.
Even now I must report in person every month, or when I am called.
Even now I cannot obtain a passport or travel outside of Yogyakarta
without specific permission from the local military commander.^^

In another interview, the artist was asked about prison, and the constant surveillance
of his family by the military since his release, and in what way this influenced his
thinking about the past and about political conditions in Indonesia since 1965. The
response rationalises rather than remembers. In a manner it is consistent with what
the New Order wanted former Leftists to believe were the real objectives of anticommunist ideology - perpetual punishment by example. For this reason the artist
said that since release from prison he had been extremely careful about how and to
whom he spoke of his prison experiences.

Enemies of the New Order were not intended to be successful, as I
now am. Those who were not killed in 1965, or who did not die of

melukis lagi. Tetapi mungkin juga tidak. Mungkin karena mereka memang bajingan. Dan waktu itu
saya juga tidak bertanya kenapa saya disiksa."
'^Ibid.
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mistreatment, were expected to suffer for their crimes until the end of
their lives, and then their children and grandchildren too. I believe that
the military are angry that I somehow survived and jealous that my
work is in demand. But the real reason, I believe, is that what I
represent has survived. Such as the tradition of my teacher, Hendra
Gunawan. For this reason LEKRA has survived. As long as I keep
painting something has survived ... I keep two goats. They have no
names. I just call them goat one and goat two. When I see these goats,
when I smell their distinctive smell, I think about my life in East Java
as a child before I came to Yogyakarta to study and to paint. The goats
are not complicated, like my life became after 1965. This is what I like
about the goats."^^

At this point, it is worth contrasting the testimony of 75-year-old 'Novi', (a
Malioboro Street shopkeeper, and the grandson of the brother of the late Sultan of
Yogyakarta, Sri Hamengkubuwono IX). Novi's business card declared that his
antique and Javanese musical instmment shop was opened by his father in 1887. His
business is almost directly opposite Vredeburg Fort. He said that during the r960s
and 1970s he had been a senior bureaucrat at Gadjah Mada University and that he
spoke German, Dutch and Japanese fluently. For this reason he was often called by
the late Sultan to translate during the Japanese military sponsored 'Protectors of the
Fatherland Program' (PETA). He said that he had been 'close' to Suharto at the end
of the Indonesian Revolution. He said that he did not hold a particular political
affiliation during the late Sukamo period.
I asked Novi whether it was tme that Vredeburg had been converted into a
prison for detained communists after October 1965. He looked visibly shocked. He

^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997. "Musuh-musuh Orde Baru biasanya
tidak sukses seperti saya sekarang. Orang-orang yang lolos dari pembunuhan tahun 1965, atau mati
disiksa, diharapkan menderita akibat kejahatan mereka sampai akhir hidup, juga anak-anak dan cucucucu mereka. Saya yakin bahwa Militer marah melihat saya bisa bertahan hidup dan iri karena karyakarya saya laris. Tetapi saya yakin alasan sebenarnya adalah bahwa apa yang saya lambangkan
masih tetap hidup. Tradisi guru Saya, Hendra Gunawan. Itulah kenapa LEKRA terus hidup. Selama
saya masih melukis masih ada yang terus hidup. Saya memelihara dua ekor kambing. Keduanya tidak
punya nama. Saya cuma memanggil mereka kambing satu dan kambing dua. Ketika saya melihat
kambing-kambing itu, ketika saya mencium bau khas mereka, saya teringat dengan kehidupan saya di
Jawa Timur ketika saya masih anak-anak, sebelum saya datang ke Yogyakarta untuk belajar dan
melukis. Kambing itu gampang, sama dengan hidup saya setelah tahun 1965. Inilah yang saya suka
dari kambing dan mengapa saya suka memandangi mereka."
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said that this was "a secret" and wanted to know how I knew. Novi reluctantly said
that after October 1965 there had been "around 100 or so political detainees in the
Fort", but as far as he was concemed, "they had all died". Novi was very happy to
talk about street batties in Yogyakarta during the hidonesian Revolution, but refused
to answer further questions about Vredeburg or 1965. When I asked if he could tell
me about his memories of the violence, Novi replied: "Oh, no, no. h would not be
wise to talk about that. That is in the past".^*^
Similarly, my interview with Ismoyo, an elderiy Abdi Dalem Kraton or
'Yogyakarta Palace Guard', was also characterised by a reluctance to talk about the
violence. He was, however, prepared to reveal a number of clues. Ismoyo explained
that he had fought to protect the Sultan's Palace from Dutch military occupation
during the Revolution. He answered a whole range of questions about the history of
Yogyakarta up until the 1960s, after which time he abmptly stopped my line of
questioning with a question of his own:

Why are you asking me all these irrelevant questions about the past?
Why don't you ask me something really important, hke: How many
trees are there in the Kraton grounds? [He further said that] At some
time, in the future, someone will ask you that question, and then you
can tmthfully [i.e. that is all I can know for certain] and confidently
answer that, in the Kraton, there are 62 trees.^'

These comments are pertinent given that reliable documentary evidence exists to
cross-reference the extent to which Yogyakarta Kraton staff were involved in the PKI
Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, July 1997.
^'Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Mengapa anda menanyakan hal-hal yang tidak
relevan tentang masa lalu, mengapa anda tidak menanyakan hal-hal yang benar-benar penting,
seperti: berapa banyak pohon yang ada di Kraton sini? Suatu hari nanti akan ada orang yang
menanyakan hal ini, dan anda bisa dengan jujur dan yakin menjawab bahwa di Kraton ada 62 pohon."
This interview led to a great deal of discussion amongst my Yogyakarta-based colleagues about what
the Abdi Dalem 'actually meant'. Professor Rahmanto from the Department of Literature at the
University of Sanata Dharma believes that the Abdi's question was almost certainly a type of code, and
that 'in a particularly Javanese way' he was saying something by not saying it. However, Professor
Rahmanto was unable to speculate about what the code may mean. Interview with Professor Bernardus
Rahmanto, Yogyakarta, 6 August 1997. M. Dwi Marianto on the other hand reminded me about an
incident that allegedly happened the day after the death of the late Sri Sultan of Yogyakarta,
Hamengkubuwono IX. It was said that one of the sacred banyan trees in the central square of the palace
died instantiy and fell over. Marianto then also speculated that the trees were a riddle rather than code,
and that it was up to me to find out the answer to the historical riddle, of the 62 Kraton trees. Discussion
with M. Dwi Marianto, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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or affiliate organisations. For instance, nearly two thirds of all employees of the
provincial govemment of Yogyakarta, or 1,240 persons, were identified as 'category
C detainees in late 1965. This group were interrogated between 1 January and 20
July 1966 and deemed to "require compulsory New Order indoctrination".^^ Ismoyo's
comments introduce the prospect of a type of culturally specific emdition. His
response raises the question of whether Javanese historical activism is an example of
how Westem oral history approaches may differ from Javanese forms of historical
knowledge. At one level, however, this may have been wilful avoidance, or a
silencing of facts. At another level, it may be a different way of looking at the process
of history. As Florida reminds us:

The history of Javanese literature [like the colonial history of the
Dutch East Indies] had been produced by colonial and post-colonial
philologists who had based their studies on Dutch archives of Javanese
manuscripts. In other words, 'traditional Javanese literature' was a
constract produced

through

investigations

of

a selection

of

manuscripts that Dutch and sometimes British colonial civil servants
had chosen to collect in the 19* and early 20* centuries. In Javanese
literature, every tale has many tellings and every detail of character or
event alludes to another or to a web of others. Everything quite selfconsciously references something else. The stories tend to form
themselves

into

genealogical

stmctures

and

not

only blood

genealogies, but also sometimes genealogies of ideas or ideologies, or
discourses or futures. And often a single story is told differentiy every
time it is told.

Interviews with Kidul resident 'Samar' demonstiate a consistency with Florida's
observations, namely that like accounts found within Javanese historical manuscripts,
oral history is not fixed in time but represents a continuum of recalled and reinterpreted experiences and a dialogue between the subject, the past, and the
interviewer, often for a future purpose.
*¥.J. Suwarno, Hamengkubuwono IX Dan Sistem Birokrasi Pemerintahan Yogyakarta 1942-1974,
Kanisius, Yogyakarta, 1994, pp.339-57.
63,http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/iournal/vnl7no2/florida.htm site accessed July 2002.
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'Samar' is a tailor who is almost bhnd with glaucoma. Before 1965, he hved
with his family in Yogyakarta where he had been a high-school teacher and a
member of the PKI. Soldiers of the RPKAD arrested him in early November 1965.
He was held in the Yogyakarta cential military barracks until early 1966 after which
time he was imprisoned without trial for five years in Vredeburg Fort. He and the
artist, mentioned in the previous interview, had known each other socially before
prison, and in prison, but had only met on two occasions since their release.
One of my neighbours said that Samar moved his new business, tailoring, and
his family, out of the city centre to Kidul after he was released from prison in 1971,
and that he had taken on a number of local boys as apprentices. He was never
permitted to retum to teaching. Many years later, one of the boys set up as a
competitor.^"^ In May 1997, during my period of fieldwork, the young man raised
Samar's 'unclean communist background' with the authorities. Samar suggested that
this was "in order to promote the man's new business".^'^ One neighbour said that the
timing was more to do with the 1997 Election and increasing the man's standing with
the military for the purpose of securing a nomination to the local parliament.^^
Yet another explanation was that the competitor's father had been a wellknown supporter of the PKI in Kidul, and this was one means of establishing the
man's anti-communist credentials.

In any respect, in 1997 Samar's family felt

intensely fearful of dismissal from their government jobs because of possible
detection under the New Order's bersih lingkungan restrictions. His children, one a
primary-school teacher, the other a government clerk, lived in a state of constant
/TO

anxiety that they too would be dismissed because of their unclean background.

For

Samar, and many others, this profoundly influenced the way the memory of the
violence could be negotiated. However, although he was clearly attempting to recall
the past, the fear of the present meant that most of his testimony tended towards
highly chronological commentary, or avoidance.
Like almost everyone in Kidul, Samar admitted no direct experience of
anyone being killed in Kidul during the arrests of early November 1965. He said.

^''Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. My informant said this man's family was
always trying to be "on the winning side".
'Hbid.
66,
"Ibid.
"•fbid.
7
68Vbid.
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"Yogyakarta was different from East Java".^^ Again this may constitute a form of
myth making where the violence of one community is deemed to be not as severe as
another. However Samar confirmed what the artist had said about prison - conditions
were very harsh and many of his friends had perished, hiterestingly, Samar's
memories of 1965 were of just before his arrest, not of his arrest per se. This period
in Samar's life seemed to be vague and difficuh to define. He showed me old
photographs of his PKI comrades, as well as one faded portrait of his brother who
had also been a member of the PKI, and who had married his wife's sister. He said
that he once had a collection of books, which were destroyed by the military when he
was arrested. (Semar actually kept some books hidden, but did not reveal this until
over a year later after the fall of Suharto.) In 1997 Samar was justifiability more
concemed about bersih lingkungan and later keterpengaruhan scrutiny, than
answering dangerous questions about his past.
In interviews, Samar recalled his "feehngs of optimism" for Indonesia before
GESTAPU (Samar's word), and his sorrow about the nation's current state of affairs.
He said that he secretly kept in contact with many of his old colleagues and that they
sometimes met in private to discuss the New Order. These very secret conversations
did not include family members or other members of the community. Again, there is
a chronological complexion to the following testimony. This is understandable given
the pressure Samar was under at the time of the interview.

As a young teacher, I was so optimistic about the future. The PKI did
a lot of good in the kampungs, and in the countryside. GERWANI was
very popular too, especially here in Kidul, but people are now too
frightened

to remember this. What happened, my arrest and

mistreatment came as a great shock you know. It was really like a bad
dream. One day I was active in doing something courageous for my
country, the next day all was destroyed. It happened so quickly. What
was this GESTAPU?, I asked myself when I first read about it in the
newspaper? Within a month, I knew what it meant all right. The word
is a curse to me. Now I am blind. I often think about the past.
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especially before the trouble, and think about how things might have
been.^°

As already seen, within interviews the memory of an association with communism
and a fear of the authorities predominate. However, there are more complex
chronological justifications such as the contemporary social negotiation of betrayal.
These accounts either use the past to make a comment on the present, or else
substantially define the past in respect to contemporary terms of reference or moral
justification. Sometimes these accounts are from the same subjects that at one time
defined their memories in more durational terms.
For most subjects willing to have their testimonies recorded, what appears
impossible to forget is the 'atmosphere', the feehng of uncertainly, or the anticipation
of something terrible about to happen. Fear is in fact a constant theme throughout
interviews and the literature. 'I Am a Leaf in a Storm' demonstrates feelings of fear
associated with realising the personal implications of the failed coup, and then the
anxiety associated with having to constantly conceal the person's former status as a
GERWANI member and PKI-based union organiser. This builds up a picture of what
it was like to be one of the millions of former Leftists that evaded arrest in 1965, but
were forced to live in constant fear of betrayal.

This same sense of 'something very

bad about to happen', mixed with the chronological rationalisation of someone
wanting to be on 'the winning side', can be seen in the following testimony.
'Muhammad' is a civil servant who lives with his family in Yogyakarta. He
was originally from East Java. His family are landowners and farmers. His village
was predominantly santri. He said that his district was one of the areas "worst
affected by the PKI's aksi sepihak''. He said that communal violence between the
PKI, in particular the Pemuda Rakyat, and landowners, was a prominent feature of
life in his village at that time. One of his comments was that the PKI held death lists

^^Ibid. "Sebagai guru muda saya sangat optimis melihat masa depan. PKI banyak berbuat kebaikan di
kampung-kampung dan di desa-desa. GERWANI waktu itu juga sangat populer, terutama di sini di
IKidul] tetapi orang-orang terlalu takut untuk mengingat-ingatnya. Apa yang terjadi, saya sangat
terkejut ditangkap dan disiksas. Rasanya seperti mimpi buruk Suatu hari saya aktif berjuang untuk
bangsa saya, dan hari berikutnya semua sudah hancur. Saya bertanya kepada diri saya sendiri apa
artinya 'GESTAPU?' ini ketika saya membaca di koran? Sebulan kemudian baru saya tahu apa
artinya kata ini. Kata itu adalah kutukan untuk saya. Sekarang saya buta. Saya sering mengenang
masa lalu, terutama masa-masa sebelum kerusuhan itu dan bagaimana seandainya peristiwa itu tidak
terjadi."
Marni, op.cit., pp.55-60.
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of their enemies. There is, however, a significant inconsistency in this interview.
Despite the military seizure of the PKI archive before the destmction of their national
headquarters in Jakarta, no evidence was produced by the New Order that PKI death
lists ever existed. Had such existed it would have almost certainly been aired in the
propaganda literature.

Everyone knew that something big was going to happen, actually our
community believed that given the strength of the PKI, and the
support they received from Sukarno, that they were preparing to
ultimately try and wipe-out Islam in Indonesia. Remember this was
only 17 years after Madiun when the PKI was wiped out. They were
after revenge for Madiun. I strongly believe this. In 1965, they were
again stronger than ever. I do not know if it is trae, but at the time
there was a lot of talk about the PKI preparing death lists, particularly
of prominent landowners. When the killings started in mid-October
1965, the communists killed many ulamas in East Java. I remember
seeing some of the people responsible caught. They were shot by
people in my village and buried in a big hole. At the time we were
fighting for our lives. It was a type of war. I have no doubt that if the
communists had won then my family would have been among the first
victims. It just so happened that the communists were caught offguard and quickly destroyed. Of course, there were many innocent
victims, communist and non-communist. I saw this for myself. The
political situation was very confused. It really was like a war, a civil
war. Looking back, I am amazed that it was not worse than what it
72

was.
^^Confidential Interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Semua orang tahu bahwa ada peristiwa
hebat yang akan terjadi, masyarakat di tempat kami percaya bahwa karena PKI kuat, dan karena
mendapat dukungan dari Sukarno, maka suatu hari PKI akan membersihkan dan membasmi Islam di
Indonesia. Ingat bahwa waktu itu barulah 17 tahun setelah peristiwa Madiun di mana PKI dibasmi.
Mereka ingin membalaskan dendam Madiun. Saya sangat percaya hal ini. Pada tahun 1965 mereka
menjadi sangat kuat dibandingkan dengan sebelumnya. Saya tidak tahu apakah ini benar, tetapi pada
masa itu ada banyak orang bicara bahwa PKI sedang menyiapkan daftar kematian para tuan tanah
terkemuka. Ketika pembantaian dimulai pada pertengahan bulan Oktober 1965, orang-orang komunis
kemudian membunuhi banyak Ulama di Jawa Timur. Saya ingat saya melihat beberapa orang yang
bertanggung jawab ditangkapi. Mereka ditembak oleh orang-orang di desa saya dan dikubur di dalam
lubang besar. Pada masa itu kami berjuang mempertahankan hidup kami. Semacam peranglah. Saya
yakiin kalau komunis yang menang, maka keluarga kamilah yang pertama menjadi korban. Yang
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Many chronological responses to questions about the killings involved negative
commentary on the Suharto regime, including origins and legitimacy - but especially
concems about the wealth and cormpt business activities of the Suharto family - and
the first family's dealings with Indonesian Chinese cukong or 'conglomerates'. In
contrast to a pre-occupation with Suharto, positive comments on the Sukarno era
were frequentiy noted, as were notions of a changed sense of 'Indonesian-ness' and
the failure of Indonesian nation building since Sukarno. One common theme involved
'feelings' that Sukarno was somehow denied his 'tme place' in Indonesian history demonsti-ated by de facto support for his daughter, the then PDI-P chairperson, and
now national President, Megawati Sukarnoputri.
An example of this is the testimony of 'Sastro', the son of a deceased Colonel
from the Kalah Hitam or 'Black Scorpions', and one time personal bodyguard of
Sukamo. Sastro's father had been a decorated Revolutionary war hero. However,
following the events of 1965 the father forbade his son from ever joining the military.
This was something Sastro deeply regretted because he was offered a place in the
officer training school in Bandung. (He said his father would often say that he was
disgusted with what happened in Jakarta in the weeks and months after September
1965.) On the night of 30 September 1965, Sastro said that his father had been
challenged by a group of armed soldiers from "the G30S", but said that he, his wife
and children had some waming and prepared automatic weapons. (As with many of
his generation, Sastro's father was pensioned off in 1969 because of his proSukarnoist sentiments.)
The father's account is suspiciously like the script from the well-known
propaganda film of the 1980s, Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. Like the film, the assailants
retreated. Sastro was very reluctant to talk about the violence, but rather wished to
talk about Sukarno. His enmity was focused on the person of Suharto who he blamed,
without being specific, for "all of Indonesia's problems". Sastro described President
Suharto as a thief of Sukarno's wahyu, or 'anointing' and that Suharto had "stolen
Sukamo's rightful history". He said that this was "a common belief among ordinary

terjadi orang-orang komunis lengah, dan mereka dengan cepat bisa dibasmi. Memang ada banyak
korban tak bersalah, komunis dan nonkomunis. Saya melihat sendiri. Situasi politik waktu itu betulbetul kacau. Rasanya seperti perang, perang sipil. Mengingat kembali peristiwa tersebut, saya heran
bahwa yang saya ingat masih kala buruk dibandingkan kejadian yang sebenarnya."
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hidonesians, even sudra'\ who maintained that Sukarno's mle had been cut short, and
that he was "at his peak of power in 1965".^^

h was known that Sukarno wasn't perfect. His great weakness was
women, but he was really entitied to anything he wanted because he
looked after his people. On the other hand, most people now believe
that Suharto is not a good king because all he cares about are his
greedy stupid children, not his people. Many people believe that
Megawati is entitled to the wahyu that was stolen from Sukarno.
However, this is seldom talked about because people feel it safer just
to keep their mouths shut.^"^

Sastro's response became more transparent once I discovered that he had been in
military prison for one year after the Malari student riots in 1974. He had been
regularly tortured while in custody. His hatred for the Suharto regime now had a
personal context. His apprehensions concerning answering questions about sensitive
historical issues were therefore understandable.
The extent to which contemporary conditions influence testimony is likewise
illustrated in the following example, where the necessity is rather to preserve the
detente of silence for the sake of community harmony. 'Yousep' is a 52-year-old
high-school teacher, and a senior member of the local Catholic organisational
stracture. He said he was strongly anti-communist in the 1960s, especially after the

"The Hindu class system is apparentiy still relevant in Yogyakarta. I have heard many people, almost
all exclusively associated with the priyayi aliran, talk about the bodoh or 'the stupid' in terms of being
sudra, or 'the lowest and most common caste'. Even egalitarian and liberal-minded educated Javanese
still think, at least privately, in this way. Interview with M, Dwi Marianto, Yogyakarta, 7 August 1997.
There is a further distinction however between wong cilik or 'the very common people', and the wong
jadi or 'those who have become human, primarily through education or rather learning', and the wong
gede, or 'the common person who has become economically successful'. Naturally no one likes to be
called a sudrah and no one likes to be called wong cilik. These terms are still very much derogatory
terms used by a higher class to describe a lower class.
^"Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Orang banyak tahu Sukarno tidak sempurna.
Kelemahan terbesarnya adalah perempuan, tetapi ia memang pantas mendapatkan apa saja yang ia
mau sebab ia mengurusi rakyatnya. Sebaliknya, orang-orang sekarang yakin bahwa Suharto bukan
raja yang baik sebab ia hanya peduli dengan anak-anaknya yang goblok dan rakus, bukan dengan
rakyatnya. Orang-orang percaya bahwa Megawati mewarisi wahyu yang dicuri dari Sukarno. Akan
tetapi, hal inijarang dibicarakan sebab rakyat merasa lebih aman tutup mulut. " One subject made the
important point that most of the Kings of Java in fact stole their wahyu from the particular previous
ruler. He recalled a story from one of Benedict Anderson's accounts of the ancient Pararaton text,
where the King saw the wahyu on the end of the dying King's penis. He subsequentiy took the wahyu
from the penis with his mouth. Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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communist youth wing "started to harass candidates from the seminary on Jalan
Kaliurang". He said that the atmosphere at the time was highly charged due to
Sukamo's insistence that NASAKOM be adopted by all official religions. He
confided that one of the leaders of the Catholic community, 'Romo John', worked
with the military and that Romo John played a leading role in the state security
apparatus after 1965, acting as a senior operative and recraiter for the intemal
security group OPSUS (later BAKIN). Yousep said that in late 1965 the situation had
become "explosive", particularly between Cathohcs and communists.

September 1965 just lit the fuse. Under the circumstances, I am
surprised that the military crackdown in November 1965 against
communists in Yogyakarta was as orderly as it was. Honestly, I was
expecting a bloody civil war. Many of Yogyakarta's and particularly
Klaten's Catholics, are ex-communists, or family members of excommunists. Now they are completely accepted and integrated in the
Catholic family. No one asks about anyone's background, ever. This is
because everyone around here has a background. I myself have
relatives who were members of the BTI and GERWANI.^^

Michael van Langenberg suggests that a desire not to mention a person's background
may be rooted in a sense of shame as much as in fear of attracting the attention of the
authorities about unclean pasts or a desire to maintain the status quo.

Where retribution is suggested, it is usually presented as being that of
the spontaneous actions of 'the People' against 'communist treachery'.
This places ultimate responsibility for the mass violence at the feet of
the PKI and its political alhes: making that violence a consequence of
the chaos of the Old Order, not the beginning of the New. In the years
since 1966, it is the memory of past disorder, and not the details of the
'^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997. "September 1965 hanyalah pemantik
saja. Pada situasi seperti itu saya heran bahwa aksi militer bulan November 1965 untuk membasmi
komunis di Yogya dilakukan dengan begitu teratur. Sejujurnya saya kira yang akan terjadi adalah
Barata Yuda Iperang sipil besar]. Banyak orang-orang Katolik di Yogyakarta dan Klaten adalah
ekskomunis, atau anggota keluarga dari ekskomunis. Sekarang mereka sudah sepenuhnya diterima dan
masuk menjadi bagian keluarga Katolik Tidak ada lagi yang menanyakan latar belakang orang lain.
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mass kilhngs themselves, which the official discourse of the New
Order regime has emphasised.^^

Blame is the theme of another account reproduced in The Indonesian Killings,
notably the pro-military 'Crashing the G30S/PKI in Central Java'.^^ Like the Gadjah
Mada Centi-e for Village Studies' document, this report stops short of a detailed
description of the killings. However, it does carefully set out the alleged guilt of PKI
members and supporters far from Jakarta based on 'incriminating documents'
supphed to the military. As Cribb suggests, "a case for the mass killings that follow is
thus laid".

However there is another side to the narrative of accusation -

acquiescence. As the following illustrates, this is complex because it involves
feelings of shame associated with not intervening to protect neighbours or friends
from false accusation and arrest.
The testimony of 'Nana' who was born in Klaten but lives in Kidul illustrates
this point. Nana actually explained that she could 'remember' aspects of the upheaval
in 1965 even though she was born in March 1966. She explained that memories
associated with her childhood neighbours were so strong that she felt she actually
remembered the circumstances surrounding their disappearance. She said that her
neighbours, two teachers - husband and wife - had been senior PKI cadres and that
her parents sometimes spoke in private about what a positive contribution the couple
had made to the community and that they were "very modem". Because of this, Nana
felt she could "imagine" {membayangkan) the teachers' goodness, but that she could
only "fantasise about" (mengkhayalkan) how the soldiers came and took the teachers
away. She also remembered how her parents had hidden, afraid to come outside. (In
fact Nana was well aware that this story had been conveyed to her by her parents, but
that it was such a powerful image that she 'felt' as if she could remember it herself.)

My parents sometimes spoke about their shame. If my parents had
tried to defend the teachers then the soldiers would surely have treated
them like communists too. The education department owned the
Ini karena semua orang di sini juga punya latar belakang yang sama. Saya sendiri punya saudara
yang bekas anggota BTI dan GERWANI."
van Langenberg, op.cit., p.58.
Cribb, 'Crushing the G30S/PKI in Central Java', The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.159-68.
™/Wdf.,p.]60.
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couple's house, so when other people moved in, nothing was ever
said. My parents often spoke of the two teachers, but only in private,
and only in soft tones. They had been close.^^

The phenomenon of 'remembering' things that happened before a person was bom is
worth discussing further. Young people in Kidul clearly did not 'remember 1965' but
as above, 'felt as if they remembered' events that they had leamt about by mmour,
such as a relative that died in the violence, or the story of someone who had been in
prison,

or in fact the stories mentioned previously, told in secret from Pasuman or

Klaten. These 'memories' were impossible to substantiate and invariably involved
'something someone had said to someone'.
The literature is patchy on discussions of memories of things that 'never
happened', however Akemi Kikumura's writing on 'insider' and

'outsider'

perspectives on family life histories provides some theoretical guidance.

Likewise

Casey's perspective on 'secondary remembering' and 're-remembering' involving the
phenomenon of the internal decoding of secondary information, points to another
possible explanation. "Thus [memories] are made vulnerable to transformations
unknown to the rememberer".

Casey also talks about the possibility of someone

"remembering the future", which he identifies as a form of projection.^^ This is
consistent with the memories of some young people in Kidul who appeared to be
projecting myths, legends and secretiy re-told stories about 1965 into a usable
account. As explained in chapter one, this process is one means by which myths may
be created and perpetuated. This is in contrast to popular knowledge of the coup,
which was mostiy the product of the series of propaganda films produced in the
1980s (mentioned previously) and screened extensively until the end of the Suharto
era.

^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, October 1997. "Orang tua saya kadang-kadang
menceritakan aib mereka. Jika orang tua saya berusaha membela guru saya, maka tentara pasti juga
akan memperlakukan mereka seperti komunis. Rumah orang tua saya adalah rumah dinas milik
Departemen Pendidikan, jadi jika ada orang lain ikut tinggal di sana, hal itu tidak diceritakan pada
siapa-siapa. Orang tua saya sering bercerita tentang kedua orang guru tersebut, tetapi secara
pribadi, dan dengan suara pelan. Mereka dulu dekat."
''Ibid.
^'Akemi Kikumura, 'Family Life Histories: A Collaborate Venture', in Robert Perks and Alistair
Thomson, eds, The Oral History Reader, Routiedge, London, 1988, pp. 140-44.
Casey, op.cit., pp.50-51.
'^Ibid., pp.62-63.
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Explanations for the killings, other than those explanations consistent with
propaganda line, only appear in rare newspaper reports in the immediate post-coup
period and seem to have had little influence on the way people thought about the
violence in 1997. For example the newspaper accounts of the killings in the
Purwodadi area, entitled, 'Purwodadi: Area of Death'^"^ by Maskun Iskandar, and
'Report from Purwodadi'^^ by Jopie Lasut.^^ As Cribb suggests, these reports
reminded readers at the time that religious differences were just as much a potent
source of the violence as the political polarisation between Left and Right; that the
violence was mostiy attributed to the extraordinary tensions within society and may
have actually been behind many of the kilhngs. The following example shares
similarities with memories of past social tensions, but are recalled from the
perspective of the victor, rather than a removed observer, or a victim. Conspiratorial
and mythological sentiments are clearly reflected in this testimony.
'Arifin' is the 45-year-old son of a deceased general who "played an
important role in eliminating communism in Yogyakarta".^^ Arifin is a member of
Muhamadyiah. He and his wife are graduate fine artists. They live in Kidul. Arifin
became angry during my questioning of his memory of 1965.

It was well known that the communists had a death list of their own.
In the end it was a matter of kill or be killed. It was also well known
that the communists had harassed Muslim groups before the PKI was
banned.

Look!

I

remember

seeing

violent

pro-communist

demonstrations as a youth in Yogyakarta. This was the Pemuda
Rakyat. These demonstrations were frightening. I do not want to see
the communists have another chance to harass or kill faithful Muslims
again. They [the PKI] have shown their impatience twice before once in 1927 and again in Madiun in 1948. The PKI were cleariy
impatient for power in 1965 too. Now there are signs everywhere the
PKI is making a big comeback. You can see this. That is why the
Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.203-13.
*^/WJ., pp.412-26.
^^Ibid., p.226. See also p.201 .Cribb notes that Sinar Harapan issued a brief statement about the general
reporting of the killings in the Purwodadi area that: "Information concerning mass killings in
Purwodadi is connected with PKI remnants who wish to discredit the government. And if there were
killings, then they were the result of military actions taken under martial law".
Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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government has to do everything possible to prevent the PKI from
becoming strong again.^^

In Kidul, like the above example, most testimonies were characterised by third-party
accounts, theories, conspiracies, and ramour.^^ They also involved the incorporation
of events into general cosmological understanding of the relationship between
pohtics and naturally occurring events, such as volcanic eraptions, droughts, floods,
etc. These particular myths about the killings also appear to have been influenced by
the official propaganda, or by the evolving bureaucratic manifestations of anticommunist ideology, for example terlibat, di bina oleh PKI and bersih diri
mentioned previously. Some of these myths originate from a vague feeling of
sympathy with a lost cause. These include the myth of the 'teacher figure' as the
inevitable first victim of the killings and disappearances, in fact the symbolic martyr
of Indonesian Leftist modernity.^°
This is reinforced by another testimony, imported into Kidul from East Java.
The subject said that his father had told him that in his village near Madiun, East
Java, communists were spared execution with the exception of the local headmaster,
who was taken away by the military and, like the teachers in Nana's story, never seen
again. The man said that his grandfather, a Haji (and the head of the village) had been
sentenced to death by the communists in 1948 during the height of the Madiun
Revolt. He was reportedly spared execution by the arrival of the TNI, apparentiy in
the nick of time. Because of this experience the Haji had a reputation for being 'anticommunist', although he was, in tmth, according to his granson, neutral. In 1965, it
was reported that he was able to turn away a military execution team who were going
Ibid. "Sudah umum diketahui bahwa orang-orang komunis punya daftar pembunuhan sendiri. Pada
akhirnya siapa yang membunuh siapa. Orang juga banyak tahu bahwa sebelum PKI dinyatakan
terlarang orang-orang komunis sering menggangu kelompok Muslim. Begini! Saya ingat waktu muda
saya pernah melihat demonstrasi prokomunis yang kasar di Yogyakarta. Itu Pemuda Rakyat
Demonstrasi itu menakutkan. Saya tidak ingin melihat komunis punya kesempatan lagi untuk
mengganggu atau membunuh orang-orang Muslim yang taat. Mereka tPKI] telah dua kali
memperlihatkan ketidaksabaran - sekali di tahun 1927 dan sekali lagi di Madiun tahun 1948. Di tahun
1965 PKI jelas-jelas tidak sabar ingin merebut kekuasaan juga. Sekarang ini di mana-mana muncul
tanda-tanda bahwa mereksa akan kembali. Bisa anda lihat. Itulah sebabnya pemerintah harus
melakukan segala cara untuk mencegah PKI menjadi kuat Kembali."
One respondent in fact stated that people in Kidul loved 'sas sus', desas-desus or 'gossip'. (While
there were many who, in 1998, wanted to gossip about village politics, or the antics of the Suharto
children - and after 1998 - the 1965 coup, I did not experience one person in Kidul during my
fieldwork who wanted to gossip about the violence.)
I am indebted to David Reeve for the conversation that led to this line of thinking, Yogyakarta,
August 1997.
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from village to village in search of PKI members. The Haji was however, not able to
save the teacher:

[Conducted in English] According to my father, the teacher was a very
good man. While he was the head of the PKI in the village, he had
also been the organiser of a regional literacy campaign and was well
respected for this commitment to the community. My father had been
close to the teacher, as the teacher had been an important person in the
community. My father said that the two of them often had discussions,
but that they never argued, rather their talks were always calm and
sophisticated. As a littie boy, I used to play with the teacher's
children, but after their father's disappearance the entire family were
forced to move away from the area.^^

These remembrances raise the persistent theme of the village teacher being one of the
09

first victims of the anti-communist backlash.

Stories of teachers as 'the first

victims' of the killings have genuine currency, as supported by both testimony and
the literature. Many teachers were idealists and therefore naturally drawn to the PKI's
social reform agenda, such as Samar. As Cribb comments: "teachers had been poorly
looked after under Guided Democracy, and had been extensively recraited by the PKI
as the key to influencing future generations".^^ This pattern of specifically targeted
violence can be seen in the oral testimony wherever killings took place. (Indeed as
Kenneth Orr suggests, over 90 per cent of all teachers in the district of Klaten, near
Yogyakarta, were held under suspicion of being PKI members.)^"^ This myth
represents a 'social type', representing a form of progressive modemity with the
teacher at its imagined vanguard. The theme of the murdered teacher figure in fact
represents a symbolic murdering of the future, or at least the destmction of
''Ibid
92'l am indebted to David Reeve for the conversation that led to this line of enquiry.
9.3''Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., p.9. Also see Kenneth Orr, 'Schooling and Village Politics in
Central Java in the Time of Turbulence', ibid., pp. 177-94. Orr notes that the killing of a large group of
teachers took place in the village of Margosari, between Yogyakarta and Klaten, on 20 October, after
being held in a makeshift prison controlled by members of the Islamic, anti-communist youth group,
Persatuuan Pejuang Agama dan Nasional (PPAN).
"^^id., p. 183. Orr comments that some 300, or 90 per cent of teachers in the district, were brought in
for questioning. "Many teachers were readily identified as senior PKI office holders; positions for
which their superior education had readily qualified them," p. 184.
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Sukamoist post-Revolutionary idealism. In its place was substituted a different future
- authoritarian, hierarchical, capitalist, and military - violently imposed by the New
Order - the antithesis of Javanese peasant socialist orientation. In contrast, this
counter-culture figure is typified by the selfless, idealist archetype of the teacher, a
theme exemplified in the writing of Ruth McVey^'' and Jacques Leclerc.^^
Other common myths revealed in testimonies maintained that everyone was a
victim and that no one was a perpetrator, the myth of burial holes, pits, caves and
secret forest graves, including the myth of the Alun Alun or 'town square' mass
grave. Finally, the local myth of the murder of the entire battalion of Cakrabirawa
(Sukamo's personal guard) on their retum to Klaten from Jakarta in December of
1965 was raised by a number of residents. These myths serve to name a place and
provide a reason for the otherwise anonymous and unaccountable disappearances. An
area that will not be covered here, but which may present an opportunity for future
research is the myth of anti-Chinese violence during 1965.^^ It is curious that the
issue of anti-Chinese violence was only raised once in fieldwork, although strident
anti-Chinese sentiment in Kidul was not concealed in the least.
My example is an interview with 'Sari' who is ethnically Chinese. She is an
academic. Her grandparents came from mainland China but her parents were born in
Indonesia. In October 1965 she was aged nine. Her only memory of the period was of
going to school, which was on Jalan Ketandan in Yogyakarta, and finding it burnt
down. The school had previously been exclusively Chinese, but in 1965 was
converted into a multi-ethnic government school. According to Sari the school
population was, at this time, predominantly ethnic Chinese. This was her only
experience of specific anti-Chinese violence in 1965. The experience of her older
brother, a junior high-school student, was, however, more devastating for her family.
Sari's brother had been a very keen dancer. According to Sari, in 1964 her brother
had performed in a public program that was sponsored by GERWANI. In late-1965,
he was picked up by the military because his name appeared on a list of 'suspects'.
This list came from the attendee record of a dance competition. Sari's brother was
imprisoned in the RPKAD barracks in Yogyakarta on the site now occupied by a
'^McVey, 'Teaching Modernity', op.cit.
'^Leclerc, 'Girls, Girls, Girls, and Crocodiles', in Nordholt, op.cit.
'^Charles A. Coppel, Indonesian Chinese in Crisis, Oxford University Press, Sydney, 1983. While this
has been covered in the literature, there is littie oral history evidence on the subject within the
fieldwork area.
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Pizza Hut restaurant. He was held without trial for ten weeks. His family was allowed
to visit and to bring food. Nowhere does Sari mention that her experiences were
related to her ethnicity, rather the present day consequences of the past for her brother
are the most important 'memory' of the period.

I remember that conditions at the barracks were very bad. I used to
carry the food for my mother when we visited. But I was only nine so
I am not sure what I remember and what people have told me since.
There were hundreds of prisoners crammed into each dormitory and
all they had to eat was soup made out of old cabbage leaves. My
family was terrified that my bother would be killed because he was
Chinese and because he was accused of dancing the dance of the
fragrant flowers that the GERWANI women danced at Lubang Buaya.
This was not trae of course. He was just a high-school student in a
traditional dance group. Fortunately, my brother was released for
Christmas 1965. He was so disturbed by what happened to him that he
moved to Semarang to finish his schooling and never retumed to
Yogyakarta. His personal identification card was never especially
marked, but I know that many people who had only the briefest
association with the PKI were permanentiy associated with GESTAPU
by their personal identification papers. My brother is still angry, and
frightened. He says that he did nothing wrong. He still does not dare to
retum to Yogyakarta and that was over 30 years ago.^^

98,

Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997. "Saya ingat kondisi di barak waktu itu
sangat buruk. Saya sering membawakan makanan untuk ibu ketika kami datang menengok. Tetapi
waktu itu saya baru berusia sembilan sehingga saya tidak begitu ingat lagi apa yang terjadi dan apa
yang orang-orang ceritakan pada masa itu. Di sana ada ratusan orang tahanan berdesak-desakan
dalam sel-sel dan mereka semua harus makan sup daun kubis tua. Keluarga saya takut kalau-kalau
saudara laki-laki saya akan dibunuh sebab ia Cina dan ia dituduh pernah menari genjer-genjer
seperti tartan GERWANI di Lubang Buaya. Jelas ini bohong. Ia hanya seorang anak SMA pada
kelompok tari tradisional. Untunglah saudara saya dibebaskan pada Natal tahun 1965. Ia begitu
terganggu dengan peristiwa yang menimpanya sehingga ia pindah ke Semarang untuk menyelesaikan
sekolahnya dan tidak pernah kembali ke Yogyakarta. Kartu identitas pribadinya tidak ditandai, tetapi
saya tahu ada banyak orang yang meskipun sedikit terkait saja dengan PKI dianggap terlibat dengan
GESTAPU dan ini ditulis pada surat keterangan mereka. Saudara saya masih marah dan takut. Ia
berkata bahwa ia tidak melakukan kesalahan apa pun. Ia masih belum berani pulang ke Yogya dan itu
sudah 30 tahun yang lalu." Lance Castles maintains that the excuse that a particular person: "was an
innocent bystander is both convenient and popular. It turns everyone into a guiltiess victim". Interview
with Lance Casties, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
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As the reluctance of Sari's brother to return home demonstiates, the social context of
memory in 1997 was closely linked to the self-regulatory effect of anti-communism,
the same self-exile, or self-censorship that applied, in more or less the same manner,
to the highest levels of the media and academia.^^ As a further illustration, the events
of the evening of 17 August 1997, or the celebration of hidonesian Independence,^°°
demonstrate the effect of this aspect of anti-communism at village level.
During the New Order period, all local family heads were expected to attend
formal celebrations. On the evening of 17 August 1997, during the middle of my
1997 fieldwork, the master of ceremonies (the pro-New Order head of the Kidul
mosque, and the former PKI member mentioned previously) asked if anyone from
among the gathering would like to speak about his experiences of the Revolution.
One man (there were no women present) was clearly nominated. All 20 or so ex-PKI
household heads were present but did not participate at any level.
The nominated man had been a boy courier during the time of the Second
Dutch Police Action in late 1948. As a 10-year-old, he had been charged with the
dangerous responsibility of ranning messages and smuggling hand grenades between
guerrilla groups in the villages outside Yogyakarta.'°' His testimony was well
rehearsed. It had been told repeatedly, every 17 August, for as long as anyone could
remember.'°^ His recollections where heroic and very legitimate. This was what was
required to satisfy the requirements of state ritual characterised by form without
substance or analysis. The man's narrative was full of humour and adventure. There
was nothing controversial in any of his remembrances. When the 'veteran' had
finished, the master of ceremonies asked if anyone else had anything to contribute. A
tall, quiet, middle-aged man put up his hand. Everyone was silent and uncomfortable.
This person had been a volunteer in the 'Crash Malaysia Campaign''°^ - a
sukarelawan. (Crash Malaysia was frequentiy associated by the New Order with
'^Muted Voices, op.cit., pp. 10-17. See also 'Surveillance and Suppression: The Legacy of the 1965
Coup in Indonesia', Censorship News, no. 43, September 1995.
'™The following year, 17 August 1998, was the first Independence anniversary not officially
celebrated since 1946. With the fall of Suharto, the legalistic and prescribed manner of the ritual also
collapsed.
""Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
'''Ibid
'°^0n 25 September 1963, Sukarno announced that he would Ganyang Malaysia, or 'gobble Malaysia
raw', a term usually, but less accurately, translated as 'Crush Malaysia'. Confrontation with Malaysia
was the quintessential Sukarnoist strategy. It meant that he could continue to promote his
'revolutionary spirit', that the Indonesian military could look forward to both increased budgets and
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Leftist discourse.) The man, then aged 18, had parachuted into the jungles of
hidonesian Borneo with his unit in mid-1965 to wage guerrilla war against British
and Australian forces supporting the Malaysian Federation, hi contrast to the
remembrances of the boy soldier, there was no clapping when the Crash Malaysia
veteran sat down. It was his past association with the Old Order that was politically
unacceptable, and therefore subject to the silencing power of anti-communism. One
testimony was a guide to permissible memory, the other, a type of social censure for
those stories deemed to be unsuitable for re-telling.
An example of the latter is the once very popular song Genjer Genjer, which
was adopted by the PKI in the eariy 1960s as an unofficial popular political
anthem.

Genjer is a weed that grows in drains, ponds, and sewerage outiets. It can

be boiled as a vegetable, and is usually only eaten during hard times. According to
one person in Kidul, "it is a very communist-type of plant".'°^ During the early New
Order period, the song was banned and people stopped eating the plant because it was
associated with communism. Genjer Genjer remained irrevocably associated with
what the New Order maintained that the PKI represented - anarchy, chaos and
betrayal. As Langer argues, "a tainted memory leaves a tainted legacy".^°^ It would
be a mistake however to fall back to a position of historical relativity that suggests
that because the memories of people in Kidul appear to be less characterised by socalled 'plain facts', it is not really important if the killings happened or not. My point
is that a real episode is always the starting point for chronology. This is what
distinguishes it from myth.
For example, 85-year-old 'Wongso' explained that she was descended from a
long line of tukang pijit or 'masseurs'. She had moved to Jakarta for work in the early
1960s and returned to Kidul in 1966. She spoke of her mother as an "official
Japanese Army masseuse", but evaded questions about her father or husband. She
lived near the Jatinegara railway station, which is about eight kilometres from the
centre of Jakarta, but said she often travelled to Ikada Stadium to listen to Sukamo's
speeches. Once she heard Sukarno speak in Yogyakarta, in the Kraton. Wongso
immediately started to recall President Sukarno's visit to Yogyakarta in 1964. This

operational activity, and that the PKI could take the lead in mass-based, anti-imperial and anti-British
political agitation. Ricklefs, op.cit., p.273.
"Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
'''ibid.
Langer, op.cit., p.38.
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one episode appeared prima facie to encapsulate her memory of the entire 1960s up
to, including and beyond the September 1965 Coup, or at least those memories that
she was willing to share at the time.

There were hundreds of thousands of people sitting patientiy, quietiy,
in the inner Yogyakarta palace square, all waiting for Sukarno to
speak. When his speech began there were no other sounds but Bung
Kamo's voice. Not even babies were crying. Most people were from
villages far away from Yogyakarta and had to walk many kilometres.
We all sat in the hot sun, with no shade and only a littie water. No one
complained. When Bung Kamo spoke his words seemed to me to
come directly from heaven. We were completely agog to see him.
Although Sukamo's speech was six hours long we listened to every
single word, never bored. He made us all feel proud to be Indonesian.
He loved his people.'°^

This testimony reveals more about contemporary conditions in Kidul than it does
about the 1960s. It is, in fact, profoundly chronological despite indications to the
contrary. It is possible that Wongso never actually heard Sukarno speak, as one of her
neighbours suggested.'"^^ Rather, Wongso's response appears to have gained a certain
pro-Sukamo momentum over the years that may or may not have been present in the
1960s. Additionally, the comments were also intended as a criticism of Suharto, as
much commentary as memory, although memory of the event is without question a
component of her story. It is however a story clouded with both chronological and
mythological perspective. In 1964 Indonesia was in the grip of hyperinflation. This
had a disastrous effect on the living standards of most Indonesians. The Sukarno
Presidency, particularly from 1957, was not the golden era many Indonesians

'"''Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Ada ratusan ribu orang duduk dengan
sabar, tenang di Alun-Alun Dalam Kraton, semua menunggu Sukamo bicara. Ketika ia mulai
berpidato tidak ada suara lain kecuali suara Bung Karno. Bahkan bayi pun tidak menangis.
Kebanyakan orang berasal dari desa-desa yang jauh dari Yogyakarta dan harus berjalan
berkilometer-kilometer. Kami semua duduk berpanas-panas, tanpa berteduh, dan hanya punya air
minum sedikit. Tidak ada yang mengeluh. Ketika Bung Karno bicara kata-katanya seperti turun
langsung dari surga. Kami benar-benar terpesona padanya. Meskipun pidato Sukarno enam jam,
kami mendengarkan setiap kata-katanya, tanpa bosan. Ia membuat kami merasa bangga menjadi
orang Indonesia. Ia mencintai rakyatnya."
"'ibid. The neighbour seemed to remember that Wongso was in Jakarta until the late 1960s.
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remember it to be, or better put, now believe it to have been. Economic conditions
and political uncertainty were not mentioned in the interview despite prompting.
Rather, everything Wongso said about Sukarno was a subtie, but nevertheless
unambiguous criticism of the New Order, and of Suharto who she privately hated,
although she was not prepared to tell me why she held such strong feelings.'"^
Neighbours reported that Wongso had relatives and friends who were 'involved' in
1965, but again, she refused to elaborate.
Usually Wongso evaded questions by just saying, ja, ya tuan, or "sure, sure,
mister". On one occasion however, after I had been in Kidul almost two months, and
after she had looked after my children on a number of occasions, Wongso
unexpectedly became very serious. She said that she remembered "thousands and
thousands of soldiers on the streets" in Jakarta. She also remembered "trackloads" of
communists being taken somewhere from Jakarta, although she was uncertain of the
exact date. In particular, she recalled the cries of a "group of communists" who she
said, "suffered greatiy". This was the flrst and only time that any of her comments
approached a durational account of the violence.

The communists were bound together around the neck with rope. They
cried out for water, and said that they "knew Sukamo", and called on
him to free them. Some ANSOR youths slashed their prisoners with
knives - all over their bodies until they died. It was inhumane. I don't
like to remember this. That is all for now. Thank you Sir.''°
'°^By the time of this interview in 1997, the Suharto family was the subject of cautious, but constant
criticism about their corrupt business dealings, and their despised relationships with ethnic Chinese
entrepreneurs. Therefore every good thing Wongso said about Sukarno could be seen as an implicit
criticism of Suharto, albeit filtered through various grievances accumulated over 30 years of
authoritarian rule. Wongso also made a point of saying that the minor eruption of Mount Merapi that
year and the unseasonably severe dry season of 1997 was the direct result of trouble in Suharto's
family and with the country. "This dry season a black cobra came into my home. This is a very bad
sign. Also the rains were not enough and the dry season is too long. People have had to come from the
villages to get water in Yogyakarta. There is no water for drinking in the hills. And Gunung Merapi is
active again. This is a bad sign too. You know that it is all because of the sin of Suharto and the bad
behaviour of his children." "Kemarau ini ada ular kobra hitam masuk rumah. Ini adalah pertanda
yang sangat buruk. Hujan sedikit sekali dan musim kemarau terlalu panjang. Orang-orang harus
berduyun-duyun dari desa ke Yogyakarta mengambil air. Di gunung tidak ada air yang bisa diminum.
Dan Gunung Merapi aktif lagi. Ini juga pertanda yang buruk. Memang ini akibat dosa Suharto dan
kelakuan jahat anak-anaknya."
""Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997. "Orang-orang komunis di ikat lehernya
bersama-sama dengan tali. Mereka berteriak-teriak minta minum, dan berkata bahwa mereka 'kenal
Sukarno', dan memintanya membebaskan mereka. Beberapa Pemuda Ansor mencincang tubuh para
tahanan itu dengan pisau di seluruh tubuh mereka sampai mereka mati. Biadab. Saya tidak suka
mengingat hal ini. Sudah cukup untuk sekarang. Terima kasih Pak."
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Pipit Rochijat makes very similar observations to those of Wongso about his
experiences of the killings in East Java,'" in particular the atmosphere of pitilessness
that accompanied mob violence. There is no evidence of this in Kidul - at least as
revealed through oral testimony - although the same atrocities raised by Rochijat
have become examples of 'the violence', whether it was experienced first hand or
not. I asked Wongso if she had any friends who were communists, and inquired
whether any of her family was involved in politics during the 1960s. Her responses
now reflected concern with the implications of a careless answer. She said "no" and
then denied ever having massaged a communist. This was in contrast to information I
gathered from her neighbour who said that Wongso and her entire family in Jakarta
and in Kidul "were all communists"."^ The importance of the interviews with
Wongso was that her memories became more durational over time as a relationship of
trast was established - to a point. This demonstrates the dynamic relationship
between interviewer and participant where the issue at hand is the memory of intense
conflict or violence. What this testimony and the one to follow also indicate is the
extent to which most people in Kidul were participants in some activity associated
with the Left in 1965, and the lengths to which they were prepared to go to conceal
this. The following interview illustrates this point.
'Rahman' had been a union official during the early 1960s. He was from
Kidul, but worked in the Serikat Buruh Kereta Api, SBKA, or the 'Union of Railway
Workers' office in Surakarta, then a city dominated by the PKI."^ In 1957, Rahman
was involved in the amalgamation of the 68,000 members of SBKA with 39 other
unions under the umbrella organisation of the Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh
Indonesia - SOBSI, or 'All Indonesian Central Labour Organisation'. As a PKI
affihate, SOBSI was an essential vehicle of PKI labour policy. SOBSI rose in
influence with the re-organisation of the PKI after the Madiun Revolt, increasing in
membership from its virtual annihilation in 1948 to 3,865,000 members in 1961 (out
of a total of seven million organised workers, making it the largest single labour
federation in Indonesia, and at the time one of the largest in the worid). "^ Rahman
was in Kidul in October 1965 for the birth of one of his children. This may have

Rochijat, op.cit., pp.43-47.
"^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, July 1997.
"^In the 1957 General Election the PKI had received over 50 per cent of the vote in Surakarta. Quoted
in Hindley, op.cit., pp.222-25.
van der Kroef, op.cit., p.203.
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saved his life, because most of his colleagues in the Surakarta

office

"disappeared"."^ He reported that he was briefly detained, interrogated and released
in November 1965, but never worked in the formal sector again and never retumed to
Surakarta.
Rahman appears to have also been in Yogyakarta during the 21 October 1965
strike of railway workers in Semarang and Surakarta, which was crashed by the
RPKAD.

h appears that he evaded capture because of his absence. He was never

called in for further interrogation. He would often apologise that he could not reveal
too many details because it was "still very dangerous" to do so. He felt that the fact
that the authorities had overlooked him was more good luck than good management.

Almost everyone around here had some connection with the PKI in
1965, through SOBSI, GERWANI, Pemuda Rakyat, or of course the
BTI [Barisan Tani Indonesia or Indonesian Farmers' Association],
who provided assistance to needy villagers in increasing rice yields,
funding irrigation projects and the like, especially in kampung areas.
That is why no one talks. This is because everyone is involved. That is
the thing. Everyone is frightened, so they don't talk. Only chitchat. I
find it hard to accept this situation myself. In 1965, BTI had over five
million members. Where are they now? They are still here you know.
Silent. Supporting GOLKAR. Where are my union comrades?
Missing. Dead. Silent. I can say no more for now. 117

During the Paracommando sweep of Kidul in late October, November, and December
1965, one of Rahman's neighbours was reported shot and killed in the laneway
outside his home. Rahman said that this was because his neighbour, a humble becak,

Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
Anderson and McVey, op.cit., p.62.
"^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Di tahun 1965 hampir semua orang di
sini terlibat dengan PKI, baik lewat SOBSI, GERWANI, Pemuda Rakyat, atau tentu saja BTI yang
banyak membantu kebutuhan orang-orang desa meningkatkan hasil padinya, membangun saluran
irigasi, dan hal-hal semacamnya, terutama di kampung-kampung. Itu sebabnya tidak ada orang yang
bicara. Karena semua orang terlibat. Begitulah. Semua orang ketakutan, sehingga mereka bungkam.
Hanya among kosong. Saya sendiri sulit menerima hal ini. Di tahun 1965 BTI (Barisan Tani
Indonesia) memiliki anggota lebih dari 5 juta orang. Di mana mereka semua sekarang? Mereka masih
di sini. Bungkam. Mendukung Golkar. Di matia kawan-kawan Serikat saya? Hilang. Mati. Bungkam.
Cukup segini dulu untuk sekarang."
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or pedicab driver"^ was an active, even "enthusiastic" member of the PKI. Rahman
commented that the becak driver had been berani or 'brave' and "had strongly
resisted the authorities". This man was the husband of Tukiyem, mentioned earlier,
who with her sister was content to answer my questions about 1965 with the passive
and evasive answers, "fine, fine, always fine, sir", and, sing wis, ya wis, "What is past
is past".

This episode raises more questions than it answers. For example if this

was the only death in Kidul reported to me, was this because it was literally the only
death, or was this as much as people such as Rahman (who made it clear to me that
he had many stories he would like to tell) were prepared to comment on in 1997?
Altemately, was it that the death of a humble becak driver was a symbolic 'type' that
acknowledged the reality of the violence yet concealed the extent of the killings?
One participant that was prepared to be more specific was 'Sri' who had been
a senior member of GERWANI in the Klaten area. Sri was the sister in law of one of
my neighbours. It is interesting to compare the same forthrightness of interviews with
former GERWANI women in the work of Wieringa'^° although, as with practically
all subjects in Kidul, this was the first time this particular person reported having had
any sort of conversation about 1965, to anyone. Sri's nephew lives in Kidul and she
frequently visits. Her husband had been a rice farmer, who in 1963 won an award
sponsored by the PKI for good farming practices. This involved a fully funded visit
to Beijing, to attend an intemational farmers' convention. It was here that Sri's
husband received his award. She described the occasion and the far-reaching
consequences in this way:

Imagine the honour for our simple farming family. My husband had
never been in a car, let alone an aeroplane. The story was in the local
newspaper, we had parties to celebrate and to wish him well for the
joumey. It was the most significant thing to ever happen to our
community. My husband was so proud. This was how his name ended
up on a list of people involved in G30S.

Hi

A poorly paid occupation, particularly of the underclass in Javanese society, and the sole victim
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
'"Ibid.
'^"wieringa, op.cit., see chapter eleven, pp.287-37.
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He was arrested in late October 1965 and accused of being part of a
nation-wide movement to overthrow the govemment. They said he
was involved. Perhaps this was because he had been to China. God
knows. Perhaps they thought he was a big boss. My husband was
imprisoned for many months in Java and then sent to Bum Island for
nearly seven years. This broke his heart. When I visited him in prison
in Jakarta he would often cry and say, "I am only a simple farmer who
won a prize. I have done nothing wrong". He would also cry out:
"When will I see the children, when will I taste sweat tea again?"
After some time I could not bear to visit him. The next seven years
were very hard for the children and me. I had to conceal my
membership of GERWANI. For some reason my name was not on a
list. This was very ironic. For a very long time I was sure that
someone would betray me to the authorities. I was always expecting to
be arrested. I had to move many times. My husband was imprisoned
and I was free. This was the end of our relationship. Actually my
husband stayed on in Bura Island for several years after his release. I
believe that he had decided to farm the land he had cleared as a
prisoner. My husband died of cancer two months after coming home
from Bura. This was in 1983. He was like a stranger to his own family
and in his own community.

'^'Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Bayangkan bagaimana bangganya kami
waktu itu sebagai keluarga petani kecil Suami saya belum pernah pergi naik mobil, apalagi pesawat.
Berita itu ditulis di koran daerah, kami mengadakan selamatan, dan mendoakan perjalanannya. Ini
peristiwa paling besar yang pernah terjadi di kampung kami Suami saya sangat bangga. Inilah yang
menyebabkan namanya masuk dalam daftar "orang-orang yang terlibat dalam G30S". Ia ditangkap
pada akhir bulan Oktober 1965 dan dituduh terlibat dalam gerakan nasional menumbangkan
pemerintah. Mereka bilang suami saya terlibat Mungkin ini karena ia pernah pergi ke Cina. Entah.
Mungkin mereka pikir suami saya bos besar. Suami saya dipenjara beberapa bulan di Jawa dan
kemudian dipindah ke pulau Buru selama hampir tujuh tahun. Hati saya benar-benar hancur. Ketika
saya mengunjungi suami saya di penjara di Jakarta dia sering menangis dan berkata, 'Aku ini cuma
petani kecH yang menang hadiah. Aku tidak salah'. Ia juga sering berteriak-teriak. 'Kapan saya bisa
ketemu anak-anak lagi, kapan bisa minum teh manis lagi'. Beberapa lama kemudian saya tidak tahan
lagi mengunjunginya. Tujuh tahun setelahnya adalah masa-masa yang paling berat untuk anak-anak
dan saya. Saya harus menyembunyikan keanggotaan GERWANI saya. Entah kenapa nama saya tidak
ada dalam daftar. Ini sangat ironis. Lama sekali saya berpikir bahwa akan ada orang yang akan
mengadukan saya pada penguasa. Saya selalu berpikir bahwa saya akan ditangkap. Saya harus
berpindah-pindah banyak kali Suami saya dipenjara dan saya bebas. Kemudian kami berpisah.
Sebenarnya, beberapa tahun setelah dibebaskan, suami saya meneruskan tinggal di pulau Buru. Saya
kira dia memutuskan bertani di atas tahan yang telah ia buka selama ia menjadi tahanan. Suami saya
mati karena kanker dua bulan setelah ia pulang dari Buru. Waktu itu tahun 1983. Ia sudah seperti
orang asing di depan keluarganya sendiri dan di tengah masyarakat."
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Sri's testimony is that of a victim. It is full of questions and uncertainty about the
injustice of the course of events. This makes a useful comparison with the confident
recollections of those who felt they had ended up on the winning side (a sentiment
raised in the testimony of Arifin, the 45-year-old son of a deceased general
mentioned previously). However, even this testimony draws on a well-circulated
myth, tiiat of the noble actions of a particular individual, in this case, the village head.
Again, myths in the story of 1965 appear to rationahse, even atone for the violent
actions of the many. Interestingly, this particular theme nearly always arises from the
testimony of a passive, non-participant observer. Yet even within the following
account, as with many subjects, there are indications that there is more untold than
told. This theme is further complicated when the person in whom such nobility is
credited is not mythological, but real.
'Sumadi' is an elderly major landowner in Kidul. He owns the land on which
a government training facility is located. This brings students into the community and
is a considerable source of income for the local market and neighbourhood food
stalls. Sumadi is a strict Catholic. There is an interesting similarity with the story of
Sumitro, the ex-communist head of the Kidul mosque in that neither man was
prepared to talk about their experiences of 1965. Actually it was a case of one man
could not and the other would not. As far as many people in Kidul were concerned,
the difference was that Sumitro was to be treated with the greatest caution - in fact
feared. On the other hand Sumadi was loved and respected by everyone I talked to.'^^
Many people made a point of telling me about the goodness of Sumadi - how he
saved people in 1965 - and how he "stood up to the TNF'.'^'^ Beyond these vague
recollections no one was prepared to give me further, or in fact exact, details.
The story of Sumadi did not end in 1965, but appears to have continued to
grow into a 'saviour myth'. Another person said that he believed Sumadi had hidden
a young man in his home who was a Gali, or 'a member of a criminal gang', during
the PETRUS killings of 1983-84.'^"^ Sumadi was generous and hospitable. His only
son, who had been a priest (and who had worked for many years in the Vatican), had
died of cancer the previous year. He welcomed the company. He said that I could ask
him anything I liked, but it would not be "fitting" to talk about what happened in

"'Ibid.
'^"^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
"%id.
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Kidul in 1965. He said, "such things were best left to the past".*^^ Again the point
these interviews make is that 1965 is actually never left in the past. If durational
memory is not permitted to emerge within the discourse of a particular history, then
semi-mythological types begin to emerge to satisfy the requirement for some form of
closure, particularly for those on the losing side of the violence.
'Petrak', on the other hand, has lived out the present day consequences of
being on the right side of the past, yet he too draws on the myth of the village head
saving people from the TNI. He is a taxi driver who lives in Kidul, but works across
the city of Yogyakarta.'^^ He is a "faithful" follower of Muhamadyiah, which, during
the time of fieldwork, enjoyed a great support in one part of Kidul. Petrak was
originally from the outskirts of Yogyakarta, near the Prambanan temple complex.
Again, themes of outside influences in the memory of the period emerge, as does a
complex mixture of chronology, myth and duration. He said, "half his village"
(located closer to Klaten than Yogyakarta) were taken away by the TNI between
November 1965 and Febmary 1966 and that many "never returned". He said that his
family and a number of others were under suspicion, but were not arrested because
the Lurah, or village head, had influence with the military. He said that the Lurah
was able to identify who were Islam and non-Islam (non-Islam in this instance being
code for the PKI). He suggested that a number of people from his village were sent to
Bura Island and he believed many had died there. It is interesting to note here that
Bura Island could not have held all of the people it was claimed were imprisoned
there. Again, there is the suggestion that 'Bura' is code for people who disappeared
without explanation during the killings. It appears that it is safer to say, "someone
perished in Bura", than to suggest that a particular person was murdered by his or her
neigbours and that his or her body was secretly disposed.
In most interviews that mentioned the word 'Buru', the strong impression was
given that this was becoming a convenient, and officially acceptable metaphor for
'imprisonment', or 'disappearances' and 'deaths'. Petrak in fact stated that 'ex', or
former PKI he knew who returned from Bura [or who, it is presumed, were held in
prison elsewhere], were "now very, very happy". He said he was happy too because
communism had "totally failed in hidonesia, Allah be praised". When I asked him

'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, July 1997.
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about the violence in Klaten he said that he was not in any way involved, but that he
had seen evidence of the killings:'^'

I remember riding my bicycle home past the area near Prambanan
temple, h must have been in October or November 1965. I saw the
bodies of three young men hanging from a tree. This was horrifying to
me. I knew them from the village. Many people from my village were
arrested. In 1966, I moved with my family to Yogyakarta. My family
was always anti-communist, yes anti-communist. We have never had
any trouble.'^^

In contiast to evasive answers, the following testimony again reinforces that trouble
was in fact everywhere - not just conveniently in East Java, or in Klaten. 'Romo'
(Father) is the Catholic priest of the Kidul congregation. He has since been re-posted.
During 1997, the church held two morning services totalling 600 people and then
evening mass. Romo said that in the Kidul area during the upheaval of late 1965 the
army carried out practically all of the arrests and that ANSOR and Muhamadyiah
groups only played a small role (as opposed to other areas of Indonesia such as East
Java). He said that the military seemed to clearly target prominent communists,
village cadres and sympathisers.

An undercurrent in Javanese society is revenge [Dendam]. Perhaps
half of all my older parishioners have some cause for revenge over
what happened in 1965. There was a great deal of false accusation and
many people not associated with politics had suffered. For this reason
I am worried that national political instability could introduce a radical
element into an already unstable social equation. Perhaps this could be
the death of President Suharto. This could create a climate of anarchy
suitable for the settiing of old scores. This would happen not just in
'^^The district of Prambanan had been associated with communism since the 1925 meeting of the PKI
leadership there to decide on initiating revolutionary action in 1926-27.
'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, July 1997. "Saya ingat saya sedang naik sepeda dari
rumah lewat daerah dekat Candi Prambanan. Waktu itu bulan Oktober atau November 1965. Saya
melihat tubuh tiga orang pemuda tergantung di pohon. Ini sangat menakutkan untuk saya. Saya tahu
mereka adalah orang-orang dari desa. Banyak orang dari desa saya yang ditangkap. Pada tahun 1966
saya bersama keluarga pindah ke Yogyakarta. Keluarga saya selalu antikomunis; ya, antikomunis.
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Kidul but also throughout hidonesia; and not just because of the
events of 1965-66, but for many complicated reasons. The Javanese
are a patient people; sometimes they will wait a whole lifetime to get
their revenge. There is a Javanese saying: if I cannot get my revenge
on you, then my children will take out my revenge on your children.'^^

The local parish priest, Romo, made the point that he was unsure whether Javanese
society could cope with opening up such an old and painful wound as the killings and
mass arrests of 1965. He said that it was the Javanese way to just "leave the wound
alone", or rather to avoid or forestall opening the wound for as long as possible. "'Sing
wis, ya wis." An example of what Romo was alluding to can be found in the
testimony of 'Martono', the son of a retired, elderly farmer. In 1965 the man's father
was in a dispute with a neighbour about the boundary of a rice field. He described
how the dispute had affected their lives since:

My father had been in a long dispute with his neighbour over land.
They could not solve their differences because it was over inheritance
between two families. It became bitter. In 1965, the head of the other
family told the RPKAD that my father was a big communist. Of
course, this was not trae. Yes, sure he was involved with BTI [Barisan
Tani Indonesia], but everyone around here was. He was arrested, but
released. The new village head granted the land to my father's enemy.
My father has remained full of hatred to this day. The hatred has really
spoilt his life and made him bitter. He hardly talks now. The other
family still owns the land of course, but have moved their house. We
Kami tidak pernah punya masalah."
'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta 1997. "Diam-diam dalam masyarakat Jawa mengalir
dendam. Mungkin separuh dari orang-orang tua di daerah ini punya alasan sendiri-sendiri untuk
membalas dendam atas peristiwa di tahun 1965. Banyak terjadi salah tuduh dan banyak orang yang
tidak ada hubungannya dengan politik menderita. Karena itu saya khawatir bahwa ketidakstabilan
politik nasional bisa memunculkan unsur-unsur radikal ke dalam situasi sosial yang sudah tidak stabil
Mungkin inilah ajal Presiden Suharto. Ini bisa menciptakan suasana anarki yang cocok untuk balas
dendam masa lalu. Ini tidak hanya akan terjadi di Kidul saja, tetapi di seluruh Indonesia; dan tidak
hanya karena peristiwa 1965-66 saja, tetapi karena alasan-alasan lain yang rumit. Orang Jawa itu
sabar; kadang-kadang mereka menunggu seumur hidup untuk membalas dendam. Ada pepatah Jawa
mengatakan: nek aku ora isa mbales, ben anakputuku sing mbales karo anakputumu (kalau bukan aku
sendiri yang membalas, anak-anakkulah yang akan membalaskannya pada anak-anakmu)." For a
fictional exposition of the themes of revenge in Javanese society see Pramoedya Ananta Toer,
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know where they live. I myself am angry because of the sin of false
witness committed against my father and the fact that our family was
branded communist. This is the anger I still have in my heart. This is
why the priest asks us to talk and pray because I know that God wants
to heal this anger.'"^^

Again, many of the accounts reproduced in this chapter involve unsubstantiated
accounts, conveyed by third parties, or informal, apocryphal accounts of what people
believe happened in 1965. This includes beliefs about other people's memories.
These accounts are as important as the durational or chronological remembrances
already outiined. That is because they illustrate points of connection with other forms
of historical knowledge in the political and social context of New Order anticommunist ideology. There are obvious similarities in the broad themes with eyewitness reports, however in the most part the following are distinguished by their
attempt to bring meaning and order to the chaos of what people think 1965
represented - through the medium of acceptable stories. This is opposed to the 'plain
facts' represented by the government propaganda. A number of re-occurring themes
emerge. These include secret communal grave sites, the ubiquitous story of the
teacher as the vanguard of Indonesian modernity and as the first and typical victim of
the violence, innocence and goodness, betrayal and shame, theories and beliefs about
re-organisations of the PKI, or heroic last stands, notions of the unsubstantiated antiIslamic intentions of GESTAPU, of crocodile holes, and assumptions of 'kill or be
killed'.
Former GERWANI member Sri, who as mentioned evaded arrest in 1965 and
detection since, believed that part of the reason she had never been identified was
'Dendam', in A.L. Becker, Writing on the Tongue, Michigan Papers on South and Southeast Asia, The
University of Michigan, Michigan, 1989, pp.74-91, (English translation pp.15-34).
'^"Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, October 1997. "Sudah lama ayah saya bertengkar
dengan tetangga perihal tanah. Mereka tidak dapat memecahkan masalah ini karena tanah itu adalah
tanah warisan kedua keluarga. Perselisihan itu makin sengit. Pada tahun 1965 kepala keluarga yang
satu tersebut mengadukan pada RPKAD bahwa ayah saya adalah gembong komunis. Tentu saja ini
bohong. Ya, dia memang terlibat dengan BTI, tetapi semua orang di sini juga terlibat. Ayah ditangkap,
tetapi kemudian dilepaskan. Kepala Desa yang baru memberikan tanah tersebut kepada musuh ayah
saya. Sampai sekarang ayah saya masih mendendam. Dendam itu benar-benar menghancurkan
hidupnya dan membuatnya sengsara. Ia jarang bicara sekarang. Keluarga yang satu tadi masih
memiliki tanah tersebut, tetapi mereka pindah. Saya sendiri ikut marah karena dosa yang dilakukan si
saksi palsu terhadap ayah saya dan karena keluarga saya disebut komunis. Inilah kenapa Pendeta
meminta kami bicara dan berdoa sebab saya tahu bahwa Tuhan akan menyembuhkan kemarahan ini.
Entah bagaimana caranya saya harus belajar memaafkan keluarga itu."
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because of "supernatural protection".''^' She believed that this was also the case for
her friend, like her, a leading GERWANI figure in Klaten.

After the soldiers had arrested my husband, they came back to our
home to interrogate me. I think it was the next night. I remember they
knocked on the door loudly and then just came into the house. I was
standing right in front of them. They just seemed to look through me.
Then I discovered that I was invisible to them. They made a rough
search of our modest house and left. I believe that a powerful spirit
was protecting me. I was well regarded in our community as a hard
worker for the people. I can only guess, but it is hkely that a dukun
[shaman] made me invisible. Perhaps it was someone that I helped at
one time. How else could I have escaped? I was the one who should
have been arrested, not my poor husband. I was well known as a
GERWANI figure in Klaten. I once went to Jakarta. And since, these
30 years, I have not been arrested. This is strange. The same happened
to my friend, also GERWANI. She was very frightened. She actually
went to a dukun for protection when the arrests started. She too has
never been arrested, yet many, many others, who were not such high
figures in GERWANI, were arrested or killed in Klaten. How else can
you explain the situation?'^^

Sastro, also mentioned previously, likewise draws on a store of myth to explain
unexplained disappearances. He said that his father had been sent from Jakarta as part

'"Ibid
'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997. "Setelah tentara menangkap suami
saya mereka kembali ke rumah kami untuk menangkap saya juga. Saya kira itu malam berikutnya.
Saya ingat mereka mengetuk pintu keras-keras dan kemudian langsung masuk rumah. Saya berdiri
tepat di depan mereka. Tampaknya mereka mengabaikan saya. Kemudian baru saya tahu bahwa saya
tidak terlihat bagi mereka. Secara kasar mereka mengacak-acak rumah kami dan pergi. Saya yakin
bahwa ada roh kekuatan yang melindungi saya. Di masyarakat saya dikenal orang yang bekerja keras
untuk rakyat. Saya hanya dapat menduga, tetapi kemungkinan ada Dukun yang membuat saya tidak
tampak. Mungkin ia adalah seseorang yang pernah saya tolong. Bagaimana lagi saya bisa lolos?
Seharusnya sayalah yang seharusnya ditangkap, bukan suami saya. Saya dikenal sebagai tokoh
GERWANI di Klaten. Saya pernah pergi ke Jakarta sekali. Dan sejak saat itu, tiga puluh tahun ini,
saya belum pernah ditangkap. Ini aneh. Hal yang sama juga terjadi pada teman saya, juga
GERWANI. Ia sangat ketakutan. Ia juga pergi ke dukun minta perlindungan ketika mulai terjadi
penangkapan. lajuga belum pernah ditangkap, tetapi banyak, banyak orang lain yang bukan petinggi
GERWANI ditangkap atau dibunuh di Klaten. Bagaimana bisa menjelaskan kejadian ini?"
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of a KOSTRAD unit to intercept a train carrying Sukamo's personal guard back to
their base in Klaten. He said that this was in the first week of December 1965.

My father said that the orders to wipe out the troops came from
Suharto himself. He was told this was because their loyalty could not
be guaranteed. My father said that KOSTRAD believed that they were
retuming to re-organise and to support the PKI. I remember my father
telling me that commanding officers of the two groups, KOSTRAD
and Cakrabirawa, shook hands and then the troops were lined up and
all shot. My father would not ever say where they were buried. My
father said that this was 1000 officers and men, a whole battalion. He
said it was the worst day of his life. You cannot read about this
anywhere, but many people must know this secret too, especially in
Klaten where their families lived.'^^

The veracity of this theme is supported by 'Miko', a 20-year-old agricultural college
student. He said that in junior high school his teacher only dedicated "15 minutes and
one paragraph" in an official textbook to the activities of the PKI before 1965, but
that GESTAPU was taught over the entire time he was in high school. He said that
his teacher also devoted time in class to the Negara Islam Indonesia, Nil or
'Indonesian Islamic State' movement under Karto Suwiryo. He said: "it was taught
that the communists had a base-camp in DIY and that the Nil had a base-camp in
West Java". Miko said that he had heard ramours and read in a very old book in his
school library about the Merapi Merbabu Corps or MMC, a group of PKI who
attempted to re-group after 1965 at a "secret headquarters in the forests of the Mount
Merapi National Park". He said that it was "believed" by most of his friends that the
PKI leadership had moved communist villagers and village cadres from place to
place until they re-organised at the MMC (after the PKI had been banned in 1966).
'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, October 1997. "Bapak saya mengatakan bahwa perintah
untuk membasmi pasukan datang dari Suharto sendiri. Katanya karena kesetiaan mereka tidak bisa
dijamin. Bapak saya bilang bahwa Kostrad yakin mereka akan kembali mengorganisir dan mendukung
PKI. Saya ingat bapak saya mengatakan bahwa petugas pemimpin kedua kelompok, Kostrad dan
Cakrabirawa, berjabat tangan dan kemudian pasukan Cakrabirawa berbaris dan bersama-sama
menembak. Bapak saya tidak akan pernah mengatakan di mana mereka dikuburkan. Bapak saya bilang
bahwa semuanya ada 1000 perwira dan prajurit. Seluruh batalyon. Ia mengatakan bahwa itu adalah
hari terburuk dalam hidupnya. Anda tidak bisa mencarinya di mana pun, tetapi pasti ada banyak
orang yang tahu rahasia ini, terutama di Klaten tempat keluarga saya tinggal."
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Miko commented that there was a ramour of a big battie in the area of the
MMC and that the army suffered heavy casualties. This was because the
"communists had modern weapons like Ml6s, and the Indonesian army only had
guns from the time of the Indonesian Revolution". He said that he believed the
governments of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China had supplied
the weapons. He also said many people believed that Aidit, the leader of the PKI, was
stih alive and living in the U.S. (In fact a number of people in Kidul were equally
convinced that Aidit was "still hiding out" in Austraha.)'^'' Miko said his grandfather
had fought both the communists in Madiun and the Nil in West Java and that his
grandfather had been an "eye witness" to both conflicts. He further reported that his
grandfather said: "The PKI fighters were mostiy poor farmers, with poor clothes, but
good weapons".

Young people don't think very much about the PKI. Sometimes we
play around with the word a bit, but only to joke around. Because of
my parents' experiences with some of our family members in Klaten
after GESTAPU they don't like us to talk about politics. What we
know about the whole thing is from the movie [Pengkhianatan
G30S/PKL]^^^ that we have to watch every year, and our school visit to
Lubang Buaya Monument and Indonesia Mini, and yes, the Yogya
Kembali monument.''^

The reaction of Miko to both Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI and to his memory of a
school excursion to Mount Merapi National Park is telling. Although he said that the

'^"Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, July 1997.
'^^Ibid. "Orang muda jarang mikir PKI Kadang-kadang kami main-main dengan kata ini, tetapi cuma
bercanda. Karena pengalaman orang tua saya dengan beberapa anggota keluarga saya yang tinggal
di Klaten setelah Gestapu, mereka tidak suka kalau kami bicara tentang politik Yang kami tahu
tentang itu semua cuma dari film (Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI) yang harus kami tonton setiap tahun, dan
dari kunjungan-kunjungan sekolah kami ke Monumen Lubang Buaya dan Indonesia Mini, dan ya,
Monumen Yogya Kembali." As Schreiner notes, the film was the primary source of popular knowledge
about the coup for the post-coup generation. As a result of political reform the film was cancelled and
replaced with the film Bukan Sekadar Kenangan, which dealt with the topics of the staunch antiCommunism of the Suharto regime and the problem of silencing traumatic experiences associated with
the killings. Schreiner, op.cit., pp. 147-48.
'•^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, July 1997. "Saya ingat saya pernah melihat grafiti
'Revolution Now' di dinding menuju aula pengunjung Taman Bermain. Kami sangat terkejut. Guruguru jelas sangat marah karenanya dan meminta pejabat (pegawai pemerintah) di sana untuk segera
menghapusnya. Saya melihat para pejabat berlarian berkumpul dan menutupnya dengan cat putih."
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symbol 'PKI' held littie potency for the younger generation, his anxious description
of graffiti he saw actually tells another story.

I remember seeing the graffiti 'Revolution Now' on the wall to the
visitors' centre at Mt. Merapi. This shocked us at this time. The
teachers were clearly upset by it and asked the government employee
at the centre to remove it immediately. I watched the employee race
around to organise to have it white washed off.'^^

This same anxiety is reflected in the testimony of 'Abang', a university lecturer. He
lives in Yogyakarta but originally came from Sumatra. His memories of 1965 appear
to concentrate exclusively on the key elements of the military propaganda campaign,
which, as detailed above, was communicated to most Indonesians by the regular
showing of Pengkhianatan G30S/PKL He is convinced that the PKI had prepared
secret burial sites, in fact 'crocodile holes', all over Indonesia, for the purpose of
putting executed Muslims in after GESTAPU. It is also significant that Abang
describes how he was filled with hate over the murder of General Nasution's
daughter. This example illustrates the powerful social influence of the propaganda
campaign, and also the necessity to seek reason, or rationalisation for the killings.
Furthermore, it is likely that these were not his memories, but rather the result of
other forms of influence, such as the transferred memories of his parents. This is
much the same as in the case of Nana who felt the memories of her parents so
strongly that she adopted them as her own.

Emotions were very high because hit lists had been found. Yes there
was proof. They were drawn up by PKI cadres in preparation for the
post-G30S slaughter of anti-communists. I was only ten at the time but
in my village in West Sumatra we were told that the communists had
dug 'crocodile holes' all over Java to put pious Moslems in to die
horribly like the Pak Yani [one of the murdered generals]. My father
and a large group of men immediately dug an enormous crocodile hole
of their own in the forest. Well-known communists from our area were
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then rounded up and forced to walk, blindfolded, along a plank
suspended across the middle of the hole. They were then shot. As far
as I could remember, or from what I have been told since, there were
around 20 people killed in this way over a period of a week or two.
After this, there was no further trouble in our area from GESTAPU. It
was explained to me, at the time and since, that if we didn't act first,
and quickly, then it was we, the anti-communist Moslems, who would
be put in crocodile holes and buried alive. This was a terrifying
prospect. They were our enemies. We were just protecting ourselves.
My father said that our treatment of communists was at least more
humane than what we could have expected. We had seen how the
communists tortured the generals in the newspaper and the terrible
death of General Nasution's littie daughter. This filled us with hatred
for what they had done.'"*^

'Pipit' works in Yogyakarta but spends weekends with her parents in Klaten. She said
that it is a rahasia umun or 'open secret' that the Klaten town square was a mass
grave. She explained that most people in Klaten believe the mythos or 'myth' that in
November or December 1965 local farmers organised a direct deputation to the
commander of the local ABRI-organised execution squad. The purpose of this was to
complain that the corpses of the thousands of slaughtered communists were spoiling
the sawah or 'wet rice field' and that, as reported: "If ABRI did not find an
altemative to throwing the bodies in the river then everyone would starve".
'^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. "Waktu itu suasana sangat tegang karena
telah ditemukannya daftar pembunuhan. Ya ada bukti. Daftar itu disusun oleh para kader PKI untuk
mempersiapkan pembantaian paska-G30S terhadap orang-orang antikomunis. Waktu itu usia saya
masih sepuluh tahun tetapi di desa saya di Sumatra Barat kami diberitahu bahwa Komunis sudah
menggali lubang buaya di seluruh Jawa untuk mengubur orang-orang Muslim yang taat sampai mati
dengan mengerikan seperti Pak Yani. Ayah saya dan banyak orang lain segera menggali lubang
buaya yang sangat besar di hutan. Orang-orang Komunis yang terkenal di daerah kami kemudian
dikumpulkan dan dipaksa berjalan, dengan mata terikat, menyusuri papan yang diletakkan di tengahtengah lubang. Kemudian mereka ditembak. Sejauh yang bisa saya ingat, atau dari cerita yang saya
dengar, ada sekitar 20 orang dibunuh dengan cara ini selama seminggu atau dua minggu. Setelah
peristiwa ini di daerah kami tidak ada masalah lagi dengan Gestapu. Saya berkali-kali diberitahu
bahwa jika kami tidak mendahului, dan dengan cepat, maka kamilah, orang-orang Muslim
antikomunis, yang akan dimasukkan dalam lubang buaya dan dikubur hidup-hidup. Ini adalah
kemungkinan yang mengerikan. Mereka adalah musuh kami. Kami hanya melindungi diri. Ayah saya
berkata bahwa perlakuan kami pada Komunis setidak-tidaknya lebih manusiawi dibandingkan apa
yang mungkin akan terjadi. Kami telah melihat di suratkabar bagaimana Komunis menyiksa JenderalJenderal, melihat kematian menyedihkan anak perempuan Jenderal Nasution. Ini membuat kami
sangat membenci hal yang mereka lakukan."
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People believe that one night the town square was barricaded with
barbed wire and guarded by tanks so that there would be no
eyewitnesses, and bulldozers moved in to dig a large open grave.
Soldiers then moved an unknown number of bodies from the river and
padi to the great hole in the square. Every time people walk past there
on their way to shop, or to the market, or to work, they have to forget
what they know. It is like a woman who has been raped and has to live
in a world full of men, she has to stmggle very hard to forget. ""^^

In contrast to Abang's officially aligned remembrances, this powerful analogy
suggests that while remembering is a passive process, conducted in the context of
favourable political circumstances, forgetting can be a determined and deliberate
act.'''^ As Pipit suggested, people have to try hard to forget, because there is actually
so much to remind them. In the absence of open and negotiated public memory, the
previous testimonies illustrate that people often devise methods of processing
forgetting into acceptable stories within the terms dictated by the context. In
Indonesia during 1997, most people were faced with a decision to normalise the
historical silences by either accepting aspects of the propaganda or by accepting other
myths. For instance, the testimony of the young agricultural student regarding the
heroic failure of the imagined post-1965 communist resistance. Indeed, this is a better
myth than memories of defenceless slaughter, especially given that practically
everyone in Kidul was either directiy or indirectiy involved with some aspect of
communism before 1965. This myth somehow dignifies what happened by changing
it to what was believed to have happened.
The testimony of the secret grave strongly suggests that myth is an important,
and in 1997, perhaps the most important, component in the historical production of

'^^Confidential interview, Klaten, August 1997. "Orang-orang percaya bahwa pada suatu malam
Alun-Alun dipagari dengan kawat berduri dan dijaga dengan tank-tank sehingga tidak akan ada saksi
mata yang melihat dan buldozer-buldozer masuk menggali kuburan yang besar. Tentara-tentara
kemudian memasukkan mayat yang jumlahnya tak terhitung yang diambU dari sungai, dan juga
memasukkan padi ke dalam lubang besar di tengah Alun-Alun. Setiap kali orang berjalan melewati
Alun-Alun menuju ke toko, atau pasar, atau bekerja, mereka harus melupakan apa yang mereka
ketahui. Ini seperti seorang perempuan yang pernah diperkosa dan harus hidup dalam dunia yang
penuh dengan laki-laki - ia harus berjuang dengan sangat keras untuk melupakan."
'""Political openness does not however guarantee an environment of free remembering. See the
extensive discussion on the Historikerstreit, or the Historians' Debate (1988-89) over the continued
meaning of the Jewish Holocaust for contemporary German society. See Peter Baldwin, ed.. Reworking
the Past: Hitler, The Holocaust and the 'Historians' Debate', Beacon Press, Boston, 1990.
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1965. This is because on careful questioning the Klaten town square story is revealed
as apocryphal - everyone has heard the story, and believes it to be authentic, but no
one has actually met an eyewitness or wanted to suggest where other forms of
evidence could be located to substantiate reports, hi fact, the story of a common mass
grave, either in a public open space, an area of permanently fallow wet rice padi or in
a forest, is a common legend, particularly in Cential and East Java, and Bali, which is
where most of the killings took place.'"^^
Indirectly this is also seen in Rahman's comments about the disappearance of
his colleagues from the Surakarta office of the Railway Workers' Union, Nur's
comment that many people know where bodies were buried but are still to afraid to
speak of it, and in the use of Abang's language of "burial pits" and "crocodile holes".
However, more than this, the secret mass grave myth'''^ acts as a point of closure for
historical uncertainty in the absence of other means of negotiating the past.'"^^ It
declares that the forgotten crimes have been uncovered and victims, while long dead,
have not been completely forgotten. They are rather 'secretiy buried'; they existed,
and what they represented in Indonesian history was at one time real and vital and
continues to survive in the recess of people's memories in spite of the overwhelming
and suffocating influence of the Lubang Buaya propaganda and anti-communist
ideology.
In addition to the theme of the teacher as a social type, there are distinct
patterns that occur across interviews that define the contribution of myth and
chronology to historical and popular negotiations about the meaning of 1965. For
example, the recalling of third person memories of atrocities, the desire for revenge
against neighbours who betrayed, or the fear of reprisal on the part of the betrayer.
However, the most fascinating is the desire to create types - the betrayer and the
saviour, clearly illustrated in Kidul through the persons of the ex-communist head of
the local mosque and the goodly Cathohc landowner. It is as if in 1997 the
community of Kidul was, in the most part, unwilling to disturb the balance between
competing versions of the same event, but felt that both accounts were best left to
myth, or rather, left to the silences.
'"'Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
'"^See Stanley, 'Opening that Dark Page: Victims of the 1965-66 anti-Communist mass murders are
working to expose the Truth. They Face some Determined Opposition', Inside Indonesia, no. 63, July
to September 2000, pp.6-7.
'"^See an extract from Sulami's speech at YPKP's first Anniversary, ibid., p.l 1.
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The creation of myth can also be seen to be influenced by the phenomenon of
'memory remembering memory'. Examples introduced in chapter two include the
New Order anti-Communist rituals of 'Hero's Day', 'The Sanctity of Pancasila Day',
'National Stability Day', and the yearly compulsory viewing of the propaganda films
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI and Djakarta 1966: Supersemar, mentioned in Miko's
testimony. This can also be seen in the mute response of the Kidul ex-communists at
the 17 August 1997 ceremony mentioned in this chapter. This commitment to ritual
remembering was clearly demonstrated in Suharto's annual speech on Armed Forces
Day, in effect a celebration of the ABRI counter coup on 1 October 1965.'^ These
speeches would have been heard, and noted by everyone in Kidul, thus reinforcing
people's private commitment to keep quiet.
In contrast, the testimony of the former LEKRA artist is atypical. It does not
enter into the chronological scheme of most accounts, but poses a durational integrity
that seems to exist outside the flow of normal time. As Langer suggests in his work:
"In doing so it [duration] does not evoke the redemptive, [but] rather the grievous
power of memory".'''^^ In contrast, the second recorded testimony of the artist is an
attempt to make sense, or rather establish order in the pattern of his life since prison,
and to rationalise experiences of mistreatment and incarceration.
In a similar way, this is demonstrated by Rahman's testimony concerning his
own dismissal, as well as reports of the murder of the becak driver. As the 17 August
1997 Independence celebration in Kidul also demonstrates, the symbol 'PKF
remained imbued with real social, psychological, physical, and pohtical implications
as 1965 continued to directly affect Indonesians who did not experience the
ideological environment of the late Sukarno Presidency. Anti-communism therefore
continued to influence generations of Indonesians born after 1965.
In the decades that followed 1965, Rahman, and in fact anyone directiy or
indirectly associated with the PKI, found themselves on the losing side of what was
for all intent and purposes a one-sided civil war. For 33 years those Indonesians
deemed terlibat did not speak of union membership, connections to Left-wing
politics and activism, the events of 1965-66, or the ensuing trauma, to anyone outside
144^Angkatan

Bersenjata, 6 October 1988, quoted in Indonesian News Service, no. 149, November 1988,
p.3. Suharto stated: "We are all determined that the national tragedy which culminated in the G30S/PKI
revolt be our last bitter experience and will not be repeated again. We must reinforce this determination
every time we commemorate ABRI Day and the Sanctity oi Pancasila Day on 1 October".
'"^Langer, op.cit., p.6.
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immediate family or close friends, and then only in secret and in whispers. When
they did speak, as this chapter has demonstrated, the nature of accounts was
dominated by myth and chronology and characterised by a lack of durational detail
about individual victims, perpetrators, events or circumstances. As Stoler and
Strassler so eloquently put it: "In hushed accounts of the 1965 coup and its bloody
aftermath the T disappears and is quickly replaced by an agent-less discourse of
silences and vague allusion".'"^^ In the next three chapters evidence will be presented
to explain how these silences were perpetuated.

'"^Stoler and Strassler, 'Castings for the Colonial', op.cit., pp.4-48.
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Chapter Five
Primary Documents:
The Silence Enters the Discourse
This chapter compares what was recalled in the oral testimonies compiled in late
1997 with what was written in two local news magazines published during the period
of the actual violence. The purpose of this comparison is not to produce a New Order
historiography of 1965, but to show how the theoretical frameworks raised in chapter
one explain the rapture of social and political integrity that occurred in the days and
weeks following 30 September. This comparison demonstrates how a particular type
of newspaper reporting disrapted the process of historical knowledge and how
chronology came to dominate historical memory.
This chapter will also compare significant omissions of factual detail
regarding the violence of 1965 with local reporting of the key events of August to
October 1965. This analysis examines the manner in which political culture in
Indonesia changed, how this transformation was negotiated and portrayed in the
local press, and how together with anti-communist ideology, the creation of silences
at the point of fact-creation shaped the basis for forgetting as characterised by the
oral testimonies in chapter four. A further comparison is made between oral and
archival sources and the Anderson and McVey Preliminary Analysis.
New Order anti-communist ideology exerted a profound influence over what
was considered 'fact' at the time of the violence and which could be later
remembered. In fact the change in political cultures between Sukarnoist populism,
typified by NASAKOM, and military authoritarianism, characterised by anticommunism, began within one day of the coup and was essentially complete within
one month of 1 October 1965. It was the political and social context in which facts
were created, and the point at which the body of propaganda assumed the mantie of
'fact'. This represented the first and most significant opportunity for the silencing of
the killings to dominate the story of 1965.

'Anderson and McVey, op.cit. See the historiography that draws heavily on the Anderson and McVey
work, therefore establishing it as an authoritative version of events, such as Dale Scott, CIA dan
Penggulingan Sukarno, Lembaga Analysis Informasi, Yogyakarta, 2001.
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However the magazine sources raised in this chapter reveal another
explanation. This is that a culture of forgetting was already well established under
Sukamo's NASAKOM. Indeed, the two pubhcations under consideration in this
chapter contain no explicit criticism of either Sukarno or the PKI in the months
leading up to October 1965. These documents suggest that NASAKOM was itself a
mechanism for forgetting, which privileged one type of knowledge, namely
authoritarian nationalism, over possible alternatives, such as democratic liberalism,
or competing socialist alternatives to the PKI's dominance of the broad Left.
The magazines Minggu Pagi and to a lesser extent PRABA were widely read
in Kidul during 1965-66, either as purchased editions, as borrowings from public
libraries, or as posted on community reading boards. These were publications of the
rakyat kecil or 'common person'. They represented a popular, although in no way
unbiased or objective reporting of the events. (The narrative strategies of such have
been dealt with as part of my general discussion of the work of Foucault.) They are,
rather, joumalism - subjective, errant, vulnerable, and given the rapidly changing
political situation in October 1965, very cautious and eminently accommodating of
changing political currents.
The magazines' content reveals a remarkable editorial contest. Because one
was a weekly and the other a monthly publication, the period between editions
demonstrates that editorial staff were making careful allowances for the changing
fortunes of key political players - Sukarno, the TNI and the PKI. In fact, it appears
that the explosive events of early October 1965 were carefully considered by senior
editorial staff in both texts for their impact and implications. Again, this
accommodation was part of the socio-pohtical landscape of Sukarno's Guided
Democracy. In particular, the response of Minggu Pagi to the effective overthrow of
Sukarno and the rapid ascendancy of one section of the TNI became one of the chief
sources of contemporary popular knowledge about the 30 September Coup in Kidul
(together with the 1980s' propaganda film Pengianatan G30S/PKI), but not the
killings, which were not part of this process of fact creation.
In terms of general background, Minggu Pagi was, and remains, affiliated
with the most popular daily newspaper in Yogyakarta, Kedaulatan Rakyat. During

^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. See, James T. Siegel, A New Criminal Type
in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today, Duke University Press, London, 1998. Siegel offers an
interesting alternative interpretation of the word 'rakyat' as 'follower', pp.24-29.
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the Japanese military occupation Kedaulatan Rakyat was called Sinar Matahari.
This was the only newspaper in Yogyakarta until after the end of World War IL In
the late 1940s another paper appeared in Yogyakarta called Nasional. The editor-inchief was a PKI member named Sugiono, who was also chairperson of the
Yogyakarta branch of the PKI until his arrest in November 1966. Sugiono was
reported to have been summarily executed at a secret location near Prambanan
Temple complex, near Klaten, together with a large group of local PKI leaders.^
These executions are not reported in Minggu Pagi at all. With Sugiono gone, a proRight-wing PNI, anti-communist joumalist named Abdurrahman took over and the
newspaper's name was changed to Bemas, now the second most popular newspaper
in Yogyakarta. Significantly the main office of both newspapers did not archive back
issues before 1997. For example, all public copies of Kedaulatan Rakyat from the
early 1960s, not held overseas, or in sealed private local archives, such as the one in
the Saint Ignatius library in Yogyakarta were reported destroyed in 1965-66.
In 1965 the Minggu Pagi deputy editor was a PKI member. The manager of
Kedaulatan Rakyat, Samawi, was also PKI. Minggu Pagi managing editor,
Wonohito, was a moderate and a member of the nationalist Masyumi. Significantiy,
it was Wonohito who headed up the editorial staff after Bambang Sindu disappeared
and was removed from the magazine's editorial credits from the 7 November 1965
issue. In Minggu Pagi, editorial text from the period after October 1965
demonstrates a contest that ebbs and flows between enthusiastic support for Leftwing Sukamoist revolutionary nationalism and very reluctant, but a no-less
necessary, sympathy for the new Right-wing praetorian imperatives emanating from
the Suharto group in Jakarta - particulariy after Bambang Sindu was removed. After
the arrests of communists started in Yogyakarta around the second week of
November 1965, Minggu Pagi showed a discrete ideological crossover between
regimes as the publication sought to position itself on the winning side of what for
all intent and purposes was a civil war.

'E-mail correspondence, Hersri Setiawan, Amsterdam, July 2001. Hersri Setiawan was born m
Yogyakarta in 1939, and was caught up in the dragnet of arrests in late 1965. In 1966 he was moved
from prison in Jakarta to Buru Island, remaining there until his release m 1978.
^Interview, Staff, Yogyakarta Municipal Library, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^E-mail correspondence, Hersri Setiawan, op.cit.
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PRABA, on the other hand, shows an almost exactly opposite process of
negotiation to Minggu Pagi. This is from cautious antagonism for Sukamoist polity
to serious and sober support for the New Order counter coup, to a reluctance to raise
issues of politics or ideology not directiy associated with Catholicism. In effect, this
course of action is a mirror of the de-politicisation of the Indonesian electorate after
1971. In 1965 this magazine was cautiously neutral and almost reluctantiy proSukarno. PRABA was the public relations organ of the later anti-PKI Partai Katolik
Indonesia in Yogyakarta during the leadership of I.J. Kasimo, although nationally
the Partai Katolik was pro-Guided Democracy. This magazine was widely read
among Kidul's Catholics in 1965. After October 1965 PRABA became cautiously
pro-New Order, seeking to position itself in a more or less neutral political position,
only to become completely pro-New Order by 1967.^
This is demonstrated by a comparison with the magazine PANBURU, the
National version of PRABA published in Jakarta for nation-wide distribution. By late
1966 PANBURU had clearly become anti-PKI, anti-Left-wing, and anti-Sukarno and
Q

completely in congress with the New Order's propaganda message. The process of
maintaining a narrative silence can be seen by comparing editions of PRABA with
the history commissioned by the Catholic cathedral in Yogyakarta and the local
Catholic congregation in Kidul.^ Again, in this work there is a brief one-paragraph
reference to G30S/PKI. This is despite the fact that many of the older members of
the Kidul congregation had been associated with the PKI or affiliates and were
forced to convert to "some form of religion" in order to establish their anticommunist bone fides from the late 1960s.
The Guided Democracy commitment to NASAKOM shifted markedly in
early November 1965 when both magazines underwent significant changes in
editorial bias, and in the case of Minggu Pagi, editorial staff, and became

^David Reeve, GOLKAR of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System, Oxford University Press,
New York, 1985, pp.291, 264 and 268.
^E-mail correspondence, Hersri Setiawan, op.cit. Also see Hill, op.cit., p. 13.
*See for example, 'Bung Karno Diminta Djawab', PENABUR, no. 25, 6 November 1966, p.395 and
'Mati untuk Subandrio', p.398, as well as the appearance of the regular pro-New Order column,
'Sekitar Orde Baru', p.387.
''Romo', Paroki 'Kidul' Yogyakarta: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, Dan Masa Depan, Yogyakarta, 1997.
'"Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, June 1997. The absence of detailed narrative about this
important aspect of the history of the congregation is significant given that during the late 1990s the
Kidul parish Priest regularly held secret group counselling sessions for those residents directly
affected by the 1965-66 violence.
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demonsti-ably, even enthusiastically, pro-New Order." The transition is dramatic. In
fact, with the exception of the democratic reforms in the immediate post-Suharto
period there are no other examples in modern Indonesian political history of such a
radical ti-ansition in political culture. (An exception may be the post-Habibie
govemment 'forgetting' that blamed many of Indonesia's contemporary woes on
Suharto.) The rapid and radical changes of October and November 1965 explain the
chronological manner in which people in Kidul attempted to make retrospective
sense of the collapse of their Old Order political and cultural terms of reference. The
lack of specific durational detail in the oral accounts outiined in the previous chapter
was caused, in part, by the almost instant replacement of Sukamoist pohty in
October and November 1965 with something foreign to what most people in Kidul
had come to accept as normal.
A sense of normal and abnormal is an important part of this changing
political landscape. What was normal under Suharto's New Order had become the
defining terms of chronological remembering. What was normal under the Old Order
regime, namely the pre-eminence of Sukarno as national leader and the privileged
and protected position of NASAKOM, had become the defining terms of reference
for forgetting. This is because the destmction of the PKI and NASAKOM was
unthinkable even as it was happening. It was "[an event] lived forward and
understood backwards".

Watershed changes in political ideology and everyday

govemance, from the level of simple village leadership to the mayors of large cities,

"Jakarta Post, 23 July 2001, p.2. The term 'New Order' is never mentioned in the texts under
consideration. On 27 June 1966, Kompas quoted former ABRI commander General Nasution as
saying: "Develop a new order, and eliminate the old order". This appears to have been the first public
use of the term. From this point on, the terms 'New Order' and 'Old Order' begin to frequentiy arise
in the political discourse. On 4 July 1966, the Kompas editorial read: "The New Order does not mean
people, but a framework of a life order ... the Old Order is Colonial, and the New Order is the
National order ... ". Four months later a different interpretation emerges. On 18 October 1966,
Kompas quoted General Nasution, then Speaker of the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly,
as saying that: "The Old Order consisted of those actively advocating for the Communists before the
30 September coup, yelling support for the National-religious-Communist doctrine and for the
eradication of capitalist bureaucrats. The Old Order also included those fostering the cult of the
individual, who did not participate in crushing the contra-Revolutionary group GESTAPU/PKI... and
those who opposed the People's three demands at that time - dissolve the Indonesian Communist
Party, purge Communist elements from the Cabinet and lower prices of basic needs." It is interesting
to observe Sukarno's response to the two terms as contained in Kompas published on 15 December
1966, in an article entitied 'President Sukarno: Not Orba, Not Orla'. The article read: "President
Sukarno said ... the terms Old Order and New Order have confused many people. Pointing repeatedly
at reporters and asking them to note his words, the President said: I myself don't know what is New
Order and Old Order". (Sukarno in fact said, he himself belonged to the "genuine order", which he
said originated from the objectives and sources of the Revolution.)
Langer, op.cit., p.6.
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provincial governors and indeed the national cabinet, were well in place before these
transformations could be comprehended much less anticipated, reported in the press,
or analysed by journalists or academics.^'' The question is, what factors determined
the manner in which ordinary subjects recalled events in predominately
chronological or mythological terms, particularly under the ideological terms set by
the advent of a new political reality? This can be seen in texts under examination in
this chapter.
These documents demonstrate that even in the first days following 30
September 1965, the phenomenon of anti-communism and the historical forgetting
that was generated by omissions in the way key events were reported in the press
was well advanced. It was, however, far from methodical, but it rather reveals the
changing roles of new key players - the combined forces of anti-communism, in
particular the Suharto group within the TNI, liberal democrats and sections of
organised Islam, particularly as the PKI leadership collapses, the position of Sukamo
unexpectedly disintegrates and the violence spreads.
The killings so graphically illustrated in other sources, such as those
examined in chapter four, is not explicitiy represented in either Minggu Pagi or
PRABA. There are only vague or sanitised descriptions of many of the mythologised
themes raised in the oral testimonies, for example, the 'kill or be killed myth'.
Topics such as hit lists, death squads, organised executions, dead bodies and mass
graves do not surface. Again, this is not to say that these are not provable
characteristics of the violence. There is ample evidence to demonstrate this. There
are, for instance, no reports in these local media of trackloads of condemned political
prisoners heading to destinations unknown, which predominate in the historiography.
Where mentions of the violence do appear, particularly after late October 1965,
joumalistic reports are couched in diplomatic language, or replaced with official
jargon.
A comparison between sources reveals more than what is said to have
occurred, or for that matter, not occurred. Each competing discourse - NASAKOM
on the one hand and the Suharto groups' anti-communist mihtary authoritarianism
on the other - overiapped in the three weeks that followed 30 September 1965 until,
as far as Minggu Pagi and PRABA readers were concerned, one suddenly emerged

'^The Mayor of Solo was a PKI member. The Governor of Bali was a communist sympathiser.
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victorious and the other was totally silenced. By 21 November NASAKOM is not
even mentioned in a Minggu Pagi editorial devoted to sharply criticising the
NASAKOM ideology. NASAKOM disappears even within the discourse dedicated
to dismantling its efficacy. This key editorial describes the period before 30
September 1965 as 'abnormal', even 'impohte and evil'. As a demonstration of how
much had changed in Indonesia, the editor even commented retrospectively, that it
was an "unforgivable sin [under NASAKOM and Sukamo] if someone proclaimed
an opinion that did not benefit the commies (kom)".^'^
By the time this was written. Guided Democracy ideological concepts such as
NASAKOM and Marhaenism had already been replaced by new key words and
abbreviations, such as G30S/PKI and 'kom\ a new non-NASAKOM word to appear
in late October 1965 roughly meaning 'commie', rather than the previously accepted,
and respectful, komunis. Even the term terlibat, which became a New Order mantra
during sessions of the Mahmillub or 'Special Military Tribunal', entered the
discourse at this point. In fact, this word appeared in the first brief public comments
of Suharto in Minggu Pagi following the coup.^^ There is no way of knowing if this
was a deliberate strategy on the part of Suharto after 1 October 1965, however given
Suharto's penchant for operational planning, and his reputation as a strategist, it is a
fair assumption. The point is that what was conceived as normal under the hegemony
of Sukarno and the PKI was utterly no more; and what is more, this happened over a
period of merely two to four weeks. Consider for example the positive outiook
conveyed by van der Kroef in his work The Communist Party of Indonesia,
pubhshed just prior to September 1965. This work is highly suggestive of the general
level of confidence and optimism that must have been felt by ordinary members of
the PKI as they approached the anniversary of their founding, planned for December
of that year.

A student of recent socio-economic changes in the Yogyakarta area
(long one of the more tradition-bound regions in the nation and the
heartland of ancient Javanese culture) has noted the susceptibility of
'Vonohito, 'Public Opinion Tanpa Antjaman', Minggu Pagi, no. 21 November 1965, p.2. "Sampai
30 September 1965 pendapat umum tidak normal, melainkan, abnormal. Pada waktu itu adalah tidak
sopan, adalah suatu kedjahatan, adalah dosa tak berampun, apabila seseorang menjatakan pendapat
jang tidak menuntungkan Kom."
'^'Pahlawan Pahlawan Revolusi', Minggu Pagi, no. 28-29, 10-17 October 1965, p.36.
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the common man to the vocabulary of socio-democracy, which the
PKI employs so well. As an old man put it to me: "In my days there
were only coolies in the village, but now we have rakyatV [The
Indonesian worid 'kulis' refers to labourers burdened with duties
while rakyat denotes 'the people' with the connotation of the
sovereignty of the state in their hands.] The same student also
indicated how well the PKI had been able to blend the symbolism of
the old and the new. During the 1955 national elections in the
Yogyakarta area the PKI organised village festivals centring on
traditional ketoprak theatre performances ... [B]y its common ground
approach ... the Party has a good chance of becoming an
organisational crystallisation of the popular, unfulfilled

dreams

aroused by the national revolution.'^

The document mirrors the same optimism and then profound confusion and
uncertainty that tum up over 30 years later in the oral history narratives in Kidul.
This is because these documents are evidence of a sudden break in established
patterns of power and thinking, which were then replaced by silence rather than
explanation or analysis. To recall the work of Trouillot, the first stage of historical
forgetting may be found at the point of fact creation, and its corollary, the recording
or for that matter non-recording of certain sets of facts in public documents, such as
newspapers and magazines. In respect to other popular newspaper sources, Cribb
notes that Sukarno had banned some 21 newspapers in early 1965 for their support of
the misleadingly named anti-communist Barisan Pendukung Sukarnoisme or 'the
Supporters of Sukarno Brigade'. He further notes that the emphasis in the remaining
publications was on ideological correctness and political caution, rather than on
joumalistic integrity. The literary form and political correctness of popular
newspaper sources up to late 1965 makes these documents "no more than a partial
17

mirror of the events concemed".
The changing editorial emphasis illustrates these silences, but on careful
examination the very earliest genesis of the New Order's propaganda message is also
seen. The disappearance of one set of sociological co-ordinates and the replacement
van der Kroef, op.cit., p.301.
Cribb, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit., pp.4-5.
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of these co-ordinates by others exposes the tension between different types of
sources and the historical understanding each produces. This process is about the
power of one discourse to silence another, and it is about the complex imposition of
a new type of pohtical and social knowledge. This parallels Foucault's project,
namely to ask, what is the form of reason that led to this forgetting, and what were
the historical conditions that caused it to happen? In the case of the New Order, the
success of anti-communist military action in late 1965 made all that had gone before
totally illegitimate - communism as an ideology, the PKI as an organisation,
including affiliate or other linked organisations such as LEKRA, GERWANI and
Pemuda Rakyat, mass-based politics, revolutionary nationalism, even Sukamo
himself (who was not to re-emerge as an officially respected person until the
political rise of his daughter Megawati in 2001, eight years after her election as chair
of the PDI in 1993). When political circumstances began to change in the immediate
post-Suharto period, anti-communism continued to dictate the absolute terms by
which the history of this period would be conceptualised and written. Analysis of the
manner in which the killings were carried out directly challenges notions of the
killings as anarchistic - a discourse that the TNI used to typify the 'Old Order' state
system, which they argue, was dominated by the PKI. For example, writing in Inside
Indonesia in late 2001, Hilmar Farid commented:

But when we go into the data, which is abundant, we get a very
different picture. Soldiers in uniform in fact killed the Generals. There
was no communist hysteria. A press already controlled by General
Suharto spread much of this misinformation. The objective was to
generate a lot of anger and direct it at the PKI. This then led to
massive killings. People who know how the killings were done tell us
they happened not in a disorderly fashion but systematically. Groups
with known names would be checked out of jail to be executed. There
was paperwork, a bureaucracy of murder. You certainly can't say this
was communal conflict among naturally violent people. What
happened in 1965-66 was a complete overtuming of the existing
pohtical system, economic stracture, and cultural life. The prisons of
the New Order were filled with the best and brightest of that
generation. Once more, the energy of the people was crashed in a
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bratal fashion. Not only the exceptionally brilhant ended in jail.
Farmers used to do their own research. They tried to educate
themselves.. Today there is nothing hke that.'^

As mentioned, the touchstone of what was to be considered 'historical' under the
New Order did not include Guided Democracy political themes. Before October
1965 Minggu Pagi and PRABA each demonstiate a political flavour consistent with
Guided Democracy, one socialist, the other accommodating the political current of
the day as a means of deflecting the same negative attention that other political
parties and organisations such as the Left-wing, non-PKI-aligned Murba Party had
attracted in January 1965.'^
Sukamo had banned a number of anti-NASAKOM publications in early
1965, together with the Murba Party, to which some of the PKI's original founders
had belonged.

(The Catholic Party was mindful of this, especiahy given the

minority status and social vulnerability of Catholicism in Indonesia, in particular in
DIY.) However, after the second week of October 1965 the New Order propaganda
narrative became hegemonic. The issue of where the Catholic Party and other noncommunist movements stood in relation to NASAKOM became completely
irrelevant. By this point the pohtical landscape had changed. NASAKOM was swept
away. In the case of Minggu Pagi this was represented in the two November 1965
editions, and PRABA with the contrast between editions 27 to 28 and 29 to 30
spanning the period from 25 September to 25 October 1965. This represents a
complete transformation in not only editorial influence, but in total political content.
Signiflcantly, the popular medium of anti-imperialist political cartoon satire, so
prevalent under Sukamo, also disappears. There is no explanation in the editorial text
for this change.
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Hilmar Farid, 'Out of the Black Hole: After the New Order, the Lid on Indonesia's Past is
Beginning to Lift', Inside Indonesia, no. 68, October to December 2001.
'^The founders of the PKI in 1920 and key members of the Party up until 1951 were Semaoen and
Darsono. They were sidelined under the PKI reorganisation in 1951 and replaced with a younger
generation of Communist leaders such as Aidit. In 1965 Semaoen was a key member of the Murba
Party. He was not directiy affected by the post-coup arrests and lived the remainder of his life under
New Order rule, un-harassed in Jakarta.
^°With the PKI destroyed at Madiun, the 'National Communists' under Tan Malaka joined and formed
the Partai Murba (Proletarian Party). Murba remained the main threat to the PKI's dominance of the
Left in Indonesia up until it was banned. Its banning sent a strong message to other small parties, such
as the Partai Katolic Indonesia, to closely adhere to the tenants of Sukarnoism - NASAKOM,
Marhaenism, anti-Imperialism and progressive Nationalism.
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In the case of Minggu Pagi the differences in pre- and post-October 1965
editions even extends to magazine covers. For example, from 1 August 1965, to 28
November 1965, a graphic change in representations of both political and popular
culture can be seen. The change in PRABA is even more defined because of the
magazine's underiying antagonism towards NASAKOM (but not Sukarno, who was
seen as a protector of minorities under the Pancasila ideology).^' For example, the 1
August edition of Minggu Pagi features a distinctiy civilian image of a smiling pretty
girl.

The 28 November 1965 edition shows two humourless, uniformed women,

well-known entertainers of the day. Sari Naralia and Dian Anggaraini - each
wearing military caps and dark glasses.^^ The young women are photographed
mingling with stern-faced soldiers of the RPKAD. To further cement New Order
Military semiotics, Naralia and Anggaraini are portrayed in front of an armoured
personnel carrier with a phallic cannon barrel between the two.^^
Similarly, the 15 September edition of PRABA shows a cartoon of a man in
military fatigues declaring, 'My Soul belongs to NASAKOM',^"^ contrasted in the
first post-coup edition of PRABA with a file photograph of a younger Sukamo, vital,
in charge and summoning his generals to account for the coup. In the next month's
edition is a cartoon parody of an Indonesian soldier and a PKI member (or possibly a
Chinese communist cadre), with the ominous image of a dragon (representing China)
under the two, declaring beneath the cartoon in the editorial: 'Our Country is only
Flying a Flag Half-Mast for the Chairman of the PKI and the Head of State,
Mmmm'. Beneath this cartoon is reproduced a 20-year-old speech delivered by
Sukamo following the failed PKI rebellion in Madiun. The editor's intention is to
support the changing political status quo, while carefully buying some political
insurance by using Sukarno's own words to criticise Musso's leadership of the PKI
over Madiun, rather than his patronage of NASAKOM.
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Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
Minggu Pagi, no. 18, 1 August 1965.
Minggu Pagi, no. 35, 28 November 1965, cover p.l, details, p.8.
'%id.
^^PRABA, no. 26, 15 September 1965, p.l.
^^PRABA, no. 27-28, 25 September to 5 October 1965, p.l.
^'''Presiden 20 Tahun Jang Lalu', PRABA, no. 29 to 30, 15 to 25 October 1965, pp.1-2. "Negara kami
tjuma mengibarkan bendera setengah tiang bagi Ketua partai komunis dan kepala negara ...
Mmmm."
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With this edition the New Order becomes the only political reality
represented in the text, and for that matter the cartoon illustiations. This is with the
exception of the weekly syndicated, Indonesian Department of Information,
'Teachings of the Great Leader of the Revolution: Sukamo', a general exposition on
Sukarnoist nationalism and Leftist social democracy, clearly written before 30
September being devoid of any political analysis of the escalating political
conditions after the coup.

However, despite the continued appearance of transcripts

of Sukarno's speeches, real Sukarnoist influence had already diminished because the
linchpin of his political ideology, namely NASAKOM, had been completely
eliminated from these popular media. (By this time the Indonesian Department of
hiformation was firmly under the control of the TNI counter-coup group, and
Sukamoist literature was already beginning to disappear from public libraries with
particular interest on the part of ABRI and para-military Islamic groups, in
ehminating ah references to NASAKOM.) Rather, anti-communist, but ostensibly
pro-Sukamo commentary, and an official - that is an ABRI - analysis of the coup,
becomes predominant. Any pro-PKI reference to the social upheaval and violence
disappears, with positive references to Leftist discourse replaced by the propaganda
line and supported by dispatch-like military reports of PKI atrocities (not atrocities
against ordinary communists). Again the propaganda is characterised by clear
references to the key features of the anti-communist myth, namely that the G30S was
a nation-wide conspiracy of the PKI, that communism was a form of political evil
and that the TNI under Suharto's direct command was solely responsibly for reestablishing order.
Before October 1965 Minggu Pagi was both distinctly socialist and ultranationalist. The publication's bi-line, Lahir Tahun 1948 di Tengah Tengah Api
Revolusi or 'Born in 1948 in the Middle of Revolutionary Fire', is characteristic of
the magazine's pre-October 1965 editorial content and general approach to national
and local politics. In 1965 Minggu Pagi was Left-wing and progressive. It was also,
consistent with Sukarnoist politics, inclusive of all major power holders, including
ABRI, the PNI, Islamic groups, NASAKOM ideology, and, towards the end of
August 1965, the PKI as an organisation (as opposed to communism as an inclusive
philosophical element of NASAKOM). Leading up to the important anniversary of
^^Ajaran Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Bung Karno, 'Sekali Lagi Tentang Sosio-Nasionalisme dan SosioDemokrasi', Minggu Pagi, no. 34, 28 November 1965, p.7.
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the PKI scheduled for December 1965 there is evidence in Minggu Pagi of the PKI's
desire for a much more public and popular, rather than party political profile.
In contrast, during the entire Suharto period, Minggu Pagi became not only
pro-New Order, but enthusiastically pro-GOLKAR.^^ This is not surprising, given
that under New Order mle public support for GOLKAR was considered a means of
'atoning for the sins of communism', or at least a way of guarding against
allegations of pro-communist sympathy. Support for GOLKAR, particulariy trae in
the case of Kidul, consisted of ostentatious displays of public loyalty at election
time, promoted by the New Order as a 'Festival of Democracy'. For instance, the
flying of the GOLKAR flag, or painting buildings, trees, telegraph poles, even stray
dogs - yellow (the colour of the GOLKAR Party). The function of such went far
beyond a display of New Order loyalty. It was also a means of deliberately
distancing individuals, or in fact entire communities, from the physical stractures
and alliances of past political realities, including forgetting the former political
vitality of the New Order's old enemy - the PKI, and the political modus operandi of
Sukamo - anti-imperialist and populist mass-based politics.
In fact, the areas of DIY, Central and East Java most closely associated with
the PKI became GOLKAR heartlands under the New Order and remain so today.
Kidul is a case in point. There is a strong argument that there is a commensurate
relationship between enthusiastic community support for GOLKAR and an equal
commitment to the PKI before October 1965. For example, in the 1997 election the
Kidul village head mobilised the public support of most people for GOLKAR,
although privately many in Kidul indicated that they were anti-GOLKAR and
purposely spoiled their ballot in a silent protest against New Order excesses.

No

one in Kidul, however, publicly supported any political party in opposition to
GOLKAR. This protest did not show up in the election results, which mirrored the
-5 1

national outcome of a minimum 74 per cent support for GOLKAR.

^'During the New Order period Minggu Pagi was well known as being 'yellow', that is it was proGOLKAR. This is not surprising. GOLKAR support was considered a means of distancing oneself
from Left-wing activities. The Minggu Pagi of the 1990s was considered locally as a 'Koran kuning',
literally a 'yellow publication', typified by a complete lack of political discussion, rather
concentrating on gossip, health, beauty and magic.
^"Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997. This was known as GOLPUT (literally
'White Group').
^'Ed Aspinal, 'What Price Victory? The 1997 Elections', Inside Indonesia, no. 51, July to September
1997,pp.2-4.
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Using Minggu Pagi as a sole source of evidence of PKI support in Kidul is
problematic. During the 1950s and early 1960s Minggu Pagi, while passionately proSukamo (and pro-NASAKOM), was not actively pro-communist, or more precisely
not pro-PKI. Very littie is actually written that explicitiy mentions the PKI as an
organisation, at least before late August or early September 1965. One explanation
for this is that the bittemess of the 1948 Madiun Revolt was still too fresh in the
minds of combatants. Further, the rehabilitation of the PKI was not yet complete.
The pre-September 1965 text is rather dominated by broad revolutionary and antiimperialist themes such as the war in Vietnam. After this time pro-PKI content starts
to appear with increasing frequency, a clear reflection of the rapidly rising
ideological tensions across Indonesia generally, and specifically in places such as
Jakarta and Yogyakarta. In the case of Minggu Pagi this is testimony to the growing
influence and confidence of PKI members on the magazine's editorial committee.
Minggu PagVs pro-PKI high water mark is characterised by irony. The 3
October edition appears to have been finalised before the news of the 30 September
Coup and 1 October counter-coup breaks. The coup story appeared instead for the
first time in the following week commencing 10 October. In this edition, or number
27, a feature appears on the life and work of Mohammed Arief, the LEKRA
composer of the popular Leftist anthem Genjer Genjer mentioned in the previous
chapter.^^ The timing of this story could not have been worse for Arief who it was
incorrectiy presumed was killed by ANSOR gangs in the East Java city of
Banyuwangi where he was based as the head of LEKRA's traditional dance division.
(In fact Arief hid from authorities for over 35 years only to emerge in 2002.)^^
A syndicated column based on the book of the same name by David Wise
and Thomas B. Ross called 'The Invisible Government' raised conspiracy theories
about the possible involvement of the CIA in Indonesian pohtics.^* Significantiy, the

^^'Komponis Lagu Genjer Genjer Mohammed Arif, Minggu Pagi, no. 27, 3 October 1965, pp.3 and
29.
^^Personal correspondence, Hersri Setiawan, The Netherlands, August 2002. Astomshmgly it was
reported in March 2002 that Mohammed Arief was "alive and well and living in East Java", that he
had married the daughter of the military prison commander where he was incarcerated, and that he
was "preparing an album for a big come back".
''Audrey and George Kahin, Subversion as Foreign Policecry: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles
Debacle in Indonesia, W.W. Norton Press, New York 1995.
See also http-//www.gwu.e,du/~nsarchiv/N.SAF.RB/NSAEBB52/ site accessed June 2002. In July 2001
George Washington University's national security archive posted on the Web at www.nsarchive.org
one of two U.S. State Department documentary histories whose release the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency in Indonesia attempted to suppress because of a concern of offending the newly appointed
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same column, or at least the same reference, was appearing in editions of the PKI
magazine Harian Rakyat up until just before banning by ABRI on 2 October under
the titie 'CL\ hitervention in the PRRI/Permesta Affair'.^*^ This column continued in
Minggu Pagi through parts two and three across the period of the coup, in editions
covering 3 October and 10 October.^^ These are testimony to both the editorial
overiap and the relationship between Minggu Pagi and the PKI through Harian
Rakyat (not formally affiliated, but equally influenced by NASAKOM ideology,
political practice and the editorial policy of the then Minggu Pagi deputy editor). In
the very next edition the news breaks of the Untung coup. Everything begins to
change, at first in a subtie way, but then more dramatically as the Suharto group
links the PKI to the 30 September Movement. The transition from communism as
normal under Sukamo's NASAKOM to communism as taboo begins almost
immediately. By November 1965 all positive references to Leftist discourse had been
eliminated from Minggu Pagi.
In the first days following the coup the magazine demonstrates an almost
naively open reporting of the events as they unfolded in Jakarta. In the 10 October
edition the coup is clearly represented in the lead pages as an internal affair of the
TNI. The editorial pleads what was both the PKI and Sukarno line, to remain calm
and concentrate on the facts. It states, 'Takta harus kita kumpulkan dengan kepala
dingin, bebas daripada emosi", or "We must compile the facts of the situation with
cool heads free from emotionalism".^^ This was not, however, to be the modus
operandi of the anti-communist coalition, who actively worked towards provoking
President of Indonesia, Megawati. The Indonesian volume includes significant new documentation on
the Indonesian Army's campaign against the PKI in 1965-66. For example, the U.S. Embassy,
reporting on 13 November 1965 passed on information from the police that from 50 to 100 PKI
members were being killed every night in East and Central Java, and the embassy admitted in a 15
April 1966 aerogram to Washington that: "We frankly do not know whether the real figure [of PKI
killed] is closer to 100,000 or 1,000,000, but believe it wiser to err on the side of the lower estimates
especially when questioned by the press". On page 339 the volume endorses the figure of 105,000
killed proposed in 1970 by Foreign Service officer Richard Cabot Howland in a classified CIA
publication. On the controversial issue that of U.S. involvement in the killings the volume includes an
'editorial note' on page 387 describing Ambassador Marshall Green's 10 August 1966 air gram to
Washington reporting that an embassy-prepared list of top communist leaders with Embassy
attribution removed was being used by Indonesian security authorities who, the report suggested,
"appeared to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time". On 2 December
1965, Green endorsed a 5 million rupiah covert payment to the anti-communist KAP-GESTAPU
movement. The 3 December CIA responses to developments is withheld in full. See pp.379-80.
Anderson and McVey, op.cit., p. 144.
^^David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, 'The Invisible Government: Part One', Minggu Pagi, no. 27, 3
October 1965, pp.25-26; Part Two, 10 October 1965, pp.13-14; and Part Three, 24 October 1965,
pp. 17-18.
Wonohito, 'Laporan Fakta-Fakta', Minggu Pagi, no. 28 to 29, 10 to 17 October 1965, p.2.
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ANSOR to violence. Minggu PagVs moderate response was quickly swept aside
with the discovery of the bodies of the six generals (and one junior-ranking officer),
and the national press coverage of the burial of General Nasution's daughter.
Prima facie, the text of this first post-coup edition of Minggu Pagi
demonstrates a sense of remote political curiosity about events. The magazine details
narrative about what happened, the names, ranks, and achievements of those killed
or involved, including a list of citations and service medals. There is, however, httie
or no commentary or analysis. As editor Wonohito pleaded, there is "just a report on
the facts".^^ As previously raised, towards the very end of this first post-coup
Minggu Pagi edition, at the back of the magazine where Indonesian editors have
traditionally buried sensitive reporting, there are a number of highly significant
quotes from the then Major General Suharto about his version of 'what happened' on
the early moming of 1 October 1965. These comments become increasingly
significant as the situation unfolds. There is also reporting of anti-communist
coalition demonstrations in Jakarta, which is in contrast to the pro-PKI
demonstration in Yogyakarta of the same day (reported in Anderson and McVey's
historiography).

The latter are not reported at all in Minggu Pagi.

Strangely, the 10 October edition does not mention the existence or local
implications of the Yogyakarta Revolutionary Council, which was supportive of
Untung's stated objective of protecting Sukarno from the ramoured 'Council of
Generals' and which was not crashed in Yogyakarta until 5 October almost a week
after the coup was neutralised in Jakarta on 1 October. There is no mention of the
killing of two senior TNI officers by the Yogyakarta coup plotters, nor mass pro-PKI
demonstrations that took place in central Yogyakarta on 4 October, although all of
this would have been well known to local journalists by the time. There is a sense
that the Untung coup was simply a part of a broader political landscape and that it
was something that was happening in Jakarta - although Yogyakarta was extremely
important to the balance of forces after Jakarta and Semarang. In any case it appears
that it was a case of wait and see.
This situation changes dramatically with the next edition of Minggu Pagi
with news of the defeat of the plotters in Jakarta. On the other hand, the state of
affairs in places like Semarang becomes increasingly complicated with the injection
^%id.
-an

Anderson and McVey, op.cit., p.57.
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of the propaganda narrative into popular press reports. In reality, the situation outside
Jakarta had become violent. This is because, unlike Jakarta, the coup plotters in
Semarang and Yogyakarta remained in control at the same time as the national press
was brought under the control of the Suharto group. This is resolved in the text with
the tumover of Minggu Pagi editorial staff in issue number 32, beginning with the
week of 7 November. Not coincidentally, this week marked the beginning of mass
arrests across Yogyakarta, including several of the Kidul residents interviewed in the
previous chapter. It was also at this time that Minggu Pagfs influential assistant
deputy editor, PKI member Bambang Sindu, was arrested and replaced."^" Despite
literature searches, local interviews and intemational inquiries amongst former
joumalists, I was not able to determine the fate of Sindu. One former joumalist, now
living in Holland, stated: "We [the expatriate PKI community living in Holland]
presume that he was killed"."^^
To put this change into context, editions of Minggu Pagi prior to the 10
October edition build up a picture of a very different popular political culture in
Indonesia from that which dominated Indonesia during my fieldwork in 1997. The 1
August edition, for example, leads with the editorial entitled: 'The Set Strength of
Progressive Revolutionary-ism' ."^^ The only reference to the PKI in this editorial is a
sympathetic comment about the passionate contribution of the PKI to a mass rally at
Senayan Stadium, Jakarta.'^'^ However, the small mention of the PKI's role belies that
fact that the editorial makes an implicit connection with the essential contribution of
Indonesian communism to NASAKOM. In the article the PKI are mentioned
accordingly.

Then the communist group under the flag of the PKI publicly
displayed their part in the straggle. However this was only minor
rebellion. So their effort to bring down Dutch power failed."^^

''"Personal communication, Hersri Setiawan, Amsterdam, July 2001. See Hill, op.cit., p.l3.
'"Personal communication, Hersri Setiawan, ibid.
^^'Susun Kekuatan PROG, REV, Minggu Pagi, no. 18, 1 August 1965, p.2.
*^Ibid., This event was organized to celebrate the anniversary of the PNI/Front Marhaenisme, in
which the Editor reports that the Pemimpin Besar Revolusi/Bapak Marhaenisme or 'The Great Leader
of the Revolution/Father of Marhaen ideology - Sukarno', defines 'Progressive Revolution' in terms
of inter-group solidarity, in particular a 'spirit' or 'unity' of faiths, namely Islam, Christianity
(Protestant Christianity), Catholicism, and Balinese Hinduism.
'%id. "Kemudian Kaum Komunis dibawah bendara PKI sanakan melak pembrontakan. Tapi
Pemberontakan hanja ketjil2-an. Maka usah meruntuhkan kekuasaan Belanda itu pun gagal."
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The editorial carefully incorporates Sukarno's comments about the role of organised
Islamic groups, in particular the influence of Tjokroaminto, his former patron and
father-in-law,"^^ with a general discussion of the defining role of Marhaenism in
illustrating the 'strength of progressive revolution'."^^ On the opposite facing page the
feature story in the regular Apa dan Siapa or 'What and Who' column features the
anti-imperialist efforts of Professor Nguyen Huu Tho in the Vietcong guerrilla war
against the South Vietnamese regime and a discussion about the rapidly escalating
intervention of the U.S. Army in that country. The article is laden with ideological
references to the solidarity of the Indonesian people with the Marxist-Leninist
straggle of the Vietnamese Communist Party."^^ This article shows two photographs one of Professor Tho inspecting well-armed guerrilla fighters waving a Red Star
North Vietnamese flag, and young women guerrilla fighters marching in file,
"fulfilling their duty"."^^ Further in the same edition an article entitled, 'Kedatangan
Nabi Muhammad (SAW) dan Revolusi yang Dibawanja', illustrates the social,
revolutionary and socialist aspects of Islam."*^ On page 24 there is a pictorial
featuring General Nasution inspecting troops, but there is no mention whatsoever of
any hostility or antagonism on the part of the TNI towards the PKI or Sukarno.^°
The 8 August edition leads with a passionately pro-Sukarno and antiimperialist editorial targeted at American involvement in Vietnam. It begins by
stating: 'The Most Important Thing: Spirit' and 'The Revolution must surely win,
and God willing, surely will win'.''' The Apa dan Siapa column features a member of
the Sukarno cabinet, the Catholic Party figure Frans Seda, then chairman. He is
identified as pro-revolutionary and implicitly pro-NASAKOM, with the sub-heading.
"^Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminto moved to Surabaya, and became active in the 'Sarekat Dagang
Islam' (SDI). Together with Samanhudi and others they set about changing the SDI's Statutes
(Anggaran Dasar). From 1912 the SDI became Sarekat Islam (SI). Non-cooperation as an idea was
developed by Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands in the early 1920s, and adopted by Sukarno's
PNI. In 1927 Tjokroaminto's Sarekat Islam, then called Partai Sarekat Islam, jointed the existing nonco-operation movement against the Dutch.
"^Tjokroaminto was, according to Sukarno, among the most prominent figures of the angkatan
perintis or 'pioneers generation' and Sukarno's most influential ideological teacher. Islam dan
Sosialisme is one among his writings. For a general discussion of Sukarno's synthesis of Islam and
Socialism, see, H. Roeslan Abdulgani, Perkembangan Tjita-tjita Sosialisme di Indonesia, Jajasan
Perguruan Tinggi Malang, 1960, and Sukarno, Temukan Kembali Api Islam, Departmen Penerangan
R.L, Jakarta, 1964.
"•^Apa dan Siapa, 'Nguyen Huu Tho', Minggu Pagi, no. 18, 1 August 1965, pp.3-4 and 31.
^^Ibid., pp.3-4.
"^Mohammed Dawam, 'Kedatangan Nabi Muhammad dan Revolusi Yang Dibawanja', ibid, pp.2123.
"Ibid.
^'Wonohito, 'Jang Pokok: Djiwa', Minggu Pagi, no. 19, 8 August 1965, p.2.
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'The Catholic Party does not play a 'Nominal' Minister, [pupuk bawang] but
participates in Carrying through the Revolution'. This is a subtie, ambiguous
reference to the influence of the PKI in national politics.^^
Pages five, six and 27 feature a modem history of Kalimantan and the
ideological justification

for Konfrontasi or Indonesian 'Confrontation'

with

Malaysia. This story features a photograph of Indonesian guerrilla volunteers, which
it refers to as "one of the only available photographs of 'the heroes of North
Kalimantan'".''^ However, Minggu Pagi is careful not to isolate or ignore ABRI
under General Nasution. For instance in most pre-September 1965 editions there are
regular military features. These were not explicitiy political and included soldiers in
training for the anticipated campaign against the Dutch in Man Jaya,^'* General
Nasution presiding over the graduation of TNI officers in Surabaya,^^ Indonesian Air
Force Day celebrations,^ as well as commando training for anticipated operations in
Konfrontasi.' The magazine almost mirrors Sukamo's balancing of national forces.
In contrast, a story about Sukarno addressing a mass rally of farmers is highly
political. In this article, the importance of agrarian land reform under the guidance of
farmers' organisations aligned with NASAKOM ideology (read the PKI) and the
necessity for indoctrination of all farmers by NASAKOM cadres is raised. Sukamo
suggests that the spirit of NASAKOM is a type of "insurance against the efforts of
counter-revolutionaries".^^ The regularly reproduced Sukarno speech on pages 11
and 12 is likewise stridently Leftist, namely Swadeshi dan Massa-aksi di Indonesia

^^Pupuk literally means 'paste' or 'poultice' (papje in Dutch); and bawang merah is the Indonesian
word for 'onion'. Pupuk bawang is a kind of onion paste, usually given to babies or young children,
and rubbed into the fontanel to prevent masuk angin or 'the common cold'. Pupuk bawang is
originally a Javanese expression, used by children in play. Pupuk bawang refers to a child who is
allowed to join in play, but is in fact not considered part of the group because of his or her junior
status or age. This term was used in Indonesian socio-political life from the beginning of the 1960s. It
was introduced into national politics by Njoto, the second vice-chairman of the Central Committee of
PKI when he was appointed by Sukarno as state minister portefeuille or 'without portfolio', referring
to himself as Menteri Pupukbawang. Although the article does not explicitly mention the PKI or
Frans Seda's views about NASAKOM, the mention of the term 'not pupuk bawang' frames his
appointment within the political context of NASAKOM.
^•Rudhy, 'Sedjarah Pendek Kalimantan Utara: Sedjarah Membuktikan rakyat Kal Utara Benar Benar
Pedjuang Konsekwen', Minggu Pagi, no. 19, 8 August 1965, pp.3-4 and 29.
^'''Dari Kawah Tjandrapara Batuddjar Dibawah Terik Matahari', Minggu Pagi, no. 18, 1 August 1965,
pp.13-14.
^^'PORAKTA ke IV di Surabaya', Ibid., p.24.
^^'Hari Bhakti AURI', Minggu Pagi, no. 20, 15 August 1965, p.24.
"'Komando Penjelamat Dibawah Air', Minggu Pagi, no. 21, 22 August 1965, pp.9-10.
^^Ibid.,p.\0.
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or 'Swadeshi (a Gandhian concept, meaning self-sustainability) and Mass-action'.^^
This continues for the next four editions in instalment form. Again anti-imperialist
cartoons

appear,

one

depicting

Sukamo

throwing

out

American

and

British/Malaysian interests, exclaiming, 'Go have a good look in the mirror
yourself .^°
The 15 August edition commences with the editorial 'We all love Comrade
Sukamo'. This highhghts of Sukano's weekly itinerary and impressions of his visit
to Yogyakarta on 29 July 1965. The Apa dan Siapa column features I.R. Sutami then Minister for organising the August 1966 Conefo [or 'Conference of the New
Emerging Forces', a type of NASAKOM Intemational] in Jakarta.^' His comment
included: "Hey NASAKOM Cadres, Conefo has to be guarded!"^^ Again, in contrast
the magazine features a story in the same edition that makes no mention of
NASAKOM, but rather only of the "doctrine of revolution".^^ In this article, which
stretches over two editions - 15 and 22 August, the focus is on para-military training
for the IPNU/IPPNU, Ikatan Pelajar NU/Ikatan Pemuda Pelajar NU or 'junior
students of the Nahdatul Ulama organisation'. This was the same official umbrella
organisation governing ANSOR (which was responsible for much of the killing in
DIY, East and Central Java some six weeks or so later). Photographs show officers
of the RPKAD instracting students in rifle and bayonet drill at a training camp in
Cebongan, which is about five kilometres from Kidul.^"^ This is surprising given that
the historiography of the killings is dominated by narrative accounts of the RPKAD
beginning hasty anti-PKI military training of NU youth after the coup. According to
Minggu Pagi, this was not the case.

^'Sukarno, Ajaran Pemimpin Besar Revolusi, 'Swadeshi dan Massa-aksi di Indonesia', Minggu Pagi,
ibid., pp.11-12. Swadeshi was a movement championed by Gandhi and inspired by his non cooperation against the British Colonial regime. This movement was followed in Indonesia by K.H.
Dewantara with Taman Siswa, Tjokroaminoto with his SI, and Sukarno with his PNI (1927).
However Sukarno did not blindly follow 'Swadeshi' a la Gandhi, but sharply criticised the movement
in this speech.
"ibid
^'This was referred to by distracters from the Right-wing of the PNI as PNI Asu or 'PNI dogs' (the
PNI faction led by Ali Surachman). His interview is clearly more concerned about establishing
publicly his pro-NASAKOM credentials rather than issues associated with completing the project on
time. Sutami was PNI Kiri or 'a member of the Left faction of Sukano's PNF.
^^Apa dan Siapa, 'I.R. Sutami', Minggu Pagi, no. 20, 15 August 1965, pp.3-4 and 30. See also
'Komando Penjelamat Dibawah Air', Minggu Pagi, no. 20, 15 August 1965, pp.9-10, and no. 21, 22
August 1965, pp. 19-20.
^^'T.C, C.B.P. Sukwan Peladjar IPNUIPPNU', Ibid., p.22.
^^There was another such camp training N.U. youth in the Paracommando complex m Kartasura,
which is between Solo and Sangiran in East Java, the site of the worst violence during 1956-66.
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Similarly, most Minggu Pagi editions published before 30 September
commonly featured stories about village-based militia tiaining. According to Minggu
Pagi, everyone was preparing for something; exactiy what is ill defined, or identified
in the various stories devoted to para-military training as responses to 'the forces of
hnperialism'. KODIM, or TNI regional command in Klaten, was actually integrating
miliatry manoeuvres with civilian defence training from August 1965. This appears
in a number of pre-September 1965 editions. These are identified as articles about
reservist activhy by the general subject title 'Behind the Lines'.^^ The term 'Yudha'
identifies the group as either neutral or anti-communist. However, as Anderson and
McVey point out, it is impossible to make such generalisations about Central
Javanese military politics at that time.

The seventh division of the Indonesian army, generally known as the
Diponegoro division, has always been the least approachable and
most difficult to understand of the major territorial units of the
Indonesian mihtary. The reason for this is that it is the division of
Central Java, and fully reflects the complexities and withdrawn
character of the civilisation of the region. Like the sixth (Siliwangi)
division in West Java and the eighth (Brawidjaja) division in East
Java, Diponegoro is an integral part of the local landscape and its
internal stmcture and political tendencies closely mirror the society in
which it is situated.^^

Articles about reservist training, about military preparation and village-based civil
defence exercises appear in almost every edition of Minggu Pagi before October
1965. The impression the text gives is one of approaching social upheaval. Given
Anderson and McVey's comments about the complexity of Central Javanese military
politics, it is difficult to determine the loyalty or affiliation of particular groups from
the content of articles alone.
The 22 August edition continues the general trend toward pushing the profile
of Left-wing figures. For example, the Apa dan Siapa column features I.R.
Surachman, 'Minister for the People's Irrigation'. At the time, Surachman was vice65 'Garis

Belakang: Waspada Yudha', Minggu Pagi, no. 20, 15 August 1995, pp.29-30.
Anderson and McVey, op.cit., p.
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chairman of the PNI.^^According to some sources Surachman was a clandestine PKI
operative within the PNI. He was the leader of the Left-PNI faction known by Rightwing elements, such as Hadisubeno, as PNI-Asu or 'PNI-dogs'. h is reported that
Surachman died in East Java during the time of the 'South Bhtar Affair' of 1968, in
effect ABRI's post-coup mopping up operations against PKI remnants in East Java,
(which was seen as evidence of his connection to the PKI). The 5 September edition
is even more brazenly pro-PKI. The featured person is Sudisman, head of the
national secretariat of the Central Committee of the PKI, a position he had held since
the PKI's post-Madiun Revolt re-organisation period. The article carefully explains
Sudisman's position in the PKI relative to other figures such as Aidit, Njoto and
Lukman.
Ideological themes connected to Sukarnoist ideology also predominate, for
example, 'The Principle of Self Sufficientiy has been adopted for a long time'.^^
Even the visit of 96 young artists from Kussudiardja, Yogyakarta, to a festival at the
Hotel Indonesia in Jakarta to celebrate the 38th anniversary of the founding of the
PNI, reported on 22 August and sponsored by the Diponegoro division of the TNI, is
an opportunity to expound NASAKOM, with a report that at the end of the
proceedings all delegates sang a round of NASAKOM bersatu or 'In NASAKOM
we are one'.
Likewise another Sukarnoist philosophy predominated, namely Gotong
Royong or 'Community Service', in this case organised by the Imogiri district
administration and the university of Gadjah Mada to promote village-based selfimprovement programs in line with Sukano's Berdikari self-sufficiency drive.

The

Sukamo speech of 26 August 1965 reproduced in the 12 September edition of
Minggu Pagi, entitled 'Build a People's Culture', is an explicitiy Marxist polemic
about contemporary Indonesian political culture. It comfortably quotes Marx and
Lenin and uses the example of the Russian Revolution as historical evidence of the
71

development of a distinctive revolutionary society in Indonesia.

^^The chairman was Ali Sastroamidjojo.
^^Sewundu, 'Princip Berdikari Sudah Lama Ditrapkan', Minggu Pagi, no. 22, 29 August 1965, pp.2526.
^^'Sendra Tari Soko Guru Revolusi', Minggu Pagi, no. 21, 22 August 1965, p.7.
™'Projek Besar Pemada: Semangat Kerdja Gotong Rojong Berdikari Dari Masjarakat Bisa
Dibanggakan', Minggu Pagi, no. 21, 22 August 1965, p.l 1.
^'Sukarno, 'Bangunkan Kebudajaan Rakyat, Pidato Bung Karno Didepan ULTA Ke 1 KSSR Dilstana
Negara 26 August 1965', Minggu Pagi, no. 24, 12 September 1965, pp.5-7.
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hi September 1965 this was not unusual. One month later, such a discussion
cannot be found in Minggu Pagi and would not be discussed again in any pubhc
foram until the resignation of Suharto in May 1998. The next issue, 19 September,
the editor warmly congratulates the citizens of the People's Republic of China on the
16th anniversary of the Chinese Revolution. Again, equal editorial time is devoted to
the Soviet Union and China, the Left and the Right, the TNI and the PKI.^^
In a bizarre twist, the very first editorial mention of the 30 September Coup
appears in the 26 September Minggu Pagi edition, ostensibly released before the
events occurred. However, in reality this edition was not released to newsstands until
the following week. The only reference to the coup appears in the editorial and must
therefore have been put in after most of the magazine had been formatted.
Distribution was obviolusy held over. Three editions, numbers 26, 27 and 28, appear
to have been released around the same time, or during the first week of October. A
brief explanation titied, 'Don't misunderstand', appears in the 10 October edition
under the critical editorial 'Report on the Facts' (of the 30 September Coup).^^
The mysterious editorial, which appears out of chronological order, is entitled
Hanjurkan Setiap Rintangan or 'Destroy Every Hindrance'. In this piece, the writer
makes light of the murder of the generals, thereafter known in the propaganda
discourse, as 'The Seven Heroes of the Revolution'. The article strongly indicates
that Sukarno had everything under control and that the 30 September Movement was
just part of the life of the Revolution. Astonishingly, the editorial referred to bodies
being found in a 'death well' (a reference to what would soon become know as
Lubang Buaya) but does not elaborate, indicating that the editorial was written after
the bodies were discovered on the late afternoon of 3 October (and disinterred the
following morning) but before the Right-wing ABRI propaganda machine had seized
upon the public relations significance of the story. The editorial goes on to flippantiy
suggest the following.

But we are not shy; we are not downcast. Because our Generals
whom we loved, will fortify our cadres, who are competent to
continue the work of the deceased. And our revolution must

'^Wonohito, 'Dirgahaju RRT!', Minggu Pagi, no. 25, 19 September 1965, p.2.
"Wonohito, 'Laporan Fakta-Fakta', and 'Djangan ada Salah Faham', Minggu Pagi, no. 28 to 29, 10
to 17 October. 1965, p.l.
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continue. The spirits of the Generals who were drawn away from our
ranks by members of the 30 September Movement, who were
precisely on command, precisely point-out and flnish the Revolution
under Bung Karno, our great revolutionary leader. ^"^

Nothing further about the coup appears in the 26 September edition and nothing at
all appears in the 3 October edition. Rather, the feature story concems the creator of
nc

Genjer Genjer.

h was very much business as usual. The syndicated 'Invisible

Govemment' series of articles about CIA conspiracy theory continues, with
particular reference to the CIA's involvement in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion of the
late 1950s.

There are also photographs of a performance by students of the

Akademi Musik Indonesia or 'Indonesian Academy of Music' preparing for a proNASAKOM production.''^ There is also the regularly reproduced Sukarno speech,
which is a proclamation to all foHowers of Marhaenism in Indonesia, which exhorts
both justice and perfection for the goals of self-sufficiency vis-a-vis the forces of
Imperialism.^^
As outlined, the comprehensive reporting of the coup per se breaks in the
combined October edition. The story dominates the editorial with calming calls for
7Q

'the facts of the situation'. File photographs of the murdered officers,

which

become the cliche images so prominent in the enduring propaganda campaign,
predominate. The file photograph of General Nasution's murdered daughter, Erma
Surjsani Nasution,^*^ featuring a caption that reads: "The sweet-faced five year old,
died by the dirty hands of the cradely self-proclaimed 30 September Movement",
appears. The careful promotion of the image of the murdered girl was to become,
according to van Langenberg and others, one of the most critical factors in

^Vonohito, 'Hantjurkan Setiap Rintangan', Minggu Pagi, no. 26, 26 September 1965, p.l.. "Tapi kita
•tidak ketjU hati, kita tidak putus asa. Sebab para Djenderal kita jang terjinta itu telah memupuk kadar
kadarjang tjakap menerusakan karya almarhum almarhum itu. Dan Revolusi kita djalan terus. Arwah
para Djenderal jang oleh orang orang Gerekan 30 September telah direnggutkan dari barisan kita
djustru menerintahkan, djustru menuntut: selasaikan Revolusi dibawah pimpinan Bung Karno
Pemimpin Besar Revolusi kita."
"Apa dan Siapa, 'Mohammad Arif, op.cit., pp.3 and 29.
^^David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, Minggu Pagi, no. 27, 3 October 1965, p.25.
Ibid., p.26.
^^Sukarno, 'Maklumat dari Bung Karno kepada Kaum Marhaen Indonesia', Minggu Pagi, no. 26, 3
October 1965, pp.9 and 11.
^''Pahlawan-Pahlawan Revolusi', Minggu Pagi, no. 28 to 29, 10 to 17 October 1965, p.2.
^'ibid., p.6.
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unleashing the anti-communist pogrom of mid-October 1965.^^ Significantiy, given
the rather lonely editorial of 26 September about the coup, at which time details of
Nasution's daughter would have been well known, it must be presumed that the
military propaganda machine was already in operation and the decision to use the
girl's image and circumstances of her death in the ensuing 'psych-war' had already
been taken.
Interestingly the theme of the teacher victim does not appear in either Minggu
Pagi or PRABA. Kenneth Orr's 'Schoohng and Village Politics in Central Java in the
time of turbulence'^^ presents a contrary picture of the real situation in DIY or
Centi"al Java. For instance, Orr's research in the village of Margosari in the
Kabupaten of Klaten,

revealed:

Most fateful for the future of the school was [that] increasing
politicising of the village population produced rifts ranning right
through the area between (in particular) PNI and PKI supporters.
Many of the teachers involved in the Taman Dewasa School at
Dororejo ahgned themselves, overtly, or covertly, with the communist
cause. Neither the Dororejo School nor its Margosari affiliate
survived the upheavals of the latter part of 1965.

Likewise, the specific report on Yogyakarta produced by the Centre for Village
Studies Gadjah Mada University, and reported in The Indonesian Killings, makes
some very specific observations about the organisation of various forces, communist
and anti-communist, in the Yogyakarta region. Again, neither Minggu Pagi nor
PRABA contain any material that may be cross-referenced with these sources or the
oral testimonies from Kidul.
Other themes not raised in these months are the activities of GERWANI or of
the role or attitudes of the Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX towards the coup, hi the case
of GERWANI, this is difficuh to explain because of the organisation's enthusiastic
^'vanLangtnheTg,'Gestapu and StateVowef, The Indonesian Killings, op.cit.,p.Al.
''Orr, 'Schooling and Village Politics in Central Java in the time of turbulence , The Indonesian
Killings, op.cit., pp.\l^-?>Q.
,
.._
^ „ „
'^This was one of a number of Kabupaten in Central Java that returned a vote of 50 per cent or more
for the PKI in the 1957 General Elections. See Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia,
op.cit., p.226.
'''Orr,o/7.aY.,p.l80.
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support for Sukarno, and reportedly high local profile, however one explanation
suggested by Wieringa was that by 1964-65, "everything revolved around Malaysia,
Imperialism and MANIPOL; peace and women's rights, so prominent in the 1950s,
had faded away".

Indeed the inclusion of a weekly 'girl Friday' gave the magazine

a sexist/patemalistic feel, popular with traditional male village-based readers.
The omission of references to the popular Sultan in late 1965 is a little more
difficult to explain. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX's strained relationship with
Sukamo over NASAKOM and the fact that the Sultan was supportive of liberal
KAMI students against the PKI from 25 October indicate that the Sultan may have
been omitted from Minggu Pagi before the 30 September Coup because he was not
'pro-Sukarno enough'. Following 1 October he may have been omitted because his
interests were not immediately aligned with the Suharto group.^^ These two areas, or
the question of GERWANI and the Sultan are suggested fields of further study,
beyond the scope of this thesis.
The central coup figure in Yogyakarta was a disgrantied Major Muljono,
87

whom Anderson and McVey describe as "a well-known

troublemaker".

Preliminary Analysis suggests that he attempted to convince Colonel Katamso to
accept the Untung proclamation and to convince the Yogyakarta Diponegoro
command to do likewise. Katamso was also in charge of training civilian volunteers
in the Yogyakarta area, of whom it is suggested a large proportion would have been
PKI or Left-PNI youth, and as chief of Yogyakarta's veteran's legion would have
been in control of a large number of disgrantied ex-revolutionaries.^^ In fact, he is
featured in this role in a Minggu Pagi article of 22 August.^^ Residents of Kidul
would have certainly participated in these activities, although no mention whatsoever
is made in interviews.
Muljono had both Katamso and a Colonel Sugijono arrested, throwing his
full weight behind the coup group in Semarang under Colonel Suherman, chief of
TNI intelligence for Central Java. At this time, PKI student groups in Yogyakarta
were persuaded by Muljono to seize the Yogyakarta government radio station, h is
reported that the group started to broadcast their support for the Untung coup from
'^Wieringa, op.cit., pp.230.
'^Suwarno, op.cit., pp.340-42.
'^Anderson and McVey, op.cit., p.47.
^^Ibid.
^'Garis Belakang, 'Waspada Yudha', Minggu Pagi, no. 21, 22 August 1965, p.l9.
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8pm on 1 October. The other significant event reported in Preliminary Analysis was
that Aidit and Omar Dani (the head of the hidonesian Air Force) landed at
Adisutjipto airfield, Yogyakarta, at 2am on 2 October. At this time, it is reported in
Preliminary Analysis that the PKI leader was driven to the house of Sutrisno, an
important local PKI leader. On the early morning of 2 October he left for Semarang.
Omar Dani is reported in Preliminary Analysis to have been convinced that the coup
group at Adisutjipto would remain calm, and left for Madiun. None of this intrigue is
reported in Minggu Pagi. None of it is recalled in the testimonies despite prompting
questions about details of the major local events of October 1965.
On Sunday evening the Jakarta-based army newspaper Berita Yudha fired the
first shots in what was to become a massive campaign to hound the PKI to
destmction.^^

The process of trying to win back the loyalty of individual units
continued unabated (between 1 and 3 October) in a silent straggle for
the psychological momentum, which would push a large mass of
hesitating soldiers one way or another. Evidently, by 7.30am on 2
October two key battalions, battalion C stationed near Yogyakarta,
and battalion L near Solo [Surakarta], had been won back by the
divisional commander.^^

In spite of this, the coup group remained in power in Yogyakarta until 4 October.
Anderson and McVey reported that the 2 October edition of Kedaulatan Rakyat, in
which a photograph and caption criticising Untung appears, was confiscated by
Muljono's 'bully boys'. However several thousand copies were reported to have hit
the newsstands in Yogyakarta.^^ Significantiy, this is the same story and photograph
to appear in Minggu Pagi a week later (as Minggu Pagi was and is still owned by
Kedaulatan Rakyat). Several large pro-Revolutionary Council (the Untung group)
demonstrations were reported in Yogyakarta on 4 October. While the PKI
organisational stracture in Yogyakarta was restrained from calling for further mass
action, PKI youth were not. In the meantime, Katamso and Sugijono were taken to

Anderson and McVey, op.cit., pp.53-55.
'^hbid., p.56.
'^^Ibid., p.47.
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Pakem near Kaliurang and killed. Again there is no evidence of this in sources
available to Kidul readers.
On 3 October the tide tumed against the coup group in Yogyakarta. On 5
October Surjosumpeno entered Yogyakarta. Shortly after this, encouraged by the
presence of the divisional commander, anti-communist youth began to sack PKI
buildings in Yogyakarta and the local violence began in earnest. None of this appears
in Minggu Pagi. Rather, dissemination of information was by eyewitness testimony,
by ramour or by the highly mediated writing found in the popular press. Minggu
Pagi tells an altogether different story, typified by huge silences in the story of what
happened in Yogyakarta in the critical days between 1 and 5 October 1965.
For example, the Minggu Pagi editorial, 'Destroy Every Hindrance', does not
mention the killings of the officers. Rather it leads with the Sukamoist slogan,
'Advance Forward, Never Retreat'.^^ On the very next page, the Apa dan Siapa
feature showcases the career of Inspector General Sutjipto Judodihardjo, the Minister
of Pangak, head of the police force and one time commander of the highly
influential and strategically important Brimob or 'Indonesian Police Force Mobile
Brigade', who was elevated to Inspector General of Police in the Sukarno ministry
during 1963. Brimob were aligned with the Left in 1965 (although not as Left as the
air force). Being appointed as Pangak, Sutjipto Judodihardjo was certainly 'Leftwing', or at least a Sukamoist and possibly even a crypto-communist. The article is
entirely devoted to a discussion about the importance and positive pervasiveness of
NASAKOM.^"^ Judodihardjo's strong public support for Conefo places the pohce
force within the NASAKOM orbit. It is likely that the editorial staff of Minggu Pagi
understood this and were playing the averages in terms of who would act to protect
the integrity of the Revolutionary Council in Yogyakarta, which was ostensibly
devoted to protecting Sukamo, the Revolution and NASAKOM. Judodihardjo even
made the comment that:

It is not only the army, air force and navy, but also the combined
police forces that must firmly adhere to the NASAKOM ideology.

'Vonohito, 'Hantjurkan Setiap Rintangan', Minggu Pagi, no. 26, 26 October 1965, p.2.
^"Apa dan Siapa, 'Insp. Djend. Sutjipto Judodihardjo', ibid., pp.3-4 and 29. "Orang Menteri itu
menjatakan dengan tegas, bahwa Conefo adalah NASAKOM International, dan bahkan adanja
NASAKOM ini maka Indonesia mendjadi kuat."
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because phobias are one of the causes of disintegration [of the
nation].^''

This article marks the end of the NASAKOM discourse in Minggu Pagi. On the eve
of the total collapse of the Yogyakarta Revolutionary Council and the destmction of
the NASAKOM ideology Minggu Pagi was still promoting a sense that nothing had
changed and that nothing would change. The next edition of Minggu Pagi is almost
surreal. This is the edition where there is no mention of the coup, the killings, or the
Revolutionary Council. The editorial page is temporarily converted to a birth column
thereby completely eliminating any opportunity for comment on developments.^^
As stated, news of the coup breaks in combined editions 10 to 17 October but
is restricted to plain narrative description, albeit consistent with the ABRI version of
events. The combining of editions is blamed on "interraptions to the supply of
electricity in Yogyakarta".

This is an incomplete clarification. A more reasonable

explanation is that this disraption was due to the turmoil associated with the murder
or arrest of PKI members working in the electricity department, or because the
Minggu Pagi editor needed time to ensure that his staff were positioned ideologically
on the winning side of the conflict, or both. This straggle is not commented on in any
article or editorial. It is at this point that Suharto makes his first brief post-coup
comments. It is here that he raises the key terms terlibat or 'involved', keamanan or
go

'security', and peristiwa or 'special occurrence'.

A number of these comments

appear opposite a photograph of Untung under arrest and in chains. The Yogyakarta
Revolutionary Council had been crashed by this time and the editor of Minggu Pagi
had decided that the Suharto group within the TNI, rather than the coup group,
including Brimob, the police, or the air force, was in control. The appearance of the
name of Major General Suharto, commander of KOSTRTAD, at this time is hardly
coincidental. Suharto's entry into the post-coup public discourse and public life are
important factors to consider and analyse.

'^Apa dan Siapa, 'Insp. Djend. Sutjipto Judodihardjo', op.cit., p.3. "Tidak hanja Angkatan Darat,
Angkatan Udara, Angkatan Laut, tetapi djuga Angkatan Kepolisian harus memegang teguh kepada
NASAKOM ini, karena phobi2an merupakan salah satu sebab daripada desintegrasi."
^^'Detik Lontjatan', ibid., p.2.
'"''Penerbitan Minggu Pagi terpaksa digabung nomornja selama 3 Minggu', Minggu Pagi, no. 28 to
29, 10 to 17 October 1965, p.5.
^^Peristiwa was also in general use before this time, for example, Peristiwa Madiun.
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From Bandung, guarded by ranks of tanks, he was taken to the
commander of KOSTRAD [Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat or
'Army Strategic Command'] Major-General Suharto last Tuesday,
who had been given orders by President to restore security. The
arrested revolution animal was taken to KOSTRAD headquarters in
casual drill outfit; he walked lamely with the right side of his face
badly swollen.^^

As soon as RRI were taken over, the commander of the Indonesian
army, Major-General Suharto widely emphasised that those [who]
participated in G30S/PKI were of the counter-Revolutionary side.
Commander of KOSTRAD, Major-General

Suharto, acting as

commander of the Indonesian army, said the situation was under
control and precautionary action taken.'°°

Major-General Suharto confirmed the President's statement that
AURI [Air Force] is not involved in G30S/PKI. However, he stated
that unquestionably there were some AURI personnel involved.
Major-General Suharto demanded AURI's sense of patriotism to
eliminate these opportunist personnel from AURI.'^'

The combined issues of 24 to 31 October mark a rapid transition between
NASAKOM and anti-communist ideology. Sections of the editorial are worth
reproducing because they show a desperate attempt to minimise the significance of
^''Pahlawan2 Revolusi', Minggu Pagi, op.cit., p.l. "Dari Bandunglah ia Selasa jang lalu dibawah
dengan panser jang berpuluh2 banjaknja untuk diserahkan kepada Pamglima Kostrad Majdjen
Suharto, jang telah ditugaskan oleh Presiden untuk mengembalikan keamanan sebagai semula.
Dapatkan ditambahkan, bawah 'ketus Hewan revolusi' jang telah dapan ditawan itu tiba di Markas
Besar Kostrad dengan mengenakan pakaian drill biasa; Halam keadaan pintjang dan mukania
merah-semaba di sebelah kanan. Dengan dikuasinja kembali RRI maka pimpinan AD dapat setjara
luas menegaskan bawah orang2 'Gerakan 30 September' adalah kontra revolusioner. Pimpinan AD
sementara dipegang oleh Major-Djenderal Suharto, Panglima Kostrad. Situasi telah dikuasai
kembali dan tindakan pengamanan giat dilakukan."
'''ibid., p.8. "Dengan dikuasainja kembali RRI maka pimpinan AD dapat setjara luas menegaskan
bawaa orang2 " gerakan 30 September" adalah kontra revolusioner. Pimpinan AD sementara
dipegang oleh Major-Djenderal Suharto, Panglima Kostrad. Situasi telah dikuasai kembali dan
tindakan pengamanan giat dilakukan".
"'ibid., p.36. "Major-Djenderal Suharto membenarkan utjapan Presiden, bawah AURI tidak terlibat
dalam 'Gerakan 30 September' tetapi menurut Major-Djenderal Suharto tidak mungkin peristiwa ini
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the coup and maximise a sense in which Sukamo was still in control. No mention
whatsoever is made of NASAKOM. This is significant if one considers the previous
edition, in which the ideology predominated. The omission is immediately
noticeable. Both the silence and the process of forgetting can be traced, at least in
terms of the text, to this point.

Bung Karno's calm, undisturbed and mindful actions in naming this,
as G-30-S should be an example for all of us to follow. We face every
negative consequence brought by those opportunists who tried to
betray our country, our nation and our Revolution. We overcame
every difficulty caused by the traitors of the Revolution with our
angry hearts, high revolutionary spirits, cool-headedly with a healthy
rationality. Bung Karno was able to stay calm. Stayed undisturbed.
He stayed mindful as he was aware of the basic line of our
Revolution, which is firm in its direction to establish the unified
nation, based on five talismans of the Indonesian Revolution, in
accordance with the aspirations of Indonesian people who were
strongly intent to accomplish AMPERA [solidarity with the suffering
of the common people]. It was the people, under Bung Karno's
command, who demolished PRRI/PERMESTA. Moreover, evidentiy
it will be the people, faithful to their great leader of the Indonesian
Revolution, which completely annihilated the G-30-S. What is the
evidence of this? Despite its mastermind's broad and complete
planning, the Revolutionary Council only survived for several hours.
Keep our faith in the progressive people power that will demolish
each and every single counter-revolution, even G-30-S with its tough
and immoral masterminds!
terlepas dari oknum2 AURI. Major-Djenderal Suharto mengutuk djiwa dan perasan patriot2 anggota
AURI supaja membersihkan AURI dari anggota2 petualang jang terlibat."
'"^Wonohito, 'Kontra-Revolusi Diganjang', Minggu Pagi, no. 30 to 31, 24 to 31 October 1965, p.2.
"Sikap tenang Presiden kita Bung Karno. Sikap tidak gugup. Sikap tidak kehilangan akal, dalam
menamakan dirinja G30S patutlah djadi tjonto bagi kita sekalian. Kita hadapi segala akibat buruk
jang ditimbulkan oleh petualang2 jang tjoba2 mengchianati Negara, Bangsa dan Revolusi. Kita atasi
segala kestalitan jang diakibatkan oleh pengchianat2 Revolusi, dengan hati jang panas, dengan
semangat jang meluap-luap, dengan kerevolusioneran jg tinggi, tapi dengan kepala jang tetap dingin,
dengan ratio jang tetap sehat. Bung Karno dapat tetap tenang. Tetap tidak gugup. Tetap tidak
kehilangan akal karena: beliau lihat garis pokok Revolusi kita jang sudah tegas arahnja, jaitu
mendirikan Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia, berlandaskan Lima Azimat Revolusi, seuai hasrat
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This edition is the last in which deputy editor and PKI member Bambang Sindu is
given editorial credit. He is arrested the second week of November along with most
senior PKI figures in Yogyakarta. This is also the edition in which the two murdered
Yogyakarta officers Katamso and Sugijono are publicly profiled. This report, entitied
'Heroes of the Revolution Katamso and Sugijono' follows the exact format of the
previous edition's reporting on the killing of the generals in Jakarta, ft also continues
the propaganda emanating from Jakarta, namely that anyone who died at the hands
of the coup plotters was therefore a 'Hero of the Revolution'. This is typified by
names, deeds and dates, and a complex narrative description of what was rapidly
becoming the official line. However, there are significant differences. In 'Helped by
the Paracommando', there is the first mention of implicit involvement of a PKI
member in the killings of Katamso and Sugijono.^°^ This is curious because the
connection between the PKI and the coup had already been cleariy made in Jakarta, a
week previously, particulariy within the ABRI newspaper Berita Yudha.^^^ The
special feature is fuU of incidentals such as the "jeep driven by plotters", and
"grieving relatives at the officer's funeral", complete with family photographs.
Finally, there is a description of tanks on patrol on the main street of Yogyakarta.'*^^
Consistent with this rapid cross-over between NASAKOM and anticommunism, these combined editions also carry the syndicated column on CIA
activities and the regular Sukarno speech, as well as a section featuring a new
Indonesian postage stamp featuring 'important people' such as Karl Marx.'°^ The
name Karl Marx, Marxism, or the name of the PKI is not mentioned again in Minggu
Pagi in anything but an unfavourable or pejorative sense for over three decades.
Within two issues the acronym G-30-S is linked for the first time with the letters
PKI, thereby formally connecting the two within the propaganda narrative.

Rakyat Indonesia jang sudah bertekad bulat untuk melaksanakan Ampera. PRRI/Permesta
dihantjurkan oleh Rakyat sendiri dibawah pimpinan Bung Karno. G-30-S pun pasti dimusnakan oleh
Rakyat sendiri jang setia kepada Pemimpin Besar Revolusinja. Buktinja ? Hanja berapa djam umur
'Dewan Revolusi', padahal dalang ulungnja telah membuat persiapan jg lengkap dan luas.
Pertjajalah kepada kekuatan Rakyat progresip revolusioner jg selalu menghantjur-luuuhkan tiap2
kontra-revolusi, sekalipun namanja G-30-S sekalipun dalangnja ulet ulung dan tidak bermoral."
'Pahlawan2 Revolusi Katamso & Sugijono', ibid., p.l.
'""Anderson and McVey note that by 4 October Berita Yudha carried photostats of the pro-coup
editorial in Harian Rakyat of 2 October together with selected items from other papers of the far-Left.
These photostats were later offered as the army's first 'proof of PKI involvement. Anderson and
McVey, op.cit., p.82.
'Pahlawan2 Revolusi Katamso & Sugijono', op.cit., pp.3-7.
"^'Orang-orang Besar Diatas Perangko', Minggu Pagi, no. 30 to 31, 24 to 31 October 1965, pp.31-32.
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hi terms of the text, the New Order narrative after editions 30-31 begins to
move quickly, hi edition 32 of 7 November 1965, Suharto is featured as "a general
who fights and makes war", and as "a sophisticated and cultured, but quiet man".'°^
h is here that the New Order propaganda narrative key word par excellence,
GESTAPU, is introduced by Suharto himself. The highly significant editorial by
Wonohito, with the name of Bambang Sindu conspicuously missing from the
magazine's credits, neatiy fits the propaganda momentum in declaring, 'Distracted
by the False Puppet Master' (a veiled reference to the PKI, or perhaps Sukamo). This
editorial marks a clear departure from previous attempts to maintain, or in fact
explain, the new anti-NASAKOM status quo and is the closest that Minggu Pagi
comes to explicitiy mentioning any level of violence in editorial, although, as the
following ti-anscript of Wonohito's editorial reveals, violence is explicitiy raised in
one-sided dispatch like reports from the Paracommando, evidence of the veracity of
other first hand reports that emerged in the historiography of the early 1970s.

The riots in Prambanan, Klaten, Boyolali, on the outskirts of the city
of Solo, all in the Surakarta region, showed the deep anger of these
ordinary people, who were the PKI's adherents. As we noted: they've
shown an inconceivable bmtality. Some of the G30S/PKI's victims
were murdered with their heads nailed with a railway spike. Others,
bmtally strack with a crow bar, died with a broken backbone.
Pregnant women were stabbed, killed with the baby all at once. Some
were buried neck down with the head remaining on the ground. It is
hard to believe that such bratalities [were] committed by these
Indonesian people, whose hospitahty was widely famous all over the
world. But these are indisputable facts. Facts that keep us wondering,
"Why do such things happen?" There must be reasons. There were,
indeed. These common, simple and innocent people who love their
freedom, their fatheriand and their leader Bung Kamo, were
heartlessly deceived. They were given misleading information that
Bung Karno was dead. 'The Council of Generals' kihed their beloved
leader with poisonous insecticide. The neo-coloniahsts Army have

107Apa

dan Siapa, 'Major-Djenderal Suharto', Minggu Pagi, no. 32, 7 November 1965, pp.3-4 and 29.
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already taken over this country. Therefore, the people must barricade
the main streets and sabotage the telephone installations. The coming
armies must be opposed. The people who love Bung Kamo are
getting angry. The people who loved their country and their freedom
are getting angry. The spirit of opposing the neo-colonialists flared up
- they barricaded the main streets, sabotaging telephone cables,
attacked the troops with bamboo spears and machetes. They attacked
Panzers with chopping knifes. As soon as they heard the tmth, they
were weighed down with remorse. They were misled. They were
trapped. Thus, based on such condition, the government's and
Indonesian armed force's 'psy-war' would be a determinative action.
Owing to the valid information given, these common, simple and
innocent people who love Bung Karno as the symbol of their unity as
well as that of Revolution begin to calm down and altogether they
build the power to crash 'Malaysia-Nekohm', as the end goal of the
Revolution. But the masterminds must be destroyed! ^°^

Issue number 32 of 7 November, the same edition that introduces and features the
person of Suharto, and a carefully worded text description of the official version of
'"^Wonohito, 'Dislewengkan Dalang Palsu', Minggu Pagi, no. 32, 7 November 1966, p.2.
"Gangguan2 keamanan di Prambanan, Klaten, Bojolali, pinggiran kota Sala - semuanja didaerah
Surakarta - menundjukkan emosi orang kebanjakan jang dijadi pengikut G-30-S telah bergedjolak
luar biasa sekali. Kita tjatat: mereka telah melakukan kekedjaman2 jg luar biasa. Diantara korban2
G30S didaerah itu ada kepalanja dipaku dg paku rel keretaapi. Ada jg patah punggungnja kena
pukulan linggis. Ada wantia hamil sedang mengemban baji ditusuk ibu dan anaknja sekali. Ada
orang2 jg ditanam hidup2, tubuh dibawah tanah, kepala menggeletak diatas tanah. Kita sukar dapat
pertjaja manusia Indonesia jang terkenal paling ramahtamah diseluruh dunia melakukan ke
kedjaman matjam itu. Tapifakta tidak diaantah. Maka setiap kita djadi bertanja: Apa sebab meraka2
itu dapat melakukan perbuatan jg luar biasa kedjamnja. Pasti ada sebabnja jg luar biasa. Memang
ada sebabnja jg luar biasa! Rakyat kebanjakan, rakyat sederhanajg djudjur rakyat berdjiwa murni jg
tjinta kemerdekaan, tjinta tanahair, tjinta Bung Karno, dikelabui habis-habiskan: Kepada mereka
ditjekokan: Bung Karno jg mereka tjinta sudah tidak ada lagi. Bung Karno jg tertjinta sudah tewas,
diratjun dg endrin oleh apa jang mereka mamakan 'Dewan Djenderal'. Tanahair sudah dikuasai oleh
tentera nekolim. Maka djalanraja harus dibarikade. Kawat telpon harus diputus. Tentera jg datang
harus ditawan. Rakjat jg tjinta Bung Karno djadi marah. Rakjat jang tjinta tanahair, tjinta
kemerdekaan, djadi marah. Semangat melawan nekolim meluap2 - maka mereka bikin barikade,
utuskan kawat telpon, tentera (TNI kita, pembatja) ditantang dg geranggang dan golok. Panser
diterdjang dg parang. Sesudah diberi penerangan jg sedjelas-djelasnja, mereka menjesalinja bukan
main. Mereka tersesat. Mereka terdjebak. Maka pada taraf sekarang ini operasi mental jg sedang
dilantjarkan oleh Pemerinta bersama-sama ABRI amat menentukan. Rakyat banjak, rakyat
sederhana, rakyat jg djiwanja murni itu, rakyat jg tjinta Bung Karno sbg lambang kesatuan dan
persatuan bangsa serta Revolusi, berkat penerangan jg tepat mulai kembali tenteram, kembali
bersama-sama menjusun kekuatan untuk mengganjang 'Malaysia-nekolim' utk menjelesaikan
Revolusi. Tapi dalanglnja harus disingkirkan."
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what happened on 30 September and 1 October, also marks the removal from
Minggu Pagi of all political cartoons (not just anti-hnperialist ones). Silences enter
the discourse at every level from the arrest of the communist deputy editor, to
complete omissions of the word NASAKOM, to altemations to the regular stamp
collecting feature, which in contiast to previous editions, makes no mention
whatsoever of stamps that contain communist figures, although this was presented as
an ongoing feature.'°^ There is no explanation or analysis of this fundamental change
in representation. Political knowledge profoundly becomes its previous opposite.
The regular feature on military training for civil defence, and the 'Crash Malaysia'
rhetoric, disappears. The magazine is filled with romantic short stories, general
fiction, advertisements and editorial concerning Javanese magic practices and beauty
or hair-care tips."° There is Suharto and the views of a particular faction of the
military, and then there is what can only be described as a-political popular culture,
devoid of progressive policy, ideas or ideology - metaphoric of most of the New
Order period, in effect the prototype of 'floating mass', the antithesis of Sukarnoist
polity, which was the only political reality even two weeks previously. This is to
continue in an unbroken discourse until 1998.
The next edition marks the textual expungment of the PKI by the editor
Wonohito and the elevation of the RPKAD as national heroes, in fact national
saviours. Again, there is no mention of the violence. There are no graphic violent
images portrayed. In the editorial 'Still Left-wing without the PKI', the Editor places
the blame squarely on the PKI for, in the reputed words of Sukamo, "setting back the
Indonesian Revolution eight years".

In an inaugural speech elevating the late Wolter Monginsidi as a
national hero, once again, the President strongly reminded us, "Our
Revolution is a Left-wing revolution". Therefore, the President very
much regretted that Leftists were pursued by the people. This warning
of the Great Leader of Revolution needs full attention when clearing
down to the roots of the G-30-S that was masterminded by PKI, we

'Sedjarah Perangko', ibid., pp.5-6.
"°'Apa Jang Anda Ketahui Tentang Rambut', Minggu Pagi, no. 32, 7 November 1965, pp.9-10;
'Lahirnya Sebuh Tjinta' pp.11-12; 'Problim Muda-Mudi Pembatasan Rasa Iri Hati', p. 14; 'Permainan
Perasaan', pp.16-18; 'Dewi Gajatri', pp.19-20; followed by travelogue about Nepal, East Timor, and
the marriage customs of the Dyaks, pp.24-30.
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will not just stop with only destroying the G-30-S, masterminded by
the PKI, but join in destioying every Leftist stream as well. If it does
happen, our Revolution will shift to the Right, and this does not match
the Message of the People's suffering, hi his speech. Bung Karno, the
Great Leader of Revolution, also clearly stated that the G-30-S should
be accursed for inflicting a loss upon our Revolution and set it back
eight years. Bung Karno also clarifled that he will take firm action
against PKI, which he said is pretending to be Leftist. The statement
made by our Great Leader of Revolution should become our guide in
our action in clearing away the G-30-S that was masterminded by
PKI. Do not deviate from our guidance. Don't overstep the bounds,
which have already been underscored by the Great Leader of
Revolution. Do not shift from the Five Talismans of Revolution.
Indonesian Socialism is Marxism, which can be applied specifically
to the real condition and situation in Indonesia, which we all already
agreed, and cannot ever be reduced even one per cent? Moreover, of
course, Indonesian Socialism is on the Left. I l l

The three editions of Minggu Pagi, numbers 33, 34 and 35, are crucial in the
development of an historical silence. These span the period of November 1965, when
most of the killings and arrests were occurring in DIY, including the arrests reported
in Kidul. These editions are dominated by a number of themes not directly related to
representations of the actual killings. The first is the New Order propaganda
message, the second the consequences of the coup as determined by the propaganda,
"'Wonohito, 'Tanpa PKI Tetap Kiri', Minggu Pagi, no. 33, 14 November 1966, p.2. "Dalam pidato
pengangkatan aim. Pahlawan Wolter Monginsidi, djadi Mahaputra, Presiden kembali peringatkan:
'Revolusi kita adalah Revolusi kiri'. Maka President sesakan ada pengedjaran terhadap jang kiri.
Peringatan Pemimpin Besar Revolusi ini harus djadi perhatian sepenuhnja, agar dalam menumpus
sampai keakar-akarnja G-30-S jang diddalangi oleh PKI itu, kita tidak kebablasan sehingga tidak
sadja menghantjurkan G-30-S jg didalangi oleh PKI tetapi ikut hantjurkan pula, setiap aliran jang
kiri. Apabila itu terjadi maka Revolusi kita djadi terbelokkan kekanan, dan itu tidak sesuai dengan
Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat. Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Bung Karno dalam pidatonja itu pun djelas
katakan: G-30-S adalah terkutuk, telah merugikan Revolusi kita, dan memendurkan Revolusi 8th
kebelakang. Bung Karno pun telah tegaskan bawah beliau akan ambit tindakan tegas terhadap PKI
jang dikatakannja ke-kiri-kirian. Pernjataan Pemimpin Besar Revolusi kita itu hendaknja djadi
pedoman bagi kita semua dalam tindakan kita mengikis habis G-30-S jang didalangi oleh PKI.
Djangan kita menjimpang dari pedoman itu. Djangan pula kita melampau batas2 jg sudah
digaraskan oleh Pemimpin Besar Revolusi Djangan kita bergeser dari Pantja Azimat Revolusi
Sosilisma Indonesia, jaitu Marxisme jang ditrapkan sesuai dengan situasi dan kondisi di Indonesia -
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the third is the role of the RPKAD and the reported appreciation of the people for
saving them from the menace of communism. Then there are new heroes, especially
military figures. These are substituted for Guided Democracy civilian heroes, such as
politicians, creators of songs and artists. Finally there are references to PKI members
voluntarily disbanding, or individual PKI leaders, now identified as traitorous
plotters, being systematically (but humanely) apprehended and incarcerated. There
are no exphcit references to the kiUings or the violence.
The Apa dan Siapa column, especiahy in numbers 33 and 35, now features
RPKAD senior field officers, with the Right-wing Islamic independence figure
Mongisidi (who died fighting the Dutch in South Sulawesi in 1949), featured in issue
number 34. By this time Minggu Pagi had assumed a completely marshal
complexion. Gone are the references to anti-Imperialism, solidarity with the world
communist movement and the Vietcong in South Vietnam, and references to
Sukamo (except obliquely in the editorials or through now meaningless speeches
about ephemeral issues such as 'capitahsm'). In edition number 33 the featured
soldier is Brigadier Surjosumpeno, head of the Central Java command of the
RPKAD who the article declares, "Broke the strategy of the 30 September
Communist plotters".^'^
This article is significant for a number of reasons. The first is that it elevates
the actions of the RPKAD to national significance as the saviours of 'the people'
from 'communist treachery'. Second, it uses euphemistic language that concentrates
on military operations such as movements of troops, keys figures, dates and times,
but does not mention executions, arrests or the actions of ANSOR, now trained and
directed in DIY, Central and East Java by the RPKAD. Finally this is the first time in
print that the acronyms 'G30S' and 'PKI' are combined as one phrase. This linking
of acronyms was to continue to the present, as if by combining the two the PKI had
become guilty by figurative association. There is no explanation in the text for this.
There is no analysis of what this means for ordinary people.
Edition number 33 continues with the personal testimony of General
Nasution, Kisah Pentjulikan Terhadap Djettd. Nasution or 'The Trae Account
According to General Nasution'. This concerns the events of the previous month,

jang sudah sama2 kita setudjui - tidak boleh 'dikurangi satu sen pun'. Dan sosialisma Indonesia itu
kiri."
"^Apa dan Siapa, 'Brigdjen Surjosumpeno', Minggu Pagi no. 33, 14 November, 1965, pp.3-5.
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including a description of the death of his daughter. Here, two pages are devoted to
the presentation of medals by RPKAD commander Colonel Sawo Edhie to
individual soldiers who assisted in crashing the Revolutionary Council in Central
Java, including in Yogyakarta, one Colonel Hardojo.^'^ This includes dishevelled
images of those considered responsible for the killing of General Yani and General
Nasution's daughter, which apart from leading one to suspect they have been
mistreated, makes them appear inhuman. This story completely eclipses the pallid
significance of the syndicated Sukarno speech, 'Capitalism is Proud of hself, which
is a general attack on capitalism with no reference whatsoever to current events.*'"^
Edition number 34, of 21 November leads with an editorial 'Public Opinion
without False Accusation'.''^ This is distinguished from previous anti-communist
diatiibes because there is a veiled, but no less desperate appeal for a retum to
'normal conditions'. It is at this time that the arrests and killings had reached the
proportions of a massacre. At this point the Editor of Minggu Pagi appeals for
restraint without compromising his pro-military and anti-communist credentials.
Ironically this approach is an early example of the friction that would occur after the
1971 Election between the New Order military apparatus and their one-time liberal
democratic supporters, who soon found, as the Minggu Pagi editor appeared to have
realised in November 1965, that the military had an agenda to completely annihilate
the PKI by orchestrating the massacres, and that their intentions in doing so were not
to establish liberal democracy but military authoritarianism.

The special occurrence of 30 September 1965 has taken the form of a
death knell for an era, which is an era both peculiar and strange where
the views of the public were unhealthy. Up to 30 September 1965
public opinion has not been normal, rather, abnormal. At that time
things [sic] which are impolite, or a difference of opinion that didn't
benefit the commies. If someone is cold hearted, not in enmity
towards the commies, those people were already branded as
communist phobics. Those with communist phobia are thus counterRevolutionary. Counter-Revolutionaries must be wiped from any

113

Ibid.
"'^Sukarno, 'Kapitalis Banga Sendiri?', ibid., p.6.
"^'Public Opinion, Tanpa Antjaman', Minggu Pagi, no. 34, 21 November, p.2.
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relationship with us. The result had to be: every person must strive to
speak sweetiy about the commies. Moreover they had to embrace the
commies and not socially condemn them, so that they were not cursed
by society, which was blind with love towards the commies. Thank
God the special occurrence of 30 September 1965 G-30-S, which
clearly was caused by the PKI and then mass base support
organisations, has brought them all down. No more should people feel
terrified by threats of social condemnation and cursed by society.
Hopefully we can continue to live prosperously with our public
views, which are healthy, fair, just and Revolutionary. 116

An article of the same Minggu Pagi edition, (reproduced and referenced from the
Jakarta-based newspaper Sinar Harapan) entitied 'The Hot Coals Burst into Flames
117

in Solo (Surakarta)',

is conspicuous by its harsh, almost ranting quotations from

key RPKAD figures. This article is characterised by an uncompromising tone, by the
use of key elements of the propaganda message and by the use of a photograph of the
Sultan of Yogyakarta (the only time the Sultan appears or is mentioned in the entire
Minggu Pagi texts from August to November 1965). In the picture, the Sultan is seen
laying a wreath at the grave of the two anti-communist officers killed in Yogyakarta.
This symbolically places the Sultan firmly within the anti-communist camp but
outside any guilt by association with the actions of the RPKAD. This is achieved by
omitting any text description of why the Sultan was paying his respects. Rather, the
article is about events outside Yogyakarta, specifically Surakarta and surrounds.

"^Vonohito, 'Public Opinion Tanpa Antjaman', Minggu Pagi no. 34, 21 November 1965, p.2.
"Peristiwa 30 September 1965 merupakan lontjeng kematian bagi suatu djangkawaktu jang lutju dan
aneh, jaitu suatu djangkawaktu dimana pendapat umum tidak sehat. Sampai 30 September 1965
pendapat umum tidak normal, melainkan abnormal Pada waktu itu adalah tidak sopan, adalah suatu
kedjatakan pendapat jang tidak menguntungkan KOM. Apabila seseorang bersikap dingin sadja,
tidak bermusuhanH Terhadap Kom, orang itu sudah ditjap Komunisto-phobi Komunisto-phobi dus
contra-revolusioner. Kontra-revolusioner, dus harus disingkirkan dari pergaulan hidup kita.
Akibatnja: setiap orang berusaha bitjara semanis-manisnja tentang Kom. Malah berusaha rangkulrangkulan dg Kom, jaitu: agar tidak socially condemned, agar tidak dikutuk oleh masjarakat jg
sedang tjinta-buta terhadap KOM. Alhamdulilah peristiwa 30 September G-30-S jang terang
didalangi oleh PKI dan ormas2nja, mengachiri semuanja itu. Tidak ada lagi orang jang berasa
ditakut-takuti oleh antjaman social condemmation, kutukan oleh masjarakat. Semoga selandjutnja
dapat hidup subur pendapat umum jang sehat jang wadjar, jang djudjur, jang Revolusioner."
"^'Bara meletup dikota Bengawan', Minggu Pagi reproduced from Sinar Harapn, no. 34, 21
November 1965, pp.9-11.
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The article sets up a convenient 'other', drawing on long-held rivalries
between the royal courts of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. h-onically the use of the
symbol of the Sultan, without captions, commentary or analysis, and apparentiy
without soliciting the Sultan's views, becomes the manner in which the figure of the
Sultan later becomes an important element of Suharto government legitimacy. The
article is further made conspicuous by the use of euphemistic language such as 'The
RPKAD Cleared out Striking Railways Workers in Balapan' (the same strike
referred to in testimony by Rahman in the previous chapter). The Paracommando
Colonel Sawo Edhie is quoted as saying that whoever helps the counter
revolutionaries will be treated in the same way as the G30S plotters."^ (Although it
does not specify what this treatment will be, in 1997 a number of people in Kidul
were well able to confirm what this was intended to mean.)
The Sinar Harapan headline also stated, 'One by one, as PKI Coup Plotters
are Identified, they Voluntarily Renounce their Membership of the PKI'."^ This
article raises the allegation of the existence of PKI black lists and makes the direct
connection between the actions of Leftist leader Musso at Madiun in 1948 and the
actions of the PKI in the 30 September Coup.'^*^ (Ironically Rahman's testimony, and
this story, provides more evidence for the existence of anti-communist 'black lists'
and challages the myth of communist intentions to systematically murder their
opponents.)
The magazine now shows an extraordinary interest in 'the GERWANI
women', completely omitted in pre-coup editions. The magazine devotes
considerable editorial attention to a paternalistic discussion of 'how to be a good
wife'. The political objectives of GERWANI are utterly silenced.'^' The same
edition also draws special attention to the military preparedness of the youth wing of
the PKI, as trained, in uniform and allegedly carrying weapons. The article states
"the non-communists in areas like Prambanan and Salatiga were ready for them [the
PKI and Pemuda Rakyat]".^^^ The article is still inconsistent with the previously
diplomatic character of Minggu Pagi, and in all likelihood is something drafted by
the mihtary, as it begins the process of justifying the actions of the RPKAD in

'"Ibid.
'"Ibid.
'''Ibid.
'"Ibid.
"'Ibid.
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Klaten and Prambanan and uses atypical language more suited to military reports
than popular joumalism.

The burning down, devastation, and kidnapping were obviously not
those of knightiy deeds. Playing 'tough guy' would only worsen the
situation, which, in fact, called for a peaceful condition to achieve the
goal. Had not the Great Commander of Indonesian Revolution
commanded: Calm down! Calm down! Calm down!^^^

The same edition contains a significant follow up article, Tak Yani tortured in spite
of being powerless [to resist]'.'^"^ This is written in a similar style to the Sinar
Harapan article reproduced above. It concentrates on demonising PKI members. It
not only describes the torture of General Yani, but also identifies the torturer, one
'Memed'. It then 'reconstmcts' a dialogue from the early hours of the morning of 1
October 1965. This is not based on transcripts but is rather a work of fiction. At this
point several new themes enter the rapidly expanding terms of the propaganda
message. The first is the physical location of the Lubang Buaya well and its
dedication to the 'Seven Heroes of the Revolution'. The second is the concocted
account of torture and the well-publicised outrage of Muslim groups to the reported
castration and mutilation of, in particular, General Yani. The sub-text of the article
reads, 'To Bear Witness in the Field of Jihad is the Heart's Desire of every
Muslim'.'^^ This is a general theological discussion about whether Muslims should
take revenge on those responsible for the torture of innocents. The article does,
however, paradoxically remind Muslims of their obhgation to be just, as below.

Motto: Be afraid of God wherever you are and accompany all your
bad deeds with the goodness and that will rehabilitate you. Therefore
1 Oft

associate with all people in a good way - Hadis.

"^Ibid., p.9. "Jg terang, pembakaran dan pengrusakan serta pentjulikan bukanlah satu pertjulikan
bisa disebut ksatria. Sok djagoan sama sekali malahan merunjamkan suasana jang sesengguhnja
membutuhkan ketenangan segara untuk dapat menggaruk ikannja setepat2nja. Bukankah Pemimpin
Besar Revolusi telah mengomandokan: Tenang! Tenang! Tenang!"
'^"'Yani disiksa meski sudah tak berdaja', Minggu Pagi no. 33, 21 November 1965, pp.21-23.
'^^'Sjahid Dimedan Djihad Idaman Hati Setiap Muslim', ibid., p.23.
'^^Djani Eva Marhaeny, 'Sjahid Dimedan Djihsd Hati Setisap Muslim', Minggu Pagi no. 34, 21
November 1965, p.23. "Motto: Takutlah kepada Tuhan dimana sadja engkau berada dan iringilah
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However, the tone of the article indicates that, in spite of this exhortation by the
Prophet Muhammad, the actions of the plotters are a special case requiring a
particular response. The final rejoinder is opened-ended and consistent with the use
of euphemistic language through the period, h concludes:

Crasade is the heart's desire of every Mushm who considers it better
to die shedding hero's blood, than merely hving on top of dirty
skeletons without meaning, as is the case with the newly imperialist
forces and GESTAPU together with their many forms and subversive
actions within and without the nation.'^^

The next page features the manifesto of the Front Kebudayaan Revolusioner, a
Right-wing group of artists and intellectuals, led by the ASRI painter Herjana
Iskandar, who is featured in an article on the previous page entitled 'Painter and
Faithful Muslim: Herjana Iskandar', and who, it appears, had emerged post-30
September from the shadow of the institution's strong LEKRA influence. Juxtaposed
with the facing page, which contains a child's drawing of General Nasution's
murdered daughter, are the words to the [by now] popular, and highly emotive song,
written to honour the child's memory, namely, Bisikan Adit Irma Surjani Nasution.
The contrast between this song and its propaganda function and Genjer Genjer,
which appeared only four editions previously, with its political message of
egalitarianism, is remarkable. Even the differences between songs are evidence of a
sudden and disorientating change in political realities. There are no coincidences in
the placement of the song, the child's image, and the exhortation to avenge the blood
of innocents.

Why did you shoot me?
I didn't hurt you
I only loved mummy and daddy
What sin is that?
setiap keburukanmu dengan kebaikan jang akan merehabilitirmu, dalam pada itu pergaulilah
segenap manusia dengan tjarajang baik - Hadis."
Ibid. "Djihad adalah kiaman hati setiap Muslim jang menganggap lebih baik gugur meneteskan
darah kepahlawanan daripada sekedar hidup diatas kerangka badan kasar tanpa arti sebagaimana
halnja nekolim dan Gestapu beserta anek2 dan aksi2 subversinja diluar maupun didalam negeri"
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Why did you cut off my life so abraptiy?
I had only just learnt to form the letters 'a' and 'u'
I had only just begun to play with my dolls
And was waiting for my next birthday
I feel pity towards you
I was just a tool of the catastrophe
Who was your puppeteer?
Hey! Mastermind, reflect on your actions!
Sooner or later you are going to have to face your God
And you wiU not be able to deny your guilt! !^^^

While issue number 35 formalises the main elements of the anti-communist
propaganda narrative, issue number 35, of 28 November 1965, marks the complete
transformation of Minggu Pagi from Sukamoist, socialist, civilian and proNASAKOM to Right-wing, militaristic and anti-communist. The magazine is almost
completely dominated with pro-RPKAD stories. The editorial sets the tone for a
discussion of the complete collapse of communism in Indonesia with the editor's
comments that, "a commitment is a commitment ... but as far as a genuine
1 2Q

commitment to reject communism, the proof is in the pudding ... ".
In many places the PKI is voluntarily disbanding. Those who are
disbanding only await its moment. Even so the disbanding of PKI
members doesn't mean that we the people who are progressive
revolutionaries ourselves, who are faithful to the ideology of
"^Bisakan Adik Irma Surjani Nasution published in Minggu Pagi (with an acknowledgement from
Kompas), no. 34, 21 November 1965, p.27.
Kenapa kau tembak tubuku?
Aku tak bersalah padamu
Aku hanja tjinta pada Ibu dan Bapaku
Itukah dosaku ?
Kenapa kau sampai hati memotong hidupku?
Aku baru beladjar hurufa dan hurufu
Aku baru main-main dengan bonekaku
Aku menunggu hari ulan-tahunku
Aku kasihan padamu
Kau hanja alat belaka
Siapa dalangman?
Hai dalang, renungkanlah lakumu!
Kelak kau toh akan menghadap Tuhanmu jang kau ungkirU!
'^Vonohito, 'Tetap Siap Siaga', Minggu Pagi no. 35, 28 November 1965, p.2.
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Pancasila, together with the Revolution and obedient to the Great
Leader of the Revolution Comrade Sukamo, may bungle the
disbanding of the PKI so that it is only on paper [i.e. not in reality].'^°

The Apa dan Siapa column again features RPKAD officers, in this instance
concentrating on movements of troops in Central Java. Moreover, as stated, the style
and content of the writing dramatically changes from popular descriptive prose to
short military-like dispatches typified by blunt, single paragraph statements. This
column extends over three pages. One significant difference between this and
previous joumalism is that there are actual references to the killings; however, as far
as these dispatches are concerned the only killings being committed are by coup
plotters, especially the PKI and named affiliate organisations.

The people of Nas-A, the progressive and revolutionary people, were
very happy. They felt protected: they felt secure. They were no longer
terrorised by PKI.

RPKAD's personnel carriers and tanks marched in a procession
around the city. A mass crowd trailed behind. They burst into
applause. They yelled.
As dusk approached on the next day, RPKAD found 14 bodies of G30-S/PKI's victims in Putat, on the banks of the Bengawan River.

Yet, soon afterwards the RPKAD attacked and killed a track full of
Pemuda Rakyat, some of whom were caught holding bloodstained
daggers.
They were the slayers, who slaughtered and murdered those 14
members of Marhaen, Islamic and Catholic Youth by G-30-S/PKI on
'^'ibid. "Dibanjak tempat PKI membubarkan diri! Pembuburan keseluruhannja rasanja tinggal
tunggu saat sadja. Namun pembubaran PKI itu tidak berati bawah kita rakjat progresiprevolusioner, jg setia kepada Pantja Sila serta Revolusi dan ta'at kepada Pemimpin Besar Revolusi
Bung Karno, sudah boleh ongkang2 Pembubaran PKI itu memang bisa djadi kenjafan diatas kertas.
Tapi masih harus djadi kenjataan dim perbuatan."
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the banks of Bengawan. RPKAD had already known: the PKI is the
mastermind,

whereas

CGMI,

Pemuda

Rakyat,

SOBSI, BTI,

BAPERKI, and PERHIMI took part as the PKI's henchmen.'"^'

This report is followed by a feature entitled: 'Wherever the Local PKI are, They are
Voluntarily Disbanding'.'^^ Three photographs accompany the article. The first is of
a large group of farmers sitting in the sun listening attentively to a speech. The
second, a group of women and children standing to attention, and the third three
senior PKI figures, the middle figure identified in the caption as 'Harsono' (then
third in charge of the PKI in Yogyakarta, the first and second in command having
already been reported by expatriate sources in Holland as executed near the
Prambanan temple complex).^^^ The story describes the collapse (in this case
portrayed as voluntary), of the PKI in Yogyakarta. No explanation is given for the
absence of senior PKI figures. No analysis is offered as to why this has taken place.
The next article outlines the circumstances surrounding the arrest of a senior
PKI figure in Prambanan. The article entitied, 'General Djojudo Arrested: The Brain
of the Coup in Prambanan: A Frequent Guest of Aidit','•^'^ shows the family of
Djojudo, identified only as 'The brain' under arrest. Djojudo's daughters are
identified as 'GERWANI'. The women's dresses are pulled up in the photo. This
makes them look like prostitutes. The article accuses a number of people associated
with Djojudo with the murder of specific figures in the Prambanan area. The single
picture of Djojudo under armed guard looks crael and uncompromising. The article
only refers to coup plotters committing the killing. There is no mention of the
mistreatment of communists. Indeed, the caption under the picture of the 'captured
'^''Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, Sehari-hari Dikenal Dengan Nama RPKAD', Minggu
Pagi no. 35, 28 November 1965, pp.3-4 and 29. "Rakjat Nas-A, rakyat progresip revolusioner
girangnja setengah mati Berasa mendapat perlindungan: Berasa dirinja aman. Tidak bakal djadi
korban kekedjaman G-30-S/PK1."
"RPKAD membariskan pasukan panser dan tank keliling Kota. Rakjat nginthU dibelakangnja.
Bersorak-sorak. Berteriak-teriak-teriak."
"Mendjelang matahari terbit esok paginja RPKAD mendapatkan 14 majat korban G-30-S/PKI di
Putat, pinggir Bengawan."
"Tapi segera pula RPKAD dapat mentjintjang satu truk penuh Pemuda Rakjat ada jg bawa pisau
masih beriumuran darah. Mereka algodjonja. Mereka jang mentjintjang dan membunuh 14 pemuda
Marhaen, Islam dan Katholikjang diketemukan ditepi Bengawan itu."
"RPKAD memang sudah tahu: dalang pengatjau ialah PKI, CGMI Pemuda Rakjat, Sobsi BTI,
Baperki Perhimi adalah antek2nia."
132

'Dimana-man PKI Setempat Bubarkan Diri', ibid., p.8.
1-3-3

*

"Confidential interview. The Netherlands, November 2000.
'•'"'Djendral Djojudo dibekuk: Otak G30S di Prambanan: Kerapkali Ketamuan Aidit', ibid., p.22.
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family' indicates that it was "taken while in custody, in a safe place".'^^ The single
oblique reference to the person of Aidit in the title, by this time already dead, is the
only reference to him. Aidit has gone from being a respected figure of national
significance under the patronage of Sukarno and NASAKOM, to a persona non
grata, all within a period of less than one month.
The final article in Minggu Pagi under consideration, edition number 35, the
same edition featuring the uniform clad actresses with soldiers of the RPKAD,
symbolically states, 'The People of Yogyakarta Provide Hospitality to ABRF. The
story outlines the enthusiastic acceptance of the people of Yogyakarta for the TNI,
including one description found on a street banner that read, 'All the Best for the
Straggle: [against the PKI] Our Heroes'. As far as the readers of Minggu Pagi were
concerned, the process of New-Order-isation was complete. There was now no other
reality except that the PKI had been demonised, their leaders killed, disappeared or
in prison, their deeds, policies and achievements forgotten, their patronage by
Sukamo brashed aside, and their place in history, or for that matter their violent
destraction, silenced. "
Many of the issues covered in Minggu Pagi have an overlap in PRABA,
however there are a number of significant differences. These are based primarily on
the fact that PRABA was a less enthusiastic supporter of NASAKOM. The difference
between the two publications in the period immediately after 30 September is that
PRABA was more academic in its response to the fortunes of Sukarno and the PKI,
and that it became critical of Guided Democracy polity before Minggu Pagi
experienced the same fundamental editorial transition. For example, in editions 3233 from the period 15 to 25 November 1965, the headline story in PRABA is
dedicated to the person of Aidit. The headline reads 'Aidit is Captured/Arrested in
Kartasura, (Central Java) but where is he?''^^ The critical tone of the article would
have been unthinkable prior to September 1965. It would have attracted a change of
'communist phobia' from Sukamo and perhaps even banning under the gathering
hegemony of the PKI. What is missing from PRABA, however, are the more emotive

"'Ibid.
'^^'Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat, Sehari-hari Dikenal Dengan Nama RPKAD', Minggu
Pagi no. 35, 28 November 1965, pp.3-4 and 29.
'^^'Dia Terangkap di Kartasura: Menko Aidit Dimana', PRABA, no. 32 to 33, 15 to 25 November
1965, p.l.
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references to the Lubang Buaya events, the death of General Nasution's daughter,
and so on.
hi the first post-coup edition of PRABA (also combined as with Minggu Pagi
because of 'disturbances to the electricity supply') Sukamo's brief response to the
coup is reproduced in full.

My dear fellows, on my command as Commander in Chief of
Indonesian

Armed

Forces, Great

Commander

of

Indonesian

Revolution as it was announced on 1 October 1965, and in order to
sweep the public's uncertainties away, yet again I clearly affirm that I
am in good health, and remain the leader of our country and the
Govemment of Republic of hidonesia. Today, 2 October 1965, I sent
for all the Commanders of Indonesian Armed Forces along with Vice
Prime Minister II Dr. Leimena and all other high office holders, with
the intention that there would be a clarification of this special
occurrence of 30 September action. I have given commands to
preserve the undisturbed and orderly situation straight away.
Therefore, it is very cracial to prevent any gunfight in this current
stage of our straggle.'''^

The same edition, however, contains a typically accommodating feature, 'Ministers
of NASAKOM in Salatiga, the City of NASAKOM', which states that: "[B]ecause
almost all of the city leaders in Salatiga were communists, it was appropriate that in
the spirit of NASAKOM that Cathohc Priests in Salatiga be pro-NASAKOM".'^^
The article seems to be aimed indirectly at the actions of the anti-communist Front

Presiden Minggu Ini', PRABA, no. 27 to 28, 25 September to 5 October 1965, p.l. "Saudara2
Sekalian, mengenai perintah saja sebagai Presiden Tertinggi ABRI/Pemimpin Besar Revolusi jang
telah diumumkan pada tangal 1 Oktober 1965, dan untuk menghilangkan semua keraguraguan
dikalsangan rakjat, maka dengan ini saja sekali lagi menjagang, bawah saja dalam keadaan sehat
walqfiat, dan tetap memerang tampuk pimpinan Negara dan tampuk piminan pemerintahan Republic
Indonesia. Pada hari ini 2 October 1965 saja telah memanggil semua Panglima2 Angakatan
Bersendjata bersama wakil P.M. II Dr. Leimena dan para pedjabat penting lainnja, dengan maksud
untuk segara menjelaskan apa jang disebut peristiwa 30 September. Untuk dapat menjelesaikan
peristiwa ini, saja telah perintahkan supaja segara ditjiptakan satu suasana jang tenang dan tertib.
Dan untuk itu perlu dihindarkan bentrokan dengan sendjata dalam tingkatan-perdjoangan bangsa
Indonesia sekarang ini."
'^'Djoko Djarot, 'Pastor NASAKOM is Salitiga Kota NASAKOM', PRABA, no. 27 to 28, 25
September to 5 October 1965, pp.8-9.

217

Katolik, who would feature in the anti-communist violence reported in Kidul.'^°
Again, the tone of the article is ostensibly pro-Sukarno and pro-NASAKOM. There
is no mention of the coup or its implications for Salatiga. There is no reference to the
violence.
The combined 15 to 25 October 1965 editions of PRABA starts, as
mentioned, with a Sukarno speech made after the Madiun Revolt in 1948, but then
incorporates a more measured Sukarno response to alleged PKI culpability in the
coup and its political aftermath. The following two editions distinguish PRABA from
Minggu Pagi in that there is a careful analytical response to the political person of
PKI chairman Aidit and GERWANI. This was absent in Minggu Pagi. This attempts
to rationally argue the demise of both organisations. Edition number 31 of 5
November 1965 is entitled Menko D.N Aidit Dimanal or 'Where is Minister D.N.
Aidit?' This headline had been hand printed into the text as an apparent afterthought.
Across the top of this edition, obtained from the Yogyakarta Central Municipal
Library, is written the graffiti, Gembung PKI or 'Blow-up the PIQ'.'"^' Issue number
36 from the 25 December does not lead with the anticipated Christmas address, but
rather with an extensive critique of GERWANI as an alleged anti-moral force in
Indonesian society. The article Gerwanisme atau Moral Komunis or 'GERWANIism or Moral Communism' appears to have been written in response to a December
street protest in Jakarta.'"^^ It calls for the banning of GERWANI and a reassessment
of general moral behaviour in the light of allegations about the direct involvement of
GERWANI women in the coup.'^^
An examination of both Minggu Pagi and PRABA reveal one overwhelming
theme, namely, by early December 1965 what ordinary readers in Kidul knew, was
that the world they had known before September 1965 no longer existed.
Furthermore, the two magazines indicate that their new mlers conveyed an
unambiguous message to ordinary people. This was that communism fully deserved
the censure that flowed from the people's moral indignation over the coup. In this
way, not only would the organisational stracture of the PKI be destroyed but also the
pohtical and ideological underpinnings that gave it currency.

'''^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, October 1997.
""'Menko D.N. Aidit Dimana', PRABA, no. 31, 5 November 1965, p.l.
'^'"Berberapa waktu jang lalu berpuluh-puluh ibu di Djarkarta berdemonstrasi memrotes tindakan
rentjana Gestapu."
"'^'Gerwanisme atau Moral Kommunis', PRABA, no. 36, 25 December 1965, pp.1 and 8-9.
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This chapter has revealed that contemporary journalistic representations were
focused almost entirely on managing possible untoward consequences, rather than on
participation in the generation of historical knowledge, hi the case of Minggu Pagi,
there was a continuum of crisis and response based on the imperative of survival,
rather than on a need to openly analyse events as they unfolded. The success of the
TNI's propaganda, the sudden, profound, and unexpected collapse of Sukamoist
political and social realities, meant that a silence was created at the very point of fact
creation. The result was that as with Marcel Ophuls's The Sorrow and the Pity, life
in BCidul, like life in Clermont-Ferrand, assumed a strange ordinary-ness, as the
memory of the violence quickly became less relevant than the necessities of avoiding
the attention of the authorities. This is illustrated by a question in a crossword puzzle
from the 28 November 1965 edition of Minggu Pagi that asks, 'What was
masterminded by the PKI?' The answer pencilled in by an anonymous hand correctiy
answers, 'GESTAPU'.'"^ There is something disturbingly pedestrian about this.
Editions of Minggu Pagi and PRABA from late 1965 show that readers were
not presented with a comprehensive reporting of facts, but were only permitted to
participate within the terms set by the power to create a new form of popular
knowledge, namely the social and political context of anti-communism. Eliminating
most of the story of what happened and why and then superimposing a new story
over a well-established system of political consciousness, determined the conditions
by which one type of knowledge or tmth would emerge at the expense of another,
and it privileged propaganda and myth as eminently more legitimate than altemative
histories, which ironically, were claimed to engender the same sort of social conflict
that ABRI said typified the activities of the PKI.
The next chapter will demonstrate that forgetting the killings of 1965 was not
only about the New Order's power to create new political terms of reference in a
popular foram, or the ability to neutialise or manipulate alternative accounts at the
beginning of the historical continuum, ft was also about the ability to sustain a
propaganda narrative by creating new historical guides to acceptable remembering.

144

Minggu Pagi, no. 35, 28 November 1965, p.28.
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Chapter Six
Historiographical Templates:
The Yogya Kembali JMonument
To sustain the silence established in the months of October to December 1965
required the complete restracturing of Indonesian historiography. This chapter
examines the way in which the New Order created a guide to remembering, in fact a
memory template, which normalised the key aspects of anti-communism into a new
body of official historiography. The role of Suharto in this process was pre-eminent.
New stories about Indonesia's second President were an essential part of a well-coordinated and systematic campaign to prevent the emergence of alternative histories
of the coup, and to ensure that the killings remained silenced.
Located in the village of Sariharjo, the Monumen Yogya Kembali or 'Retum to
Yogyakarta Monument' is positioned six kilometres from the Kraton of Yogyakarta,
along a ring road that links the ancient temples of Borobudur and Prambanan with the
district of Klaten. In 1965 this area was mentioned briefly in Minggu Pagi as a place
where killings actually took place.' President Suharto inaugurated the monument
complex on 6 July 1989, some 18 years after the election that formally installed his
New Order govemment and 24 years after the worst of the killings of late 1965. The
Yogya Kembali Monument celebrates two events. The first is the 1 March 1949
Serangan Umum or 'General Attack' by Republican forces on the then Dutch held
city of Yogyakarta. The second date, and ostensibly the reason the monument was
commissioned in 1985, was actually of considerably less interest to the New Order
regime. This celebrates the withdrawal of Dutch forces from their occupation of
Yogyakarta on 29 June 1949 and the return of the nationalist army, the next day, 30
June 1949 (but not General Sudirman himself who was suspicious of Dutch
intentions; he did not re-appear in Yogyakarta until 10 July). This however is not
simply a case of competing dates. The Yogya Kembali Monument actually
appropriated many of the themes celebrated in a pre-existing festival, held unofficially
by former guerrilla fighters and university students in 1957 and 1958,^ as part of a

Djendra Djojudo Dibekuk: Otak G-30-S Di Prambanan, Kerapkali Ketamuan Adit', Minggu Pagi no.
5, 28 November 1965, p.22.
p.2
35,
Meski Ditawari Mahkota
Mahkoti 'Kaiser Jawa' Sir Sultan Tetap Berjuang untuk Republic', Kedaulatan
-'Meski
Rakyat, 25'i\xr\Q 1991, p.l.
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campaign to promote the 1 March story as a celebration of Suharto's pivotal role in
both the Revolution and in 1965.^
Also known as Yogya Kembali, the festival was re-launched by General Ali
Moertopo, a powerful Suharto lieutenant and Minister for Information, together with
Suhan Hamengkubuwono DC, Govemor of DIY, in a lavish ceremony that lasted three
days from 29 June to 1 July 1981. This celebration was intended to mark the reenactment of the original seven month, 1009 km joumey called 'The Advance
Guerrilla Trail', which was then re-traced annually from 1983 by trainee soldiers and
enthusiastic others. Each year when the re-enactment was concluded, lecture rooms
and facilities at the monument complex were "used as a meeting place for local
veterans to reunite and discuss or clarify historical issues associated with the war"."*
This was more or less the situation from 1981 until the resignation of Suharto in May
1998. After this time there was no further interest in celebrating the General Attack as
interpreted by the New Order, or retracing the march, and the event passed rapidly
into obscurity.^
This chapter analyses how the Yogya Kembali festival was cautiously redefined in 1981 as a means of testing the public's capacity to accept the myth of
Suharto's new place in Indonesian historical consciousness. The New Order's aim
was to create a vehicle through which to re-write history. This supported the longstanding pre-eminence of the TNI in Indonesian society, including the official role of
ABRI as the destroyers of communism and the restorers of order after the 30
September Coup. The new remembering depended almost exclusively on Suharto's
role as the protector of the nation from the Second Dutch Police Action of the
moming of 19 December 1948,^ but more explicitiy from the danger of resurgent
communism. The story of Yogya Kembali is therefore closely aligned with the key co-

^The festival was ostensibly reactivated to celebrate the 4'" eight-year cycle or 'empat windu of the
anniversary of the 29 June event.
4
"Confidential interview, state-employed 'monument expert', Yogya Kembali monument, Yogyakarta,
September 1997. "Veteran perang kemerdekaan yang masih hidup untuk berdiskusi guna pelurusan
sejarah atau klarifikasi sejarah perang Indonesia."
^Personal correspondence, Budi Susanto, Department of Literature and Theology, University of Sanata
Dharma and Director of Realino Centre of Studies, Yogyakarta, October 2001. The Monument itself no
longer attracts state funding. This is because after Suharto, the administrations of Abdurrahman Wahid
and Megawati Sukarnoputri, have not considered Yogya Kembali a museum, but rather a 'recreational
park'. For this reason it is now promoted by local management - out of desperation - for its arsitektur
khusus or 'special architecture', rather than for its original stated purpose. However in July 2001 the
son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, Hamengkubuwono X, again encouraged interest in the original
celebration, especially those aspects not related to New Order discourse or to the person of Suharto.
^R.E. Elson, Suharto: A Political Biography, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002, pp.28-29.
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ordinates of the New Order's historical treatment of the 1965 coup. This reinforced
those accounts sanctioned by the regime as 'historical' and silenced those not aligned
with the propaganda narrative. This constitutes a clear pattem of historical forgetting,
and is characteristic of the way the New Order handled the memory of 1965. The
issue, however, is not necessarily to call into account the tmth of the events
surrounding the constmction of the Yogya Kembali Monument, but rather to examine
the influence a particular historiography had on the manner in which the practice of
history was constracted, and in what way this influenced oral testimony gathering in
1997.
New Order historiography involved a willingness on the part of Suharto to
manipulate history for very precise political ends. The basis of this charge was that
after 1985 Suharto began to strenuously insist that the General Attack was entirely his
idea, carried out with the same bold initiative and determination that he himself
displayed on the early moming of 1 October 1965 when he ordered KOSTRAD
armour (already in Jakarta) and Siliwangi infantry into action to crash the G30S coup,
and in early October 1965 the RPKAD into DIY, Central and East Java to annihilate
both the leadership and mass-base of the PKI. Linked, the two events, 1 March 1949
and 1 October 1965, constitute a parallel propaganda discourse that legitimated
Suharto's personal power, established the political correctness of New Order rale and
promoted and sustained New Order anti-communist myths. Deconstracting this
complex discourse demonstrates how a New Order historical consciousness was
perpetuated and how alternative histories were silenced.
Significantiy, the issue of who was responsible for the 1 March attack was not
a matter of public interest until Suharto raised, promoted and then imposed it. This
process began in earnest with the 1979 release of the big budget propaganda film
Janur Kuning or 'Yellow Coconut Leaf and the even more expensive and epic
cinematic production, Serangan Fajar, or 'Dawn Attack' the following year. As
Krishna Sen suggests, Janur Kuning established Suharto not only as a super patriot,
but also something of a superhuman, who was able to out-last, out-fight and out-think
'mere mortals' such as the Sultan of Yogyakarta, General Nasution and even his
commander-in-chief, General Sudirman. Indeed, throughout the Suharto era it was
implied that to rescue the nation from 'communism' and to emerge as the 'Father of
Development' took a special, indeed extraordinary character. For this reason Janur
Kwiing strongly suggested that neither Sudirman nor the Sultan had much to do with
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the planning or implementation of the 1 March attack, hi the film the former are
portrayed as minor, or at best marginal characters, incapable of making tough
decisions, hi contrast, the film depicts the figure of Suharto as a prophet rather than
mortal. As Sen points out, even the Dutch commandos are made to acknowledge
Suharto's special qualities as someone who is able to co-ordinate and plan "such a
bold action".^ However the film and the entire 1 March discourse had a much broader
agenda. It silenced the role of the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Sudirman and Nasution, the
Siliwangi division of the TNI, and the diplomatic offensive of President Sukamo and
Deputy President Syahrir.^ h left no doubt whatsoever in people's minds that Suharto
was the pre-eminent historical figure, in fact someone capable of beating the Dutch
almost single handedly, comprehensively defeating the 'evil' of communism, and
rebuilding the nation from the rains of Guided Democracy. And it reinforced a
particular way of using history to silence the past.
The film's production was part of a strategy of imposing one set of stories in
order to silence others. According to Angus Mclntyre in his work on biographical and
autobiographical accounts of the life of Suharto, the President put forward his revised
view of the General Attack on 1 November 1985 after Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX
feU out with Suharto by refusing to ran again as his vice-President, and publicly
withdrew his unqualified support for the official 1 March account.^ (The release of
Janur Kuning the following year compensated for this by complimenting preparations
for the Yogya Kembali festival of 1981, and later the commissioning of the Yogya
Kembah Monument in 1985 in the absence of the Sultan's pubhc support.)
The Sultan's final word on the subject of Suharto's claims was aired in an
interview with the BBC Worid Service on 23 November 1985.'° After this time there
was no further comment. The Sultan died of a heart attack while visiting the U.S. in
1988. Up until late 1985 the government's position was characterised by a consensus
that the General Attack was the combined effort of a number of key players within the
greater milieu of the Indonesian Revolution. No single individual claimed exclusive
^Krishna Sen, Indonesian Cinema: Filming the New Order, Zen Books, London and New Jersey, 1994,
pp.89-97.
^Ibid., pp.93-94. Sen notes that the film even differs substantially fi-om the dioramas and their
explanation in the Armed Forces Museum opened in 1972. While the 1 March diorama stresses the
importance of the action by Suharto's Brigade, the diorama for 19 December 1948 stresses that the
action was within the brief of the Siliwangi division.
^Angus Mclntyre, Soeharto's Composure: Considering the Biographical and Autobiographical
Accounts, Working Paper no. 97, Monash Asia Institute, Clayton, Victoria, 1996.
"ibid.
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credit. According to Mchityre, this compromise can be best represented in Roeder's
biography of Suharto, The Smiling General.''^

During one of the secret meetings between Sultan Hamengkubuwono,
who held the rank of Colonel in the TNI, and Lieutenant Colonel
Suharto, a bold decision was taken to launch a general attack on
Yogyakarta and to hold the town, even if it was [held] for only few
hours. The aim was to demonstrate to the world that persistent
Indonesian resistance had not vanished, as was being alleged by the
Dutch representatives at the United Nations.'^

However, a careful examination of newspaper sources suggests that Suharto was, on
the contiary, pushing his historical re-evaluation - or rather revision - as far back as
1968 when the 1 March date was declared the Diponegoro division's official day of
celebration. This was following the gazetting of 1 October as Hari Peringatan
Kesaktian Pancasila (shortened to Hari Kesaktian Pancasila or the 'The Sanctity of
Pancasila Day').

These revisions were initiated during the height of the purge of

ABRI personnel sympathetic to Sukamoist ideology - in particular officers from the
Diponegoro division, which was the most pro-NASAKOM of the Indonesian
territorial divisions - by forces loyal to Suharto. Following the purges of the late
1960s and early 1970s Suharto's initial 1 March position was stated in a series of
major articles that appeared throughout March 1975.
For example, Empat Lima, a military newspaper for veterans, reporting in
March 1975, led with the statement, "Not many people stih remember 1 March 1949".
The article then went on to state the Suharto case.''' Another ABRI newspaper Berita
Yudha, also declared in support of Suharto that: "The 1 March 1948 attack on
Yogyakarta Stirred the Worid".''^ hi Pikiran Rakyat (based in Bandung) - "1 March
26 Years Ago Yogyakarta became a Place of Fierce Battle";'^ in Berita Buana -

Roeder, The Smiling General, op.cit.
'^Ibid., p.no.
Schreiner, op.cit., p.l52.
''''Serangan Umum Satu Maret', Empat Lima, 3 March 1975.
'^'Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1948' [wrong year in the article noted], Berita Yudha, 1 March 1975.
'^'1 Maret 26 Tahun Yang Lalu Kota Yogyakarta Jadi Kancah Pertempuran Sengit', Pikiran Rakyat, 28
February 1975.
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"Yogyakarta retumed to the fold of the Republic of hidonesia";'^ "The Special
Occurrence of 1 March";'^ and "The Certainty of hidonesian Military History
Conceming 1 March".'^ The theme appeared again the next year in Pikiran Rakyat,
which showed the unfolding of the Suharto position, namely, "27 Years Ago on 1
March 1949 General Suharto Stmck the Dutch in Yogyakarta a Blow".^°
These articles marked the beginning of a campaign to silence competing dates
and altemate explanations that threatened the pre-eminence of Suharto's story - a
story that featured the official version of the coup. These stories also established a
form of chronological memory as the modus operandi of New Order historical
production. This strategy was executed with the clear intention of elevating Suharto's
political prestige and historical reputation. Indeed there were three identifiable waves
of 'debate' after 1975 that sought to provoke carefully directed discussion about the
comparative importance of various historical events. This gained momentum as
challenges to Suharto's rale emerged - particularly from within sections of the raling
elite and from within the student movement.

Conveniently, this resulted in a rapidly

escalated revival of allegations of 'a new communist threat', which not only served
the immediate political needs of the New Order, but also reinforced the historical
silence of the killings that was created in the weeks and months immediately
fohowing the 30 September Coup.
The three attempts to establish 1 March as Suharto's defining test of 'bravery,
initiative and patriotism' occurred prior to the re-launch of the Yogya Kembali festival
in 1985.^^ It was at this time that the decision was made to commission the Yogya
Kembali Monument. This followed the 1 March 1985 opening of the General Attack
Monument in the centre of Yogyakarta (not to be confused with the Yogya Kembali
Monument).^^ Finally, the new emphasis on the Suharto story emerged following the
death of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. Interestingly, the issue of what happened on 1
March was never a question of debate during these periods of sustained press interest.
'^'Yogyakarta Kembali ke Pangkuan R.I.', Berita Buana, 11 July 1975.
'^'Peristiwa 1 Maret', Pikiran Rakyat, ZMarch. 1975.
"'Pembetulan Disjarah Militer TNI-AD: Tentang Tulisan 1 Maret', Pikiran Rakyat, 6 March 1975.
^"'27 Tahun Yang Lalu 1 Maret 1949: Jenderal Suharto Pukul Belanda Di Yogyakarta', Pikiran Rakyai
1 March 1976, p.l.
^'Elson, op.cif.,pp.203-l 1.
^^Soewarno,'Menggali Kemulusan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa', Berita Buana, 18 November 1985, p.2.
^^'Peringatan Serangan Umum Di Yogyakarta', Suara Karya, 1 March 1985; 'Serangan 1 Maret', Pos
Kota, 1 March 1985; 'Serangan Umum 1 Maret Turut Menentukan Sejarah Kita', Sinar Harapan, 1
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It was rather a matter of who was responsible and the way in which this message was
manipulated. The changed emphasis was from a celebration of political independence
to the commemoration of two single actions, namely, Suharto's conspicuous role
during the revolutionary conflict in Yogyakarta and his actions in crashing the 30
September Coup on 1 October 1965. Both silenced competing discourses with
physical 'evidence' that 'proved' the story of why Suharto had a legitimate right to
rale in the place of Indonesia's founding President, Sukarno. However, what this
served was to reinforce the memory of the original New Order's raison d'etre of
being the only effective remedy to the menace of communism - and the strategy of
annihilating individual communists. To this end the Yogya Kembali Monument was
constracted as a means of physically representing Suharto's view of himself in
hidonesian society and history - in particular in the eyes of the key constituency of
DIY/Central Java. It was therefore a way of reinforcing the myth of his role as
restorer and defender of priyayi political, military and cultural values, through
carefully orchestrated historical representations. In the historical vacuum created by
the anti-communist coalition's physical victory over the PKI and Sukarno, Suharto
seized the opportunity presented by the building of the Yogya Kembali Monument to
substitute alternative historical possibilities with an even more sophisticated layer of
official myth.
The opening of the Yogya Kembali Monument in 1989 can be viewed in
relation to a number of important events. The first was the 1984 production and
release of Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI. As Keith Foulcher suggests, the film's primary
appeal was not necessarily to challenge the official version of the coup per se, [indeed
it clarified the official position] and certainly not to recall memory of the killings, but
as "a repetitive affirmation of the sanctity of the family and children ... with
particular reference to General Nasution's murdered daughter ... values that were
allegedly violated by the inhumane and un-Indonesian actions of the PKI and
supporters".^"* The function of the film was to draw, and in fact re-draw, a clear line
between political good and evil, with the New Order clearly good and the PKJ clearly
evil. The year 1985 was also marked by the release of Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI in
novel form, written by Arswendo Atmowiloto, transcribed directly from Arifin C.

March 1985; 'Makna SO 1 Maret 1949', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 1 March 1985; '49 Peristiwa Penting
Dalam Sejarah Kemerdekaan Indonesia', Angkatan Bersenjata, 4 March 1985.
•^Foulcher, op.cit., pp.113-19.
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Noer's film scenario. This further extended the reach and effect of the film's message:
the PKI must never be aUowed to rise again.^^
The second event was the redefining and redrafting of the entire hidonesian
primary and secondary school history curriculum, hi 1984, under orders from Suharto,
two new subjects were made compulsory for all school-aged children. The first was
Pendidikan Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa, PSPB, or 'The History of the Nation's
Straggle', and the second, Pendidikan Moral Pancasila, PMP, or 'Pancasila Moral
Education'. These directives were then formalised and reinforced across all official
education policy documents.^^ The PSPB and PMP programs were masterminded and
implemented by the minister for Education, Brigadier-General Notosusanto,
mentioned previously, head of ABRI's history section and the TNI's official historian
and propagandist. Both subjects instracted students about the 'evil' of communism,
the alleged primary role of the PKI in the 30 September Coup, and the pivotal role of
Suharto in restoring stability, security, and development to the Indonesian State.
Again this is evidence for the continued development of chronological memory so
prominent in the testimonies raised in chapter four. Nothing in the texts refers to the
killings, only the coup. This key message was further reinforced by the 1989
publication of the Suharto autobiography, Suharto: My Thoughts, Words and Deeds.
Unintentionally, the prestige and position of Suharto was severely damaged by what
were seen as autocratic and arrogant assertions in the text.
The third major event was the death of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX in 1988.
This allowed Suharto to develop his historiographical agenda without risking offence
to the Sultan or the disapproval or scratiny of the Sultan's loyal Yogyakarta-based
foUowers.^^ Significantiy, the foundation stone of the Yogya Kembali Monument had
been laid by both of Yogyakarta's hereditary ralers - Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX
and Pakualam VIII - providing Suharto with 'double royal insurance' against
. . .

^0

criticism.

^^Arswendo Atmowiloto, Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI, Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1986.
^ % r example see Kurikulum 1994 Pendidikan Dasar dan Pendididikan Menengah, Departemen
Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan 1993, Jakarta.
Soemardjan, op.cit.
^^Confidential interviews, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^'Selo Soemardjan, 'In Memoriam: Hamengkubuwono IX, Sultan of Yogyakarta 1912-1988',
Indonesia, no. 47, April 1989, pp. 115-17.
^"Confidential interview, 'Monument expert', Yogya Kembali Monument, September 1997.
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The fourth event was connected with a challenge to Suharto's rale from within
ABRI and bureaucratic elite, hi 1980 a group of leading political and military figures
led by former Marine commander and Govemor of Jakarta, Ali Sadikin, called the
'Petition of 50', signalled the possibility of a split within the mhng elite^' by
publishing a list of grievances that called into account the un-democratic aspects of
New Order rale.' These grievances were illustiated in a 1988 Inside Indonesia
interview with Ali Sadikin himselfi

They [Murtopo, Sudomo, Surono and Murdani] are rathless ... and
Suharto is vindictive. Those who know him say he is a vindictive
person. [Former Siliwangi Division Chief of Staff Lieutenant General]
Dharsono is proof of that. Without the Siliwangi Division, there would
be no New Order. Most of Suharto's Diponegoro Division were
communists. The RPKAD [the elite Paracommando Regiment - key
Suharto allies in the counter coup of 1 October 1965] numbered only a
few hundred, but Jakarta was surrounded by Siliwangi. Moreover,
what was Dharsono's offence? Nothing. That was all fabricated. But he
still got such a heavy sentence. By putting Dharsono behind bars
Suharto wanted to demonstrate his power. It had a 'shock effect' on
society. Everyone was afraid ... and in the kampungs, there was a
feeling of fear. In the kampungs, people are afraid of the local military
officials. They are the ones with the power, not the civilians ... Today
the system generates fear, not love. During the Revolution, the people
had love for ABRI. We were one. Now it has all changed. ^^

The fifth challenge was an example of the growing desperation of the New Order to
maintain power in the early 1990s. This was a govemment-sponsored revival of the
'communist threat'. This began with a headline in the Jakarta-based militaryinfluenced daily newspaper Jayakarta, which in March 1988 quoted retired RPKAD
commander. Lieutenant General Sarwo Edhie, as saying that: "The PKI will awaken

^''Interview with Dr Herb Feith: Background to the Crackdown', Inside Indonesia, no. 16, October
1988, p.6.
^^'Interview with Ali Sadikin', Inside Indonesia, no. 16, October 1988, pp.2-4.
^^Ibid., pp.2-4.
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while we sleep".^'' This statement was a direct response to the Yogyakarta student
subversion trials of the same year. These trials highlighted fresh challenges to New
Order legitimacy, hi addition, the govemment's identification of a new threat of
'communist revival' from within the bureaucracy was pushed forward by an
announcement by co-ordinating minister for Political and Security Affahs, Suharto
loyalist. Admiral Sudomo, that he would "re-examine all G30S/PKI remnants at large
in society, to see where they were, what work they were doing, and what their
attitudes were".

According to Sudomo, this involved a greatiy increased level of

surveillance of 33,000 former political prisoners in category B and around 500,000 in
category C, who he said showed signs - according to the government - of planning a
'comeback'. Six weeks later Sudomo escalated the issue by announcing that PKI
remnants could never be rehabilitated and that their names could never be removed
from the official register of people who had once belonged to 'a banned organisation'
- namely the PKI. Sudomo in fact suggested: "Once a GESTAPU, always a
GESTAPU".-^^ The Bersih

Lingkungan

purge of the late

1980s and the

keterpengaruhan anti-communist campaign of the early and mid-1990s can be traced
to these announcements.
These assertions are supported by a comparison of press articles that show the
evolving role of Suharto within the tradition of Yogya Kembali celebrations, with
reports from 1989 clearly illustrating the President's dominant role in controlhng the
means of remembering. This comparison constitutes evidence of Suharto's power to
silence the killings by the use of anti-communist ideology, of which myths about his
role in neutralising the 30 September Coup had become defining elements. This
illustrates an evolving continuum of forgetting that culminated in the physical
constmction of the Yogya Kembali Monument as a visible representation of the
'historical' Suharto. Again, this is directiy relevant to Kidul, because many local
people worked as labourers in the constraction of the monument, hideed, children of
local people regulariy visited the Yogya Kembali Monument during the 1980s and
1990s as part of organised and compulsory school 'historical excursions'."
"'"See Goodfellow, Api Dalam Sekam, op.cit., pp.29-38.
^^Ibid
^^Ibid., chapter two, 'Bersih Diri, Bersih Lingkungan'.
^''Confidential interview, Kidul, September 1997. See Poedhyarto Trisaksono, Sosiodrama Pelengkap
PSPB, Tiga Serangkai, Jakarta, 1985. This school text is an example of how the silence was
perpetuated down to the level of primary school text through the medium of a hypothetical dialogue
between major New Order players in the coup.
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Yogya Kembali, however, remained an important site for reasons not directiy
associated with the persons of Suharto, the Sultan or Sudirman, although the Yogya
Kembali Monument is actuahy located on the site of one of the main Dutch surrender
ceremonies. The main reason the land was selected was because of its cultural
significance: it lies on an imaginary axis between the crater peak of the Merapi
Volcano, the Tugu Monument,^^ the Sultan's Kraton, the Panggung Krapyak
Monument and the South Sea at Parangtritis Beach.'^ The Yogya Kembali
Monument's highly symbolic location ostensibly honours and commemorates the
deeds and deaths of hundreds of selected guerrilla fighters. The official aim of the
complex as outiined in guidebook literature is to:

... give information about the Indonesian Peoples' straggle in the
revolutionary period to the young generation ... [Because of the] need
to respect their heroes, they must honour the service of these heroes,
and they must understand the history of the Peoples' straggle.*°

The nature of the straggle and the criteria for 'hero-hood' was, however, portrayed as
explicitiy anti-communist. The Yogya Kembali Monument was a reminder to
everyone, including former communists (and contemporary dissenters such as the
Yogyakarta-based students who supported the nation-wide 1978-80 student protest
movement),

that Suharto's physical triumph over both communism and Sukarnoism

was a military, political and historiographical victory. The existence of the Yogya
Kembali Monument, museum complex and research library in fact 'proved' the logic
inherent in commemorating Suharto's imagined role as the chief instigator of the
General Attack. Both directly and indirectly, Yogya Kembali was an integral
component of the myth of 1965. In terms of the development of a particular way of
using history, the integrity of New Order historiography rests on reports of Suharto's
actions as a Brigade commander, illustrated through exhibit and diorama at Yogya
Kembali. These are representative of a 'courageous leader' who was prepared to take
•3Q

Originally built in 1755 to commemorate the establishment of the Ngayogykarta Sultanate.
This line represents the Sultanate's cultural and spiritual identity and the legitimate right to rule of the
Kings of Yogyakarta. This right is derived from the cosmological connection between the Queen of the
South Sea, the scared mountain and the Kraton.
Sewindu Monumen Yogya Kembali, Yayasan Yogya Kembali, Yogyakarta, 1989.
Edward Aspinal, 'Student Dissent in Indonesia in the 1980s', unpublished BA hons thesis, Sydney
University, 1991.
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swift and decisive action at critical moments - 1 March 1949 and 1 October 1965.
This is represented in an October 1965 Minggu Pagi article that describes Suharto in
the following terms:

... General of 'Fighting and War', a sophisticated man, but when it
comes to actions or duties, then it would be said that he is all about
action, action and action, he never forgets Pantjasila, a trae
Saptamargais. Tri-Ubaya-Sakti remains his main doctrine.42

hi contrast, many people in Kidul during 1997 privately described Suharto's pivotal
role in revolutionary dispatches and his basic character as nekad. Nekad is a Javanese
word that can be politely translated as "brave to the point of being uncaring of the
consequences".''^ However nekad can also mean 'foolhardy'. It is said as a
compliment but intended as a criticism. Nekad describes someone who has acted
irresponsibly by doing something that puts others at risk - unnecessarily. During my
1997 fieldwork this expression was used a number of times to describe Suharto in
relation to claims made through the medium of the Yogya Kembali Monument.''^ As
Antlov comments:

The Yogya Kembali Monument, everybody in Yogyakarta knows, is
Suharto's brainchild. The monument thus provides a new and
important perspective on Suharto: that he is not only the man of 1965,
but also a revolutionary soldier and a loyal officer who has his position
beyond the events of 1965. The location and the shape of Yogya
Kembali makes it represent an important element of Javanese political
culture, the 'exemplary centre'. From the monument, and its sponsors,
power flows to the surrounding and subordinate population and it must

"^'Major-Djendral Suharto', Minggu Pagi, no. 32, 7 November 1965, pp.3-4 and 29. "Djendral
Berkelahi dan Perang, orang halus-pupus, tapi kalau sudah kerdja: thes thes thes, tak pernah
melapaskan Pantjasila, sebagai Saptamargais, Tri-Ubyja-Sakti tetap doktrine utamanja."
"^Series of confidential interviews, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
""One Kidul resident told me that his father knew of someone who had fought with Suharto and that he
was known as being very brave or 'berani', but 'nekad'. It was reported that in battie he had no regard
for his own life and therefore no regard for the lives of the soldiers under his command. Confidential
interview, Kidul, September 1997.
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be never forgotten who the ralers are; prayers in the monument are
devoted to the army and to the President."^

Antiov further notes that this interpretation conforms to Pemberton's observations of
the 'Beautiful Indonesia' Museum in Jakarta in which the lower level is dedicated to
'training the eye', the middle floor to 'educating the mind' and the top floor to
'displaying cultural valuables'. At Yogya Kembali Suharto represents the apex of
importance in the form of 'heritage', stored near the peak of the figurative 'mountain'.
So just as Suharto could be proven to have acted in a particular way according to
'history' - as physically and culturally represented at Yogya Kembali - it was then a
reasonable extrapolation for ordinary Indonesians to make, given the resources
dedicated to commemorating the actions of Suharto, that 1965 was a similar action
undertaken by Suharto, then commander of KOSTRAD, for a similar noble cause.
According to this logic, because these assertions could be sustained by a 'research
library', photographs, museum exhibits, and dioramas, then it was, in a sense, also
provable that Suharto acted in the same way against the 30 September plotters swiftly and decisively. The same reasoning, as suggested by Antlov, also works in
reverse: 1965 'proves' 1 March 1949.
Finally, Yogya Kembali can be seen as one of the means employed by Suharto
to resurrect the memory of Sukamo. This was initiated in 1978 after Ali Moertropo
announced Suharto's plan to constract the late President's rather modest tomb in
Blitar, East Java."^ The Sukarno mausoleum and the Yogya Kembali festival in fact
share something in common. They suppress memories of the Guided Democracy
period, including the Independence straggle as social revolution, the PKI as an
organisation of high community standing, communism as a social movement, and
even Sukamo as a progressive and dynamic political figure."^ These stractures are
also a powerful means of perpetuating silences. One story silences another. Thus for
the people of Kidul, and for all Indonesians, Yogya Kembali silenced unofficial and
therefore unacceptable memories of not only an alternative past, but more importantiy
"^Hans Antiov, 'The Revolusi Represented: Contemporary Indonesian Images of 1945', Indonesia
Circle, no. 68, 1996, p.8.
"^Karen Brooks, 'The Rustic of Ghosts: Bung Karno in the New Order', Indonesia, no. 60, October
1995,pp.61-99.
"^Timothy C. Lindsay, 'Concrete Ideology: Taste, Tradition, and the Javanese Past in New Order
Public Space', in Virginia Hooker, ed.. Culture and Society in New Order Indonesia, Oxford
University Press, Singapore, 1995.
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an altemative present. Yogya Kembali thus ensured that non-official memories
remained silent by guiding, indeed compelling, people to commemorate things that
never happened (the propaganda version of the 30 September Coup) at the expense of
things that actually did (the killings).
Recalling the theoretical framework provide by Trouillot, the Yogya Kembali
Monument and its political raison d'etre correspond with the third opportunity for a
silence to enter a particular historical discourse. This is the retrieval of 'facts' and the
analysis and presentation of these same facts as 'historical'. The story of Yogya
Kembali is therefore more than a re-writing of history to reflect Suharto's style of
mle. h in fact represents the entire New Order State apparatus as the legitimate heir of
the Independence straggle by virtue of Suharto's personal ability to protect the
Revolution. (Suharto's treatment of hundreds of thousands of PKI members after
1966 of course tells a different story.) The New Order further linked the Communist
Uprising of 1927, the Madiun Revoh of 1948, and the 30 September Coup, as part of
this one simplistic, liner historical continuum. (Even a cursory examination of these
events demonstrates that no such simple relationship exists.) In place was substituted
a convenient 'opposite' that distinguished the goodness of the Suharto regime by the
anarchy of the Guided Democracy period. This sought to preserve and advocate the
nilai luhur or 'noble values' of the pejuang or 'independence fighters' and appropriate
48

these same values as ideological support for the New Order anti-communist state.
This reinforced the fundamental contrasts between the goodness of the New Order
and the evil of communism, ultimately leading to the position: New Order historical
orthodoxy was right, and alternative accounts of any complexion were to be treated in
the same way as the memory of the PKI."^ The corollary to this, as established in
chapter one, was that all dissent, including historiographical dissent, was 'communistinspired'. As the Yogya Kembali guide book explained:
"^'The Museum of the Treason of the PKI' is located near the 'Memorial for the Sacredness of
Pancasila' at Lubang Buaya. These themes are equally represented in 'The Museum of Communist
Betrayal', at the Pancasila Saki Monument and the Museum Waspada Purbawisesa.
"^Schreiner, 'History in the Showcase', op.cit., pp.99-118. Indonesian museums such as Yogya Kembali
fall into the category of museum khusus or 'special museums'. This includes museums that focus on a
particular historical subject or period. Schriener's study concentrates on museums or permanent
expositions that are commonly known as Museum Perjuangan or Museums of the National Struggle' of
which Yogya Kembali is prominent. These state-sponsored and currated museums are devoted to the
presentation and interpretation of those aspects of Indonesian history that can, in some way, be linked
to the struggle for independence and its historiographical integration with the struggle against
communism. Indonesian historical museums in the guise of Museum Perjuangan or 'Struggle
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This function [of Yogya Kembali] exceeds the usual educational
purpose of such institutions. After a visit to this museum it is hoped
that you will be more aware of the fact that unity and unification will
stiengthen national security.-''^

Yogya Kembali reduced history to a single and authoritative interpretation: it was not
only the Suharto story that began on 1 October 1965, but a story convenientiy
backdated to 1 March 1949. As with all other forms of New Order history, the
exhibition, including diaromas, is a constmction - a representation and interpretation
of a past moment - based on ideas derived from the consideration of the body of
propaganda itself, ft is a false version of the past and not the past itself.^' Schreiner's
point is that for the New Order, history does not start in 1945 with the proclamation of
hidependence, or even at the beginning of the 20th century, with the advent of various
Indonesian political associations. Indonesian national history, according to both
Sukamo and Suharto-era historians, began with the rise of the Srivijaya Empire and
reached its first peak when Majapahit extended its rale over the whole archipelago in
the 13' and 14* centuries. This 'golden age' of Indonesian history came to an end
through the conquest of European colonialism. The 'dark age' of colonial domination
lasted until the end of World War II. Nationalist historiography links the modem
republic to the early Buddhist and Hinduist kingdoms, thereby interpreting 'New
Order Indonesia' as the natural successor to these early kingdoms.^^

The younger generation as the future generation of successors, who
will naturally continue the ideals and the straggle of their predecessors,
needs to be endowed with a cultural heritage besides intelligence. This
is necessary to permanently safeguard the identity of the Indonesian
Nation and to realise the ideals of national development in order to
shape the perfect Indonesian.'

Museums' are often shown to play a special role. Schreiner argues that they communicate historical
events and facts as static events, frozen in time in the form of exhibits and dioramas.
^'Museum Waspada Purbawisesa; Buku Panduan, Departemen Penerangan R.I., Jakarta, 1995, p.vii.
^'Gaynor Kavanagh, History Curatorship, Leicester, London, 1990, p.127.
^^Sejarah NasionaU Universitas Gadjah Mada, Klooster, Yogyakarta, 1985.
^^Tedjo Susilo, 'Peningkatan apresiasi generasi muda terhadap museum', Museografia, no. 22, vol. 1,
1992, p.7.
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And the 'perfect hidonesian' was anti-communist. Margot Cohen, referring to the
'Museum of Communist Betrayal', states:

Where documentation is lacking, dioramas do the trick. Behind a clear
glass panel, a miniature General staggers through his dining room,
blood streaming from bullet holes and smudging the floor. For drama
on a larger scale, the Crocodile Hole offers the Torturing Veranda, a
one-room wax museum. Communists wave razors and sickles at two of
the Generals, as blood drips onto their pyjamas. When the custodian
remembers to flick the switch, the scene is animated by voices
shouting 'Kill! Kill!' and 'Feel this razor!' punctuated by evil laughter
and drambeats.^''

Yogya Kembali is similar in intent, but different in how it achieves the same goals. It
combines the propaganda features of other New Order museums, which are
predominately dedicated to perpetuating anti-communist myths, with powerful
legitimating cultural symbols of the royal households of Central Java, in particular
Surakarta,^"^ and to a lesser extent, Yogyakarta - although the Yogyakarta Sultanate
can never be excluded because of its key role in the Revolution.

To quote the

official guidebook, the Yogya Kembali Monument is: "a shape that reflects the abode
en

of gods and ancestors".
By shaping it symbolically like a mountain, the mythical character of
the events of 1945 are at once reinforced and deified - the sacred place
from which power is diffused to the world. A distance is maintained
from the actual events, while the myth of straggle, death, and unity
[against communism] is emphasised. Identification with actual events
^"Margot Cohen, 'The Red Menace is Preserved and Well in Java', Asian Wall Street Journai 20 to 21
December 1991, p.22.
^%hn Pemberton, On the Subject of Java, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1994. On
Beautiful Indonesia in Mini, pp.152-61 and on Mrs Suharto's pre-occupation with the Court Culture of
Surakarta reinvented as 'Indonesian Culture', see pp. 148-96.
^^Antiov, op.cit., p.7. As Antiov states: "The Monument is spectacular. It is huge and cone-shaped,
built to represent both a mountain and tupeng or the central dish of Javanese ceremonial meals (literally
a mountain made of rice). The mountain-shape represents a replica of both Borobudur and Prambanan
and the Javanese Hindu centre of the Earth - Mount Merapi."
^^Sewindu Monumen Yogya Kembali, Yayasan Yogya Kembali, Yogyakarta, 1989, p.2.
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is not the issue here; what takes place is rather a transcription of these
events into 'the history of the people's straggle'. What is celebrated is
not the stmggle of 1945, but the Monumen Yogya Kembali that by hs
sheer existence is proof of national success.^^

Between the foreground and the inside courtyard of the monument is a rana, or
specially crafted Javanese-style wall on which the names of 'fallen heroes' who died
in combat in the Wehr Kreise III military sub-District (comprising the city of
Yogyakarta and the area to the south) between 19 December 1948 and 29 June 1949
are inscribed.^^ (The region to the north of Yogyakarta up to and around Magelang
was under the command of General Yani, one of the generals killed on the early
moming of 1 October 1965). Of ah the thousands of sub-districts in the campaign this
is the only one readily recalled to mind by school children.^^ Not coincidentally, this
was the same area under the direct command of Suharto. The names of the fallen
heroes are displayed in such a way as to give the impression that they represent the
guardians of the monument. Therefore to criticise any aspect of the message the
monument proclaims is to call into question the sacrifice of carefully selected
guerrilla fighters, their commemorated cause, or in fact the authenticity of their very
existence. The immunity to criticism afforded to the monument also serves to protect
the Suharto myth from critique, and the killings of 1965 from scratiny, from analysis
or in fact from memory itself.
There are 420 names identified by unit and rank inscribed on the granite Rana.
There is also a section for the Pahlawan Pahlawan yang tidak Dikenal, or 'The
Unknown Heroes'. In addition to TNI regulars, units include irregular groups under
the command of sections of Sudirman's army, namely Tentara Pelajar, Kompi
Indonesia, Hantu Maut, Hisbulah, Mobpel, Pejunag, Agen Polisi, Sabillah, KMD
Kommando, Pegawai UGM, Pagar Desa, Polisis Keamanan Desa, Kepolisian and
Pegawai Negeri Sipil^^ Pesindo guerrillas, aligned with the PKI, are not mentioned at
all, although before the 1948 Madiun Revolt this organisation was active against the
Dutch in the Yogyakarta area.

^^Antiov, op.cit., p.l.
^^The German name was in fact the name adopted by Indonesian guerrilla leaders to distinguish areas
of operational command.
^''Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
^'Fieldwork notes, Yogya Kembali Monument, August 1998.
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The formal Javanese expression, Gapura PapatAmbuka Jagad, is inscribed on
the outside of the rana. This represents the year of the 'Yogya Kembali incident' in
1949. This is formed by a Chandra Sengkala, colophon, or circle with a cross dividing
it into four parts, another Javanese symbol with its roots in pre-Islamic Hindu Java.
This edifice further 'proves' that what is being commemorated 'actually happened' by
cross-referencing it with the Javanese calendar and with powerful symbols of preEuropean Javanese culture. The moat that encircles the entire area symbolically
protects both the monument and the names of the fallen from evil. It is never
explicitiy mentioned what this evil was, however given the attention devoted to
official historiography in the Yogya Kembali Monument museum library, there would
be no doubt in any visitor's mind that this evil was 'communism'.
It is the third floor of the complex that symbolically marks the ultimate
neutralising of Guided Democracy history. Officially, this space functions as a silent
room for meditation. (Actually after May 1998 the space rather delightfully became a
popular place for young lovers to berpacar or 'to court'.) However, inside the room is
a rehef displaying Indonesia's military straggle against the Dutch, an Indonesian flag
on a simple sandalwood pole, and the 'hand-written style' words of President Suharto,
in very large gold lettering. Significantly, this appears not only in the style of
Sukamo's Proclamation of Independence, but also has the same word length.
Therefore it has the same appearance.

The people and the Indonesian Armed Forces are joined in the same
straggle and we have the same ideas that we will never fail to maintain
the great Pancasila State to the glory of the most exalted God.
Yogyakarta, 6 of July 1981. Suharto.^^

[The Proclamation of Indonesian Independence] We, the people of
Indonesia,

hereby

declare

Indonesia's

Independence.

Matters

concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed in

^^Suharto: "Rakyat dan ABRI selalu manunggal Perjuangan dan cita cita pantang gagal Negara
Pancasila tetap jaya dan kekal berkat Ridho Tuhan yang Uaha tunggal Yogyakarta 6 July 1981."
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an orderiy manner and in the shortest possible time. Jakarta, 17 August
1945. Sukamo.^^

hi the complex's library can be found the strangest collection of New Order
historiography and unrelated books and documents,^" including eight copies of
Suharto's daughter's book of Javanese wise-sayings,^^ President Suharto's authorised
biography, Anak Desa: Biografi Presiden Soeharto,^^ multiple copies of O.G.
Roeder's English and Indonesian translations of The Smiling General,^'' works by
Notosusanto and Saleh^^ and an incomplete set of Tempo back issues - with editions
relating to a liberalisation of press attitudes towards missing former political prisoners
missing. Volumes of New Order historiography in multiple copies include Sewindu
Monumen Yogya Kembali!''^ which lists the names of those on the monument honour
wall, but in no way explains their eligibility. Finally there are multiple copies of the
definitive work of New Order propaganda, namely, Gerakan 30 September:
Pemberontakan

Partai

Komunis

Indonesia,

Latar

Belakang,

Aksi

dan

Penumpasannya or 'The Movement of 30 September: The Uprising of the PKI, a
Retrospective Examination of the Actions and Accomplices'.
Within the collection are also Kedaulatan Rakyat and Minggu Pagi clippings
from the period 29 June to 1 July 1981 compiled to mark "the special celebration of
the Yogya Kembali festival".^' The bound volume is introduced by reproducing the
official literature from the opening ceremony, first with a statement by General Ali
Moertopo and then by the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Moertopo's document contains seven

^^Sukarno: "Kami bangsa Indonesia dengan ini menyatakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia. Atas berkat
rahmat Allah, maka rakyat Indonesia dengan ini menyatakan kemerdekaannya. Hal-hal yang mengenai
pemindahan kekuasaan dan Iain-lain diselenggarakan dengan cara saksama dan dalam tempo
sesingkat-singkatnya."
^Wolfgang Hannig, Towards a Blue Revolution: The Social and Economic Aspects of Brackish Water
Pond Cultivation in Java, Gadjah Mada University Press, Yogyakarta, 1998.
^^Hardiyanti Rukmana, Butir Butir Budaya Jawa, Yayasan Yogya Kembali, Jakarta, 1987.
^^Roeder, Anak Desa: Biografi Presiden Soeharto, op.cit.
Roeder, The Smiling General, op.cit.
^^Nugroho Notosusanto and Ismail Saleh, The Coup Attempt of the September 30 Movement in
Indonesia, 2"" edition, Indonesian Army Centre for Armed Forces' History and Tradition, Jakarta,
1987; and Jakarta Sejarah National Indonesia IV, Departemen Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan, PT Balai
Pustaka, Jakarta, 1987.
^'^Sewindu Monumen Yogya KembaU, Yayasan Yogya Kembali, Yogyakarta, 1989.
'"Gerakan 30th September. Pemberontakan Partai Komunis Indonesia, Latar Belakang, Aksi dan
Penumpasannya, Sekretariat Negara Republic Indonesia, Jakarta, 1994.
^'Soegiato, Yogya Kembali 29 Juni - 1 Juli 1981: Klipping, Sumbangsih Keluarrga Besar, Kedaulatan
Rakyat, Yogyakarta, July 1981, pp.1-2.
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points, of which one is specifically concerned with Suharto and historical agenda
setting:

On 1 March 1949, Lieutenant Colonel Suharto attacked and took over
Yogyakarta. His troops occupied Yogyakarta for six hours. This was a
terrible shock for the Dutch. The worid stared with eyes wide open at
Indonesia. All at once, the eyes of the world were on Indonesia and
they knew that the Indonesian Republic remained a reality without
retreat: 'Freedom or Death' kept echoing woridwide. Any kind of
colonisation must be abolished.^^

Moertopo's introduction does not mention the Sultan or Sukarno and only briefly
quotes Sudirman. This confirms that a substantial rewriting of history was underway.
In contrast, the Sultan's introductory message mentions the Second Dutch Police
Action of 19 December 1948, and the return of Sudirman's forces on 30 June 1949. It
does not mention either the General Attack of 1 March or Suharto's reported role, or
for that matter the New Order.

There is a similar ambiguity in a number of key

editorials that comment on the celebration and its meaning for contemporary
Indonesia. This demonstrates that Suharto's re-writing of history was not entirely
smooth.
The Kedaulatan Rakyat editorial was devoted to the Sultan and was published
on 27 June 1981. Entitled: 'We are full of the hope for the Sultan',^^ the article
mentions all the key dates associated with the Revolution, but does not link Suharto to
events, hi contrast to the New Order, the Sultan's enemy is not communism, but the
widening social gap between rich and poor. In the editorial there is no mention of
1965.
Sri Sultan also recited Yogyakarta's role and position in the history of
hidonesian national struggle. What great patriotism the people of
72

Ibid., p.l. "Tanggal 1 Maret 1949 Letnan Kolonel Suharto menyerbu dan merebut Yogyakarta.
Selama enam jam Yogyakarta dikuasai oleh pasukan Soeharto. Belanda terkejut. Dunia terbelalak.
Sekaligus mata dunia terbuka, bawah bangsa Indonesia masih tetap dalam nyala tekad yang
membawa: Merdeka atau Mati! Pekik 'Merdeka' mengema terus diangkasa International Penjajhan
diatas dunia harus dihapuskan."
"Soegiato, Klipping, op.cit., p.l.
^"'Tajuk Rencana: Kita Penuhi Harapan Sri Sultan', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 27 June 1981, p.4.
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Yogyakarta had shown in expelling the Dutch from this region, as a
part of the history of the Indonesian national straggle. "Yogya is a city
of straggle. Even now we're still fighting, ft's just that now we're not
fighting against the Dutch, our enemies are underdevelopment and
poverty".^^

The 29 June editorial takes a different tack, ft is stiongly oriented towards support for
the ABRI leadership, but does not mention Suharto or 1 March 1949. What is does
mention is the pre-eminent role of ABRI in New Order society and the connection
between the nation-building event of 30 June 1949 - the arrival of Sudirman's forces
in Yogyakarta - and the nation-protecting actions of the military against the PKI on 1
October 1965

As frequentiy stated by General M. Yusuf, without all the people's
perseverance, TNI-ABRI would have no enduring strength. If people
are unfaithful to the idea of stmggle, it can easily be imagined what
TNI would face in the past 4 Windu [one windu is eight years]. Thus,
the high functionality of ABRI keeps on reminding us that ABRI
comes from people, and once shoulder-to-shoulder with them,
therefore ABRI should stay in unity with the people. Unless we stay
faithful to the aspirations of Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia,
which is based on UUD 1945 and Pancasila, we might have never
succeeded in smashing all attempts to devastate this Republic, such as
those of DI-TII and G30S/PKI in the past.^^

75

Ibid. "Oleh Sri Sultan juga diceriterakan kedudukan dan peranan Yogya yang dipimpinya itu dalam
sejarah perjuangan nasional bangsa Indonesia. Betapa patriotisme rakyat Yogya mengusir penjaja
Belanda dari daerah ini sebagai bagian dari sejarah perjuangan nasional bangsa Indonesia. ' Yogya
Kota perjuangan. Sekarang pun kita masih tetap berjuang. Hanya musuh kita sekarang bukan Belanda,
tetapi keterbelakangan dan kemiskinan'."
'Tajuk Rencana: Semangat 'Yogya Kembali", Kedaulatan Rakyat, 29 June 1981, p.4. "Dan
sebenamyalah, tanpa keuletan rakyat seluruhnya itu, seperti sering diucapkan Menhankam Pangab
Jenderal M. Yusuf -TNI-ABRI tidak akan mempunyi kekuatan yang tangguh. Kalau rakyat tidak setia
kepada cita-cita perjuangannya, sudah dapat dibayangkan apa yang akan dihadapi TNI 4 Windu
yang lalu itu. Karenanya juga oleh pimpinan ABRI selalu diingatkan bahwa ABRI yang berasal dari
rakyat, dan pernah berjuang bahu-memahu dengan rakyat, harus terus selalu manunggal dengan
rakyat. Tanpa kesetiaan kepada cita-cita Negara Kesatuan Republic Indonesia yang berdasar UUD
1945 dan Pancasila, barangkali kita pun tidak akan berhasil menghancurkan usaha-usaha untuk
merongrong republik ini seperti yang dilakukan DI-TII dan G30S/PKI di masa yang lalu."
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On 25 June, four days before the Yogya Kembali festival launch, a 'non-debate' was
aired in Kedaulatan Rakyat that served to test public opinion about whether the
reported actions of Suharto on 1 March and the developing contest mentioned above,
were perceived to have usurped the historical pre-eminence of the Sultan.^^ This led
from comments made by the Sultan of Yogyakarta's minor royal household, Sri Paku
Alam, who engaged in a discussion of whether Suftan Hamengkubuwono DCs
diplomatic and civil role was of greater significance than the military straggle led by
Suharto. Under the titie 'Meaningless Babble' was written:

This former soldier 'remembered' that Serangan Oemoem of 1 March
1949 greatly affected the restoration of the Indonesian govemment in
Yogyakarta on 29 July 1949. "Serangan Oemoem has opened the
world's eyes, especially the United Nations'. It tore down the Dutch
propaganda stating that they [the Dutch] had destroyed TNI!" he
added. The Dutch created "Rust en Orde"' in their occupation area in
Indonesia since 19 December 1948 by ranning the second mihtary
aggression, followed by occupying the capital Yogyakarta and
arresting the President, vice-President, and several high functionaries.
"However the people and TNI kept on fighting and the situation
reached its climax in SO on 1 March 1949. It has already proven that
the Dutch propaganda was nothing but bullshit!" he excitedly stated.
For the TNI was still strong enough and even, could attack and occupy
Yogyakarta on 1 March 1949.^^

The key paragraph in the article raises the issue of whether Sultan Hamengkubuwono
DCs key role in the Revolution was 'civil' or 'military', or both. The reality was that
"'Meski Ditawari Mahkota 'Kaiser Jawa' Sir Sultan Tetap Berjuang untuk Republic', Kedaulatan
Rakyat, op.cit., p.l.
^^Ibid. "Di bagian lain, bekas pejuang bersenjata ini mengingatkan, antara Serangan Umum 1 Maret
1949 dengan pulihnya pemerintahan ke ibukota RI di Yogya 29 Juni 1949 bertahan erat sekali Sebab
setelah terjadinya 'SO' mata dunia international khususnya PBB menjadi lebih terbuka. 'Propaganda
Belanda yang menyatakan TNI telah mereka hancurkan berhasil diagalkan!' tambahnya. 'Rust en
ordre' yang mereka ciptakan di waliyah RI yang didukinya sejak 19 December 1948 dengan
melancarkan aksi militernya yang kedua, dan menduduki ibukota RI Yogya, dan menawan Presiden dan
WakU Presiden berserta sejumlah pembeasr sipil 'Namun rakyat dan TNI tetap memberikan
perlawanannya dan memuncak pada SO 1 Maret 1949. Terbukti propaganda Belanda itu among
kosong,' ujarnya bersemangat. Sebab TNI masih cukuk kuat bahkan mampu menyerbu dan menduduki
Yogya, pada 1 Maret itu."
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the Sultan was the Govemor of Yogyakarta, a civihan role, and an officer with the
rank of Colonel in the TNI. At the time, Suharto held the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.
Because of his civihan role, the Sultan reported to Sudirman. hi fact Suharto reported
to the Sultan prior to the Second Police Action. (After 19 December he was not
required to report to the Sultan, but to his superior, Nasution.) The article suggests
that Suharto's role was pre-eminent throughout this period.^^ Again, this represents a
substantial re-writing, in fact a falsification of history, and the basis on which
Suharto's response to the above-mentioned challenges to his rale would be mounted
through the medium of the Yogya Kembali Monument eight years later.

At the same time the civilian and military capacity of the Republic was
to be examined, and at this moment Sri Sultan was accompanied by
two prominent figures, Sri Paku Alam as vice-govemor and Lieutenant
Colonel Suharto as high commander of Indonesian national armed
forces in Yogyakarta. ^"^

The subtle contest between differing perspectives on what was to be the main focus of
the festival can be seen by examining local press articles from the period that are all
written, prima facie, about Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. These reports, with one
exception, contain no mention of the Sultan in relation to the 1 March date, only 30
June. It is almost as if 1 March was of such in-consequence that it paled into
insignificance. Yet by celebrating the event under the auspices of the Suhartocontrolled Department of Information, the Sultan was tacitly supporting Suharto's
claims at the expense of his own place in Indonesian history. In 'The 4* Windu
Yogya Kembali anniversary of 30 June will be celebrated by the Sultan in Person',^'
the Sultan reiterates the importance of the date, not only to Yogyakarta, but also to the
entire nation. The article of 25 June in fact goes so far as to suggest that without the

Elson, op.cit., chapter two.
^'Meski Ditawari Mahkota 'Kaiser Jawa' Sir Sultan Tetap Berjuang untuk Republik', Kedaulatan
Rakyat, op.cit., p.l. "Sekaligus menguji kemampuan aparatur negara RI sipil dan militer, dan waktu
itu Sri Sultan didampingi dua tokoh, Sri Pakualam sebagai Wakepda-Gubemur Militer DIY dan
Letkol Suharto Komandan Tertinggi TNI di DIY."
^''4 Windu Yogya Kembali 29 Juni Akan Diperingati Sri Sultan Hadir Membuka', Kedaulatan
Rakyat, 19 June 1981, p.l.
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efforts of the Sultan there would be no hidonesia.^^ Again, there is no mention of
Suharto's actions.
hi fact, of the fifteen major articles and editorials pubhshed in Kedaulatan
Rakyat between 15 and 30 June 1981, six mention the General Attack (not counting
the Ali Moertopo's introduction and the almost dismissive comments attributed to the
Sultan in an interview on 29 June).^^ hi bold print, to distinguish ft from the rest of the
text, one article even makes it clear that it was the Sultan who called Suharto to battle,
not Suharto taking unilateral action as was later asserted through the monument:

He ordered and hoped that there would be victory for the Indonesian
straggle having Dutch pledges for privilege or favour. After listening
to the news on the radio, Sri Sultan sent for Lieutenant Colonel Suharto
to come to the Palace to discuss the next step in the Indonesian straggle
and finally they came to the decision to ran the General Attack of 1
March through which they intended to reveal the traths behind the lies
of the statement that the Dutch had already beaten Indonesia. The
General Attack of 1 March then took place and succeeded.^''

Yet in the previous day's Kedaulatan Raykat, of 25 June 1981, a reahstic-style comic
strip appears, which clearly extols Suharto as the commander of Brigade 10, of
military sub-district Wehrkreise III. This suggests that the 1 March action was pivotal
in "letting the rest of the world know that the Indonesian Republic was still alive".^^
There is no discussion of Suharto's role as field commander. On 26 June a half-page
photograph appears showing a youthful Suharto with unarmed guerrilla fighters. The
caption reads: "Before the return of guerrillas to Yogyakarta, Lieutenant Colonel

^^'Meski Ditawari Mahkota 'Kaiser Jawa' Sri Sultan Tetap Berjuang Untuk Republic', Kedaulatan
Rakyat, op.cit., p.l.
^^H. Suprapto, 'Pikiran, Sri Paduka Kangjeng', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 29 June 1981, p.26.
^"'Yogya Kembali Berarti: De Victorie van Indonesia Begint van Yogya', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 26 June
1981, p.4. "Mamrih/menginginkan supaya perjoangan Republik Indonesia berhasil tanpa milik/ingin
mendapatkan janji janji Belanda untuk pribadi Sesudah mendengar berita radio tersebut Sri Sultan
lantas meminta Kedatangan Letkol Suharto (sekarang Presiden Republik Indonesia) masuk ke Kraton
untuk merundingkan perjoangan selanjutnya dan akhirnya diputuskan untuk melaksanakan "Serangan
Umum 1 Maret" untuk membuktikan kepada Dunia Internasional bawah berita Belanda seakan-akan
sudah dapat menundukkan Bangsa Indonesia itu tidak benar sama sekali. Terjadi Serangan Umum 1
Maret dan berhasil."
^•''Sun Ardi and Gesi Goran, Yogya Kembali [Comic Strip], 25 June 1981, p.2.
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Suharto with staff and forward fighters sometime before the month of June [1949]".*^
And again with Sultan Paku Alam in Kedaulatan Rakyat of 27 June'' and 25 June
photographed next to General Sudirman^' - also portrayed in a giant street banner,
again next to Sudirman.'^ Even though the Sultan is featured in every press article
produced by Kedaulatan Rakyat between 25 and 29 June he only appears in one front
page photograph

while Suharto is featured in two, together with one second page

feature, not including the cartoon strip mentioned previously. Finally, a front-page
photograph of the Dutch withdrawal on 29 June 1949 has the following leading
caption, just to make sure the Suharto message got a final ran.

Dutch Convoy: After being greatiy pressured, both on the battlefield,
which climaxed in SO [Serangan Oemoem or 'General Attack'] on 1
March as well as on the conference table, the Dutch eventually
withdrew their troops on 29 June 1949 from the District of
Yogyakarta.^'

The year 1981 demonstrates a significant milestone in the evolving story of 1 March,
because it illustrates a particular way that the New Order was beginning to use
history. Like the official treatment of the 30 September Coup in the months of
October and November 1965, the Yogya Kembali festival was a political and
historiographical ambush. What initially appeared to be a celebration of the TNI's 30
June return to Yogyakarta was hijacked to promote Suharto's role within the extended
version of the New Order propaganda discourse. The subtie debate above
demonstrates the momentum to have 1 March made synonymous with Suharto was,
by 1985, gaining the ascendancy. It was, however, as shown above, not completely
one way.

^^Photograph in Kedaulatan Rakyat, 26 June 1981, p.l.
^^Photograph in Kedaulatan Rakyat, 27 June 1981, p.l.
^^'Sedan Chevrolet Bersejarah Penjemput Jeneral Sudirman Ditemukan di Kampung Sapen',
Kedaulatan Raykat, 25 June 1981, p.l.
^''Ditandai Pameran Poster Perjuangan dan Hiburan oleh Artis Ibukota', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 29 June
1981, p.2.
'"Photograph in Kedaulatan Rakyat, 29 June 1981, p. 1.
^'Photograph in Kedaulatan Rakyat, 24 June 1981, p.l. "Konvoi Belanda: Setelah mandapat tekanantekanan yang bertubi-tubi baik di Medan pertempuran dengan puncaknya SO 1 Maret, maupun di
meja perundingan. Tanggal 29 Juni 1949, akirnya Belanda mulai melaksanakan penarikan munder
pasukannya dari 'karesidenan Yogyakarta'."
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One newspaper report characterised a level of subtie dissent. In 1985, after the
opening of the General Attack Monument in central Yogyakarta, concerns were raised
by Soedarisman, then rector of Janabadra University, Yogyakarta, which typified
what many people felt, but few were prepared to air publicly.^^ Soedarisman stated:
"ft was still unclear who demonstrated the first incentive [for the attack]. General
Nasution, Bambang Soegeng [Suharto's divisional commander] or the Sultan".^^
Soedarisman's comments show that in early 1985 ft was stih acceptable, or at least
possible, to suggest this line of argument. By November that same year Suharto had
put the matter to rest by establishing that such responsibility actually lay with him as
brigade commander for Yogyakarta. This reinforced the point with military power,
thereby silencing further discussion or challenges by Soedarisman, and anyone else
for that matter.
With the death of Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX in 1988, and the inauguration
of the Yogya Kembali Monument in 1989, key aspects of the battle of Yogyakarta had
been silenced. What is more, a historiographic template had been created by which
other non-official stories could also be silenced, or in the case of the kilhngs of 1965,
kept silent. A plethora of articles in fact appeared in the Indonesian press between 5
and 9 November 1985 which forcefully and confidently stating the Suharto case. This
was given a sense of urgency with the announcement of a 1 July 1985 final deadline
to find funding for the constraction of the Yogya Kembali Monument.^'* Curiously,
these press reports did not once indicate that the focus of the Monument would be 1
March but rather the focus remained, temporarily, on the Dutch withdrawal of 29-30
June.
By November of the same year even this discussion had been silenced. For
example a 5 November article in Pelita, quoting Suharto, stated that the attack was
'entirely Suharto's initiative'. This was accompanied by a photograph of General
Sudirman personally inspecting troops under the command of Suharto, with a caption
indicating the photograph was taken immediately prior to the March attack.^^ This
was accompanied by a photograph of Suharto with a detachment of guerrilla
^^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1997.
'^'Perlu Diteliti Siapa Pemberi Komando Pertama Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949', Suara Merdeka, 27
October 1985.
'^'Monumen "Djogja Kembali" dibanguan di Ngaglik', Kompas, 1 July 1985; 'Sri Sultan: Dengan
Peristiwa Yogya Kembali Sejarah Indonesia Menjadi Lain', Suara Karya, 2 July 1985; and 'Ada Nilai
Sejarah Perjuangan Bangsa Dari Pembebasan Penjajah Belanda', Berita Buana, 1 July 1985.
^^'Jenderal (Purn) Soeharto Tegaskan Fakta Sejarah', Pelita, 5 November 1985, p.2.
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fighters,

96

as was an article of the same day in Sinar Harapan^'' and a 7 November

interview with Suharto in Pikiran Rakyat^^ hi Merdeka of 9 November 1985 Suharto
suggested that his actions were taken in a "governmental or political vacuum"^^ - not
coincidentally also a vital component of the 1 October 1965 story.
In Terbit of 5 November 1985, Suharto pubhcly invited "hving eyewitnesses"
to testify to his leading role in the General Attack.'°*^ Although never acted upon, this
manoeuvre was highly effective. As with the guerrilla fighters who gave their lives
and were immortalised on the walls of the rana at the Yogya Kembali Monument five
years later, the call to substantiate the Suharto story by 'actual eyewitness fighters'
made it difficult to criticise the story without criticising the Revolution or more
precisely, the sacrifice of local fighters. For this reason 1985 clearly showed a
growing distance between durational remembering and the chronological reconfiguration of the Revolution for contemporary political ends. This process had the
effect of neutralising any possibility that eyewitness reports of the killings would ever
surface. By determining what were, and were not, acceptable eyewitness accounts
(without any intention of facilitating their telling), Suharto's growing power to create
history in the present was almost complete. Even Rector Soedarisman was intimidated
into making a statement that: "praised the open manner in which the President was
considering the issue [of who initiated the General Attack]" with General Nasution
publicly reinforcing the Suharto position by stating that Sudirman was "very satisfied
with Suharto's initiative in Yogyakarta".
As far as real 'eyewitness' accounts were concerned, the historiographical
options were to acquiesce or remain silent. The son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono DC,
Sultan Hamengkubuwono X, for example, was conspicuously absent from the entire
1989 proceedings, with Sultan Paku Alam Vlll attending as the 'duty' royal in order to
curry favour of his own with the New Order vis-a-vis Hamengkubuwono X, and his

96.

Presiden Tentang Serangan 1 Maret 1949', /STom/^a^, 5 November 1985 p.2.
Sekitar Serangan Umum 1 Maret Di Yogyakarta: Soeharto: Kalau Ragu-ragu Tanyakan Pada
Jenderal Nasution Dan Sri Sultan', Sinar Harapan, 5No\emheT 1985, p.2.
^^'Wawancana Dengan Presiden Soeharto', 1 November 1985; 'Ihwal Pemberi Komando Serangan 1
Maret 1949', Pikiran Rakyat,! November 1985, p.2.
'''Sebuah Episode Revolusi 1945', Merdeka, 9 November 1985, p.2.
'°°'Serangan Umum 1 Maret 1949 Untuk Bantah Kebohongan Belanda: Presiden Persilahkan Saksi
Saksi Hidup Bicara', Terbit, 5 November 1985, p.2.
'°'lt was reported that Sudirman described Suharto as a "Flower of battie". "Pak Dirman pusas sekali
dengan keadaan daerah Yogya. Dalam salah satu surat beliau kepada saya, disebutkan bawah Letnan
Kolonel Soeharto adalah sebagai 'bunga pertempuran'," in 'Pak Dirman Sebut Soeharto Sebagai
Bunga Pertempuran', Kompas, 6 November 1985, p.2.
97 4
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ambition

to remain

Govemor

of

Yogyakarta.'^^ Following

the

death of

Hamengkubuwono IX it appears that Suharto no longer required the vicarious
legitimation of the Royal Household of Yogyakarta alone, which had been an integral
component of the 1981 Yogya Kembali festival launch. Rather the new launch was
attended by New Order luminaries Professor Haryati Soebadio, Radinal Mochtar,
loop Ave, G.P. Poeger (a Javanese Prince and educated official) the celebrated writer
Umar Kayam, Suparto, Amrin Siman and Noer Saidi.'°^
Suharto now had virtual impunity to advance his historiographical agenda.
Any potential challenge from the historical persons of Sukarno, General Sudirman or
Hamengkubuwono IX had been neutralised. Rather their contributions now appeared
as mere footnotes, devoid of analysis or criticism of the historical aims of the Yogya
Kembali Monument: precisely the same fate as representations of 1965, which as
argued in chapter two were dominated by the propaganda account of the 30
September Coup. Even the Yogya Kembali Monument museum curator acknowledged
this in private.'°'' The fact that at the same time Suharto gave equal treatment to major
restoration works at Borobudur and Prambanan, the Indonesian National Museum and
the Indonesian Museum of Clove Cigarettes further blurred the lines between politics,
popular culture, propaganda, history, and absurdity.

Recently, a number of projects in Central Java and Yogyakarta, i.e.
Museum Negeri and Museum Kretek, Yogya Kembali Monument,
Taman Wisata Candi Borobudur and Prambanan have been completed
and will be officially opened. These projects will be opened after years
of constraction, which took time and effort. They were warmly
welcomed and expected to serve their purpose. These museums and
monuments will become a significant source of information for our

'"^'Mewujudkan Cita-cita Nasional Tugas Generasi demi Generasi', Kedaulatan Raykat, 7 July 1989.
'"'''Presiden Akan Meresmikan Monument Yogya Kembali 6 Juli', Kedaulatan Raykat, 21 June 1989.
Haryati Soebandio, a former Director General of Culture and relative of Nugroho Notosusanto, was
acting in her capacity as Minister for Social Affairs. Her replacement as Director General was Poeger, a
Javanese aristocrat from Solo. His attendance was both formal and symbolic of Suharto's developing
relationship with the Royal Court of Surakarta through his wife Tien Suharto. loop Ave was Minister
for Tourism, quite a colourful character; Umar Kayam was a celebrated and best selling author.
'"^Confidential interviews, Yogya Kembali Monument, Yogyakarta, August 1997 and August 1998.
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nation's history, as well as that of retrospection about our past and
comprehensive knowledge about historical matters preserved there.'°^

hi pre-launch publicity to announce the inauguration date, Suharto was quoted as
suggesting that: "The [Yogya Kembali] Monument has equal historical status with the
ancient temples of Borobudur and Prambanan".'°^ Kedaulatan Raykat of 6 July 1989,
quoting Suharto loyalist Harmoko, in the article, 'The Constraction of the Monument
Points to Historical Consciousness', commented that the Yogya Kembali Monument
was traly a means of "passing historical consciousness from one generation to the
next".

Even the official terminology 'guide' is explicitiy employed to describe the

process of producing a new type of historical knowledge.

The constraction of Yogya Kembali Monument in fact leads towards a
form of guidance about historical awareness from the older generation
to the new one, the history that recorded long ago stories of a
generation.

Indonesians would clearly and comfortably leam their national history
on account of the scenes of historical events vividly pictured in
dioramas. For the Indonesian people, the Yogya Kembali Monument is
traly something to be proud of.'

'"^'Sekitar Peresmian Monumen dan Museum', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 6 July 1989. "Hari-hari ini
beberapa projek di Jawa Tengah dan DIY telah dan akan diresmikan. Museum Negeri dan Museum
Kretek Monumen Yogya Kembali Taman Wisata Candi Borobudur dan Prambanan. Proyek-proyek
tersebut diresmikan setelah dikerjakan beberapa tahun dengan pengorbanan Maya dan tenaga.
Masyarakat akan merasa gembira bila proyek-proyek itu seusai diresmikan dapat berfungsi seusai
tujuan. Museum dan Monumen masing-masing dapat menjadi bahan informasi tentang sejarah,
menjadi bahan permenungan tentang masa lalu dan menambah pemahaman tentang semua yang
tertata dalam museum dan Monumen."
'"^'Presiden Akan Meresmikan Monumen Yogya Kembali', Kedaulatan Rakyai 21 June 1989.
'"'''Pembangunan Monumen Yogya Kembali Tunjukkan Adanya Kesadaran Sejarah', Kedaulatan
Rakyai 6 June 1989.
"^Ibid. "Pembangunan Monumen Yogya Kembali sebenarnya menunjuk ke arah pembinaan kesadaran
sejarah oleh sebuah generasi ke generasi berikutnya, yang lebih merupakan hasil rekaman kondisi
kelampauan pada sebuah generasi..."
'°^'Hari Ini Diresmikan Pak Harto: Monumen Yang Sarat Makna', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 6 July 1989.
"Dari diorama-diarama dalam monumen itu pulalah, warga Indonesia bisa mempelajari sejarah
nasional itu dengan enak dan jelas karena adegan demi adegan ditampakkan seperti kejadian yang
sebenarnya. Monumen Yogya Kembali memang merupakan munumen kebanggaan Bangsa Indonesia."
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This sentiment was repeated on 7 July in Kedaulatan Rakyat under the headline
'Giving shape to a sense of national responsibihty from generation to generation'."^
hi only two local articles are the dates of the 29 or 30 June mentioned after
this time. Both stories are in Minggu Pagi. The first, in edition number four, 9 to 15
July 1989, suggested that Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX gave his blessing to the
concept of the Yogya Kembali Monument by laying the foundation stone prior to his
death. Sukamo and Hatta are only mentioned in passing.'" This article, which is in
marked contrast to the Socialist character of pre-September 1965 editions of Minggu
Pagi, emanates from a vastiy changed publication (and a vastly changed Indonesia),
by this time regarded as a "GOLKAR mouthpiece"."^ In the second Minggu Pagi
article, 29 June is neutralised by a buoyant Suharto who, in response to a question
from a journalist, suggested that the "really significant date was not 29 June, 30 June
or 1 March 1949, but 6 July 1949", the date the Republican govemment returned to
Yogyakarta."^
Suharto's point should not however be constmed as evidence of a lack of
consistency. Rather the fact that in 1949 General Sudirman and other TNI leaders
were reluctant to accept the authority of civilian politicians who, they alleged,
deserted the Republic at its darkest hour, demonstrates that Suharto was capable of
selecting dates to suit the occasion. The significance of Suharto's comments regarding
the patemalistic responsibility of ABRI would not have been lost on listeners or
readers. The clear message on the day of the Yogya Kembali inauguration was that:
ABRI (read Suharto himself) would not let the Republic down. Hence the significance
of Suharto choosing 6 July as the inauguration date.

According to Pak Harto, it is worth noting the sequence of events
known as Yogya Kembali, the most important thing is 6 July 1949,
when Yogyakarta re-operated as the capital of Indonesia. Not any other
date. Accordingly, the opening of this Monument, along with that of
Borobudur and Prambanan, were chosen to be held on 6 July

""'Mewujudkan Cita-Cita Nasional Tugas Generasi demi Generasi', Kedaulatan Raykat, 1 July 1989.
'"'Monumen Yogya Kembali Diresmikan Pak Harto', Minggu Pagi no. 14, 9 to 15 July 1989.
"^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997.
"^'Mewujudkan Cita-Cita Nasional Tugas Generasi demi Generasi', Kedaulatan Raykat, 7 July 1989.
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remembering the same day forty years ago. Pak Harto was handsome
at that time.""

This point is reinforced in almost every newspaper report during 1989. The 'fact' was
argued that 'ABRI and The People' could be counted on - an implicit criticism of
civilian politics, in particular Guided Democracy. Not only were other dates and
persons silenced by the imposition of this exclusive narrative, but also other forms of
non-military straggle. This is home out in the comments of Suharto loyalist General
Widodo who featured prominentiy in the inauguration preparations.

The Dutch always tried to destroy Yogyakarta. Yet all of their attempts
failed, owing to the People and TNI, which came together to fight with
guerrilla tactics."^

In a post-launch feature of 7 July 1989, Kedaulatan Raykat concentrated on the
symbolic aspects of the Yogya Kembali Monument. There is no mention of General
Sudirman, the past or present Sultans of Yogyakarta, or Sukamo. As suggested by
Pemberton,"^ the Suharto story had been parcelled up for mass consumption in terms
of culture and history as one homogeneous package: the General Attack, to the 30
September Coup and on to the New Order's anti-communist, pro 'development'
vision of the future. Indeed the monument's diorama exhibit purposely blurred time
lines. This created the impression that the New Order was the natural evolution of
previous historical epochs, yet timeless. The impression was that the New Order had
always been in existence and would continue forever, with the Sukarno or 'Old Order
era', brashed aside, in fact declared an aberration typified by communism.

""'Presiden Suharto Di Monumen Yogya Kembali: Mengingat Cerita Panjang Perjuangan Kita',
Minggu Pagi no. 15, 16 to 22 July 1989. "Menurut Pak Harto dari serangkaian peristiwa beruntun
yang disebut Yogya Kembali itu, "Yang penting adalah tangal 6 July 1949, beifungsinya kembali
Yogyakarta sebagai ibukota negara. Bukan tanggal lain. Karena itu, peresmian monumen ini pun,
bersamaan dengan itu diresmikan pula Taman Wisata Candi Borobudur dan Prambanan, diambilkan 6
July empat puluh tahun lalu itu, Pak Harto, memang bagus, tampan."
"^'KR' Isis Monumen Yogya Kembali 'Dulu Kertasnya Nyolong di KR', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 27 June
1989. "Belanda selalu berusaha menghancurkan Kota Yogya. Manun usaha Belanda selalu gagal
karena kesigapan tentara dan rakyat, yang secara bersama sama sating bahu-membahu melakukan
perlawanan, dengan siasat perang Gerilya."
"^Pemberton, op.cir.
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Quoting President Suharto's statement, the Director General said that
the diorama was arranged in chronological order, starting from the
period of Sultan Agung, Diponegoro. The following dioramas are the
periods of Dutch and Japanese occupation. The north side of the
building's diorama is of the period of Indonesian proclamation and the
formation of ABRI etc. Following then is the period of the New
Order. "^

During the 1989 inauguration, a single, oblique, and veiled criticism of the
proceedings appeared in the Indonesian news magazine Tempo. This represents the
subtle means by which the Indonesian press were slowly beginning to discover a
politically safe way of criticising Suharto without attracting his wrath. The modest
length of the article is in contrast to the importance Suharto placed on the event. The
use of punning, a Yogyakarta tradition, was purposely intended to trivialise the Yogya
Kembali Monument and its message, therefore subtly challenging both.

As one of those who participated in the event, Suharto was wearing a
brown Monument staff shirt, the same uniform worn by the other
participants. This Monument is full of meaning. Geographically, this
memorial, which required 9.44 billion rapiah to build, is greatiy
influenced by philosophical values that have had deep roots since the
days Pangeran Mangkubumi built the city of Yogyakarta more than
two centuries ago. The Monument is situated on an imaginary axis,
which is strongly believed to have a magical power, in line with Mt.
Merapi, Tugu, Keraton, Krapyak, and the South Sea. The idea to build
this Monument originahy came from Colonel Soegiarto. When he was
still the Mayor of Yogyakarta in 1983, he brought up the idea, which
was then positively welcomed by his colleagues ... ft took four years
to build this Monument. What now is confusing is, "We still have to
dwell on finding the funds for maintenance," said Soegiarto. The

"'''Gapura Papart Ambuka Jagad 4 Gerbang Menuju Kejayaan', Kedaulatan Rakyai 7 July 1989.
"Mengutip penjelasan Presiden Suharto Dirjen mengatakan, penyusunan diarama ini perlu periodisasi
mulai dari Sultan Agung, Diponegoro. Periode kedua jaman Belanda dan Jepang. Gedung sebelah
utara diorama yang sudah dimulai dengan peristiwa kemerdekaan dan bengungan ABRI dan
sebagainya. Periode keempat, Orde Baru."

251

Yogya Kembali Foundation, who will possibly manage the Monument,
should find a way to figure it out. "We need 300 million rapiah a year
for basic maintenance", stated Soegiarto. ft seems impossible to rely on
visftors' admission, which is projected to be 250 rapiah per person for
domestic tourists and $US3 for foreign tourists. From this admission,
the annual estimation will be no more than 25 to 30 million. Soegiarto
hopefully commented: "If only the manager can manage to gain funds
up to two billion and then put the money in the bank, the interest would
be enough to cover the maintenance expense and pay the salary"."^

"^I Made Suarjana, '408 Nama di Dinding Rana', Tempo, 17 July 1989. "Waktu itu 29 Juni 1949.
Tentara Belanda menarik diri dari Ibu Kota Republik Indonesia, Yogyakarta, dan seminggu kemudian,
6 Juli para pemimpin bangsa, terutama Bung Karno, tiba kembali di Yogya dari tempat pengasingan di
Bangka. Kembalinya Bung Karno dari pengasingan dinyatakan sebagai hari berfungsinya kembali
Pemerintah Republik Indonesia. Maka, 6 Juli itulah dinyatakan sebagai peristiwa 'Yogya Kembali'.
Sebelumnya peristiwa 'Yogya Kembali' (YK) ini selalu dirayakan setiap 29 Juni 'Jadi kalau kita
rayakan 29 Juni berarti kita merayakan tentara Belanda meninggalkan Kota Yogya' ujar R. H.
Soerjono, salah seorang pelaku peristiwa YK. Dengan alasan itu, pada 6 Juli 1989 silam monumen YK,
yang berdiri megah di utara Kota Yogya itu, diresmikan Presiden Soeharto. Sebagai seorang pelaku,
Soeharto hari itu mengenakan hem cokelat, dengan motif logo monumen, sama dengan yang dipakai
para pelaku YK lainnya. Monumen YK ini sarat makna. Dari segi letaknya saja, monumen yang
menelan biaya Rp 9.44 milyar itu sangat memperhatikan nilai-nilai filsafat yang sudah tertanam sejak
Pangeran Mangkubumi membangun kota Yogyakarta, lebih dari dua abad yang lalu. Monumen ini
berada pada poros imajiner - sangat dipercaya mempunyai kekuatan magis - antara Gunung Merapi,
Tugu, Keraton, Krapyak, dan Laut Selatan. Persisnya di dusun Jengkang, Sariharjo, Sleman, 9 km
utara Keraton. Gagasan membangun monumen ini datang dari Kolonel (Purn.) Soegiarto. Ketika masih
menjabat Wall Kota Yogyakarta, 1983, ia melontarkan ide ini dan mendapat tanggapan positif dari
rekan-rekannya sesama pelaku YK. Kini monumen itu berdiri di atas areal seluas 55.680 m , berbentuk
gunungan yang dipancung pucuknya. Tinggi monumen 31.80 meter dengan diameter bawah 45.60
meter. Sedangkan bagian atasnya berdiameter 5.40 meter. Monumen ini dibangun dengan sistem
struktur beton pratekan, dikombinasikan dengan struktur beton konvensional Bangunan induk
monumen ini terdiri tiga lantai Lantai I seluas 4.462 m^, dibagi menjadi beberapa ruangan, antara
lain: museum, perpustakaan, aula, ruang musala, kantin. Kemudian lantai II 1.252 m , ruang yang
menggambarkan peristiwa sejarah perjuangan bangsa, dalam bentuk diorama dan relief Ruangan
bunda di lantai III, yang bergaris tengah 28.50 meter - disebut Ruang Grabha Graha, yang berarti
tempat kelahiran - merupakan ruang hening. Lantai ruangan ini berlapis batu bintang, dan persis di
tengah atas terdapat lubang bergaris tengah 1.80 meter. Cahaya matahari dari luar masuk melalui
lubang ini Di ruang inilah pengunjung bisa mendengarkan pesan lisan pak Harto lewat rekaman. Di
bagian depan monumen ini terdapat plaza. Plaza dengan bangunan induk dibatasi oleh rana atau
sketsei sebuang dinding beton tingginya 3 meter dan panjangnya 60 meter. Di sini tercantum 408 nama
dari 632 pahlawan yang diketahui gugur pada masa Clash II di wilayah Wehrkreise III. Monumen YK
ini dibangun selama empat tahun. Yang kini membingungkan, 'Kami masih harus memikirkan
bagaimana mencari dana untuk biaya perawatannya,' ucap Soegiarto. Yayasan YK, yang kemungkinan
akan mengelola monumen ini perlu putar otak. 'Kami membutuhkan biaya perawatan Rp 300 juta per
tahun,' ujar Soegiarto. Dana sekian itu amat muskil diperoleh dari tiket masuk pengunjung, yang
menurut rencana Rp 250 per orang untuk turis domestik dan tiga dolar untuk turis asing. Dari tiket
masuk ini setiap tahunnya diperkirakan hanya terkumpul Rp 25 sampai 30 juta. Soegiarto hanya bisa
berangan-angan. 'Kalau pengelola nanti bisa mendapatkan dana Rp2 milyar, uang itu didepositokan
dan bunganya cukup untuk biaya perawatan dan gaji Pegawai'."
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The Tempo article is an example of the sort of careful, even oblique mode of criticism
that began to cautiously emerge in the late 1980s and eariy 1990s, despite Suharto's
power to control the media. The Tempo article appears to praise the official line, but
actually trivialises the aims and objectives of the monument by concentrating on the
colour of Suharto's jacket, and by raising the issue of where the funds for
maintenance were going to come from (especially given the tiny amount of revenue
the monument would collect through visitor ticket sales, a veiled poke by Tempo that
no one would actually want to visit the Yogya Kembali Monument anyway). Even
suggesting that ordinary people would want to listen to Suharto's recorded speeches
in special sound booths was in itself a form of satire.
Finally, the reference to the ambiguity between the 408 names celebrated 'out
of 632' - the accepted figure for the number killed in the General Attack - is a
commentary on New Order historiography that was seen to appropriate veterans and
suitable units that were ideologically consistent with Suharto's historiographical aims
and objectives at the expense of historical accuracy. The Tempo article was, however,
a token gesture. It had little or no influence on the people of Kidul. There is no real
analysis or criticism of Suharto's agenda in the Tempo article.
The trath is that in Kidul by 1997 the terms of remembering had been almost
completely redefined by a combination of anti-communist ideology and the integrated
propaganda chronology of which Yogya Kembali had become a key local component.
In Kidul, and elsewhere, this succeeded to the extent that durational representations of
the kihings were not only silenced but also became, in the most part, privately
unspeakable. When asked about the striking five-metre high granite statue of General
Sudirman in front of the Yogyakarta Legislature - sculptured from one boulder milled
on the slopes of Mount Merapi, and carried to Yogyakarta in 1958 by the LEKRA
artist Hendra Gunawan - not one person interviewed was even aware of the landmark.
This was despite the statue's prominent public position, and the political background,
deeds and historical significance of the person who sculptured it. The statue, hke the
history it represented, including the imprisonment of Hendra Gunawan after 1965, had
not only been silenced, it had become physically 'invisible'. In 1997, no one, except a
former political prisoner, was able to recall that Vredeburg had ever been a political
prison between 1965 and 1975. Only one person could remember that the site of the
Pizza Hut restaurant on Jalan Solo in Yogyakarta had been the former place of the
notorious military barracks, which had once held thousands of detainees for
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processing before imprisonment or execution. Few people were able to describe the
key events that occurred in Yogyakarta before or after the 30 September Coup, and
even fewer wanted to talk about specific details of the arrests, disappearances and
kilhngs of October to December 1965.
Yet everyone could recall the name of Suharto's unit, brigade and area of
operations during the Revolution - even the make and model of his favorite weapon,
an Austialian-manufactured Owen Gun, and his extiaordinary and 'heroic' exploits in
Yogyakarta on 1 March 1949 and in Jakarta on 1 October 1965 when he 'singlehandedly' delivered the nation from the 'treachery of communism'. Everyone in
Kidul could immediately recall the intimate details of the New Order propaganda
movies of the late 1980s, the names, ranks and biographies of the 'Seven Heroes of
the Revolution', whose bodies were hauled from the Lubang Buaya well on 2 October
1965, the name of General Nasution's slain daughter, and the words to the song
commissioned to inflame hatred of the PKI in October 1965. Almost everyone in
Kidul had visited the Yogya Kembali Monument, most more than once. All were very
aware of the immense social and personal implications of being labelled a communist
sympathiser. To illustrate this last point, one person in Kidul began to innocently
recite the flrst lines to the former Sukarnoist (and communist) political anthem,
NASAKOM Bersatu, but pulled himself up short when the shock of his indiscretion
awoke him from his daydream, and brought him suddenly back to the present, and to
the potential implications of expressing an illegitimate memory."^
However, consistent with the examples raised in the introduction to this thesis,
namely, the testimony of Nyi Mardiyem, the public poetry reading of Sitor
Situmorang and the publication of Ojo Dumeh, together with the use of the word
'nekad' to describe Suharto, the punning of the name of 'Yogya KembaT to 'MonjalV,
and even the Tempo article reproduced above, in late 1997 the government's
domination of historical memory did not translate into perfect control. This is also
borne out in a small number of oral testimonies in chapter four where some form of
durational remembering predominates. While the government had imposed its own
historiographical templates, and chronological memory dominated oral accounts
during the period of fieldwork, altemative stories of 1965 appeared poised to emerge
when the conditions of knowledge's emergence changed.

119,Confidential

interview, Kidul, August 1997.
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These examples represent a carefully concealed reminder not to forget,
directed at a public that had forgotten how to remember. These were in fact models
for how one might begin to negotiate the past in a way not proscribed by official
historiography. As the next chapter will demonstrate, in the immediate post-Suharto
period this new consciousness was conspicuous by irregularity and by what was left
unexplained - not by what was publicly stated, recorded or analysed. Because the
coup and the killings were characterised by separate and distinctive historiographies,
and because the propaganda story of 30 September 1965 had dominated the public
historiographical agenda for so long, it was not surprising that in the immediate postSuharto period the coup and the killings maintained their separate characters. The
evidence for this is that in late 1998, three months after the fall of Suharto, many
people in Kidul wanted to comment on new theories of the coup, but not one person
wanted to raise new information about the killings.

255

Chapter Seven
Sejarah Gelap Akan Terungkap:
The Dark History will be Exposed
Each and every nation in the worid has its own "dark history", so does
Indonesia. In Indonesia, the tmth behind concealed historical events
would slowly start to be revealed. Rob Goodfehow, a doctoral
candidate from the University of WoUongong, Australia, made this
statement in a discussion ran by Pusat Penelitian Kebudayaan dan
Perubahan Sosial (Research Centre on Cultural and Social Change) at
University of Gadjah Mada, 10 September 1997. "This fresh wind
blows slowly", he stated. It was this fresh new wind of change that he
found in a theatre performance entitled Carousel by Teater Garasi,
which aired representations of violence in Indonesia, in the novel Ojo
Dumeh by Agnes Yani Sardjono revealing the story of the Petrus
killings in Yogyakarta a few years ago, and in other articles in the mass
media. For now, Rob describes this new wind as blowing slowly, but it
will gradually become more and more intense, to the point where it
will overflow. Such a situation is something Rob is expecting some
time in the future. For this reason he believes that ft is the scholar's
role to anticipate this, otherwise the situation may lead us to a
'revolution' that takes civilians' lives, such as during the G30S/PKI.

During the crisis [of the last two years] it became clear that Indonesia
really is a "make believe" countiy, a heap of delusions. Of aU the ideas
that have been paraded for decades and that people have believed in,
''Sejarah gelap Akan terungkap', Bernas, 11 September 1997. "Semua negara di dunia mempunyai
"sejarah gelap" termasuk Indonesia. Di Indonesia peristiwa-peristiwa yang kebenarannya belum dapat
terungkap itu pelan-pelan akan menjadi terbuka. Rob Goodfellow, kandidat doctor University of
WoUongong, Australia, mengungkapan keyakinannya itu dalam diskusi yang digelar Pusat Penelitian
Kebudayaan dan Perubahan Social (P3PK) UGM Rabu (10/9), kemarin. 'Angin segar pelan-pelan
berhembus', ujarnya. Berhembusnya angin segar itu dijumpaipula ketika ia menyaksikan pentas teater
berjudul Carousel oleh Teater Garasi yang mengungkapankan berbagai kekerasan di negeri ini novel
Ojo Dumeh kaya Agnes Yani Sardjono yang mengungkap tentang Petrus yang terjadi di Yogyakarta
beberapa tahun silam atau artikel-artikel lain di media massa. Saat ini jelas Rob, hembusan angin itu
berlangsung pelan. Tetapi makin lama akan semakin besar dan terjadi banjir. Situasi seperti itu tidak
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not one could survive. Even so, this harsh reality was still not stiong
enough to produce any satisfactory change.^

The Bemas article translated above represented the flrst time that the possibility of an
alternative history of 1965 had been aired in a Yogyakarta newspaper. However while
the article marked a change in the way the violence was formally portrayed,
particularly as a 'concealed historical event', in Kidul this had littie or no impact on
the historical memory of the killings. Rather, in the months following the resignation
of Suharto in May 1998, a revisionist discourse of the coup unexpectedly emerged.
Furthermore, this was accompanied not by a greater openness about the violence, but
by nostalgia for the memory of Sukamo and Guided Democracy politics.
This chapter examines these changes. It compares new patterns of memory to
the mechanisms of historical silence that typified the 33 years of Suharto rale, namely
anti-communist ideology, the rapture of historical production at the point of fact
creation, and the systematic development of official historiographical guides to
memory, such as those associated with the Yogya Kembali Monument. It looks at how
by August of 1998, or one year after the testimonies in chapter four were complied,
cracks were beginning to appear in the New Order's ability to contain all analysis of
the 30 September coup and maintain the silence that dominated the killings for over
33 years. The themes this chapter will address are: the impact of changes in historical
consciousness on the people of Kidul and the implications of this for a comprehensive
understanding of Indonesian history?
In Kidul, neighbours and confidants suggested that the above comments to the
press were berani or 'brave', but not nekad or 'foolhardy'. In fact at the time a local
journalist suggested that the article written about me was used to see how far Bemas
could go in mentioning that there was an alternative to the New Order's rigid
explanation of what happened.'* In Kidul, however, the effect was unexpected.
Combined with a new discourse of the coup emanating from New Order critics in
dikehendaki Rob. Karena itu, ia mengharapkan peran para sarjana untuk mengantisipasinya. Soalnya,
Kalau terjadi 'revolusi' akan menelan Korban wong cilik seperti kitika terjadi peristiwa G30S/PKI."
^van Klinken, 'The Battie for History After Suharto', op.cit., pp.333, quoting Parakitri T. Simbolon.
^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, 12 September 1997.
''Confidential interview, Yogyakarta, 11 September 1997.1, in fact, had some direct experience of this.
In 1994 I published an article critical of development policy on the island of Bali. My sub-editor on the
Jakarta Post expressed the view that my work was being used to test Suharto's press liberalisation
commitment. This did not extend that far. The newspaper, in an act of self-censorship, banned me from
writing until my name "cooled down". This took two years.
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Jakarta, the article appeared to actually stimulate greater discussion and criticism
about the official history of the coup. Perhaps paradoxically, these conversations
became more cautious in respect to the killings, hi fact ordinary people expressed
their deep fears about the implications of revealing private memories of the violence
during the months of social upheaval prior to, and following, the resignation of
Suharto. To this extent, there was no new information about the killings forthcoming
in Kidul at this time. This was despite the growing atmosphere of political openness.
There was, initially, only a guarded willingness to accept that the events of October to
December 1965 were something best left alone: sing wis, ya wis.
Paradoxically, late 1998 and early 1999 did see historiographical revision
emerge, including biographies critical of the New Order regime,'' post-Suhartocentied nationalism, a renewed interest in decentralised local history narratives^ and
the recording of new exile and expatriate experiences.^ All of these showed a changed
emphasis at elite level from the highly controlled historical writing of the Suharto era
to more analytical or even critical accounts of the coup. However while the New
Order had lost the ability to unquestioningly impose official history on the prodemocracy city-based elite, the military was still very much in control at a local level.
In fact in the context of the political turmoil of the Habibie Presidency, ABRI took an
even more active role in maintaining the social status quo.
While Suharto was no longer in office, people in Kidul were under no
misapprehensions that he still controlled the TNI - in particular KOPASSUS and
KOSTRAD. Many ordinary people identified by the New Order as irrevocably
contaminated by communism also continued to fear the unwelcome attention of the
intemal security organisation Bakorstanas-D (for Daerah, or District). The great
majority of people in Kidul shared this anxiety, most of which, as established in the
oral accounts, had some family connection with the PKI or GERWANI. Therefore, at
kampung level, far from the scratiny of the newly-liberated and invigorated press in
Jakarta, the political power of New Order anti-communist ideology, and the residual
influence of historical templates - real or imagined - remained, even after the formal
^See Karia Leksono-Supelli, 'Kasah dialektika kaum Korban', in J.B. Kristanto ed., Seribu Tahun
Nusantara, Kompas Publications, Jakarta, 2000, pp.34-54; Kusnanto Anggoro, 'Uncovering the
Cemeteries of Truth', Jakarta Post, 7 April 2000, p.3; Budiawan, 'Menyingkirkan Beban Masu Lalu',
Kompas, 3 May 2000, p.4; Seno Gumira Ajidarma, 'Indonesia Sebagai Pasien Jung: Sejarah Tak
Terbuburkan', Kompas, 6 May 2000, p.4.
San Klinken, 'The Battie for History After Suharto', op.cit., pp.326-27.
"^ http://www.iisg.nl/asia/silenced.html op.cit., site accessed 12 September 2002.
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power stractures that nurtured them ceased to operate.' hi Kidul, the terms by which
altemate forms of historical knowledge about the killings could emerge remained
mostiy unchanged. Anti-communism had a life of fts own, in fact a momentum, which
carried its power to suppress memories of the violence beyond the end of the New
Order. This is not to say, however, that there was no change in the way the past was
re-negotiated.
Most people in Kidul expected Suharto to "make a come back and get his
revenge" [on those responsible for his down-fall]. Many people made the comment,
without elaborating, that the last months of the Suharto regime reminded them of what
they remembered it feft like during the end of the Guided Democracy period: "A
sense of something terrible about to happen".'° In fact ft was openly suggested that
mass revenge taking over "unresolved injustices" was expected to break out at any
time.

Most people therefore felt less, not more, confident about elaborating their

concealed experiences of the killings.'^ A distinction can be made between the
changes in historical consciousness at an elite or academic level, and at kampung
level. This explains in what manner and why there remained a significant difference
between the two in the immediate post-Suharto period.
An examination of newspaper and magazine sources in the relatively liberal
weeks and months following May 1998 reveal two very different discourses.
Discussions centred on a new interest in alternative accounts of the story of Suharto's
rise to power, especially the coup, but also the transfer of power from Sukarno to
Suharto on 11 March 1966. This was characterised by a remarkable retum, especially
amongst some Yogyakarta-based groups, such as students and artists, to the political
rhetoric of the Sukamo era.'"^ A comparison of post-Suharto Leftist political language
with the pohtical commentary of pre-September 1965 editions of Harian Rakyat, and
for that matter, Minggu Pagi, illustrates this.

Tanter, op.cit.
'Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1998.
"Ibid,
"ibid.
'^Ibid.
'^A number of people in Kidul requested that I not make any reference to our conversations about
revenge taking. These conversations were based on relationships of trust. This information was not
recorded and has not been used in this thesis.
"^Terompet Rakyat, see the first six editions from edition no. 1, December 1998.
'^During fieldwork in August 1997 I was only able to find one copy of Harian Rakyat in the
Yogyakarta Municipal Library. This had fallen behind a bookshelf. It was immediately confiscated by
staff, which appeared anxious to return it to the locked section of the library.
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hi the immediate post-Suharto period, when almost every aspect of New Order
mle was being questioned, fresh variations on New Order historiographical thinking
were emerging. This challenged the carefully managed treatment of the coup, while
excluding any mention of the killings. There were a number of notable exceptions.
However, these works did not deal with the violence of 1965 or with the silencing of
historical memory, but rather with the overthrow of Sukamo by the Suharto group
within the TNI and the suppression of democratic polity that followed. These histories
include Bambang Siswoyo's Bung Karno Dalang G-30-S/PKI,^^ the memoirs of Oei
Tjoe Tat,'"' and the work of Sulistyo, namely Palu Arit}^
Two rare exceptions were a July 1998 article in the Yogyakarta-based tabloid
Swadesi

(a foreranner of a new generation of tabloids that emerged with the

liberation of the tightiy controlled press under Suharto), and in December of the same
year, Vokal. The former featured a front-page story about Aidit, the former PKI
General Secretary, who was murdered in October 1965 somewhere between
Yogyakarta and Solo.

The story raised the question of who was responsible for

Aidit's disappearance. The article shocked people in Kidul.^' It caused great
uncertainty by actually mentioning the words 'murder' and 'national tragedy'. No one
was prepared to discuss the article, at all, although it was widely read, particularly by
students. There was no follow-up in Swadesi whatsoever. As illustrated in chapter
four, in October 1965 the name of Aidit went from national significance to complete

'^Bambang Siswoyo, Bung Karno Dalang G30S/PKI?, UD. Mayasari, Surakarta, 1988.
''Oei Tjoe Tat, Memoir Oei Tjoe Tat: Pembantu Presiden Sukamo, Hastra Mitra, Jakarta, 1995.
IQ

Sulistyo, Palu Arit, op.cit.
'%hn Olle, 'Sex, Money, Power: Amidst Screaming Headlines, the Tabloids are Recreating Political
Culture', Inside Indonesia, no. 61, January to March 2000. In the three months following Suharto's
resignation, the Ministry of Information approved almost 1000 new press permits. This is in addition to
the 200-300 existing ones under the New Order. Much of this press explosion consisted of cheap,
politically oriented weekly tabloids hawking news behind the news, full of scenarios, conspiracy
theories, sensational language, accusations and counter-accusations. The first to appear was DeTak, a
reincarnation of DeTik, which was closed down by the New Order in 1994 together with Tempo and
Editor. Other eariy post-New Order publications included Oposisi Bangkit, Kontras (Aceh), Demo
(Palembang), Bebas (Banjarmasin), and Vokal (Yogyakarta). The latter was aimed largely at students.
Oposisi from the rival Jawa Pos group, claimed to be critical and on the side of truth. Other political
tabloids with a national scope included Realitas (associated with the Media Indonesia group), Tokoh
(mostiy interviews with public figures), Siaga (established by GOLKAR figure Eki Syachrudin), Berita
Keadilan (focussing on the law and published by the same company that produces the PDI-P tabloid
Demokrat) and Perspektif Many others had national pretensions but were really only regional in scope.
This included Format and Mimbar Demokrasi from Semarang, Gaung Demokrasi in Jakarta and West
Java, Penta (Jakarta), Asasi (Aceh), and Opini (Solo).
^"'Tentang G-30-S/PKI Dibunuhnya D.N. Aidit. Siapa Bertanggung Jawab', Swadesi July 1998, p.l.
^'My landlord's wife had experienced the violence in East Java first hand as a teenager.

260

silence within a period of one month, not to re-emerge until the pubhcation of the
Swadesi article.

The thing about who is responsible for Aidit's murder still remains
sealed. Or, is it just a procedural fault? Since, however, Aidit was the
key PKI figure that knew every detail of the national tragedy, ft is the
task of history to respond to this misty question that has not been
brought into light until this day.^^

The Aidit story disappeared from the public domain as suddenly as it appeared.
People in Kidul simply did not know how to respond. The result was that the
discourse retreated back to the silences and was not discussed. On the other hand, a
general pre-occupation with the coup continued to dominate the popular press, and
kampung discussions, with articles typified by a mixture of new information,
speculation, ramour, official stories and popular myth. Many of these representations
were reinterpreted, even magnified by a growing nostalgia for the imagined 'golden
era' of Sukamo's pre-1965 Indonesia. The Yogyakarta-based pulp tabloid Vokal, for
example, had begun in late 1998 to print adventurous material about allegations that
Suharto was not only responsible for the coup but for the spate of 'Ninja' attacks on
prominent Islamic leaders throughout East Java, reportedly as a means of destabilising
Indonesian society in order to create a pretext for his faction of ABRI - in particular
KOPASUS - to stage a coup d'etat. The headline in Vokal read 'Suharto's Revenge:
Seven Towns to be Destroyed?' in which the former President is depicted as a
muscle-bound Hercules, with broadsword in hand, ready to strike down his enemies.
These accounts were characterised by a cautious breaking away from the
propaganda discourse as it related to the coup only.^^ The opening up of the general
debate about the meaning of 1965, with an emphasis on the coup, can be illustrated by

^^Ibid. "Kini yang belum dapat disingkap sedikitpun adalah siapa yang harus bertanggung jawab atas
dibunuhya Aidit? Ataukah itu merupakan kesalahan prosedur? Sebab bagaimanapun Aidit tokoh kunci
PKI paling banyak mengetahui segala ihwal tradedi nasional itu. Tugus sejarah untuk menjawab
pertanyya penuh kabutyang sampai sekarang belum ada titik terangnya."
^^An Interview with Hermawan Sulistiyo, 'Lifting the Lid on the Truth of 1965 Abortive Coup
Attempt', The Jakarta Post, 1 October 1998, p.l. In this interview Sulistiyo is careful not to appear in
any way pro- or anti-PKI. He is rather implicitiy sympathetic towards victims, and critical of Sukarno's
decision not to immediately ban the PKI, and thereby meet, what he described as, "the people's
demands". Sulistiyo suggests that Sukarno's recalcitrance resulted in the deaths of 400,000 people in
East Java alone.
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examining public documents from the period immediately before and then fohowing
the resignation of Suharto. This takes into account the deluge of often radical, antiNew Order material that appeared in the public domain from late 1997 and early 1998
onwards, hi fact during an August 1998 interview with senior members of the
curitorial staff at the Yogya Kembali Monument museum it was openly stated that the
sooner New Order propaganda influences were removed the better. This anti-New
Order sentiment was in contrast to an August 1997 field trip in which the official line
was strictly adhered to.^''
Press reports demonstrate a return in some media to the political character of
the period immediately prior to the coup - Leftist, Sukamoist, Nationalist, antiImperialist. The examination of these sources indicates that in terms of popular
political expression it was as if the 33 years of Suharto's rale had never happened.
Mechanisms that suppressed mass-based politics, so carefully managed by the New
Order through the electoral system, were swept away as some 150 new political
parties (many of them with a definite anti-Communist platform), registered as part of
the reform of the electoral system under President Habibie.^^ An indication of the
conservative nature of many of these new political organisations was that the
possibility of un-banning the PKI was not raised in any public form, nor was it
suggested by ex-PKI members in Kidul. This is in contrast to the violent anticommunist debate that erapted after December 1999 when President Wahid granted
permission for former members of the PKI living abroad to retum, setting off a debate
that culminated in an astonishing revival of anti-communist ideology, thus confirming
the worst fears of many people in Kidul.

Interestingly, people in Kidul treated any

discussion about the possible re-emergence of the PKI, in the context of reformasi,
with the same silence as the memory of the killings.
This changing political mood is typified by three examples. First, the writing
of Soebadio Sastrosatomo (Badio), former leader of the Indonesian Socialist Party
during the Sukamo era. Badio's 1997 and early 1998 writings show the distinction
between the political critique of the Suharto regime, the return of 1960s political

^"Confidential interview, Yogya Kembali Monument Museum, Yogyakarta, August 1998.
^^Many of these new political parties were used to bolster the 'Bahaya Laten Orde Baru', or the
activities of New Order power-holders who continued to dominate the Habibie 'Reformasi
Government.
^^Budiawan, 'When Memory Challenges History: Public Contestation of the Past in Post-Suharto
Indonesia', Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science, vol. 28, no. 2, 2000, pp.40-41.
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rhetoric and new interpretations of the historical memory of 1965.^^ ft was not
Badio's criticism of the New Order regime so much as the populist nature of his
analytical inquiry and the physical form of that analysis that was reminiscent of
Sukarnoist polity, and, as suggested, a new means of forgetting the kilhngs. Badio's
work, while deeply critical of the New Order, did not raise the killings as a topic at
all. In fact many representations of 1965 in the early reformasi period constituted a
continuation of the great silence - despite the fact that political conditions allowed for
the possibility of such a debate to emerge.
Second, this can be demonstrated through an examination of public debate
over Supersemar that briefly flourished in Yogyakarta in mid-1998 and which was
foUowed closely by people in Kidul. This debate directly challenged the legitimacy of
the entire New Order State system without raising the killings as the physical basis of
New Order power and de facto political and historical legitimacy. Third, it can also be
seen in other, more radical and marginal, examples of newly emerging post-Suharto
political literature, such as Terompet Rakyat (The People's Trampet) published by
Taring Padi, a group of radical artists and anarchists that sprang up at the site of the
abandoned Gampingan Campus of ASRI - The Academy of Indonesian Art - in mid1998. Again, the first edition of Terompet Rakyat published in December 1998 is
vigorous in attacking the politics of the New Order, the Suharto family, the TNI, the
West and Capitalism. However while it implicitiy promoted the political legacy of the
PKI, in particular the artistic influences of LEKRA, Taring Padi did not raise issues
associated with durational accounts of the 1965 violence. This was despite the
boundary-testing character of its ultra radical project.^^ These three examples will be
examined in tum.
Badio's work, published in late 1997, typifies the mainstream form of
remembering during the immediate post-Suharto period, including Kidul. ft was
Badio's broad appeal to 'the people', to 'social justice' and 'national economic
sovereignty' {yis-d-vis the Worid Bank-imposed reforms on the hidonesian economy
fohowing the onset of the 1997-98 monetary crisis) that distinguished his work.
Badio's books were themselves templates for openly, boldly, and pubhcly, criticising
the politics of Suharto. They illustrate that in the months following Suharto's

^''Badio's writing was in fact widely distributed in late 1997 through the extensive informal network of
student organisations in Yogyakarta.
^^Terompet Rakyat, Lembaga Budaya Taring Padi, Edisi Perdana, 1 December 1998, p.3.
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resignation, public remembering involved a political rather than historical critique of
the New Order, typified more by nostalgia than by current analysis. New Era, New
Leader: Soebadio Rejects the New Order Regime's Fabrication^'^ fohowed by 'The
Mount Lawu Insight: The Dosomuko Politics of the New Order Regime: Fragile and
Making the Common People Sujfer^^ not only physically resembled the printed and
pubhshed speeches of Sukamo, commonly found in Indonesian book stores and
public libraries prior to 1966, but in many ways also mirrored the anti-hnperialist
social justice themes prominent in the late Guided Democracy rhetoric.
In New Era, New Leader: Soebadio Rejects the New Order Regime's
Fabrication, the writer only mentions the violence of 1965 once, and this is in
passing. Badio uses the long accepted and widely employed neutral New Order
euphemism Peristiwa 65 or the 'Special Occurrence of 1965' to identify the period.
However Badio's writing almost exclusively focuses on the illegitimacy of Sukamo's
11 March 1966 Supersemar transfer of power to Suharto.

According to Suharto the letter of 11 March 1966 {Supersemar) can be
seen as a type of 'driver's licence'. But as everyone knows, the actual
Supersemar document has been lost. So for more than 30 years Suharto
traly has been a driver without a 'license'. This is the reality. How can
this be, Suharto - who is so concerned with the ways of Java - was
able to lose the 'national anointing', or according to modem
terminology, Suharto is not a legitimate leader to lead the New
Order?^' Suharto is surely powerful, but he is not [the legitimate]
leader of this country. The people therefore are experiencing a
'vacuum of leadership'. There is power but there is no leadership!
32

These are two very distinct issues.
^^Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Era Baru - Pemimpin Baru, Pusat Dokumentasi Politik Guntur 49, Jakarta,
1997.
^"Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Mount Lawu Insight: The Dosomuko Politics of the New Order Regime:
Fragile and Making the Common People Suffer, Pusat Dokumentasi Politik Guntur 49, Jakarta, 1998.
^'Sastrosatomo, Era Baru, op.cit., pp.4-5.
^^Ibid. "Bagi Suharto, Supersemar dapat dianggap ibarat 'SIM', surat izin mengemudi Tetapi seperti
semua orang tahu, Super-semarnya dikatakan hilang. Jadi selama 30 tahun lebih, Suharto sebenarya
menjadi sopir negara sonder 'SIM'. Ini kenyatan! Apakah itu suatu pertanda, Suharto - dalam
pengertian Jawa - sudah kehilangan 'Wahyu Nusantara', atau dalam terminologi modern, Suharto
sudah tidak legitimate (tidak punya wewenang sah) memimpin ordre baru? Suharto memang berkuasa,
tapi dia tidak memimpin bangsa ini Wong sekarang ini terjadi 'vacuum of leadership'. Ada penguasa,
tetapi tidak ada Pemimpin! Itu dua hal yang berbeda sekali."
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Badio's work concentrates on a number of areas of critique, namely the suffering of
the common people, the regime's abuse of the Pancasila ideology, violations of the
Rule of Law, the destraction of democratic processes, the suppression of the popular
press, and the nepotism, collusion and corraption that characterised New Order
monopoly Capitalism.'''* While he does write about human rights' issues, there is
conspicuously no specific reference to the killings. In the English-language translation
of Mount Lawu Insight: The Dosomuko Politics of the New Order Regime: Fragile
and Making the Common People Suffer the author specifically notes the following
concems about the New Order's abuse of human rights:

Ironicahy, the people who were supposed to enjoy the results of
development have become the victims of development itself. This is a
form of disrespect towards human dignfty, not to mention our position
in the eyes of the worid as the violator of human rights, even worse
than [the] Communist nations. The examples are the violations that
happened in Tanjung Priok, Lampung, Aceh, East Timor, Timika (ftian
Jaya), Sampang (Madura), Unjung Padang and the latest one in
Banjarmasin. All of these are proofs [sic] that the Dosomuko^^ regime
has trampled on human values. The Dosomuko regime of the New
Order is the root of the total crisis that the Indonesian people face
today.^^
For Badio, Suharto was metaphoricaUy the Dosomuko, literally 'the ten-faced (or tenheaded) evil King Rahwana', and the New Order was his kingdom, buift "by a regime
[that] was greedy, voracious, selfish, shameless, bratal, crael, tactful [sic] [and]
megalomaniacal".'' The New Order is portrayed as a modem day Alengka Diraja
Kingdom'' built on "falsehood, which has caused the common people to be
chained".'^ This falsehood is identified as the 11 of September histraction 1966 -

^^DosoiSuko is the Javanese Shadow Puppet's alternative name for Kmg Rahwana, m Indones an
sources for the antagonistic figure in the Ramayana epic. Literally, Dosomuko means ten faces or ten
heads'! which is ho^ he appears in his full demonic form. Rahwana was a greedy and mdeed demonic
King vvho seized Sita, the beloved wife of Rama, the hero of the epic.
^^Sastrosantomo, Dosomuko, op.cit., p.23.
^''The evil Kingdom of King Rahwana believed to have been located in modern-day Sri Lanka.
^^Ibid., p.4.
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Supersemar. Badio goes on to state that his aim in writing Mount Lawu Insight was
that:

Every time the common people encounter those in power, the people in
power never lead; as a consequence, my point of view, which is
different from the regime's, is accused of being subversive.'^

Despite the fact that Badio's 'insight' was distributed extensively in Yogyakarta's
kampungs through the local student network in late 1997 and eariy 1998, there are no
references to the ideology of anti-communism, or the pervasive nature of the Lubang
Buaya propaganda, which formed the ideological basis for Suharto's 33-year rale.
And while Badio raised the issue of 'root causes' concerning the nature of the New
Order regime, he never explicitiy mentions the violence following 30 September
1965, which was unquestionably the foundation stone of ABRI's success in late 1965.
Badio's second book was written in the midst of a period of profound political,
social and economic turmoil, and for that matter relative openness. Again the issue of
1965 was not included in his raft of concerns. In Badio's writing it is as if the violence
in 1965 never actually happened.""^ Badio talks about a 'reawakening', and a 'political
renaissance', but not a comprehensive change in historical consciousness about
Indonesia's violent past.

The [Badio's] insight is a resuft of sedimentation during my retreat at
Mount Lawu, Central Java. I observe that the socio-political condition
in Indonesia is decaying from day to day. The crisis happening now
has awakened us, whipped us [up], that it has caused the formation of
"a new reahty" that needs new understanding and [a] new solution,
with new contents, new dimensions and new paradigms.

Consistent with the thrast of Badio's writing, in the first months fohowing the fah of
Suharto, a form of historical nostalgia for Sukarno memorabiha appeared, including

^^Ibid., p.9.
'°Ibid., p.23.
"Ibid., p.25.
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demand for rare remaining copies of original Sukamo speeches and books.^^
hiterestingly, when asked whether he expected the same interest in Suharto
memorabilia, a second hand bookseller was quoted as saying: "No way. He [Suharto]
is not a good model for the countiy or the people".^' (A public statement of this kind
would have been unthinkable at any time prior to May 1998.) This same process was
mirrored in Kidul, where, during August 1998, people that had previously denied
having any pre-New Order literature, or any knowledge of this material, offered for
sale what would have been only months before considered very politically sensitive
material. This included original copies of Sukarno's two volume Beneath the
Revolutionary Flag

and printed speeches such as 'There will be no Compromise

with the Newly Colonised Nations',''^ 'Our Revolution is a Sociahst Revolution'"^^ and
Sukamo's final speech to the Indonesian Parliament in which he attempted to explain
his actions following 30 September 1965.^^'
Because of the rapid decline in employment and real wages during the first
months of the Asian economic collapse (December 1997 to Febmary 1998), many of
these works were now offered for sale as a means of raising money for basic living
expenses.''^ Another example of this material was an original and long-hidden copy of
the PKI poet H.R. Bandaharo's 1959 collection of works entitied From the Red
Earth,^^ and a copy of H. Roeslan Abdulgani's Sosialisme di Indonesia.'
Interestingly, faded photographs of Sukarno in full commander-in-chief uniform
quickly replaced the standard official photograph of Suharto as pre-New Order
material began to re-emerge from hiding places. Official photographs of President

''^Basrie, K. 'People Race to Sell Sukarno Memorabilia', The Jakarta Post, 7 August 1998, p.3. The
trend began around 1 August 1998 with the placing of a large number of classified advertisements in
most Indonesian newspapers for all manner of Sukarno memorabilia.
'hbid.
^"Sukarno, Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi vols. 1 and 2, Publication Committee of the Indonesian
Government, Jakarta, 1966.
"^Sukarno, Tidak Ada Kompromi Dengan Nekolim, Departemen Penerangan R.L, Jakarta, 1965.
''^Sukarno, Revolusi Kita Adalah Revolusi Sosialis, Departemen Penerangan R.L, Jakarta, 1962.
"^Sukarno, Bangsa Indonesia Djangan Sampai Merobek-Robek Dirinja Sendiri Departemen
Penerangan R.L, Jakarta, 1965 and Sukarno, 'Nawa Aksara: Amanat Presiden Sukarno Didepan Sidang
Umum M.P.R.R- Ke-lV, 1966', Dengan Pendjelasan Sebagai Progress Report, Indonesia, Yogyakarta
1966.
"^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1998.
"^H.R. Bandaharo, Dari Bumi Merah, self-published and printed by the Poet, Yogyakarta, 1959.
50fj Roeslan Abdulgani, Sosialisme di Indonesia, Jajasan Perguruan Tinggi, Malang, 1960.
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Habibie ' were nowhere to be seen in Kidul in late 1998, and were at this time only
found in government offices where their display was mandatory.^^
However what was to have the most profound impact on the people of Kidul at
this time was not the fall of Suharto per se - because this was generally anticipated by
most people from around the time of the December 1997 and the May 1998 Jakarta
riots - but the newspaper debate that publicly called into question the entire basis for
New Order formal political legitimacy, the Supersemar, or Letter of Instraction of 11
March 1966, which Suharto had consistently asserted was a real physical document
that authorised the transfer of executive power, thus declaring the New Order to be
'Constitutional' and therefore legitimate.'''' This was consistent with one of Badio's
main pre-occupations. The problem was that Suharto could never actually produce a
copy of the document, but insisted that it was 'in safekeeping'. No one in Kidul from
August to October 1997 felt that Supersemar was anything other than trae and factual.
The validity of the document was not raised once as an issue in interviews during
1997. As one person later commented in 1998, Supersemar was "the big lie".^^ It was
such a big lie that people simply could not imagine that Suharto could dare make it
up.^^ While criticism of Suharto over Supersemar was spirited, the implications of
such a falsehood appeared outside of most ordinary people's psychological and social
terms of reference. The analysis that Supersemar was the final act in the overthrow of
Old Order polity - including the role of the PKI within NASAKOM, and that this was
directiy connected with the outcome of the violence - did not emerge at this time.
The local outrage associated with these revelations was rather typified by
calling into question not only Supersemar, but other selected parts of the Suharto
story, including Suharto's role in the Revolution and even his role in the coup. The
question at the back of many peoples' minds at this time was, suppose that Suharto
himself was really behind the 1965 Affair? Many people expressed their profound
confusion with the possibilities, which ultimately had to lead them privately to the
^'it was reported by Adrian Vickers that photos of Habibie as President had the word 'WakiV in WakU
Presiden or 'vice-President' paper-whited out so that the same photograph could be used as the
mandatory Head of State photographs for Government offices and schools after he took over office
from Suharto in May 1998.
^^From a series of confidential interviews, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1998.
^^Confidential interviews, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1997 and August 1998. Anticipation was also
high because of the unusual volcanic activity of Yogyakarta's Mount Merapi. In local cosmology this
was taken to mean that a disturbance in the political worid was imminent.
^^Ibid.
^^Ibid.
'^Ibid.
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risky conclusion that ex-Tapols may have a right to assert their role as the victims of
the violence and not the perpetiators of the coup.^^ hi late 1998 this was perceived by
most people in Kidul as very dangerous thinking.
The August 1998 Supersemar debate was reported briefly, but extensively in
three Yogyakarta-based newspapers, widely read, and extensively discussed at every
level of local society from the unemployed kampung residents to university students
and Civil Servants. The basis of the stories in Bemas,^^ Kedaulatan Rakyat^'^ and
Jawa Pos,

arose from comments made by a former adjutant of Sukamo, who was

living in retirement in the neighbouring kampung district to Kidul. Soekardjo
Wilardijito, an eyewitness to the formal 'hand-over of power' in March 1966, had
remained silent for over three decades. (It was must noted that Soekardjo's statement
is uncorroborated and therefore open to question). Nevertheless in the era of reformasi
he was prepared to reveal he had been a witness to Major General Panggabean
holding a 45 calibre FN pistol to Sukamo's chest while Major General Basuki
Rachmat restrained the then head of state until he agreed to co-operate with Suharto's
demand to unconditionally hand over power. Wilardijito's revelations, and his
extraordinary desire to put the historical record straight, bewildered people in Kidul.
As one person explained:

We all knew that Suharto was cormpt and that his family were corrapt.
Everyone knew that his great fortune came from the common people.
We just overiooked ft as long as it seemed as if our hves were
improving. We even ignored the terrible behaviour of his greedy
children. I knew that what Suharto said about what happened here in
1965 were just lies, but we ignored that too. I was a teenager at the
time. It was like a long daydream when I look back on it. But what
shocked us most was the trae eyewitness account of Soekardjo
Wilardijito. There never was a Supersemar letter. This is shocking for
us. ft was one terrible lie. Now the common people really know that
"Budiawan, op.cit., p.38.
^^'Soal Supersemar: Kesaksian Soekardjo Perkuat Dugaan Sejarahwan', Bernas, 26 August 1998, pp.1
and 8 and 'Pemerintah Takkan Tanggapi Soekardjo', Bemas, 31 August 1998, pp.1 and 8.
^^'Kesaksian Wilardjito Soal Supersemar Dada Bung Karno Ditodong Pistol FN-45', Kedaulatan
Rakyat, 26 August 1998, pp.1 and 8.
*^°'Panggabean: Pengakuan Soekardjo Bisa Rusak Sejarah: Menyatakan Ada di Mabes AD Saat
Supersemar Diteken', Jawa Pos, 28 August 1998, pp.1-2.
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Sukarno's anointing was not at an end. Suharto is a thief. Yes. But he
is a thief of Sukarno's tme place in history. We know this now and we
are deeply shocked and angry to be tricked in this way.''

The articles in question, in particular those written in Bemas, beginning with a leader
on 25 August 1998, made exphcft reference to the 'historical significance' of the
claims in a front-page headhne the next day on 26 August. However by obliquely
referring to the banning of the PKI on the days after Supersemar the article only
tenuously linked Supersemar with the violence. The thrast of the article was rather to
question whose decision it was to ban the PKI - Sukamo or Suharto. For example, in
Soal Supersemar: Kesaksian Soekardjo Perkuat Dugaan Sejarahwan or 'Supersemar
Problem: Eyewitness Soekardjo Confirms Historical Suspicions', Bemas directiy
quotes the allegations of Sukarno's adjutant:

According to Soewarno, the presumption that Supersemar was actually
an act of coup d'etat had already emerged at the beginning. However,
historians didn't have enough evidence. We can be sure of this by
looking at the events that occurred a day after Supersemar was signed,
Soewarno stated. As said by Soewarno, on 12 March 1966 Lieutenant
General Suharto issued Presidential Resolution No. 1/3/1966 about
PKI dissolution, the one he signed on behalf of Mr. President
[Sukamo]. The Keputusan Presiden was in fact based on the letter of
command, which was made on 11 March 1966.
61

Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, September 1998. "Kita semua tahu bahwa Suharto korup
dan bahwa keluarganya juga korup. Semua orang tahu bahwa harta kekayaannya berasal dari rakyat.
Tetapi selama hidup kita baik-baik saja, kita seolah-olah tidak tahu. Kita bahkan mengabaikan
kelakuan buruk anak-anaknya yang rakus. Saya tahu bahwa yang Suharto katakan tentang peristiwa
yang terjadi di tahun 1965 adalah bohong belaka, tetapi kita mengabaikannya juga. Pada waktu itu
saya masih remaja. Kalau saya mengingatnya, rasanya seperti mimpi di siang bolong yang panjang.
Namun, yang paling mengejutkan kami semua adalah pengakuan saksi mata Soekardjo Wilardjito.
Supersemar tak pernah ada. Ini mengejutkan. Kebohongan yang sangat mengerikan. Sekarang rakyat
benar-benar tahu bahwa wahyu yang tidaklah lengkap. Suharto adalah pencuri Ya. Tetapi yang
dicurinya adalah tempat Sukarno dalam sejarah. Sekarang kita telah tahu dan kita sangat terkejut dan
marah ditipu seperti ini."
^^'Soal Supersemar: Kesaksian Soekardjo Perkuat Dugaan Sejarahwan', ibid., p.8. "Menurut Soewarno,
dugaan-dugaan bahwa Supersemar sebetulnya pengalihan kekuasaan sudah muncul pada awal awal.
Cuma, sejarahwan tidak punya bukti lengkap. Satu hal yang bisa itu peralihan kekuasaan, ungkap
Suwarno, bisa dilihat dari perkembangan sehari setelah Supersemar ditandatangani Menurut dia,
pada tanggal 12 Maret 1966 Letjen Suharto mengeluarkan Keputusan Presiden No. 1/3/1966 tentang
pembubaran PKI yang ditandatanganinya atas nama Presiden. Keputusaan Presiden itu, ternyata
didasarkan pada Surat Perintah yang dibuat tanggal 11 Maret 1966."

270

Curiously, in the same edition of Bemas, there was a reference to the propaganda film
Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI, in which a victim of ABRI's human rights' abuses in the
separatist war in the province of Aceh likened ABRI's treatment of Acehnese
Independence fighters to the same treatment the PKI aUegedly meted out to the
murdered generals. Despite the allegations surrounding the authenticity of Suharto's
claims about Supersemar, the New Order's propaganda discourse continued to be
used as a social and historical reference point in describing more contemporary forms
of violence.'^ For example the article stated that:

On the moming of 30 September he [the man's brother] was freed
without the official letter stating someone has been released from
prison. I remember it was the day before the Hari Kesaktian Pancasila
commemoration.

The

night before,

I watched

Pengkhianatan

G30S/PKI. I told my family that what they saw in the film was as
dreadful as what I have been through, especially the torture I
experienced on the days I was imprisoned.'''

The Supersemar expose continued to develop over the last week of August 1998 in
Jawa Pos and Kedaulatan Rakyat. Headlines aired even more explicit accounts of
what 'really happened'. For instance, '[Lieutenant General] Panggabean has Ruined
History','^ and 'A FN-45 Pistol Held to the Breast of Comrade Sukarno','^ and finally
in Bemas of 31 August 1998 the front page headline read, 'The Problem of Soekardjo
the Supersemar Order Witness not Reacted to', followed up in the same edition with
'Notes on Supersemar: When the Situation Heated up',

in which a great deal of

journalistic energy was spent discussing both the coup and Supersemar. Again the
regime propaganda line blaming the communists for the coup was prominent. For
example, a comment in Bemas stated that: "Since the emption of the 30 September

^•^Korban Kekerasan Militer Bersaksi Siksaan Persis Film G30S/PKI, Bernas, 26 August 1998, p.8.
^Ibid. Tanggal 31 September pagi dia dilepas tanpa Surat pemnebasan. "Saya ingat, kala itu sehari
menjelang upacara hari kesaktian Pancasila. Malamnya saya nontonfilm Pengkhianatan G30S/PKI.
Saya cerita kepada keluarga seperti itulah penjiksaan yang saya alami selama dalam penyekapan."
^^'Panggabean: Pengakuan Soekardjo Bisa Rusak Sejarah', op.cit.
^•^'Kesaksian Wilardjito Soal Supersemar Dada Bung Karno Ditodong Pistol FN-45', op.cit.
^^'Soal Kesaksian Supersemar Pemerintah Takkan Tanggapi Soekardjo', Bernas, 31 August 1998, p.l.
"•^Ibid.
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1965 Movement, the political circumstances in Indonesia became unstable. Evidence
shows that the PKI was behind the Movement".'^
However, after 31 August 1998 the Supersemar story disappeared from the
pages of the Yogyakarta press as the eyewitness's home was reported bumed down by
'unknown elements', much the same way as the article about the murder of Aidit had
dropped out if sight the month before. Wilardjito was forced into hiding, possibly
outside Yogyakarta. hi Kidul it was suggested that off-duty, or rather 'un-attached'
KOPASUS officers ahegedly had Wilardjito put on a "hit list".^° The local
terminology used was that Wilardjito would be diPKIkan - or "made to suffer the
same fate as a communist".^' Whatever the reason the story did not reappear. This
further added to the anxiety associated with conspiracy theories about "Suharto
getting his revenge on anyone whom dared to cross him", and of the general
implications of "disturbing the past".^^ Wilardjito's disappearance into hiding
contributed to the resolve of local people to remain silent. The pre-occupation with
the coup and Supersemar, and even public discussions about Aidit, never once
focused on the historical re-negotiation of the killings.
To a great extent, despite superficial appearances to the contrary, these new
pre-occupations can all be seen as extensions of a chronological mode of memory
management and therefore, indirectly, part of the process of maintaining the silence
surrounding the killings. Each arose out of an existing store of historical knowledge
and terms of reference. For example, even though these new themes were ipso facto
radical, they nevertheless drew on ways of remembering 1965 that were based on
terms set by the propaganda narrative, by the New Order re-writing of history, and by
the memory guides raised in the previous chapter. However most importantly, the
social context remained unchanged. The fear engendered by anti-communist ideology
continued to set the terms by which the past could be recalled in the present. Nothing
had really changed in respect to remembering the violence.
Ironically this is supported by the third of my examples, namely the extreme,
even violent anti-New Order representations found in editions 1-8 of Taring Padi's
^^'Catatan Seputar Supersemar: Ketika Situasi Terus Memanas', Bernas, 31 August 1998, p.l. "Sejak
Gerakan 30 September 1965 melutus, situasi politik dalam negeri Indonesia memang terus memanas.
Bukti-bukti menujukkan bawah PKI berada di batik peristiwa ini Namun, Presiden Sukarno kokoh
berpendirian bawah komunis tidak dapat dienyakhkan dari Indonesia."
™Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, August 1998.
^'Ibid.
'^Ibid.
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magazine, Trompet Rakyat (December 1998 until July 1999). These editions show the
adoption of a type of revolutionary anarchism that mirrored the political essence of
the mid-1960s. This supports the proposition that memory at this time was
predominantiy a form of nostalgia for Guided Democracy. Actually, Taring Padi took
their political inspiration not directiy from the reorganised PKI under Aidit, but from
the pro-Moscow colonial-era communist, Muso, who was killed by anti-communist
elements of the TNI following the Madiun Revoft, during the Indonesian Revolution.
The graphically violent wood block print images seen through the first eight editions
of Trompet Rakyat were consistent with the images of revolution prominent in social
realist representations of the late 1940s.
A contiast can also be made between the comic-book style polemical material
of Taring Padi and the govemment's mass-produced propaganda comic of 1985,
raised in chapter six, which outhnes the story of Suharto on 1 March 1949. hi the
Taring Padi publication entitled 'Freedom Comic', a farmer is seen to throw a
Molotov cocktail. The comic draws on 1960s' Marxist-Leninist revolutionary
rhetoric, ft is violent and provocative. Significantly Taring Padi succeeds in creating
its own silences by neutralising non-violent means of straggle against Suharto, just as
the Suharto comic neutralised a range of alternative stories not consistent with the
New Order project. Again the similarity is that both are means of creating forgetting
through popular contemporary representations. In the Suharto comic Suharto is
irrepressible. The line between the deeds of Suharto and the exploits of the enemy, in
this case the Dutch commandos, is unambiguous.
The Taring Padi material, including Trompet Rakyat, contrasts with messages
of peace, brotherhood and social harmony found in the same editions. It is as if Taring
Padi had emerged from a political and historical vacuum with only the distant,
sometimes inaccurate, memories of social activism reminiscent of some sections of
the PKI to guide them; a type of 'Chinese whispers', which ultimately led to a
distortion of the original message. The extraordinary thing is that there is no mention
of 1965 in the Taring Padi material, although in the post-Suharto period their rhetoric
became increasingly violent, culminating in depictions of assassinations of New Order
figures in edition 8 of July 1999. The activities of Taring Padi demonstrate that the
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process of remembering 1965 in post-Suharto hidonesia, even for those on the reemerging Left, was rather uneven and at times, confusing.^^
These examples are evidence of a new historical consciousness not associated
with durational remembrances of the kihings. The question is: How do the theoretical
assertions made in chapter one explain the irregular nature of memory in post-Suharto
Kidul? Foucault maintained that power determines the emergence of a particular
discourse.

Trouillot elaborated on this by asserting that power enters the story (in

this instance of the killings of 1965) at different times and from different angles, ft
first precedes the narrative proper, ft then contributes to both its creation and to its
interpretation. In history, power begins at the source, with the context determining
more than any other factor the mode of memory and the continued power to silence.^^
However as Foucault asserts, history is a story of narrative strategies that have
been created in the past but exist in the present. The power to silence alternative
accounts of the killings in those areas previously under the hegemony of the PKI
relied foremost on the power to establish a silence, and second to maintain it. New
Order anti-communism determined the way in which 1965 would be remembered
from the very point of fact creation, and as oral accounts have demonstrated, exerted a
powerful influence in terms of what was considered 'fact' at the time of the killings,
and which could be understood and later remembered.
The difference is that the discourse of the coup was never actually silenced by
the New Order, as the killings had been, but rather 'managed' to conform to the
Lubang Buaya propaganda and the ideological requirements of building a new state
system. The coup was celebrated and commemorated. As Minggu Pagi press reports
from October and November 1965 demonstrate, local political consciousness was
dominated by the coup, albeit a carefully crafted official version. The killings were
not. The story of Supersemar similarly was distorted, for political ends, but never
eliminated from historical consciousness. Supersemar was in fact inexorably
connected with the destraction of Old Order polity; the last act in a scenario that
began on the moming of 1 October 1965. Likewise, the overthrow of the Old Order
by the New Order was manipulated and mythologised but never silenced. It is then not
surprising that as discourses, the coup and Supersemar did emerge at a local level in

'^^Merebut Kota Perjuangan: SU. 1 March 1949, Yayasan Sinar Asih Mataram, Jakarta, 1985.
""•Foucault, On Power, op.cit., p. 103.
•'^Trouillot, op.cit., pp.28-29.
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the post-Suharto period. The vigorous, but short-lived interest in both stories during
August 1998 is evidence of this. In fact the same level of social and political risk was
associated with remembering the violence. However, as oral accounts demonstrate,
when stories of the killings did cautiously emerge, under terms of strict anonymity,
they were dominated by chronology and by the phenomenon of mythological types:
the teacher, the saviour and the betrayer, the ubiquitous victim. When the political
conditions changed after May 1998 the status quo remained almost, but not entirely,
unchanged.
One event in Yogyakarta in 1998 did briefly divert public focus away from a
pre-occupation with the coup per se. The one painting exhibition by Djoko Pekik,
entitied Indonesia 1998: Hunting the Wild Boar (5m x 3m, oil on canvas), held in
Yogyakarta on 16 August 1998, can be seen to initiate a unique process of dialogue
with the past in Yogyakarta. It marks an important tuming point in the story of
forgetting, although while the exhibition did not produce oral or written evidence of
changed historical consciousness in the community of Kidul, it did result in an
unexpected local change in the symbolism of Indonesia's violent past. The painting in
fact marked the emergence of new ideas, indeed both a new context and a new
template for negotiating the violence. Although complicated, what the painting also
did was validate ordinary people's fears about the possibihty that Suharto would
retum and seek revenge on those that had supported or celebrated his downfall.
Conspicuously, the painting, articles about the painting, and comments from
the artist himself, never explicitly or implicitiy referred to the coup (the preoccupation of Badio), or the Supersemar contioversy (the pre-occupation of most
people in Kidul in the first three months after the fall of Suharto in May 1998). Rather
the exhibition and everything written about it was concemed with exploring ways of
depicting the violence and of negotiating a way of dealing with it. hi this instance, the
dominance of chronological memory was directly challenged by the emergence of an
unexpected mode of durational memory - not oral testimony, but visual art.
Not coincidentally, the exhibition occurred during the first post-Suharto
celebration of hidonesian hidependence on 17 August 1998. The exhibition received
extensive local and national attention through both the broadsheet and popular press.

76ggg for instance Ridio Aryanto, 'Antara Mahkota dan Mishu', Tajuk, no. 13, 1 to 20 August 1998,
pp 36-7; Ahmad Solikhan, 'Djoko Pekik dan Sebuah Perayaan Hari Kemerdekaan', D&R, 22 August
1998, pp-62-3; M. Dwi Marianto, 'Bejo Yang Digen jadi David Copperfield: Dong Djoko Pekik', Citra
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The Sultan of Yogyakarta officially opened the exhibition, imbuing the message ft
carried with instant profile and credibility.^^ Press coverage was unprecedented, not
only in respect to the contioversial subject material and the fact that Indonesia 1998:
Hunting the Wild Boar was the work of a former LEKRA member and political
prisoner, but that it had been sold for $US 100,000 as soon as ft was put on the
market.^^
The first of the articles about Djoko Pekik appeared in Basis magazine, under
the titie 'Hunting the Wild Boar', hi this work, which was exclusively dedicated to
attacking Military-sponsored violence, the Catholic intellectual Romo Sindhunata
wamed, "the wild boar can return in another form".^^ The feature did not mention
Pekik's membership of LEKRA or his imprisonment. However what it did explain
was the painting's objective of depicting responses to violence through the medium of
art. For example the popular national newsmagazine D&R carried a full-page story
on 22 August 1998 entitled 'Djoko Pekik and a Type of hidependence Day
Celebration'.

In this article the question of the boar as a metaphor was raised.

Before this Djoko Pekik had completed a number of works on the
subject of the boar. Why swine? "I want to use an example. You want
to be a king, be a swine, you'll know what I mean in return",
commented Pekik. According to Sindhunata, Pekik's stream of thought
follows the ex-negative line because he doesn't look for the trath, but

Yogya, edition 2 to 3, 1998, pp.20-30; Tedy Novan, 'Berburu Celeng, Berburu Keserakahan', Media
Indonesia, 23 August 1998, p.8; Joko Syahban, 'Teriakan Dalam Diam: Kini kerap terdengar hujatan
yang menggerus Nurani, Tapi Djoko Pekik Membungkusnya Dengan Simbol', Gatra, 29 August 1998,
p.87; 'Dipamerkan, Kukisan Rp. 1 Milyar', Yogya Post, 15 August 1998; and later in, 'Runtuhnya
Kekuasaan Celeng', Kompas, 13 November 2000; and Hikmat Darmawan, 'Homo Homini Celeng',
Gatra, 22 January 2000, p.60.
^^'Celengnya Selamat: Sri Sultan HB X Urung Resmikan Pameran Djoko Pekik', Bernas, 18 August
1998, pp.8 and 15.
^^From a series of interviews with M. Dwi Marianto and Djoko Pekik's son, Gogor Bangsa, December
2001. See, 'Lukisan Publik Djoko Pekik', Tempo, 8 March 1999, pp.89-90; Fatchur, 'Jko Pekik Jualan
Celeng', Bulaksumur, vol. VII, no. 27, 1998, p.3; Sihono, 'Gambaran Keprihatinan di Indonesia: Tahun
2000, Matinya Seekor Celeng', Kedaulatan Rakyat, 12 December 2000; Sulistyawan, 'Ruwatan Celeng
Djoko Pekik', Vokai December 2000; and 'Djoko Pekik Tak Mau Lukisannya Keluar Yogya', Bernas,
12 December 2000, p. 10.
^''Sindhunata, Awas Celeng-Celeng Gentayangan', Basis, no. 9, September to October 1998, p.3.
^^'Sindhunata, Berburu Celeng', ibid., pp.48-60. "Suatu saat pernah, ketika badan leleh sudah, dalam
perjalanan dari Surabaya ke Yogyakarta, saya melihat bus besar melaju cepat Jalanan padat dengan
kendaraan, di antara mobil-mobU yang lewai bus besar itu kelihatan bagikan raksasa sombong yang
melangkah kelewat cepat Dari jauh terbaca, kaca belakangnya bertulisan kata yang bunyinga Celeng
Dhegleng."
^''Djoko Pekik dan Sebuah Perayaan Hari Kemerdekaan', D&R, 22 August 1998, p.62.
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the meaning of trath. 82

On 23 August Media Indonesia carried the headline 'Hunting the Wild Boar, Hunting
Gluttony'

in which the symbolism of the wUd boar [Suharto], was again raised:

Swine isn't just a kind of beast. But, ft represents bestial behaviour,
namely greed. Greed in the belly of the swine embodies the shattering
of people's sense of justice. In the background there is the picture of
multi-story buildings, fly-overs and other modern buildings block
people's view, reflecting the raler's greed.^^

In Gatra on 29 August the provocative headline read, 'A Cry from the Silence' [a pun
on the name of 'Pekik', which in Javanese means to 'cry out'],

in which dream

symbolism suggestive of political and historical forgetting was raised.

According to Pekik, the overflowing mass of people is not protesting.
Instead they are hunting for 'swine,' the creature fills Pekik's dream.
The overcrowding mass wears a harsh look. Among them, there is a
man with black-white stripped shirt - a symbol of a political prisoner.
There is a mysterious man wearing 'intellectual' eyeglasses and there
is also a tycoon. Pekik places popular art forms [into his work], namely
ledhek, tembem, jathilan and reyog^^ The breast of the dancer, or the
ledhek, looks very erotic, vividly displaying her cleavage. A fine art
observer Soewarno Wisetrotomo notices that this time Pekik's work is
^'^Ibid. "Sebelumnya, Djoko Pekik sudah melukis beberapa lukisan dengan objek celeng. Mengapa
Celeng" "Saya mau memberi contoh yang jelek Kalau mau jadi raja, jadilah celeng, nanti kamu tahu
sendiri akibatnya", jawab Pekik "Menurut Sindhunata, jalan pikiran Pekik adalah jalan pikiran exnegativo karena ia tidak mencari kebenaran, tapi mana kebenaran."
^^'Berburu Celeng, Berburu Keserakahan', Media Indonesia, 23 August 1999, p.20.
^^Ibid. "Celeng bukan sekudar nama binatang saja. Celeng juga simbolisasi perilaku bebinatangan itu
sendiri yaitu keserakahan. Keserakahan yang ternanam dalam perut celeng itu berisikan cerai
burainya seadilan rakyat. Latar belakang-lukisan dengan gambar gedung gedung bertingkat. Jalan
layang dan bangungan dan modern lainnya, yang membentengi rakyat menjadi cermin atas
keserakahan penguasa."
^^'Teriakan Dalam Diam', Gatra, 29 August 1998, p.87.
^^Ledhek means a female dancer who performs publicly and receives money which is slipped into her
cleavage by [usually] men; tembem is a type of clown, usually also a woman; jathilan is a popular
public*show consisting of dancers, musicians, and 'horses' made of woven-bamboo 'bark'; reyog is also
a popular show that looks like jathilan, but the main dancer [only one] wears a large mask made of
peacock feathers - both shows [jathilan and reyog] are also a form of martial art.
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saturated with political themes - expressing the accumulation of this
country's social, political, and economical realities. Soewamo strongly
senses Pekik's ideological background that is quite left. "But his
commitment to humanity is [also] very deep", says the Indonesian
Institute of Art Yogyakarta lecturer to GATRA. ^^

Djoko Pekik's former status as a political prisoner and member of LEKRA was not
raised in any article associated with the exhibition, except the above, although the
reference to 'the prisoner' in the painting would have been obvious to anyone
interested in the painter's work or subject matter - this was made very explicit in a
later article in Kompas on 13 November 2000^^ (an indication of how much had
changed). At the time of the August 1998 exhibition, however, the importance of the
painting's non-verbal symbolism, Djoko Pekik's reputation and the message of the
painting was not lost on those who attended the public exhibition or who were
exposed to the media coverage.
The painting relates to a well-known local folk tale about the village of
Ambarawa, Central Java. It tells the story of a husband and wife who wished to
become rich. Their rapacious plan involved one of them becoming a

babijadijadian,

babi ngepet, or 'a magical and evil pig', through a process of supernatural
transformation. According to legend, the babi ngepet has the ability to suck the
material wealth from common people, an unambiguous reference to Suharto. The
story suggests that even if the boar is trapped and killed it still has the capacity to
come back to life should someone find a piece of the boar's hair and attach ft to an
enchanted amulet. After this the boar is resurrected and returns filled with rage and
revenge to again steal and plunder. The painting's bold reference to the behaviour of
Suharto and his family and business associates is unmistakable. So are representations
of the fear that the boar may return in another form intent on reprisal. The point is that
^^'Teriakan Dalam Diam', Ibid. "Menurut Pekik, rakyat yang tumpah bagiamana air bah itu bukan
tengah berdemonstrasi Melainkan tengah berburu 'celeng', sesuatu yang hadir dalam mimpi-mimpi
seorgang Pekik. Massa yang berkerumun itu tampak berwajah keras. Ada yang mengenakan baju putih
bergaris horisontal hitam - simbol kaum narapidana. Ada pula sosok orang yang serius berkacamata
kaum intelektual dan konglomerat.Pekik juga menyusupkan sosok kesenian rakyai semisal pentul,
tembem, jatilan, dan reog. Buah dada penari wanita, alias ledak, tampak sangat erotis - terlihat jelas
belahannya... Pengamat seni rupa Soewarno Wisetrotomo melihai lukisan Pekik kali ini sarat dengan
muatan politik. Suatu ekspresi dari akumulasi realitas sosial politik, dan ekonomi di negeri ini
Soewamo dapat merasakan latar ideolgi Pekik yang berbau 'kiri'. 'Namun, komitmen kemanusiaannya
sangat kental', kata dosen Institut Seni Indonesia Yogyakarta itu kepada Gatra."
^^'Runtukan Kekuasan, Celeng', Kompas, 13 November 2000, pp.1 and 11.
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such a representation is highly charged. It is politically courageous and as such would
have been unthinkable prior to 21 May of that same year.
The painting shows two bare-chested peasants carrying a wild black boar over
their shoulders. All four legs of the boar and its snout are tightiy bound to a stake. The
tusks of tiie boar indicate that the beast is old. The scene is dominated by the animal's
small, but piercing, savage eyes and is set in the hidonesian capital Jakarta with the
Suharto family-owned toll road filling the entire background space. In the mid-ground
appear masses of people. Most are rakyat or 'common people' celebrating the event,
however some faces reflect anxiety and concern.^^ The highly emotive colloquial
expression that inspired Indonesia 1998: Hunting the Wild Boar was Buajinganl or
'you pig!'

What makes the exhibition a watershed in the social history of the

violence is that it visibly, rather than secretly, represented the public rage of
Indonesians, including many people in Kidul, who had endured the violence first
hand.

In this situation the problem of aesthetics and refined artistic forms is
temporarily inappropriate. Conversely, and in absolute contrast, what
has sprang back in the heat of passion for revenge are expressive
colours and new messages, declared with a fresh directness and
boldness. The remarkable thing about post-Suharto art is that these new
representations of violence have long been foreshadowed through
isolated, yet powerful works of Indonesian contemporary art. This is
despite the suffocating and limiting parameters imposed by the New
Order system. Furthermore, the existence of any form of so-called
'subversive art' during the Suharto years is remarkable given that
formal cultural representative bodies, which were funded under the
Indonesian

Constitution

to

represent

the

people,

exclusively

represented the Government, or more specifically, Suharto.

^'See Goodfellow and Marianto, 2001, 'Buajingan! Indonesian Art, Literature and State Violence
around the Downfall of President Soeharto', in David E. Lorey and William H. Beezley, eds, Genocide,
Collective Violence and Popular Memory: The Politics of Remembrance in the Twentieth Century,
Scholarly Resources, Boston, 2001, pp. 123-27.
50//7/^.,p.l23.

''/&/^.,P-134.
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This exhibition did not appear in social and political isolation but is an example of
how a thin form of remembering existed on the outer peripheries of civh society even
during the height of New Order power, hi the Djoko Pekik story this can be dated
from 1989 when a one-sided public debate was initiated in the hidonesian press by
comments made by anti-communist, pro-New Order dance choreographer Bagong
Kussudiardjo.

Bagong took issue with the inclusion of former LEKRA artists'

works, including those of Hendra Gunawan, Sudjojono and Djoko Pekik, in a national
exhibition representing a broad spectre of hidonesian fine art to tour the U.S. in 1990
entitied, 'Modem hidonesian Art: Three Generations of Tradition and Change 19451990'. Bagong's comments were supported by Professor Bud Mochtar, Rector of the
State College of the Arts, who suggested, "artists who were involved in the G-30S/PKI should not be chosen to go to America".^^ The debate was widely reported,
although as Djoko Pekik's son suggested: "My father never gave any answer about it
at that time. He was very silent. You know an ex-political prisoner had no right to
answer [accusations] at that time".^''
Bagong's strident criticisms of surviving LEKRA artists, nearly 25 years after
1965, was unexpectedly seen as mean-spirited and self-serving. While there was never
a public response from Djoko Pekik, or any other LEKRA artist, consistent with the
silence that dominated the violence during the Suharto era, there was a subtle shift in
the attitude of the elite Yogyakarta art community towards reconciliation with those
artists who had previously identified with the hegemony of the Left. In the end it was
Bagong who was forced to retract his statement when the Indonesian Foreign
Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, suggested in the press that it was the quality of
the exhibits that counted, not the former affiliations of the artists.^^ There is a clear
connection here between this event and the gradual development of a critical art
movement in Yogyakarta during the 1990s. Nevertheless, former LEKRA artists
remained silent, although their work was beginning to speak for itself in terms of
assisting Indonesians to begin to understand that LEKRA once played an important
role in the artistic life of the Nation.

'^See 'Protes Menjelang', Tempo, 16 April 1989 and 'Kasus Protes Para Seniman Yogya', Wawasan, 3
April 1989.
''Ibid.
^''Personal correspondence, Gogor Bangsa, March 2002.
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The New Order's preferred art was sweetly decorative and abstractspiritual. Fine art genres in themselves, they were also seen as
pohtically toothless, thus 'safe' to the regime, which in terms of
citizens' rights could bear no scratiny. However, the injustices of
Suharto's New Order, in combination with its ultra-conservative art
establishment, ensured the return of politically engaged art by activist
painters and poets. Beginning after a 10-year hiatus following the
decimations of the 1965 massacres, this gradual retum ensured a
tenuous existence for engaged art from the late 1970s onwards.'96

When compared to the highly controUed 17 August 1997 Indonesian National Day
celebrations in Kidul, a marked change in social representations can be seen one year
later on 17 August 1998. There is an analytical connection between this non-verbal
representation and the Djoko Pekik painting. In Kidul, as with most Indonesian
villages, the entrance to the community is dominated by a customarily decorated
gapura, or 'village gateway'. Under the New Order the gapura was used to illustrate
the military stmggle for Independence. The basic elements of these faqa.de entrances
were figurines, often-oversized statues, or drawings of combat fatigue-clad village
'freedom fighters'. Gapura statues often depicted resolute, determined, fierce
guerillas carrying weapons, including sharpened bamboo spears, rifles, or pistols.
New Order 17 August festivities were actually forms of rigidly controlled public
political theatre, which demanded the inclusion of all Indonesians in the celebrations
but forbade their participation. During the Suharto era neither the method of depiction
nor the role of the people as passive observers was ever called into question. It was
part of the re-writing of Indonesian history that transformed the popular and Leftwing 'Revolution' into the politically neutral 'War of Independence'.^^ August 1998
was radically different in Kidul. The mandatory male-only celebration did not
eventuate. In its place the community organised a talent quest for children. There were
no testimonials of violent resistance to Dutch colonial mle, graphic representations of
the government's version of the coup, affirmations of New Order loyalty, or warnings

^^Astri Wright, 'Djoko Pekik: A Painter of Expressive Empathy', Inside Indonesia, no. 30, March
1992, p.27.
''Ibid.
'^Barbara Hatiey, 'Indonesian Ritual Javanese Drama: Celebrating Tujuhbelasan', Indonesia, no. 34,
October 1982, pp.55-64.
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against the retum of communism. There was hardly a sense that this was a celebration
of a date, but rather a party, with colour, hilarity and spontaneity, ft was highly
suggestive of the subjects in Djoko Pekik's painting. This was a celebration of
'hidonesian-ness' that was remembered by people in Kidul to be "the way things were
when Sukamo was President".^^ These celebrations were typified by the emergence of
political graffiti everywhere in Yogyakarta, and in particular Kidul, which openly
mocked New Order figures, including President Habibie. As one person commented:

ft is like we are living in a different worid. Everything has changed
since Suharto's fall. Everything is uncertain. One year ago we were
happy to answer your questions about the past, but in secret. Now we
are talking about politics in a public place, about Sukamo and the PKI.
Last night it was a very strange experience for me to sing the words of
NASAKOM bersatu. And we are having a talent quest tonight [instead
of the official Indonesian Independence celebration]. And no one cares.
Astonishing.^^

What was happening was that by August 1998 people in Kidul were beginning to
question whether the violent symbols of the Suharto era, such as the 17 August
celebrations and the military-style Gapura gateways were appropriate. New Order
depictions elevated the subject of violent straggle to the highest position within the
story of Indonesian nationhood. Conversely, the intellectual, diplomatic or cultural
straggles, which were also an integral part of Indonesian Independence, were rarely if
ever presented - like 1965, they were also silenced. During August 1998 celebrations,
less than three months after the resignation of Suharto, the decorated military Gapura
that characterised 17 August celebrations since 1965 were nowhere to be seen. Even
at the grass roots level the violent images of the Suharto years were beginning to be
neutralised. A new context was poised to emerge.

'^Confidential interview, Kidul, Yogyakarta, 17 August 1998.
''ibid. "Rasanya seperti hidup dalam dunia yang berbeda. Sejak kejatuhan Suharto, segalanya
berubah. Segalanya tidak pasti Setahun yang lalu, kami senang menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan
anda tentang masa lalu, meskipun dengan sembunyi-sembunyi dan berbisik-bisik. Sekarang di tempattempat umum kami bisa berbicara tentang politik, Sukarno, dan PKI. Semalam saya merasa aneh
sekali ketika menyanyikan kembali syair 'NASAKOM bersatu'. Dan, bukannya merayakan
mengadakan acara spontanitas. Dan tidak ada seorang pun yang peduli Mengherankan."
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Although beyond the timeframe of this study, it was not until the public
statement issued by the Foundation for the Research into the Kilhngs of 1965-66
(YPKP) in April 1999 that the process of recovering durational testimony by
"[cohecting] information began to cautiously, but substantively, emerge. This was
expressed through the medium of written expositions, recordings, photographs,
videos, documents etc".

In their literature the Foundation explicitly described the

means of compiling a new body of knowledge to challenge three decades of New
Order propaganda and memory manipulation, namely:

Examples of basic research: data collection of the killed victims (form
a); the imprisonment of victims (form b); the dismissal of victims from
their jobs (form c); data base management, forensic research such as
the excavation of mass graves in the Situkup Forests, Dempes Village,
Kaliwiro District, and in the Wonosobo Regency, Central Java. [A
printed addition uses as support YPKP's forensic research of 16-18
November 2002 which resulted in the exhumation of 24 skeletons
which the report suggested showed evidence of acts of violence by the
govemment apparatus against a part of the Indonesian people.] ft is
assumed that there are lots of such graves throughout Indonesia,
waiting for the YPKP to investigate.'^'

The origins of YPKP can be found just before the resignation of Suharto in June 1998
when an Australian television crew made a documentary on Sulami's sole efforts to
uncover a mass grave in Blora, East Java. This led to messages of support from,
amongst others, Pramoedya Ananta Toer and Hasan Raid, and provoked discussions
that would a year later lead to the formation of YPKP. ft was, as Stanley suggested, "a
simple humanitarian impulse".'^' However, because of the high profile support of
Pramoedya and former Deputy Director of GERWANI, Sulami, as a member of the
Board of YPKP and chairperson respectively, the launch of YPKP in April 1999 was

•o°Private correspondence issued by the Secretariat, Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/66,
Jakarta, 21 March 1999.
101 YPKP literature issued in Yogyakarta, 7 April 1999.
'°^Stanley, 'Opening that Dark Page', Inside Indonesia, no. 63, July to September 2000, pp.6-7.
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reported extensively in the Jakarta press. "^^ hi fact a number of articles appeared
across a wide spectmm of newspapers reporting the aims of YPKP, and specific
testimonies of eyewitnesses to the 1965 violence. These directiy raised the issue of the
killings, the memory of the violence, and the manner in which to negotiate new
sources as historiography. For example the extraordinary public discussion of issues
associated with the sexual abuse of women political prisoners in, 'Former Secretary
General of GERWANI' in Merdeka on 16 April 1999;'°^ 'Sulami: problems of the
G30S/PKI made up and practically crael' and 'The number of killed in the 1965
tiagedy only 400,000' in Harian Suara, on 18 Aprh 1999,'^^ and 'The hidonesian
Human Rights Commission Asked to Look into the Issue of the Victims of the Coup'
in the mainstream Kompas, on 30 April 1999.'106

Yesterday, ten victims of the post-G30S/PKI killings decided to take
Suharto to court. They alleged that the inhumane treatment they
underwent during the post-G30S/PKI period was commanded by
Suharto - the Commander of the Military operation ... "Also we are
conducting research, collecting data and searching the mass grave sites
around Java. Around 2001 we will conduct research in outer Java,"
explained the Chief of YPKP 65/66, Sulami, to the journalists in
Jakarta yesterday.'^^

In September 1999 Sulami's memoirs, Perempuan, Kebenaran dan Penjara or 'A
Woman, Trath and Prison''^^ was published and widely distributed in mainstream
bookstores, receiving favourable critical attention in a feature devoted to the book by
'"^See for example a number of articles that appeared in April 1999 that directiy raised the issue of the
violence, its memory and the manner in which to negotiate it as historiography: 'Bekas Sekjen Gerwani
Gugat Suharto', Merdeka, 16 April 1999, p.9; 'Komnas HAM Diminta Teliti Korban Pembunuhan
Pasca-G30S/PKI', Kompas, 30 April 1999, p. 19.
'°*Bekas Sekjen GERWANI Gugat Suharto, ibid., p.2.
'"^Sulami, 'Soal G30SPKI Ordre Barulakukan Praktek Kejam' and 'Korban Tragedi 65 hanya
400,000', Harian Suara, 18 April 1999, p.2.
'°^'Komnas HAM Diminta Teliti Korban Pembunuhan Pasca-G30S/PKI', Kompas, 30 April 1999.
'"^'Bekas Sekjen Gerwani Gugat Suharto', op.cit., "Kemarin, sebanyak sepuluh orang korban
pembantaian pasca peristiwa G-30-S/PKI bertekad menyeret Soeharto ke pengadilian. Mereka
meniliai perlakuan tidak manusiawi yang mereka terima pada pasca G-30-S/PKI adalah atas perintah
Soeharto sebagai panglima operasi Militer... kami juga akan melakukan penyelidkan, mengumpulkan
data dan mencari kuburan massal di sikitar pulau Jawa. Selanjutnya sekitar tahun 2001 kami juga
akan melakukan penelitian di luar Jawa, tutur Ketua Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan
1965/1966 (YPKP 65/66), [Ibu] Sulami kepada wartawan di Jakarta, Kemarin."
'°^ Sulami, Perempuan, Kebenaran dan Penjara, Cipta Lestari, Jakarta, 1999.
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Tempo.^^^ In the same feature Sulami boldly stated that, "I have an obsession with
opening up the G30S Kihings"."° Also in the same feature a novel by Martin Aleida,
former political prisoner and victim of the 1965 violence was reviewed, entitied: The
Kites Will Not Fly High Again.^^^ Like Ojo Dumeh - the novel about the Petras
Killings raised in the intioduction - Layang-Layang itu Tak Mengepak Tinggi-Tinggi
begins the process of not only putting 'hterary flesh and bone' on to the otherwise
anonymous victims of the 1965 violence, but ft also contributed to a new process of
leaming how to negotiate the memory of the killings through literature, in fact,
together with the changed meaning of the 17 August celebrations, a new space from
which altematives historical consciousness can arise.
The work of YPKP and the more explicit testimonials of the killings found in
the Indonesian press after this time - which recorded names, places, and eyewitness
experiences - is an indication that future research may follow."^ This new process
began in the months following the end of the Suharto regime in May 1998 with a new
historiographical

starting point, characterised initially by a continuation of

chronological pre-occupations with the 30 September 1965 coup, but then becoming
more durational, in respect to the memory of the killings, as fresh historical
perspectives began to emerge. This heralded a new tendency towards durational
accounts, separate and detached from the propaganda narrative of the coup and anticommunism. An extract from Sulami's speech at YPKP's anniversary in April 2000
reinforces the profound change in historical representations and aspirations that had
occurred in Indonesia since late 1997 and mid-1998.

All Indonesians feel that this country is moving towards something
new. Something free from the darkness of oppression and exploitation,
from the corraption, collusion and nepotism that was bom out of
absolute power, from the economic and political crisis that grew out of
the greed of its leaders. No nation can move into the future with its feet
'"^'Perempuan Kebenaran Dan Penjara', Tempo, 5 September 1999, p.46.
"%id., p.AS.
'"Martin Aleida, Layang-Layang itu Tak Mengepak Tinggi-Tinggi, Emansipasi Damar, Jakarta, 1999.
"^See a number of highly significant durational accounts that appeared in a special edition of Tempo on
5 September 1999, including: 'Pejuang Yang Dihapus Dari Sejarah, Tempo, 5 September 1999, p.50;
'Sulami: Saya Punya Obsesi Membongkar Pembunuhan G30S', ibid., p.48; Sulami, 'PerempuanKebenaran dan Penjara', ibid., p.46; 'Lahir Kembali Setelah 'Mati' Di Balik Jeruji', ibid., p.43;
'Pleidoi Untuk Korban Kekacauan', ibid., p.52; 'Cacat Mengkhianati Teman Tak Bisa Hilang', ibid.,
p.53; and Carmel Budiardjo, 'Gulag itu Bernama Ordre Baru', ibid., p.54.
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chained to an historical burden, to those dark traumatic moments that
will forever haunt the national character in the future. That burden
must be released. This nation must bravely face up to its fears, to the
trath that lies behind the trauma."^

"•''Stanley, op.cjY., p.7.
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Conclusion
The question of what characterised the forgetting of the 1965 killings in the kampung
of Kidul can be answered in three parts. It was the power of the New Order
propaganda machine that determined which historical accounts were created; it was
the self-perpetuating nature of anti-communist ideology that maintained the longevity
of the silence; and it was the promotion of historiographical templates by the regime
that gave the silence its mature form, even after the collapse of the New Order in May
1998. Oral testimonies recorded before the fall of Suharto reveal that forgetting was
contingent on the regime's power to create, impose and maintain the silence.
Newspaper and magazine sources from 1965 demonstrate that the transition
from communism as an integral component of NASAKOM, to communism as
unspeakable under the New Order, occurred practically ovemight, with all positive
references to Leftist discourse eliminated from the popular press in Yogyakarta by
early November 1965. From this time, and throughout the period of this study, the
symbol 'PKI' remained imbued with very negative social, psychological and political
implications. This occurred to such an extent that it not only affected those who
experienced the violence first hand, but also profoundly influenced generations of
Indonesians bom after 1965.
By late November 1965 the PKI as an organisation had been demonised, its
leaders killed or imprisoned, its mass base annihilated, its deeds and progressive
policies forgotten, and its place in history - including its violent destraction silenced. Journalistic representations available to people in Kidul immediately
following the 30 September Coup were focused entirely on a continuum of crisis and
response. This was based on the imperative of survival in a highly fluid, and
dangerous, political situation, rather than on a desire to openly and objectively analyse
events. Political culture profoundly became its previous opposite. Within one-month
state-sponsored ideologies associated with the Guided Democracy period, such as
NASAKOM, were systematically extracted from popular consciousnesses as the
Untung Coup was squarely blamed on the PKI. The killings, which were not part of
this process of fact creation, were silenced.
New Order anti-communist ideology exerted a powerful influence on what
was considered fact at the time of the killings and which could later be remembered.
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Many of those interviewed in Kidul during fieldwork in 1997 conflded that the
circumstances prior to the resignation of Suharto were very similar to "the sense of
how it felt just before September 1965". Therefore memory of the flrst three months
following the 30 September 1965 Coup, like the first three months fohowing
Suharto's resignation in May 1998, were treated by local people with the utmost
caution, sensitivity and secrecy. Contrary to Ophuls's study of the historical memory
of Vichy France, it was not a case that people in Kidul just wanted to be 'on the
winning side' - in 1997 most people did not want to be identified with any side. This
was a direct consequence of the post-coup propaganda campaign - which not only
engendered fear in the general population but also disturbed the historiographical flow
of killings well before an open narrative had a chance to emerge. The propaganda
campaign and its representation in the press compromised the manner in which sets of
facts were collected, archived, and then made available for later recall or analysis.
What is more, the Lubang Buaya propaganda substituted regime-generated
propaganda as 'history' to the exclusion of open narratives of the violence. New
Order myths about the 30 September Coup therefore flourished at the expense of
durational accounts of the killings. This was reflected in the highly chronological
nature of testimonies compiled in Kidul during 1997.
Two processes shaped chronological remembrances, which dominated local oral
testimony in 1997. The first relates to over 33 years of the psychologicahy violent
aspects of anti-communist ideology. This includes the fear of sectarian identification
with the PKI, fear of the consequences of being specificahy identified with the losing
side, and the very understandable fear of being labelled as misled, gullible, wrong, or
even politically evil. The second relates to the imposition of memory templates, such
as the story of Suharto at the Yogya Kembali Monument. This defined the
historiography of the entire New Order period by two events: Suharto's Nationcreating actions of 1 March 1949 and his nation-saving crashing of the Untung Coup
on the eariy morning of 1 October 1965 and the destraction of the PKI in the months
that followed. A comparison of oral accounts before and after the fall of Suharto
reveals that this latter discourse was so enduring that it even neutialised the political
openness of late 1998. The fact that the 30 September Coup, and Supersemar,
emerged as open topics of local discussion in the immediate post-Suharto period, and
the killings remained silent, is evidence that while the historiography of the coup, and
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its corollary, Supersemar, were carefully controlled by the New Order, unlike the
kihings, they were never actually silenced.
New Order stractures of power and the mechanisms of forgetting were well
established in Kidul in 1997 and remained in place during 1998. The oral testimonies
in chapter four provide a sense of the effect these processes had in the environment of
late New Order Indonesia, in a particular time and place. The distinction between
durational and chronological remembering, the influence of New Order power
stractures on memory, and the Suharto regime's preoccupation with a highlycontrolled narrative of the coup, actually afforded the best method of analysing oral
testimony in chapter four, reading the press in chapter five, and deconstracting the
goals and intentions of the Yogya Kembali Monument in chapter six. However as the
political atmosphere continues to shift in post-Suharto Indonesia, new archives will be
opened up to examination, and new historical spaces will emerge. This will create the
possibihty of an open analysis of the story of 1965. In chapter seven eariy evidence of
this new process was demonstrated through the example of the Djoko Pekik's work.
This development will inevitably give way to a more documented national history of
the violence, based in part on archives and in part on the observations and
explanations of why the killings were silenced. An example of this is Gerry van
Klinken's 2001 work of 'The Battle for History after Suharto: Beyond Sacred Dates,
Great Men, and Legal Milestones'.
One of the most persistent themes to arise from Sing Wis, Ya Wis was that in
1997 the people of Kidul were only prepared to reveal tiny glimpses of their store of
experiences about the violence. This does not mean that there were not stories to tell.
Rather the social and political context of both 1965 and 1997 determined that
altemative histories of the kilhngs of 1965 could not emerge. This is because the
phenomenon of durational modes of remembering actually engendered social disorder
simply because these memories were considered to be in conflict with official history.
Any deviation from official views of political culture was therefore declared to be
immoral, illegitimate a-historical and therefore, unthinkable.
For these reasons the Yogya Kembali Monument was more than a vehicle for
the passing of New Order historical notice from one generation to the next, ft was a
mechanism for establishing and perpetuating a process. It was a re-defining of history

van Klinken, 'The Battie for History After Suharto', op.cit.
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as a single authoritative interpretation. The Yogya Kembali Monument therefore
actually created propaganda discourses of the coup and suppressed open discussion of
the killings with physical 'evidence' that 'proved' the story of why Suharto had a
legitimate right to rale. However, what this really served was to reinforce the New
Order's own raison d'etre of being, according to their measure, the only effective
remedy to the 'menace' of communism. Even following Suharto's resignation, at
kampung level, military elites continued to wield the power necessary to maintain this
pressure. Consequentiy, even up to one year after the formal end of the New Order
period, durational accounts of the killings remained almost impossible to solicit, while
local people were willing, even enthusiastic to surrender highly chronological
opinions about the causes and origins of the 30 September Coup and the 11 March
1966 transfer of executive power from Sukamo to Suharto. On the other hand, in
terms of the memory of the killings, the consensual and conceptual terms of
remembering were absent; the circumstances of knowledge's emergence did not allow
for the possibilities of alternatives to arise.
Finally, a number of clear patterns occurred across interviews that defined the
contribution of myth to popular historical negotiations about the meaning of 1965.
The most fascinating of these was the desire to create types - the betrayer and the
saviour, the anonymous victim represented by the becak driver, and the mythological
martyr, represented by the teacher. It was as if in 1997 the community of Kidul was
unwilling to disturb the fine balance between competing versions of the history of
1965, but felt that both were, in the most part, best left to myth, or rather, left to the
silences: sing wis, ya wis. This conclusion has implications for the future emergence
of a South African-style 'Trath and Reconciliation Commission' such as has been
suggested and promoted by YPKP. Such however remain contingent not only on a
changed political context, but more importantly, on the emergence of open and
provable historiographical guides and processes that foster the emergence of an
altemative body of historical thinking about of the killings.
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